

10 7 9 92

four annually as a tribute : That the districts, on the other hand, of Coiladdy and Elangad should be ceded to the Raja ; and that Arni should be restored to its former Governor or Killedar. The pecuniary exactions were greatly inferior to the claims of the Nabob ; and so great reluctance did he show to the ratification of the treaty, that Mr. Pigot is said to have seized his chop or seal, and applied it to the paper with his own hand.¹ Aware that the inflated conceptions diffused among their countrymen of the riches of India, and of Tanjore as a distinguished part of India, might lead the Court of Directors to regard the sum extracted from the Raja as criminally small, the Presidency wrote, in their own defence ; that, without their assistance, the Nabob was unable to extract a single rupee ; that the reduction of Tanjore would have been a difficult enterprise ; that they had not an army sufficient for the purpose ; that the expedition would have occasioned an expense which they were unable to bear ; and that a rupture with the Raja would have tended to raise up other enemies. The inability of the country to sustain, without oppression, a heavier exaction, they were either not yet aware of, or did not care to allege. When the Directors afterwards transmitted their reflections, they said : " If four lacs were given as a present, it seems as if the Company ought to have it, for their interposition and guarantee of the treaty. We shall be glad to have this affair explained to us, that we may know the real state of the case, with respect to that donation."² The twenty-two lacs were directed to be paid to the Company, and credit was given for them in the Nabob's account.

The war between the English and French, which had ceased in India with the fall of Pondicherry, was terminated in Europe by the treaty of Paris, definitively signed on the 10th of February, 1763. Of this treaty the eleventh article, intended to define the rights of the two nations in India, or those advantages, in the enjoyment of which

¹ This is stated on the authority of the Nabob's Letter to Mr. Palk, October 8, 1776. The author of the Hist. and Management, &c., says, " General Lawrence, Mr. Pouchier, and particularly Colonel Call, and Mr. Palk, were either present at this transaction, or were convinced of the truth of it, from the incontestable information, given by others as well as by the Nabob, who made heavy complaints to them of the President's conduct : " p. 127.

² Letters from the Court of Directors to the President and Council of Fort St. George, 30th December, 1763.





THE HISTORY
OF BRITISH INDIA,
BY
MILL & WILSON. .

IN TEN VOLUMES.

• VOL. III.


THE HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BY JAMES MILL, ESQ.

FIFTH EDITION WITH NOTES AND CONTINUATION,

BY HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A., F.R.S.

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AND OF THE ORIENTAL SOCIETY OF GERMANY; OF THE IMPERIAL INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, AND THE
IMPERIAL ACADEMIES OF VIENNA AND ST. PETERSBURGH; OF THE ROYAL ACADEMIES
OF BERLIN AND MUNICH, ETC., ETC.; AND HODEN PROFESSOR OF
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CONTENTS.

BOOK IV.

FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT, ON LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, OF ONE EXCLUSIVE COMPANY, IN THE YEAR 1708, TILL THE CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMPANY, BY THE ACT OF 13TH GEO. III. IN 1773.

CHAPTER I.

	PAGE.
The Constitution of the East India Company: its practical Arrangements for the Conduct of Business, and Transactions till the Conclusion of the War with France, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle	1

CHAPTER II.

Origin, Progress, and Suspension of the Contest for establishing Mohammed Ali, Nabob of the Carnatic	60
--	----

CHAPTER III.

Suraj-ad-Dowla, Subahdar of Bengal — takes Calcutta — attacked by an Army from Madras — dethroned — Meer Jaffier set up in his stead	108
--	-----

CHAPTER IV.

Renewal of the War with the French in the Carnatic—Arrival of Lally — French Power superior to the English — English Power superior to the French — Pondicherry taken, and the French driven out of the Carnatic	138
--	-----

CHAPTER V.

First Nabobship of Meer Jaffier — Expedition against the Northern Circars — Emperor's eldest Son, and Nabobs of Oude and Allahabad, invade Bengal — Clive resigns the Government, and is succeeded by Mr. Vansittart — Jaffier dethroned, and Meer Casim set up — Disorders by the Private Trade of the Company's Servants — War with Casim — He is dethroned, and Jaffier again set up — War with the Nabob of Oude — Death of Jaffier — His Son made nominal Nabob — Courts of Proprietors and Directors — Clive sent back to govern Bengal	187
---	-----

CHAPTER VI.

Political State of the Carnatic — Views of the Nabob on the Governor of Vellore, King of Tanjore, and Marawars — Treaty with Tanjore — Company's Jaghire — War on Mohammed Issoof — Mound of the Cavery	263
---	-----

CHAPTER VII.

Second Administration of Clive — Company's Orders respecting the Private Trade disregarded — Arrangements with the Vizir — With the Emperor — Acquisition of the Dewannee — Private Trade created a Monopoly for the Benefit of the superior Servants — Reduction of the Allowances — Its Effects — Clive resigns, and Verelst succeeds — Proceedings in England relative to the Rate of Dividend on Company's Stock — Financial Difficulties — Verelst resigns, and Cartier succeeds	274
---	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

	Page
Subahdar of the Deccan dethroned by his Brother — The English take possession of the Northern Circars — Make a Treaty with the Subahdar of the Deccan, which embroils them with Hyder Ali — Hyder's First War with the English — New Treaty with the Subahdar — Peace with Hyder	315

CHAPTER IX.

Public Opinion in England — Proceedings in the India House, and in Parliament — Plan of Supervisors — Plan of a King's Commissioner — Increase of Pecuniary Difficulties — Dividend raised — Company unable to meet their Obligations — Parliamentary Inquiry — Ministerial Relief — An Act which changes the Constitution of the Company — Tendency of the Change — Financial and Commercial State.....	336
--	-----

BOOK V.

FROM THE FIRST GREAT CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, AND IN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, IN 1773, TILL THE SECOND GREAT CHANGE, BY THE ACT, COMMONLY CALLED MR. PITT'S ACT, IN 1774.

CHAPTER I.

Administration of Hastings till the Time when the Parliamentary Members of the Council arrived, and the Operations of the New Constitution commenced, including — Arrangements for collecting the Revenue, and administering Justice, ostensibly as Dewan — Treatment of Mohammed Reza Khan, and the Raja Shitabroy — Elevation of Munny Begum — Destruction of the Rohillas — Sale of Corah and Allahabad to the Vizir — Payment refused of the Emperor's Revenue — Financial results	361
--	-----

CHAPTER II.

	Page.
Commencement of the New Government,—Supreme Council divided into two Parties, of which that of the Governor-General in the Minority — Presidency of Bombay espouse the cause of Ragoba, an ejected Peshwa — Supreme Council condemn this Policy, and make Peace with his Opponents — Situation of the Powers in the Upper Country, Nabob of Oude, Emperor, and Nujuf Khan — Pecuniary Corruption, in which Governor-General seemed to be implicated, in the cases of the Rance of Burdwan, Phoujdar of Hoogly, and Munny Begum — Governor-General resists Inquiry — Nuncomar the Great Accuser — He is prosecuted by Governor-General — Accused of Forgery, found guilty, and hanged — Mohammed Reza Khan, and the Office of Naib Subah restored	409

HISTORY

OF

BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK IV.

FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT, ON LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY,
OF ONE EXCLUSIVE COMPANY, IN THE YEAR 1708, TILL
THE CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMPANY,
BY THE ACT OF 13TH GEO. III. IN 1773.

CHAPTER I.

The Constitution of the East India Company, its practical Arrangements for the Conduct of Business, and Transactions till the Conclusion of the War with France by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

WHEN the competitors for Indian commerce were united into one corporate body, and the privilege of exclusive trade was founded on legislative authority, the business of the East India Company became regular and uniform. Their capital, composed of the shares of the subscribers, was a fixed and definite sum. Of the modes of dealing, adapted to the nature of the business, little information remained to be acquired. Their proceedings were reduced to an established routine, or a series of operations periodically recurring. A general description, therefore, of the plan upon which the Company conducted themselves, and a statement of its principal results, appear to comprehend every thing which falls within the design of a history of that commercial body, during a period of several years.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.
1708.

BOOK IV. When a number of individuals unite themselves in any common interest, reason suggests, that they themselves should manage as much as it is convenient for them to manage; and that they should make choice of persons to execute for them such parts of the business as cannot be conveniently transacted by themselves.

CHAP. I.

1708.

It was upon this principle, that the adventurers in the trade to India originally framed the constitution of their Company. They met in assemblies, which were called Courts of Proprietors, and transacted certain parts of the common business; and they chose a certain number of persons belonging to their own body, and who were called Committees,¹ to manage, for them, other parts of the business, which they could not so well perform themselves. The whole of the managing business, therefore, or the whole of the government, was in the hands of,—

1st. The Proprietors, assembled in general court;

2ndly. The Committees, called afterwards the Directors, assembled in their special courts.

At the time of the award of the Earl of Godolphin, power was distributed between these assemblies according to the following plan:

To have a vote in the Court of Proprietors, that is, any share in its power, it was necessary to be the owner of £500 of the Company's stock: and no additional share, contrary to a more early regulation, gave any advantage, or more to any proprietor than a single vote.

The directors were twenty-four in number; no person was competent to be chosen as a Director who possessed less than £2,000 of the Company's stock; and, of these Directors, one was Chairman, and another Deputy-Chairman, presiding in the Courts.

The Directors were chosen annually by the Proprietors in their General Court; and no Director could serve for more than a year, except by re-election.

Four Courts of Proprietors, or General Courts, were held regularly in each year, in the months of December, March, June, and September, respectively; the Directors might summon Courts at other times, as often as they saw cause, and were bound to summon Courts within ten days, upon⁴

¹ *Committees*; i. e., persons to whom something is committed, or intrusted.

a requisition signed by any nine of the Proprietors, qualified to vote. BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

1708.

The Courts of Directors, of whom thirteen were requisite to constitute a Court, were held by appointment of the Directors themselves, as often, and at such times and places, as they might deem expedient for the despatch of affairs.¹

According to this constitution, the supreme power was vested in the Court of Proprietors. In the first place they held the legislative power entire : all laws and regulations, all determinations of dividend, all grants of money, were made by the Court of Proprietors. To act under their ordinances, and manage the business of routine, was the department reserved for the Court of Directors. In the second place, the supreme power was secured to the Court of Proprietors, by the important power of displacing, annually, the persons whom they chose to act in their behalf.

In this constitution, if the Court of Proprietors be regarded as representing the general body of the people, the Court of Directors as representing an aristocratical senate, and the Chairman as representing the sovereign, we have an image of the British constitution ; a system in which the forms of the different species of government, the monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical, are mixed and combined.

In the constitution, however, of the East India Company, the power allotted to the democratical part was so great, that a small portion may seem to have been reserved to the other two. Not only were the sovereignty, and the aristocracy, both elective, but they were elected from year to year : that is, were in a state of complete dependence upon the democratical part. This was not all : no decrees, but those of the democracy, were binding, at least in the last resort ; the aristocracy, therefore, and monarchy, were subordinate, and subject. Under the common impression of democratic ambition, irregularity, and violence, it might be concluded, that the democratic assembly would grasp at the whole of the power ; would constrain and disturb the proceedings of the Chairman and Directors ; would

¹ Letters Patent, 10 Will. III., Collection of Charters, etc.

BOOK IV. deliberate with violence and animosity; and exhibit all
 CHAP. I. confusion, precipitation, and imprudence, which are so
 commonly ascribed to the exercise of popular power.

1708.

The actual result is extremely different from what the common modes of reasoning incite common minds to infer. Notwithstanding the power which, by the theory of the constitution, was thus reserved to the popular parts of the system, all power has centred in the Court of Directors; and the government of the Company has been an oligarchy, in fact. So far from meddling too much, the Court of Proprietors have not attended to the common affairs even sufficiently for the business of inspection; and the known principles of human nature abundantly secured that unfortunate result. To watch, to scrutinize, to inquire, is labour; and labour is pain. To confide, to take for granted that all is well, is easy, is exempt from trouble, and, to the great mass of mankind, comparatively delightful. On all ordinary occasions, on all occasions which present not a powerful motive to action, the great mass of mankind are sure to be led by the soft and agreeable feeling. And if they who act have only sufficient prudence to avoid those occurrences which are calculated to rouse the people on account of whom they act, the people will allow them abundant scope to manage the common concerns in a way conformable to their own liking and advantage. It is thus that all constitutions, however democratically formed, have a tendency to become oligarchical in practice. By the numerous body who constitute the democracy, the objects of ambition are beheld at so great a distance, and the competition for them is shared with so great a number, that in general they make but a feeble impression upon their minds; the small number, on the other hand, intrusted with the management, feel so immediately the advantages, and their affections are so powerfully engaged by the presence, of their object that they easily concentrate their views, and point their energies with perfect constancy in the selfish direction. The apathy and inattention of the people, on the one hand, and the interested activity of the rulers on the other, are two powers, the action of which may always be counted upon; nor has the art of government as yet exemplified, however the science may or may not have discovered, any

MODE OF CONDUCTING THE COMPANY.

certain means by which the unhappy effects of that action may be prevented.¹

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

1708.

For conducting the affairs of the Company, the Directors divided themselves into parties called Committees ; and the business into as many separate shares.²

The first was the Committee of Correspondence, of which the business was more confidential, as well as extensive, than that of any of the rest. Its duties were, to study the advices from India, and to prepare answers for the inspection of the Court of Directors: to report upon the number of ships expedient for the trade of the season, and the stations proper for each: to report upon the number of servants, civil and military, in the different stations abroad; on the demand for alterations, and the applications made for leave of absence, or leave to return: all complaints of grievances, and all pecuniary demands on the Company, were decided upon, in the first instance, by this Committee, which nominated to all places, in the treasury, and in the secretary's, examiner's, and auditor's offices. It performed, in fact, the prime and governing business of the Company: the rest was secondary and subordinate.

The next Committee was that of Law-suits; of which the business was to deliberate and direct in all cases of litigation; and to examine the bills of law charges. It is not a little remarkable that there should be work of this description sufficient to engross the time of a committee.

The third was the Committee of Treasury. Its business was to provide, agreeably to the orders of the Court, for the payment of dividends and interest on bonds; to negotiate the Company's loans; to purchase gold and silver for exportation: to affix the Company's seal to bonds and

¹ Not in the East India Company alone; in the Bank of England, also, the constitution of which is similar, oligarchy has always prevailed. Nor will the circumstances be found to differ in any joint-stock association in the history of British Commerce. So little does experience countenance the dangerous maxim, of the people's being always eager to grasp at too much power, that the great difficulty, in regard to good government, is, to get them really to exercise that degree of power, their own exercise of which good government absolutely requires.

² The following account is derived from an official report on the business of the Committees, called for by the Board of Control, and transmitted officially by the Court of Directors, of which the substance is given in Mr. Bruce's *Historical View of Plans for the Government of British India*, p. 600.

BOOK IV. other deeds ; to examine monthly, or oftener, the balance
CHAP. I. of cash : and to decide, in the first instance, on applica-
 1708. tions respecting the loss of bonds, on pecuniary questions
 in general, and the delivery of unregistered diamonds and
 bullion.

The Committee of Warehouses was the fourth. The business of importation was the principal part of its charge. It framed the orders for the species of goods of which the investment or importation was intended to consist : it had the superintendence of the servants employed in the inspection of the purchases ; determined upon the modes of shipping and conveyance ; superintended the landing and warehousing of the goods ; arranged the order of sales ; and deliberated generally upon the means of promoting and improving the trade.

The fifth was the Committee of Accounts ; of whose duties the principal were, to examine bills of exchange, and money certificates ; to compare advices with bills ; to examine the estimates, and accounts of cash and stock ; and to superintend the office of the accountant, and the office of transfer, in which are effected the transfers of the Company's stock and annuities, and in which the foreign letters of attorney for that purpose are examined.

A committee, called the Committee of Buying, was the sixth. Its business was, to superintend the purchase and preparation of the standard articles of export, of which lead and woollens constituted the chief ; to contract with the dyers and other tradesmen ; to audit their accounts, and keep charge of the goods till deposited in the ships for exportation.

The Committee of the House was the seventh, and its business was mostly of an inferior and ministerial nature. The alterations and repairs of the buildings, regulations for the attendance of the several officers and clerks, the appointment of the inferior servants of the House, and the control of the secretary's accounts for domestic disbursements, were included in its province.

The eighth Committee, that of Shipping, had the charge of purchasing stores, and all other articles of export, except the grand articles appropriated to the Committee of Buying ; the business of hiring ships, and of ascertaining the qualifications of their commanders and officers : of dis-

tributing the outward cargoes ; of fixing seamen's wages ; of issuing orders for building, repairing, and fitting out the ships, packets, &c., of which the Company were proprietors ; and of regulating and determining the tonnage allowed for private trade, to the commanders and officers of the Company's ships.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1708.

The ninth was the Committee of Private Trade ; and its occupation was to adjust the accounts of freight, and other charges, payable on the goods exported for private account, in the chartered ships of the Company ; to regulate the indulgences to private trade homeward : and by examining the commanders of ships, and other inquiries, to ascertain how far the regulations of the Company had been violated or obeyed.

The tenth Committee was of a characteristic description. It was the committee for preventing the growth of private trade. Its business was to take cognisance of all instances in which the license granted by the Company for private trade was exceeded ; to decide upon the controversies to which the encroachments of the private traders gave birth ; and to make application of the penalties which were provided for transgression. So closely, however, did the provinces of this and the preceding committee border upon one another ; and so little, in truth, were their boundaries defined, that the business of the one was not unfrequently transferred to the other.

Other transactions respecting the employment of troops, and the government of territory, required additions to the system of committees, when the Company afterwards became conquerors and rulers. But of these it will be time to speak when the events arrive which produced them.

The chairmen, as the name imports, preside in the Courts, whether of directors or proprietors ; they are the organs of official communication between the Company and other parties, and are by office members of all the committees.

The articles in which the export branch of the Indian trade has all along consisted are bullion, lead, quicksilver, woollen cloths, and hardware, of which the proportions have varied at various times.

The official value of all the exports to India, for the year

BOOK IV. 1708, the year in which the union of the two Companies
 CHAP. I. was completed, exceeded not £60,915. The following year
 1708. it rose to £168,357. But from this it descended gradually
 till, in the year 1715, it amounted to no more than £36,997. It made a start, however, in the following year; and the medium exportation for the first twenty years, subsequent to 1708, was £92,281 per annum.¹ The average annual exportation of bullion during the same years was £442,350.

The articles of which the import trade of the East India Company chiefly consisted, were calicoes and the other woven manufactures of India: raw silk, diamonds, tea, porcelain, pepper, drugs, and saltpetre. The official value of their imports in 1708 was £493,257; and their annual average importation for this and the nineteen following years was £758,042. At that period, the official value assigned to goods at the Custom House differed not greatly from the real value: and the statements which have been made by the East India Company of the actual value of their exports and imports for some of those years, though not according with the Custom House accounts from year to year, probably from their being made up to different periods in the year, yet on a sum of several years pretty nearly coincide.² The business of sale is transacted by the East India Company in the way of auction. On stated days, the goods, according to the discretion of the Directors, are put up to sale at the India House, and transferred to the highest bidder.

At first the Company built and owned the ships employed in their trade. But in the progress and subdivision of commerce, ship-owning became a distinct branch of business; and the Company preferred the hiring of ships, called chartering. It was in hired or chartered ships, accordingly, that from this time the trade of the Company was chiefly conveyed; and a few swift-sailing vessels, called packets, more for the purpose of intelligence than of freight, formed with some occasional exceptions, the only article of ship-

¹ Custom House Accounts. See Sir Charles Whitworth's Tables, p. 9.

² Try, for example, the sum of the exports for twenty years, from 1710, in Sir Charles Whitworth's Tables, and that in the Company's accounts; the table, for instance, No. 7, in the Appendix to Mr. Macpherson's History of European Commerce with India. See, too, the averages in Bruce's Historical View of Plans for British India, p. 295.

ping which they properly called their own. This regulation set free a considerable portion of the funds or resources of the Company, for direct traffic, or the simple transactions of buying and selling.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1708.

That part of the business of the Company which was situated in India, was distinguished by several features which the peculiar circumstances of the country forced it to assume. The sale, indeed, of the commodities imported from Europe, they transacted in the simplest and easiest of all possible ways; namely, by auction, the way in which they disposed of Indian goods in England. At the beginning of this trade, the English, as well as other European adventurers, used to carry their commodities to the interior towns and markets, transporting them in the hackeries of the country, and established factories or warehouses, where the goods were exposed to sale. During the confusion, however, which prevailed, while the empire of the Moguls was in the progress of dissolution, the security which had formerly existed, imperfect as it was, became greatly impaired; and, shortly after the union of the two Companies, a rule was adopted, not to permit any of the persons in the Company's service, or under their jurisdiction, to remove far into the inland country, without leave obtained from the Governor and Council of the place to which they belonged. According to this plan, the care of distributing the goods into the country, and of introducing them to the consumers, was left to the native and other independent tribes.

For the purchase, collection, and custody of the goods, which constituted the freight to England, a complicated system of operations was required. As the state of the country was too low in respect of civilisation and of wealth, to possess manufacturers and merchants, on a large scale, capable of executing extensive orders, and delivering the goods contracted for on pre-appointed days, the Company were under the necessity of employing their own agents to collect throughout the country, in such quantities as presented themselves, the different articles of which the cargoes to Europe were composed. Places of reception were required, in which the goods might be collected, and ready upon the arrival of the ships, that the expense of demur-

¹ Ninth bye-law of the Company, in Russell's Collection of Statutes.

BOOK IV. rage might be reduced to its lowest terms. Warehouses
 CHAP. I. were built; and these, with the counting-houses, and other
 1708. apartments for the agents and business of the place, constituted what were called the factories of the Company. Under the disorderly and inefficient system of government which prevailed in India, deposits of property were always exposed, either to the rapacity of the government, or, under the weakness of the government, to the hands of depredators. It was always, therefore, an object of importance to build the factories strong, and to keep the inmates armed, and disciplined for self-defence, as perfectly as circumstances would admit. At an early period, the Company even fortified those stations of their trade, and maintained professional troops, as often as the negligence permitted, or the assent could be obtained, of the kings and governors of the countries in which they were placed.

Of the commodities collected for the European market, that part, the acquisition of which was attended with the greatest variety of operations, was the produce of the loom. The weavers, like the other laborious classes of India, are in the lowest stage of poverty, being always reduced to the bare means of the most scanty subsistence. They must at all times, therefore, be furnished with the materials of their work, or the means of purchasing them; and with subsistence while the piece is under their hands. To transact in this manner with each particular weaver, to watch him that he may not sell the fabric which his employer has enabled him to produce, and to provide a large supply, is a work of infinite detail, and gives employment to a multitude of agents. The European functionary, who, in each district, is the head of as much business as it is supposed that he can superintend, has first his banyan, or native secretary, through whom the whole of the business is conducted; the banyan hires a species of broker, called a gomashtah, at so much a month: the gomashtah repairs to the aurung, or manufacturing town, which is assigned as his station, and there fixes upon a habitation, which he calls his cutchery: he is provided with a sufficient number of peons, a sort of armed servants, and hircarahs, messengers or letter carriers, by his employer; these he immediately despatches about the place, to summon to him the dallals, pycars and weavers: the dallals and pycars are two sets of

brokers; of whom the *pycârs* are the lowest, transacting the business of detail with the weavers; the *dallâls* again transact business with the *pycârs*: the *gomashtah* transacts with the *dallâls*, the *banyan* with the *gomashtah*, and the Company's European servant with the *banyan*. The Company's servant is thus five removes from the workman; and it may easily be supposed that much collusion and trick, that much of fraud towards the Company, and much of oppression towards the weaver, is the consequence of the obscurity which so much complication implies.¹ Besides his *banyan*; there is attached to the European agent a *mo-hurrer*, or clerk, and a cash-keeper, with a sufficient allowance of *peons* and *hircarâls*. Along with the *gomashtah* is despatched in the first instance as much money as suffices for the first advance to the weaver, that is, as suffices to purchase the materials, and to afford him subsistence during part at least of the time in which he is engaged with the work. The cloth, when made, is collected in a warehouse, adapted for the purpose, and called a *kottah*. Each piece is marked with the weaver's name; and when the whole is finished, or when it is convenient for the *gomashtah*, he *holds a kottah*, as the business is called, when each piece is examined, the price fixed, and the money due upon it paid to the weaver. This last is the stage at which chiefly the injustice to the workman is said to take place; as he is then obliged to content himself with fifteen or twenty, and often thirty or forty per cent. less than his work would fetch in the market. This is a species of traffic which could not exist but where the rulers of the country were favourable to the dealer; as everything, however, which increased the productive powers of the labourers added directly in India to the income of the rulers, their protection was but seldom denied.

The business of India was at this time under the government of three Presidencies, one at Bombay, another at

¹ The obstinate adherence of the natives to their established customs, renders it not easy to quit the track which on any occasion they have formed; and, under the ignorance of their manners and character, which distinguishes the greater proportion of the Company's servants, it would be mischievous to attempt it. Where the agent, however, is intelligent, and acquainted with the language and manners of the people, he does simplify and improve the business to a certain degree; and were it performed by men who had an interest to establish themselves in the country, and who would make it a business, it would gradually acquire that rational form which the interest of a rational people would recommend.

BOOK IV. Madras; and a third at Calcutta, of which the last had
 CHAP. I. been created so lately as the year 1707, the business at
 1708. Calcutta having, till that time, been conducted under the
 government of the Presidency of Madras. These Presi-
 dencies had as yet no dependence upon one another; each
 was absolute within its own limits, and responsible only
 to the Company in England. A Presidency was composed
 of a President or Governor, and a Council; both appointed
 by commission of the Company. The council was not any
 fixed number, but determined by the views of the Direc-
 tors; being sometimes nine, and sometimes twelve, according
 to the presumed importance or extent of the business to
 be performed. The Members of the Council were the
 superior servants in the civil or non-military class, pro-
 moted according to the rule of seniority, unless where
 directions from home prescribed aberration. All power
 was lodged in the President and Council jointly; nor could
 anything be transacted, except by a majority of votes.
 When any man became a ruler, he was not however de-
 barred from subordinate functions; and the members of
 council, by natural consequence, distributed all the most
 lucrative offices among themselves.¹ Of the offices which
 any man held, that which was the chief source of his gain
 failed not to be the chief object of his attention; and the
 business of the Council, the duties of governing, did not,
 in general, engross the greatest part of the study and care
 of a Member of Council. It seldom, if ever, happened, that
 less or more of the Members of Council were not appointed
 as chiefs of the more important factories under the Presi-
 dency, and by their absence, were not disqualified for
 assisting in the deliberations of the governing body.
 The irresistible motive thus afforded to the persons
 intrusted with the government, to neglect the business

¹ There were no lucrative offices, for many years, under the Company's administration. For some time, the salaries of the chiefs of Bombay and Fort St. George, did not exceed 300*l.* per annum, and those of the merchants and factors were but 30*l.* and 20*l.* per annum. Even as late as the acquisition of all real power in Bengal, the salary of a counsellor was 250*l.* per annum; of a factor, 140*l.*; of a writer, as then lately increased, 130*l.* The advantages made by the Company's servants, arose from their engaging in the internal trade, and also in the trade by sea to all eastern ports north of the equator, except Tonquin and Formosa (see the text, p. 37). In either of those branches of trade, much depended upon convenience of situation; and, so far, the Company's servants were dependant upon the principal, with whom it rested where to employ them. The official emoluments attached to any situation, were, in all cases, of small amount.—W.

of government, occupied a high rank among the causes to which the defects at that time in the management of the Company's affairs in India may, doubtless, be ascribed. Notwithstanding the equality assigned to the votes of all the Members of the Council, the influence of the President was commonly sufficient to make the decisions agreeable to his inclination. The appointment of the Members to the gainful offices after which they aspired, was in a considerable degree subject to his determination; while he had it in his power to make the situation even of a member of the Council so uneasy to him, that his continuance in the service ceased to be an object of desire. Under the notion of supporting authority, the Company always lent an unwilling ear to complaints brought by a subordinate against his superior; and in the case of councilmen disposed to complain, it seldom happened, that of the transactions in which they themselves had been concerned, a portion was not unfit to be revealed.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

1708.

The powers exercised by the Governor or President and Council, were, in the first place, those of masters in regard to servants over all the persons who were in the employment of the company; and as the Company were the sole master, without fellow or competitor, and those under them had adopted their service as the business of their lives, the power of the master, in reality, and in the majority of cases, extended to almost everything valuable to man. With regard to such of their countrymen, as were not in their service, the Company were armed with powers to seize them, to keep them in confinement, and send them to England; an extent of authority which amounted to confiscation of goods, to imprisonment, and what to a European constitution is the natural effect of any long confinement under an Indian climate, actual death.¹ At an early period of the Company's history, it had been deemed necessary to intrust them with the powers of martial law, for the government of the troops which they maintained in defence of their factories and presidencies; and by a charter of Charles II., granted them in 1661, the Presidents and Councils in their factories were empowered

¹ Close imprisonment, debarring a prisoner from air, light, and exercise altogether, has probably never been inflicted in India by an English government, and its effects, even if it had been, would not be necessarily more injurious to life than similar treatment elsewhere.—W.

BOOK IV. to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction according to the laws of England. Under this sanction they had exercised judicial powers, during all the changes which their affairs had undergone; but at last it appeared desirable that so important an article of their authority should rest on a better foundation. In the year 1726 a charter was granted, by which the Company were permitted to establish a Mayor's Court at each of their three presidencies, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta;¹ consisting of a mayor and nine aldermen, empowered to decide in civil cases of all descriptions.² From this jurisdiction, the President and Council were erected into a Court of Appeal. They were also vested with the power of holding Courts of Quarter Sessions for the exercise of penal judicature, in all cases, excepting those of high treason. And a Court of Requests, or Court of Conscience, was instituted, for the decision, by summary procedure, of pecuniary questions of inconsiderable amount.

CHAP. I.
1708.

This reform in the judicature of India was not attended with all the beneficial effects which were probably expected from it. Negligence was left to corrupt the business of detail. The charter is said to have been procured by the influence of an individual, for the extension of his own authority; and when his ends were gained, his solicitude expired. The persons appointed to fill the judicial offices were the servants of the Company, bred to commerce, and nursed in its details; while a manuscript book of instructions comprised the whole of the assistance which the wisdom of the King and the Company provided to guide uninstructed men in the administration of justice.

Nor was the obscurity of the English law, and the inexperience of the judges, the only source of the many evils which the new arrangements continued, or produced. Jealousy arose between the Councils, and the Mayor's Courts. The Councils complained that the Courts encroached upon their authority; and the Courts complained

¹ Madras had been previously formed into a municipality, in December 1687, under the authority of the King in Council, consisting of a mayor, twelve aldermen, and sixty burgesses.—W.

² The charter of 1726, comprehended the three Presidencies, but this was superseded by a new charter in 1753, which is the final authority for the constitution of the different European courts then authorised. (See Seventh Report of Secret Committee, 1773).—W.

that they were oppressed by the Councils. The most violent dissensions often prevailed; and many of the members of the Mayor's Courts quitted the service, and went home with their animosities and complaints.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

1708.

Besides the above-mentioned tribunals established by the Company for the administration of the British laws to the British people in India, they erected, in the capacity of Zemindar of the district around Calcutta, the usual Zemindary Courts, for the administration of the Indian laws to the Indian people: the Phoujdary Court for the trial of crimes; and the Cutcherry for civil causes; besides the Collector's Court for matters of revenue. The judges, in these tribunals, were servants of the Company, appointed by the Governor and Council, and holding offices during pleasure; the rule of judgment was the supposed usage of the country, and the discretion of the court; and the mode of procedure was summary. Punishments extended to fine; imprisonment; labour upon the roads in chains for a limited time, or for life; and flagellation, either to a limited degree, or death. The ideas of honour, prevalent among the natives, induced the Mogul government to forbid the European mode of capital punishment, by hanging, in the case of a Mussulman. In compensation, however, it had no objection to his being whipped to death; and the flagellants in India are said to be so dexterous, as to kill a man with a few strokes of the chawbuck.¹

The executive and judicial functions were combined in the Councils, at the Indian presidencies; the powers even of justices of the peace being granted to the members of Council, and to them alone. If complaints were not wanting of the oppression by these authorities upon their fellow-servants, it is abundantly evident, that the Company were judge in their own cause in all cases in which the dispute existed between them and any other party.

The President was Commander-in-Chief of the military force maintained within his presidency. It consisted, partly of the recruits sent out in the ships of the Company; partly of deserters from the other European nations

¹ Seventh Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the State of the East India Company, in 1773.—M. These latter particulars are not found in the Report referred to.—W.

BOOK IV. settled in India, French, Dutch, and Portuguese; and
 CHAP. I. partly, at least at Bombay and Surat, of Topasses, or persons whom we may denominate Indo-Portuguese, either
 1708. the mixed produce of Portuguese and Indian parents, or converts to the Portuguese from the Indian faith. These were troops disciplined and uniformed; besides whom, the natives were already, to a small extent, employed by the Company in military service, and called Sepoys, from the Indian term Sipahi, equivalent to soldier. They were made to use the musket, but remained chiefly armed in the fashion of the country, with sword and target; they wore the Indian dress, the turban, *cubay* or vest, and long drawers; and were provided with native officers according to the custom of the country; but ultimately all under English command. It had not as yet been attempted to train them to the European discipline, in which it was possible to render them so expert and steady; but considerable service was derived from them; and under the conduct of European leaders they were found capable of facing danger with great constancy and firmness. What at this time was the average number at each presidency, is not particularly stated. It is mentioned, that at the time when the presidency was established at Calcutta in 1707, an effort was made to augment the garrison to 300 men.

The President was the organ of correspondence, by letter, or otherwise, with the country powers. It rested with him to communicate to the Council the account of what he thus transacted, at any time, and in any form, which he deemed expedient; and from this no slight accession to his power was derived.

The several denominations of the Company's servants in India were, writers, factors, junior merchants, and senior merchants: the business of the writers, as the term, in some degree, imports, was that of clerking, with the inferior details of commerce; and when dominion succeeded, of government. In the capacity of writers they remained during five years. The first promotion was to the rank of factor; the next to that of junior merchant; in each of which the period of service was three years. After this extent of service, they became senior merchants. And out of the class of senior merchants were taken by

seniority the members of the Council, and when no particular appointment interfered, even the presidents themselves.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1708.

Shortly after the first great era, in the history of the British commerce with India, the nation was delivered from the destructive burden of the long war with France which preceded the treaty of Utrecht: and though the accession of a new family to the throne, and the resentments which one party of statesmen had to gratify against another, kept the minds of men for a time in a feverish anxiety, not the most favourable to the persevering studies and pursuits on which the triumphs of industry depend, the commerce and the wealth of the nation made rapid advances. The town of Liverpool, which was not formed into a separate parish till 1699, so rapidly increased, that in 1715 a new parish, with a church, was erected; and it doubled its size between 1690 and 1726. The town of Manchester increased in a similar proportion; and was computed in 1727 to contain no less than 50,000 inhabitants: the manufactures of Birmingham, which thirty years before was little more than a village, are stated as giving maintenance at that time to upwards of 30,000 individuals.² In 1719, a patent was granted to Sir Thomas Lombe, for his machine for throwing silk, one of the first of those noble efforts of invention and enterprise which have raised this country to unrivalled eminence in the useful arts. The novelty and powers of this machine, the model of which he is said to have stolen from the Piedmontese, into whose manufactories he introduced himself in the guise of a common workman, excited the highest admiration; and its parts and performances are described to us by the historians of the time with curious exactness; 26,586 wheels, 97,476 movements, which worked 73,726 yards of organzine silk by every revolution of the water-wheel, 318,504,960 yards in one day and a night: a single water-wheel giving motion to the whole machine, of which any separate movement might be stopped without obstructing the rest; and one fire communicating warmth by heated air to every part of the manufactory, not less

¹ See Ninth Report, Select Committee, 1783, p. 11.

² Anderson's History of Commerce, Anno 1727.

BOOK IV. than the eighth part of a mile in length.¹ London was
 CHAP. I. increased by several new parishes. And from the year
 1708-23. 1708 to the year 1730, the imports of Great Britain, according to the valuation of the custom-house, had increased from 4,698,663*l.* to 7,780,019*l.*; the exports from 6,969,089*l.* to 11,974,135*l.*²

During this period of national prosperity, the imports of the East India Company rose from 493,257*l.*, the importation of 1708, to 1,059,759*l.* the importation of 1730. But the other, and not the least important, the export branch of the Company's trade, exhibited another result. As the exportation of the year 1708 was exceedingly small, compared with that of 1709 and the following years, it is fair to take an average of four years from 1706 to 1709 (two with a small, two an increased exportation), producing 105,773*l.* The exportation of the year 1730 was 135,484*l.*; while that of 1709 was 168,357*l.*; that of 1710, 126,310*l.*; that of 1711, 151,874*l.*; and that of 1712, 142,329*l.*

With regard to the rate of profit, during this period, or the real advantage of the Indian trade, the Company, for part of the year 1708, divided at the rate of five per cent. per annum to the proprietors upon 3,163,200*l.* of capital; for the next year, eight per cent.; for the two following years, nine per cent.; and thence to the year 1716, ten per cent. per annum. In the year 1717, they paid dividends on a capital of 3,194,080*l.*, at the same rate of ten per cent. per annum, and so on till the year 1723. That year the dividend was reduced to eight per cent. per annum, at which rate it continued till the year 1732.³

In the year 1712, on the petition of the Company, the period of their exclusive trade was extended by act of parliament, from the year 1726, to which by the last regulation it stood confined, to the year 1733, with the usual allowance of three years for notice, should their privileges be withdrawn.⁴

In the year 1716, they obtained a proclamation against interlopers. Their complaints, it seems, were occasioned by the enterprises of British subjects, trading to India

¹ Anderson's History of Commerce, A.D. 1719.

² Sir Charles Whitworth's Tables, part i. p. 78.

³ Third Report from the Secret Committee of the House of Commons on the State of the East India Company in 1773, p. 73.

⁴ 10 Ann., c. 28. See Collection of Statutes, p. 42.

under foreign commissions. As this proclamation answered not the wishes of the Company, nor deterred their countrymen from seeking the gains of Indian traffic, even through all the disadvantages which they incurred by intrusting their property to the protection of foreign laws, and the fidelity of foreign agents; they were able, in 1718, to procure an act of parliament for the punishment of all such competitors. British subjects, trading from foreign countries, and under the commission of a foreign government, were declared amenable to the laws for the protection of the Company's rights; the Company were authorized to seize merchants of this description when found within their limits, and to send them to England, subject to a penalty of 500*l.* for each offence.¹

The Company's present alarm for their monopoly arose from the establishment for trading with India, which under the authority of the Emperor, was formed at his port of Ostend. After the peace of Utrecht, which bestowed the Netherlands upon the house of Austria, the people of those provinces began to breathe from the distractions, the tyranny, and the wars which had so long wasted their fruitful country. Among other projects of improvement, a trade to India was fondly embraced. Two ships, after long preparations, sailed from Ostend in the year 1717, under the passports of the Emperor; and several more soon followed their example. The India Companies of Holland and England were in the highest degree alarmed; and easily communicated their fears and agitations to their respective governments. These governments not only expostulated, and to the highest degree of importunity, with the Emperor himself; but, amid the important negotiations of that diplomatic period, hardly any interest was more earnestly contended for in the discussions at the courts both of Paris and Madrid.² The Dutch captured some of the Ostend East India ships. The Emperor, who dreamed of an inundation of wealth from Indian trade, persevered in his purpose; and granted his commission of reprisal to the merchants of Ostend

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.
1708-23.

¹ Anderson's History of Commerce, A.D. 1716 and 1718, and Collection of Statutes.

² See Cox's Memoirs of Sir Robert and Lord Walpole, and History of the House of Austria, *ad annos*.

BOOK IV. In the beginning of 1720, they sent no fewer than six vessels to India, and as many the year that followed. The English East-India Company pressed the Government with renewed terrors and complaints. They asserted that, not only the capital, with which the trade was carried on, was to a great degree furnished by British subjects, but the trade and navigation were conducted by men who had been bred up in the trade and navigation of the British Company. They procured, in 1721, another act of parliament, enforcing the penalties already enacted; and as this also failed in producing the intended effects, another act was passed in the spring of 1723; prohibiting foreign adventures to India, under the penalty of triple the sum embarked; declaring all British subjects found in India and not in the service, or under the license of the East India Company, guilty of a high misdemeanour; and empowering the Company to seize, and send them home for punishment.¹ The Emperor had been importuned, by the adventurers of Ostend, for a charter to make them an exclusive company; but, under the notion of saving appearances in some little degree with England and Holland, or the maritime powers, as they were called in the diplomatic language of the day, he had induced them to trade under passports as individuals. In the month of August, however, of 1723, the charter was granted; in less than twenty-four hours the subscription-books of the Company were filled up; and in less than a month the shares were sold at a premium of fifteen per cent. Notwithstanding the virulent opposition of all the other nations, already engaged in the Indian trade, the Ostend Company experienced the greatest success. At a meeting of Proprietors in 1726, the remaining instalment on the subscriptions, equal to a dividend of thirty-three and one-third per cent., was paid up from the gains of the trade. But by this time political difficulties pressed upon the Emperor. He was abandoned by his only ally, the King of Spain, and opposed by a triple alliance of France, England, and Holland. To give satisfaction to this potent confederacy, and to obtain their support to the pragmatic sanction, or the guarantee of his dominions to his daughter and only child, he submitted to sacrifice the Ostend Company. To save ap-

¹ 5 Geo. I. c. 24; 7 Geo. I. c. 21; 9 Geo. I. c. 26.

pearances, and consult the imperial dignity, nothing was stipulated in words, except that the business of the Ostend Company should be suspended for seven years; but all men understood that, in this case, suspension and extinction were the same.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.
1708-23.

By the act of 7 Geo. I. c. 5, the Company were authorized to borrow money on their common seal, to the amount of the sums lent by them to government, if not beyond the sum of five millions sterling in the whole. They were permitted, however to borrow solely for the purposes of their trade. They were expressly interdicted from receiving moneys in any of the capacities of a banker; and for that purpose several restrictive clauses were inserted in the act; they were not to borrow any sums payable on demand, or at a shorter date than six months; they were not to discount any bills; or to keep books or cash for any persons sole or corporate, or otherwise than for the real business of the Company.¹

When the Company commenced operations in India, upon the new foundation on which their affairs were placed by the grand arrangements in 1708, Shah Aulum, successor of Aurungzeb, was Emperor of the Moguls. His second son Azeem-oos-Shaun had been appointed Viceroy of Bengal before the death of Aurungzeb; and having bent his chief attention to the amassing of a treasure, against the impending contest between the competitors for the throne, he accepted the bribes of the company, and granted them proportional privileges. Under his authority they had purchased, in 1698, the Zemindarship of the three towns of Sutanutty, Calcutta, and Govindpore, with their districts. When Azeem-oos-Shaun left Bengal to assist his father, in the war which ensued upon the death of Aurungzeb, he left his son Ferokhser his deputy. In 1712 Shah Aulum died; Azeem-oos-Shaun lost his life in the struggle for the succession; and Ferokhser, by the help of two able chiefs, the Syed brothers, gained the throne. The government of Bengal now devolved upon Jaffier Khan, and the company experienced a change. This chief, of Tartar extraction, was born at Boorhanpore, in the Deccan, and rose to eminence in the latter part of the reign of Aurungzeb, by whom he had been appointed dewan (or comptroller of

¹ Collection of Statutes, p. 50.

BOOK IV. the revenues) of Bengal. It would appear that he was no-
 CHAP. I. minated, by Shah Aulum, to the viceroyalty of Bengal,
 1708-23. shortly after his accession to the throne; but it is probable
 that, during the short reign of that prince, the appointment
 never took place; as, at the time of his death, Ferokhsar
 was in possession of the province. Upon the departure,
 however, of Ferokhsar to ascend the imperial throne, Jaffier
 Khan was invested with entire authority, as subahdar of
 Bengal; and the English Company, along with his other
 subjects, began speedily to feel the effects of his severe and
 oppressive administration.¹

In 1713, the first year of the reign of Ferokhsar, the
 President of Calcutta applied to the Company at home for
 leave to send an embassy, with a handsome present, to the
 Mogul durbar, in hopes of obtaining greater protection
 and privileges. Two of the Company's factors, under the
 direction of an Armenian merchant, named Serhaud, set
 out for Delhi; and the Emperor, who had received the
 most magnificent account of the presents of which they
 were the bearers, ordered them to be escorted by the
 governors of the provinces through which they were to
 pass.

They arrived at the capital on the eighth of July 1715,
 after a journey of three months; and, in pursuance of
 the advice which had been received at Calcutta, applied
 themselves to gain the protection of Khan Dowran,² a
 nobleman in favour with the Emperor, and in the interest
 of Emir Jumla. Whatever was promoted by the interest

¹ Orme's History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in India, i. 17—19. Seer Mutakhareen, i. 17 and 296.

² He is named Caundorah by Mr. Orme (Ibid. p. 20), who erroneously makes Houssain, instead of Abdoolah Khan, Vizir.—M. It has already been intimated, that a great distinction is to be made in the merits of Orme as an historian. For all that regards the transactions of the British in India he may be relied on; he was present at much that he relates; he was acquainted with the principal persons engaged, and maintained an active correspondence with them; and he made diligent use of many valuable public and private documents in the English language; but it is evident that he was no Orientalist; and, consequently, had no access to written native information in what regards transactions purely Indian; therefore he is by no means a safe authority, as he constantly misstates names, and confounds persons and events. Khan Dowran was the name of the nobleman whom he calls by the vulgar corruption Caundourah, and besides the misstatement of one Syed brother for the other, here pointed out, he is wrong as to the name of the father of Ferokhsar's bride, who was Ajit Singh, not Jesswant Singh, as he calls him, and who bore an important part in the events of this period. Scott, who derives his knowledge from native historians, is much more accurate. Aurungzebe's Successors, 136. Tod's Rajasthan, i. 401.—W.

of Emir Jumla was opposed by that of the vizir. The influence also of Jaffier Khan was exerted to defeat an application, which tended to abridge his authority, and impeach his government. The embassy and costly present of the Company were doomed to imperial neglect, had not an accident, over which they had no control, and the virtue of a public-spirited man, who preferred their interest to his own, opened an avenue to the grace of Ferokhsar. The intemperance of that prince had communicated to him a secret disease, from which the luxury of the harem does not always exempt. Under the unskilful treatment of Indian physicians, the disorder lingered : and the Emperor's impatience was augmented, by the delay which it imposed upon the celebration of his marriage with the daughter of the Raja of Jodpore. A medical gentleman of the name of Hamilton accompanied the embassy of the English Company. The Emperor was advised to make trial of his skill: a cure was the speedy consequence. The Emperor commanded his benefactor to name his own reward : and the generous Hamilton solicited privileges for the Company.¹ The festival of the marriage, however, ensued ; during which it would not have been decorous to importune with business the imperial mind ; and six months elapsed before the ambassadors could present their petition. It was delivered in January, 1716 ; and prayed, " that the cargoes of English ships, wrecked on the Mogul's coast, should be protected from plunder ; that a fixed sum should be received at Surat in lieu of all duties ; that three villages, contiguous to Madras, which had been granted and again resumed by the government of Arcot, should be restored in perpetuity ; that the island of Diu, near the port of Masulipatam, should be given to the Company, for an annual rent ; that all persons in Bengal, who might be indebted to the Company, should be delivered up to the presidency on the first demand ; that a passport (*dustuck*, in the language of the country), signed by the president of Calcutta should exempt the goods which it specified from stoppage or examination by the officers of the Bengal

¹ This incident is related with some additional circumstances by Scott, *History of Aurungzebe's Successors*, p. 139. From the manner in which he speaks of the Emperor's disease (he speaks very vaguely), he appears not to have thought it of the sort which is generally represented : the question is of small importance.

BOOK IV. government; and that the Company should be permitted
CHAP. I. to purchase the Zemindarship of thirty-seven towns, in
1708-23. the same manner as they had been authorized by Azeem-
oos-Shaun to purchase Calcutta, Suttanuttu, and Govind-
pore." The power of the vizir could defeat the grants of
the Emperor himself; and he disputed the principal
articles. Repeated applications were made to the Em-
peror, and at last the vizir gave way; when mandates were
issued confirming all the privileges for which the petition
had prayed. To the disappointment, however, and grief of
the ambassadors, the mandates were not under the seals of
the Emperor, but only those of the vizir, the authority of
which the distant viceroys would be sure to dispute. It was
resolved to remonstrate, how delicate soever the ground on
which they must tread; and to solicit mandates to which
the highest authority should be attached. It was now the
month of April, 1716, when the Emperor, at the head of
an expedition against the Seiks, began his march towards
Lahore. No choice remained but to follow the camp.
The campaign was tedious. It heightened the dissensions
between the favourites of the Emperor and the vizir; the
ambassadors found their difficulties increased; and con-
templated a long, and probably a fruitless negotiation,
when they were advised to bribe a favourite eunuch in the
seraglio. No sooner was the money paid, than the vizir
himself appeared eager to accomplish their designs, and
the patents were issued under the highest authority.
There was a secret, of which the eunuch had made his
advantage. The factory of Surat, having lately been op-
pressed by the Mogul governor and officers, had been
withdrawn by the Presidency of Bombay, as not worth
maintaining. It was recollected by the Moguls, that, in
consequence of oppression, the factory of Surat had once
before been withdrawn; immediately after which an
English fleet had appeared; had swept the sea of Mogul
ships, and inflicted a deep wound upon the Mogul trea-
sury. A similar visitation was now regarded as a cer-
tain consequence; and, as many valuable ships of the
Moguls were at sea, the event was deprecated with pro-
portional ardour. This intelligence was transmitted to
the eunuch, by his friend the viceroy of Guzerat. The
eunuch knew what effect it would produce upon the mind

of the vizir; obtained his bribe from the English: and then communicated to the vizir the expectation prevalent in Guzerat of a hostile visit from an English fleet. The vizir hastened to prevent such a calamity, by granting satisfaction. The patents were despatched; and the ambassadors took leave of the Emperor in the month of July 1717, two years after their arrival.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.
1708-23.

The mandates in favour of the Company produced their full effect in Guzerat and the Deccan: but in Bengal, where the most important privileges were conceded, the subahdar, or nabob as he was called by the English, had power to impede their operations. The thirty-seven towns which the Company had obtained leave to purchase, would have given them a district extending ten miles from Calcutta on each side of the river Hoogley; where a number of weavers, subject to their own jurisdiction, might have been established. The viceroy ventured not directly to oppose the operation of an imperial mandate; but his authority was sufficient to deter the holders of the land from disposing of it to the Company; and the most important of the advantages aimed at by the embassy was thus prevented. The nabob, however, disputed not the authority of the President's dustucks, a species of passport which entitled the merchandise to pass from duty, stoppage, or inspection; and this immunity, from which the other European traders were excluded, promoted the vent of the Company's goods.¹

The trade of the Company's servants occasioned another dispute. Besides the business which the factors and agents of the Company were engaged to perform on the Company's account, they had been allowed to carry on an independent traffic of their own, for their own profit. Every man had in this manner a double occupation and pursuit; one for the benefit of the Company, and one for the benefit of himself. Either the inattention of the feebly interested Directors of a common concern had overlooked the premium for neglecting that concern, which was thus bestowed upon the individuals intrusted with it in India; or the shortness of their foresight made them count this neglect a smaller evil than the additional salaries which their servants, if debarred from other sources of emolument, would probably

¹ Orme, *Hist. ut supra*, II. 20—25.

BOOK IV. require. The President of Calcutta granted his dustucks.
 CHAP. I. for protecting from the duties and taxes of the native
 1730. government, not only the goods of the Company, but also the goods of the Company's servants; and possibly the officers of that government were too little acquainted with the internal affairs of their English visitants to remark the distinction. The Company had appropriated to themselves, in all its branches, the trade between India and the mother country. Their servants were thus confined to what was called "the country trade," or that from one part of India to another. This consisted of two branches, maritime and inland; either that which was carried on by ships from one port of India to another, and from the ports of India to the other countries in the adjacent seas; or that which was carried on by land between one town or province and another. When the dustucks of the President, therefore, were granted to the Company's servants, they were often granted to protect from duties, commodities, the produce of the kingdom itself, in their passage by land from one district or province to another. This, Jaffier Khan, the viceroy, declared it his intention to prevent; as a practice at once destructive to his revenue, and ruinous to the native traders, on whom heavy duties were imposed; and he commanded the dustucks of the President to receive no respect, except for goods, either imported by sea, or purchased for exportation. The Company remonstrated, but in vain. Nor were the pretensions of their servants exempt from unpleasant consequences; as the pretext of examining whether the goods were really imported by sea, or really meant for exportation, often produced those interferences of the officers of revenue, from which it was so great a privilege to be saved. Interrupted and disturbed in their endeavours to grasp the inland trade, the Company's servants directed their ardour to the maritime branch; and their superior skill soon induced the merchants of the province, Moors, Armenians, and Hindus, to freight most of the goods, which they exported, on English bottoms. Within ten years from the period of the embassy, the shipping of the port of Calcutta increased to 10,000 tons.

The year 1730 was distinguished by transactions of considerable moment in the history of the Company. In England a new sovereign had but lately ascended the throne;

an active and powerful Opposition made a greater use of the press, and more employed the public mind as a power in the state, than any party which had gone before them; success rendered the trading interest enterprising and high-minded; intellect was becoming every day more enlightened, more penetrating, more independent; and experience testified the advantages of freedom in all the departments of trade.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1730.

Though the gains of the East India Company, had they been exactly known, would not have presented an object greatly calculated to inflame mercantile cupidity; yet the riches of India were celebrated as proverbially great; the boastings of the Company, in the representations they had made of the benefit derived to the nation from trading with India, had confirmed the popular prejudice; and a general opinion seems to have prevailed, that the British subjects at large ought to be no longer debarred from enriching themselves in the trade which was invidiously, and, it seemed imprudently, reserved for the East India Company.

Three years were still unexpired of the period of the Company's exclusive charter: yet the plans of those who desired a total alteration in the scheme of the trade were moulded into form, and a petition, grounded upon them, was presented to the legislature so early as February, 1730.

As the payment of 3,200,000*l.* which the Company had advanced to government at an interest of five per cent. was a condition preliminary to the abolition of their exclusive privileges, the petitioners offered to lend to government an equal sum on far more favourable terms. They proposed to advance the money in five instalments, the last at Lady-day in 1733, the date of the expiration of the Company's charter; requiring, till that period, interest on the money paid at the rate of four per cent., but offering to accept of two per cent. for the whole sum, from that time forward: whence, they observed, a saving would accrue to the public of 92,000*l.* per annum, worth, at twenty-five years' purchase, 2,500,000*l.*¹

¹ See a distinct summary of the proposals, and of the arguments *pro* and *con*, in Anderson's History of Commerce, A.D. 1730. For the proceedings in Parliament, consult the Journals, with Boyer's Political State, and Hansard's Parliamentary History.

BOOK IV. For the more profitable management of this branch of
CHAP. I. the national affairs, the following was the scheme which
 1730. they proposed. They would constitute the subscribers to this original fund a company, for the purpose of opening the trade, in its most favorable shape, to the whole body of their countrymen. It was not intended that the Company should trade upon a joint stock, and in their corporate capacity; but that every man in the nation, who pleased, should trade in the way of private adventure. The Company were to have the charge of erecting and maintaining the forts and establishments abroad; and for this, and for other expenses, attending what was called "the enlargement and preservation of the trade," it was proposed that they should receive a duty of one per cent. on all exports to India, and of five per cent. on all imports from it. For ensuring obedience to this and other regulations, it should be made lawful to trade to India only under the license of the Company. And it was proposed that thirty-one years, with three years' notice, should be granted as the duration of the peculiar privileges.

It appears from this account, that the end which was proposed to be answered, by incorporating such a company, was the preservation and erection of the forts, buildings, and other fixed establishments, required for the trade in India. This was its only use, or intent; for the business of trading, resigned to private hands, was to be carried on by the individuals of the nation at large. And, if it were true, as it has been always maintained, that for the trade of India, forts and factories are requisite, of such a nature as no individual, or precarious combination of individuals, is competent to provide, this project offers peculiar claims to consideration and respect. It promised to supply that demand which has always been held forth, as peculiar to Indian trade, as the grand exigency which, distinguishing the traffic with India from all other branches of trade, rendered monopoly advantageous in that peculiar case, how much soever proved to be injurious in others. While it provided for this real or pretended want, it left the trade open to all the advantages of private enterprise, private vigilance, private skill, and private economy; the virtues by which individuals thrive, and nations prosper: and it afforded an interest

to the proposed Company, in the careful discharge of its duty ; as its profits were to increase in exact proportion with the increase of the trade, and of course, with the facilities and accommodation by which the trade was promoted.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1730.

As no trade was to be carried on by the Company, the source, whence dividends to the proprietors would arise, was the interest to be received from Government, and the duties upon the exports and imports : and as the territorial and other duties belonging to the forts and establishments in India were deemed sufficient to defray the expense of those establishments, this source was described as competent to yield an annual return of five or six per cent. upon the capital advanced. Under absence of risk, and the low rate of interest at the time, this was deemed a sufficient inducement to subscribe. Had the pernicious example, of lending the stock of trading companies to Government, been rejected, a very small capital would have sufficed to fulfil the engagements of such a company ; and either the gains upon it would have been uncommonly high, or the rate of duties upon the trade might have been greatly reduced.

The friends of this proposition urged ; that, as the change which had taken place in the African trade, from monopoly to freedom, was allowed to have produced great national advantages, it was not to be disputed, that a similar change in the India trade would be attended with benefits so much the greater, as the trade was more valuable ; that it would produce a larger exportation of our own produce and manufactures to India, and create employment for a much greater number of ships and seamen ; that it would greatly reduce the price of all Indian commodities to the people at home ; that it would enable the nation to supply foreign markets with Indian commodities at a cheaper rate, and, by consequence, to a larger amount ; that new channels of traffic would thence be opened, in Asia and America, as well as in Europe ; that a free trade to India would increase the produce of the customs and excise, and “thereby lessen the national debt ;” that it would introduce a much more extensive employment of British shipping from one part of India to another, from which great profit would arise ; and that it

BOOK IV. would prevent the nation from being deprived of the re-
 CHAP. I. sources of those who, for want of permission or opportunity
 1730. at home, were driven to employ their skill and capital in
 the Indian trade of other countries.

The attention of the nation seems to have been highly excited. Three petitions were presented to the House of Commons, from the merchants, traders, &c., of the three chief places of foreign trade in England, London, Bristol, and Liverpool, in behalf of themselves and all other His Majesty's subjects, praying that the trade to India might be laid open to the nation at large, and that they might be heard by their counsel at the bar of the House. The press, too, yielded a variety of productions, which compared with one another the systems of monopoly and freedom, and showed, or pretended to show, the preference due to the last. Though competition might appear to reduce the gains of individuals, it would, by its exploring sagacity, its vigilance, address, and economy, even with an equal capital, undoubtedly increase the mass of business ; in other words, the annual produce ; that is to say, the riches and prosperity of the country. The superior economy, the superior despatch, the superior intelligence, and skill of private adventure, while they enable the dealers to traffic on cheaper terms, were found by experience to yield a profit on the capital employed, not inferior to what was yielded by monopoly ; by the business, for example, of the East India Company, whose dividends exceeded not eight per cent. Whatever was gained by the monopolizing company, in the high prices at which it was enabled to sell, or the low prices at which it was enabled to buy, was all lost by its dilatory, negligent, and wasteful management. This was not production, but the reverse ; it was not enriching a nation, but preventing its being enriched.¹

The Company manifested their usual ardour in defence of the monopoly. They magnified the importance of the trade ; and asked if it was wise to risk the loss of known advantages, of the greatest magnitude, in pursuit of others

¹ It was asserted by the merchants, and, as far as appears, without contradiction, that foreigners possessed at least a third part of the stock of the East India Company ; and one-third of their gain was thus made for the benefit of other countries. *Political State, A.D. 1730, xxxix. 240.*

which were only supposed ; they alleged that it was envy which stimulated the exertions of their opponents ; coveting the gains of the Company, but unable to produce any instance of misconduct, without going forty years back for the materials of their interested accusations : the Company employed an immense stock in trade, their sales amounting to about three millions yearly. The customs, about £300,000 per annum, for the service of Government, ought not to be sacrificed for less than a certainty of an equal supply ; and the maintenance of the forts and factories cost £300,000 a year. Where, they asked, was the security, that an open trade, subject to all the fluctuation of individual fancy, one year liable to be great, another to be small, would afford regularly an annual revenue of £600,000, for customs and forts ? By the competition of so many buyers in India, and of so many sellers in Europe, the goods would be so much enhanced in price in the one place, and so much reduced in the other, that all profit would be destroyed, and the competitors, as had happened in the case of the rival companies, would end with a scene of general ruin.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1730.

Under the increased experience of succeeding times, and the progress of the science of national wealth, the arguments of the Company's opponents have gained, those of the Company have lost, a portion of strength. To exaggerate the importance of the Indian trade ; and, because it is important, assume that the monopoly ought to remain, is merely to say, that when a thing is important, it ought never to be improved ; in things of no moment society may be allowed to make progress ; in things of magnitude that progress ought ever to be strenuously and unbendingly opposed. This argument is, unhappily, not confined to the case of the East India Company. Whoever has attentively traced the progress of government, will find that it has been employed by the enemies of improvement, at every stage ; and only in so far as it has been disregarded and contemned, has the condition of man ascended above the miseries of savage life. Instead of the maxim, "A thing is important, therefore it ought not to be improved," reason would doubtless suggest that the more anything is important, the more its improvement should be studied and pursued. When a thing is of small importance, a

BOOK IV. small inconvenience may suffice to dissuade the pursuit of
 CHAP. I. its improvement. When it is of great importance, a great
 1730. inconvenience alone can be allowed to produce that unhappy effect. If it be said, that where much is enjoyed, care should be taken to avoid its loss; this is merely to say that men ought to be prudent; which is very true, but surely authorizes no such inference, as that improvement, in matters of importance, should be always opposed.

The Company quitted the argument, to criminate the arguers: The objections to the monopoly were the impure and odious offspring of avaricious envy. But, if the monopoly, as the opponents said, was a bad thing, and free trade a good thing; from whatever motive they spoke, the good thing was to be adopted, the evil to be shunned. The question of their motives was one thing; the truth or falsehood of their positions another. When truth is spoken from a bad motive, it is no less truth; nor is it less entitled to its command over human action, than when it is spoken from the finest motive which can enter the human breast; if otherwise, an ill-designing man would enjoy the wonderful power, by recommending a good course of action, to render a bad one obligatory upon the human race.

If, as they argued, the East India Company had a large stock in trade, that was no reason why the monopoly should remain. The capital of the mercantile body of Great Britain was much greater than the capital of the East India Company, and of that capital, whatever proportion could find a more profitable employment in the Indian trade, than in any other branch of the national industry, the Indian trade would be sure to receive.

With regard to the annual expense of the forts and factories, it was asserted by the opponents of the Company; and, as far as appears, without contradiction, that they defrayed their own expense, and supported themselves.

As to the customs paid by the East India Company; all trade paid customs, and if the Indian trade increased under the system of freedom, it would pay a greater amount of customs than it paid before; if it decreased, the capital now employed in it would seek another destination, and pay customs and taxes in the second channel as well as the first. To lay stress upon the customs paid by the Com-

pany, unless to take advantage of the gross ignorance of a minister, or of a parliament was absurd.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1730.

The argument, that the competition of free trade would make the merchants buy so dear in India, and sell so cheap in England, as to ruin themselves, however depended upon, was contradicted by experience. What hindered this effect, in trading with France, in trading with Holland, or any other country? Or what hindered it in every branch of business within the kingdom itself? If the two East India Companies ruined themselves by competition, why reason from a case which bore no analogy whatsoever to the one under contemplation; while the cases which exactly corresponded, those of free trade, and boundless competition, led to a conclusion directly the reverse. If two East India Companies ruined one another, it was only an additional proof, that they were ineligible instruments of commerce. The ruin proceeded, not from the nature of competition, but the circumstances of the competitors. Where two corporate bodies contended against one another, and the ruin of the one left the field vacant to the other, their contention might very well be ruinous; because each might hope, that, by exhausting its antagonist in a competition of loss, it would deliver itself from its only rival. Where every merchant had not one, but a multitude of competitors, the hope was clearly vain of wearing all of them out by a contest of loss. Every merchant, therefore, would deal on such terms alone, as allowed him the usual, or more than the usual rate of profit; and he would find it his interest to observe an obliging, rather than a hostile deportment towards others, that they might do the same toward him. As it is this principle which produces the harmony and prosperity of trade in all other cases in which freedom prevails, it remained to be shown why it would not produce them in the Indian trade.

The subject was introduced into parliament, and discussed. But the advocates for the freedom of the trade were there overruled, and those of monopoly triumphed.

In order to aid the parliament in coming to such a decision as the Company desired, and to counteract in some degree the impression likely to be made by the proposal of their antagonists to accept of two per cent. for the whole of the loan to Government, they offered to reduce

BOOK IV. the interest from five to four per cent., and, as a premium .

CHAP. I. for the renewal of their charter, to contribute a sum of £200,000 to the public service. On these conditions it

1732. was enacted that the exclusive privileges should be prolonged to Lady-day in the year 1766, with the usual addition of three years' notice, and a proviso that nothing in this arrangement should be construed to limit their power of continuing a body corporate, and of trading to India on their joint stock with other of their fellow-subjects, even after their exclusive privileges should expire.¹

On the ground on which the affairs of the East India Company were now established, they remained till the year 1744. From 1730 to that year, the trade of the Company underwent but little variation. Of goods exported, the amount indeed was considerably increased ; but as in this stores were included, and as the demand for stores, by the extension of forts, and increase of military apparatus, was augmented, the greater part of the increase of exports may be justly set down to this account. The official value of the goods imported had kept rather below a million annually ; sometimes indeed exceeding that sum, but commonly the reverse, and some years to a considerable amount ; with little or no progressive improvement from the beginning of the period to the end. The exports had increased from £135,484, the exportation of the first year, to £476,274, that of the last. But the greater part of the increase had taken place after the prospect of wars and the necessity of military preparations ; when a great addition was demanded in the article of stores.²

In the year 1732, the Company first began to make up annual accounts ; and from that period we have regular statements of the actual purchase of their exports, and the actual sale of their imports. In the year 1732, the sales of the Company amounted to £1,940,996. In 1774, they amounted to £1,997,506 ; and in all the intermediate years were less. The quantity of goods and stores paid for in the year 1732 amounted to £105,230 ; the quantity paid

¹ As a corporate body is seldom hurt by its modesty, the Company alleged that they had a right, by a preceding Act of Parliament, to the *monopoly* in perpetuity ; but, to avoid disputes, they consented to waive this claim for a certainty of thirty-six years. 3 Geo. II. c. 14. Collection of Statutes, p. 73. Anderson, ad. an. 1730. Political State, xxxix. 268.

² Sir Charles Whitworth's Tables, part II. p. 9.

for in 1744, to £231,318. The quantity of bullion exported in 1732, was £393,377; the quantity exported in 1744, was £458,544. The quantity, then, of goods exported was increased, and in some degree, also, that of bullion, while the quantity of goods imported remained nearly the same. It follows, that the additional exportation, not having been employed in the additional purchase of goods, must have been not merchandise, but stores. It is to be observed also, that in the amount of sales, as exhibited in the Company's accounts, were included at this time the duties paid to Government, stated at thirty per cent.; a deduction which brings the amount of the sales to nearly the official valuation of the imports at the Custom-house.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1744.

In 1732, the Company were obliged to reduce their dividends from eight to seven per cent. per annum; and at this rate they continued till 1744, in which year they returned to eight per cent.² The Dutch East India Company, from 1730 to 1736, divided twenty-five per cent. per annum upon the capital stock; in 1736, twenty per cent.; for the next three years, fifteen per cent. per annum; for the next four, twelve and a half per annum; and, in 1744, as much as fifteen per cent.³ The grand advantage of the English East India Company, in the peculiar privilege of having their trade exempted from duties in Bengal and in the other concessions obtained by their embassy to the court of the Mogul, had thus produced no improvement in the final result, the ultimate profits of the trade.

The Company seem to have been extremely anxious to avoid a renewal of the discussion on the utility or fitness of the monopoly, and, for that purpose, to forestal the excitement of the public attention by the approach to the conclusion of the privileged term. At a moment accordingly, when no one was prepared to oppose them; and in the middle of an expensive war, when the offer of any pecuniary facilities was a powerful bribe to the Govern-

¹ Third Report of the Committee of Secresy, on the State of the East India Company (House of Commons, 1773), p. 75.

² Ibid. p. 73.

³ *Histoire Philosoph. et Polit. des Etablissements, etc., dans les Deux Indes*, par Guillaume THOMAS Raynal, liv. II. sect. 21. Table at the end of the volume.

BOOK IV. ment, they made a proposal to lend to it the sum of one
 CHAP. I. million, at an interest of three per cent., provided the
 1746. period of their exclusive privileges should be prolonged to
 three years' notice after Lady-day, 1780. On these con-
 ditions, a new Act was passed in 1744; and to enable
 the Company to make good their loan to Government,
 they were authorised to borrow to the extent of a million
 of their bonds.¹

On the death of the Emperor Charles VI., in the year 1740, a violent war, kindled by competition for the imperial throne, and for a share in the spoils of the house of Austria, had begun in Germany. In this contest, France and England, the latter involved by her Hanoverian interests, had both engaged as auxiliaries; and in the end had become nearly, or rather altogether principals. From 1739, England had been at war with Spain, a war intended to annul the right claimed and exercised by the Spaniards, of searching English ships on the coast of America, for contraband goods. England and France, though contending against one another, with no ordinary efforts, in a cause ostensibly not their own, abstained from hostilities directly on their own account, till 1744; when the two Governments came to mutual declarations of war. And it was not long before the most distant settlements of the two nations felt the effects of their destructive contentions.

On the 14th² of September, 1746, a French fleet anchored four leagues to the south of Madras; and landed five or six hundred men. On the 15th the fleet moved along the coast, while the troops marched by land; and about noon it arrived within cannon-shot of the town. Labourdonnais, who commanded the expedition, then landed, with the rest of the troops. The whole force destined for the siege, consisted of 1000 or 1100 Europeans, 400 Sepoys, and 400 Caffres, or blacks of Madagascar, brought from the island of Mauritius: 1700 or 1800 men, all sorts included, remained in the ships.³

¹ Anderson's History of Commerce, ad. an. 1744; Collection of Statutes, p. 84, 17 Geo. II. c. 17.

² Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 124. Mr. Orme, i. 67, says the third, the difference being that of the styles. The old style, it appears, was used by the English historian.

³ Mémoire, ut supra, p. 125. Orme, p. 67.

Madras had, during the space of 100 years, been the principal settlement of the English on the Coromandel coast. The territory belonging to the Company extended five miles along the shore, and was about one mile in breadth. The town consisted of three divisions. The first, denominated the white town, in which resided none but the English, or Europeans under their protection, consisted of about fifty houses, together with the warehouses and other buildings of the Company, and two churches, one an English, the other a Roman Catholic church. This division was surrounded with a slender wall, defended with four bastions, and four batteries, but weak and badly constructed, decorated with the title of Fort St. George. Contiguous to it, on the north side, was the division in which resided the Armenian, and the richest of the Indian merchants, larger, and still worse fortified than the former. And on the northern side of this division was a space, covered by the hovels of the country, in which the mass of the natives resided. These two divisions constituted what was called the black town. The English in the colony exceeded not 300 men, of whom 200 were the soldiers of the garrison. The Indian Christians, converts or descendants of the Portuguese, amounted to three or four thousand ; the rest were Armenians, Mohammedans, or Hindus, the last in by far the largest proportion ; and the whole population of the Company's territory amounted to about 250,000. With the exception of Goa and Batavia, Madras was, in point both of magnitude and riches, the most important of the European establishments in India.¹

The town sustained the bombardment for five days, when the inhabitants, expecting an assault, capitulated. They had endeavoured to save the place, by the offer of a ransom ; but Labourdonnais coveted the glory of displaying French colours on the ramparts of fort St. George. He engaged, however, his honour to restore the settlement,

¹ A Letter to a proprietor of India Stock, published in 1750, by a person who was evidently concerned in the government of Madras at the time, states, that the soldiers were not only few, but of a very indifferent description ; that the town was ill provided with ammunition stores, and that its fortifications were in a ruinous condition : the necessity for rigid economy at home, having withheld the means of maintaining the establishment abroad in a state of efficiency.—W.

BOOK IV. and content himself with a moderate ransom ; and on

CHAP. I. these terms he was received into the town.¹ He had not

lost so much as one man in the enterprise. Among the
1746. English four or five were killed by the explosion of the bombs, and two or three houses were destroyed, Labourdonnais protected the inhabitants, with the care of a man of virtue ; but the magazines and warehouses of the Company, as public property, were taken possession of by the commissaries of the French.²

Labourdonnais, with the force under his command, had arrived in India in the month of June, 1746. At that time the settlements of France in the Indian seas were under two separate governments, analogous to the English Presidencies ; one established at the Isle of France, the other at Pondicherry. Under the former of these governments were placed the two islands ; the one called the isle of France, about sixty leagues in circumference, the other that of Bourbon, of nearly the same dimensions. These islands, lying on the eastern side of Madagascar, between the nineteenth and twentieth degrees of latitude, were discovered by the Portuguese, and by them called Cerne, and Mascarenhas. In 1660 seven or eight Frenchmen settled on the island of Mascarenhas ; five years afterwards they were joined by twenty-two of their countrymen ; the remains of the French colony which was destroyed in Madagascar sought refuge in this island ; and when it became an object of some importance, the French changed its name to the island of Bourbon. The island of Cerne was, at an early date, taken possession of by the Dutch, and by them denominated the island of Mauritius, in honour of their leader Maurice, Prince of Orange ; but, after the formation of their establishment at the Cape of Good Hope, was abandoned as useless. The French, who were subject to great inconvenience by want of a good harbour on the island of Bourbon, took possession of it in 1720, and changed its name from the isle of Mauritius to the isle of France. Both islands are fruitful, and pro-

¹ The memoir cited in the preceding note, describes discussions which took place at home, in regard to the payment of certain bonds given by the government of Madras, to raise money to the extent of 100,000 pagodas, which, it is intimated, were presented to the French commander as the price of his moderation.—W.

² *Mémoire pour Labourdonnais*, i. 126—142. Orme. i. 61—69.

duce the corn of Europe, along with most of the tropical productions. Some plants of coffee, accidentally introduced from Arabia, succeeded so well on the island of Bourbon, as to render that commodity the staple of the island.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1746.

Pondicherry was the seat of the other Indian government of the French. It had under its jurisdiction the town and territory of Pondicherry; and three factories, or *Comptoirs*, one at Mahé, not far south from Tellicherry on the Malabar coast, one at Karical on one of the branches of the Coleroon on the Coromandel coast, and one at Chandernagor on the river Hoogley in Bengal.²

The form of the government at both places was the same. It consisted, like the English, the form of which was borrowed from the Dutch, of a Governor, and a Council; the Governor being President of the Council, and allowed, according to the genius of the government in the mother country, to engross from the council a greater share of power than in the colonies of the English and Dutch. The peculiar business of the Governor and Council was, to direct, in conformity with instructions from home, all persons in the employment of the Company; to regulate the expenditure, and take care of the receipts; to administer justice, and in general to watch over the whole economy of the establishment. Each of the islands had a Council of its own; but one Governor sufficed for both.³

In 1745, Labourdonnais was appointed Governor of the islands. This was a remarkable man. He was born at St. Malo, in 1699, and was entered on board a ship bound for the South Sea at the age of ten. In 1713, he made a voyage to the East Indies and the Philippine islands, and availed himself of the presence of a Jesuit, who was a passenger in the ship, to acquire a knowledge of the mathematics. After performing several voyages to other parts of the world, he entered for the first time, in 1719, into the service of the East India Company, as second lieutenant of a vessel bound to Surat. He sailed again to India, as first lieutenant in 1723; and a third time, as second

¹ Raynall, ii. 271. *Mémoire pour Labourdonnais*, i. 88, 95. Orme, i. 92.

² *Mémoire*, ut supra, p. 94. Raynal, ut supra, p. 217.

³ *Mémoire pour Labourdonnais*, i. 96. *Mémoire contre Dupleix*, p. 8.

BOOK IV. captain in 1724. In every voyage he found opportunity
 CHAP. I. to distinguish himself by some remarkable action; and
 1746. during the last he acquired, from another passenger, an officer of engineers, a knowledge of the principles of fortification and tactics. He now resolved to remain in India, and to navigate a vessel on his own account. He is said to have been the first Frenchman who embarked in what is called the country trade; in which he conducted himself with so much skill, as to realize in a few years a considerable fortune. The force of his mind procured him an ascendancy wherever its influence was exerted: a violent quarrel was excited between some Arabian and Portuguese ships in the harbour of Mocha, and blood was about to be shed, when Labourdonnais interposed, and terminated the dispute to the satisfaction of the parties. So far did his service on this occasion recommend him to the Viceroy of Goa, that he invited him into the service of the King of Portugal, gave him the command of a King's ship, the order of Christ, the rank of Fidalgo, and the title of agent of his Portuguese Majesty on the coast of Coromandel. In this situation he remained for two years, and perfected his knowledge of the traffic and navigation of India; after which, in 1733, he returned to France. Apprized of his knowledge and capacity, the French government turned its eyes upon him, as a man well qualified to aid in raising the colonies in the eastern seas from that state of depression in which they remained. In 1734 he was nominated Governor General of the isles of France and Bourbon, where he arrived in June 1735. So little had been done for the improvement of these islands, that the people, few in number, were living nearly in the state of nature. They were poor, without industry, and without the knowledge of almost any of the useful arts. They had neither magazine, nor hospital, neither fortification, nor defensive force, military or naval. They had no roads; they had no beasts of burden, and no vehicles. Everything remained to be done by Labourdonnais; and he was capable of everything. With the hand to execute, as well as the head to contrive, he could construct a ship from the keel: he performed the functions of engineer, of architect, of agriculturist: he broke bulls to the yoke, constructed vehicles, and made roads: he apprenticed blacks to the few handicrafts whom

he carried out with him : he prevailed upon the inhabitants to cultivate the ground ; and introduced the culture of the sugar-cane and indigo : he made industry and the useful arts to flourish ; contending with the ignorance, the prejudices, and the inveterate habits of idleness, of those with whom he had to deal, and who opposed him at every step. To introduce any degree of order and vigilance into the management even of the hospital which he constructed for the sick, it was necessary for him to perform the office of superintendent himself, and for a whole twelvemonth he visited it regularly every morning. Justice had been administered by the Councils, to whom that function regularly belonged, in a manner which produced great dissatisfaction. During eleven years that Labourdonnais was Governor, there was but one law-suit in the Isle of France, he himself having terminated all differences by arbitration.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

1746.

The vast improvements which he effected in the islands did not secure him from the disapprobation of his employers. The captains of ships, and other visitants of the islands, whom he checked in their unreasonable demands, and from whom he exacted the discharge of their duties, filled the ears of the Company's Directors with complaints ; and the Directors, with too little knowledge for accurate judgment, and too little interest for careful inquiry, inferred culpability, because there was accusation. He returned to France in 1740, disgusted with his treatment ; and fully determined to resign the government : but the minister refused his consent. It is said that being asked by one of the Directors of the Company, how it was, that he had conducted his own affairs so prosperously, and those of the Company so much the reverse ; he replied that he had conducted his own affairs according to his own judgment : those of the Company according to that of the Directors.¹

Perceiving, by the state of affairs in Europe, that a rupture was approaching between France and the maritime powers, his fertile mind conceived a project for striking a fatal blow at the English trade in the East. Imparting the design to some of his friends, he projected that he should be aided with funds sufficient to equip, as ships of

¹ Raynal, liv. 4, sect. 20.

BOOK IV. war, six vessels and two frigates ; with which, being on
CHAP. I. the spot when war should be declared, he could sweep the
 1746. seas of the English commerce, before a fleet could arrive
 for its protection. He communicated the scheme to the
 ministry, by whom it was embraced, but moulded into a
 different form. They proposed to send out a fleet, com-
 posed partly of the King's and partly of the Company's
 ships, with Labourdonnais in the command : and though
 he foresaw opposition from the Company, to whom neither
 he nor the scheme was agreeable, he refused not to lend
 himself to the ministerial scheme. He sailed from L'Orient
 on the 5th of April, 1741, with five ships of the Company :
 one carrying fifty-six ; two carrying fifty ; one, twenty-
 eight ; and one, sixteen guns ; having on board about 1200
 sailors, and 500 soldiers. Two King's ships had been in-
 tended to make part of his squadron ; but they, to his
 great disappointment, received another destination. He
 also found that, of the ship's crews, three-fourths had
 never before been at sea : and that of either soldiers or
 sailors hardly one had ever fired a cannon or a musket.
 His mind was formed to contend with, rather than yield to
 difficulties : and he began immediately to exercise his men
 with all his industry : or rather with as much industry as
 their love of ease, and the opposition it engendered, ren-
 dered practicable. He arrived at the Isle of France on the
 14th of August, 1741, where he learned that Pondicherry
 was menaced by the Mahrattas, and that the islands of
 France and Bourbon had sent their garrisons to its assist-
 ance. After a few necessary operations to put the islands
 in security, he sailed for Pondicherry on the 22d of August,
 where he arrived on the 30th of September. The danger
 there was blown over ; but the settlement at Mahé had
 been eight months blockaded by the natives. He repaired
 to the place of danger ; chastised the enemy ; re-estab-
 lished the factory ; and then returned to the islands to
 wait for the declaration of war between France and Eng-
 land. There he soon received the mortifying orders of the
 Company to send home all the vessels under his command.
 Upon this he again requested leave to resign, and again
 the minister refused his consent. His views were now
 confined to his islands, and he betook himself with his
 pristine ardour to their improvement. On the 14th of

September, 1744, in the midst of these occupations, the intelligence arrived of the declaration of war between France and England; and filled his mind with the mortifying conception of the important things he now might have achieved, but which the mistaken policy or perversity of his employers had prevented.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.
1746.

Unable to do what he wished, he still resolved to do what he could. He retained whatever ships had arrived at the islands, namely, one of forty-four guns, one of forty, one of thirty, one of twenty-six, one of eighteen, and another of twenty-six, which was sent to him from Pondicherry with the most pressing solicitations to hasten to its protection. The islands, at which unusual scarcity prevailed, were destitute of almost every requisite equipment of the ships; and their captains, chagrined at the interruption of their voyages, seconded the efforts of the governor with all the ill-will it was safe for them to show. He was obliged to make even a requisition of negroes to man the fleet. In want of hands trained to the different operations of the building and equipping of ships, he employed the various handicrafts whom he was able to muster; and by skilfully assigning to them such parts of the business as were most analogous to the operations of their respective trades, by furnishing them with models which he prepared himself, by giving the most precise directions, and with infinite diligence superintending every operation in person, he overcame in some measure the difficulties with which he was surrounded. In the meantime, intelligence was brought by a frigate, that five of the Company's ships which he was required to protect, and which he was authorized by the King to command, would arrive at the islands in October. They did not arrive till January, 1746. The delay had consumed a great part of the provisions of the former ships: those which arrived had remaining for themselves a supply of only four months; they were in bad order: and there was no time, nor materials, nor hands to repair them. Only one was armed. It was necessary they should all be armed; and the means for that purpose were totally wanting. The ships' crews, incorporated with the negroes and the handicrafts, Labourdonnais formed into companies; he taught them the manual exercise, and military movements; showed them how to scale a wall, and apply

BOOK IV. petards ; exercised them in firing at a mark ; and employed
 CHAP. I. the most dexterous among them in preparing themselves
 1746. to use a machine, which he had invented, for throwing
 with mortars grappling-hooks for boarding to the distance
 of thirty toises.¹

He forwarded the ships, as fast as they were prepared, to Madagascar, where they might add to their stock of provisions, or at any rate save the stock which was already on board ; and he followed with the last on the 24th of March. Before sailing from Madagascar, a storm arose by which the ships were driven from their anchorage. One was lost ; and the rest, greatly damaged, collected themselves in the bay of a desert island on the coast of Madagascar. Here the operations of repairing were to be renewed ; and in still more unfavourable circumstances. To get the wood they required, a road was made across a marsh, a league in circumference ; the rains were incessant ; disease broke out among the people ; and many of the officers showed a bad disposition ; yet the work was prosecuted with so much efficiency, that in forty-eight days the fleet was ready for sea. It now consisted of nine sail, containing 3342 men, among whom were 720 blacks, and from three to four hundred sick.

In passing the island of Ceylon, they received intelligence that the English fleet was at hand. Labourdonnais summoned his captains on board, many of whom had shown themselves ill-disposed in the operation of industry ; but all of whom manifested an eagerness to fight. As Labourdonnais understood that he was superior to the English in number of men, but greatly inferior in weight of metal, he declared his intention to gain, if possible, the wind, and to board. On the 6th of July, on the coast of Coromandel, the English fleet appeared to windward, advancing with full sail towards the French.²

¹ This seems to be the same invention, exactly, with that of Captain Manby, for throwing a rope on board a vessel threatened with shipwreck. See an *Essay on the Preservation of Shipwrecked Persons*, by G. W. Manby, Esq., and *Mémoire pour Labourdonnais*, i. 80. The obvious expedient of training the sailors for land operations, is of high importance ; and it argues little for the heels of those who have conducted enterprises in which the mariners might have been, or were to be, employed for land operations, that such training has so rarely been resorted to. How much more instructive than that of the vulgar details of war, is the contemplation of the ingenuity, the industry, and the perseverance of such a man as Labourdonnais, in the various critical situations in which he was placed !

² For the above details respecting Labourdonnais, see *Mémoire*, ut supra, pp. 10—92.

Immediately after the declaration of war between France and England, a fleet, consisting of two ships of sixty guns each, one of fifty, and a frigate of twenty, commanded by Commodore Barnet, had been despatched to India. It cruized, at first, in two divisions; one in the Straits of Sunda, the other in the Straits of Malacca, the places best fitted for intercepting the French traders, of which it captured four. After rendezvousing at Batavia, the united fleet appeared on the coast of Coromandel, in the month of July, 1745. The Governor of Pondicherry, the garrison of which at that time consisted of only 436 Europeans, prevailed on the Mogul Governor of the province, to declare Pondicherry under his protection, and to threaten Madras, if the English fleet should commit hostilities on any part of his dominions. This intimidated the government of Madras, and they requested Commodore Barnet to confine his operations to the sea; who accordingly left the coast of Coromandel, to avoid the stormy season, which he passed at Mergui, a port on the opposite coast; and returned in the beginning of 1746. His fleet was now reinforced by two fifty gun ships, and a frigate of twenty guns from England; but one of the sixty gun ships had become unfit for service, and, together with the twenty gun frigate, went back to England. Commodore Barnet died at Fort St. David in the month of April; and was succeeded by Mr. Peyton, the second in command, who was cruising in the southward of Fort St. David, near Negapatnam, when he descried the enemy just arriving on the coast.¹

Labourdonnais formed his line, and waited for the English, who kept the advantage of the wind, and frustrated his design of boarding. A distant fight began about four in the afternoon, and the fleets separated for want of light about seven. Next morning Mr. Peyton called a council of war, and it was resolved, because the sixty gun ship was leaky, to sail for Trincomalee. The enemy lay to the whole day, expecting that the English, who had the wind, would return to the engagement. The French, however, were in no condition to pursue, and sailed for Pondicherry, at which they arrived on the eighth day of the month.²

¹ Orme, i. pp. 60—63.

² Orme, i. pp. 62, 63. *Mémoire*, ut supra, pp. 83—90. Mr. Orme says th

BOOK IV. Joseph Francis Dupleix was at that time Governor of
 CHAP. I. Pondicherry; having succeeded to the supreme command
 1746. of the French settlements in 1742. To this man are to be traced some of the most important of the modern revolutions in India. His father was a farmer-general of the revenues, and a Director of the East India Company. He had set his heart upon rearing his son to a life of commerce; and his education, which was liberal, was carefully directed to that end. As the study of mathematics, of fortification, and engineering, seemed to engross his attention too exclusively,¹ his father in 1715 sent him to sea; and he made several voyages to the Indies and America. He soon imbibed the taste of his occupation, and, desiring to pursue the line of maritime commerce, his father recommended him to the East India Company, and had sufficient interest to send him out in 1720 as first Member of the Council of Pondicherry. Impatient for distinction, the young man devoted himself to the business of his office; and became in time minutely acquainted with the commerce of the country. He embarked in it, on his own account; a species of adventure from which the poverty of the servants of the French Company had in general debarred them. In this station he continued for ten years, when his knowledge and talents pointed him out as the fittest person to superintend the business of the Company at their settlement at Chandernagor in Bengal. Though Bengal was the richest part of India, the French

challenge of Labourdonnais was only a feint, and that he was in no condition to renew the engagement. He himself, in the *Mémoire*, says that it was not a feint, and that *ce fut avec un extrême regret qu'il vit les Anglois lui échapper*.—M.

This assertion can scarcely be credited, as, although the French squadron was more numerous than the English, the former consisting of nine, the latter of five ships, yet of the latter, four exceeded in number and weight of guns, the largest vessel in Labourdonnais' fleet. It is very probable, therefore, that Orme was right.—W.

¹ The character he manifested at school bears a resemblance to what is reported of Napoleon Bonaparte: "La passion avec laquelle il se livra à l'étude des mathématiques, le dégoût qu'elle lui inspira pour tous les arts aimables qui ne lui paroissent que frivoles, le caractère taciturne, distrait, et méditatif, qu'elle parut lui donner, et la retraite qu'elle lui faisoit toujours préférer aux amusemens ordinaires de la société." *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 2. The coincidence in character with these men of another remarkable personage, Frederick the Great of Prussia, while a boy, is, perhaps, worth the remarking. His sister says, "Il avoit de l'esprit; son humeur étoit sombre et taciturne; il pensoit long temps, avant que de répondre, mais, en récompense, il répondoit juste." *Mémoires de Frédérique Sophie Wilhelmine de Prusse, Margravine de Bareith*, i. 8—22.

factory in that province had, from want of funds and from bad management, remained in a low condition. The colony was still to be formed ; and the activity and resources of the new manager soon produced the most favourable changes. The colonists multiplied ; enterprise succeeded to langour ; Dupleix on his own account entered with ardour into the country trade, in which he employed the inheritance he derived from his father, and had frequently not less than twelve vessels, belonging to himself and his partners, navigating to Surat, Mocha, Jedda, the Manillas, the Maldivias, Goa, Bussora, and the coast of Malabar. He realized a great fortune : during his administration more than 2000 brick houses were built at Chandernagor. He formed a new establishment for the French Company at Patna, and rendered the French commerce in Bengal an object of envy to the most commercial of the European colonies.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.
1746.

The reputation which he acquired in this situation pointed him out as the fittest person to occupy the station of Governor at Pondicherry. Upon his appointment to this chief command, he found the Company in debt ; and he was pressed by instructions from home, to effect immediately a great reduction of expense.

The reduction of expense, in India, raising up a host of enemies, is an arduous and a dangerous task to a European governor. Dupleix was informed that war was impending between France and the maritime powers. Pondicherry was entirely open to the sea, and very imperfectly fortified even towards the land. He proceeded, with his usual industry, to inquire, to plan, and to execute. Though expressly forbidden, under the present circumstances of the Company, to incur any expense for fortifications, he, on the prospect of a war with the maritime powers, made the works at Pondicherry a primary object. He had been struggling with the difficulties of narrow resources, and the strong temptation of extended views, about four years, when Labourdonnais arrived in the roads.¹

The mind of Dupleix, though ambitious, active, and ingenious, seems to have possessed but little elevation. His vanity was excessive, and even effeminate ; and he was not exempt from the infirmities of jealousy and re-

¹ Mémoire pour Dupleix, pp. 9—26.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK IV. *venge.* In the enterprise in which the fleet was destined

CHAP. I. to be employed, Labourdonnais was to reap the glory ;
and from the very first he had reason to complain of the air

1746. of haughtiness and reserve which his rival assumed. As the English were warned out of the seas, and nothing was to be gained by cruising, Labourdonnais directed his thoughts to Madras. The danger, however, was great, so long as his ships were liable to be attacked, with the greater part of their crews on shore. He, therefore, demanded sixty pieces of cannon from Dupleix, to place him on a level, in point of metal, with the English fleet, and resolved to proceed in quest of it. Dupleix alleged the danger of leaving Pondicherry deprived of its guns, and refused. With a very inferior reinforcement of guns,¹ with a very inadequate supply of ammunition, and with water given him at Pondicherry, so bad, as to produce the dysentery in his fleet, Labourdonnais put to sea on the 4th of August. On the 17th, he descried the English fleet off Negapatnam, and hoisted Dutch colours as a decoy. The English understood the stratagem, changed their course, and fled. Labourdonnais says he pursued them all that day and the next ; when, having the wind, they escaped.² He returned to Pondicherry on the 23rd, much enfeebled by disease, and found all hearty co-operation on the part of the governor and council still more hopeless than before. After a series of unfriendly proceedings, under which he had behaved with a manly temperance ; after Dupleix had even commanded him to re-land the Pondicherry troops, he resolved to send the fleet, which he was still too much indisposed to command, towards Madras, for the double purpose, of seizing the vessels by which the people of Madras were preparing to send away the most valuable of their effects, and of ascertaining whether his motions were watched by the English fleet. The cruise was unskilfully conducted, and yielded little in the way of prize ; it afforded presumption, however, that the English fleet had abandoned the coast. Labourdon-

¹ Labourdonnais (*Mémoire*, i. 109,) does not state the number of the guns from Pondicherry, with which he was obliged to content himself. Orme, i. 64, says, he obtained thirty or forty pieces ; but it is a grievous defect of Mr. Orme's history, that he never gives his authorities.

² *Mémoire pour Labourdonnais*, ut supra, p. 110, and Orme, p. 64, who here adopts the account of Labourdonnais.

nais saw, therefore, a chance of executing his plan upon Madras. He left Pondicherry on the 12th of September, and on the 14th commenced the operations, which ended, as we have seen, in the surrender of the place.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

1746.

It was in consequence of an express article in his orders from home, that Labourdonnais agreed to the restoration of Madras.¹ But nothing could be more adverse to the views of Dupleix. He advised, he entreated, he menaced, he protested; Labourdonnais, however, proceeded with firmness to fulfil the conditions into which he had entered. Dupleix not only refused all assistance to expedite the removal of goods, and enable the ships to leave Madras before the storms which accompany the change of monsoon; he raised up every obstruction in his power, and even endeavoured to excite sedition among Labourdonnais' own people, that they might seize and send him to Pondicherry. On the night of the 13th of October, a storm arose, which forced the ships out to sea. Two were lost, and only fourteen of the crew of one of them were saved. Another was carried so far to the southward, that she was unable to regain the coast; all lost their masts, and sustained great and formidable injury. Disregarding the most urgent entreaties for assistance, Dupleix maintained his opposition. At last, a suggestion was made, that the articles of the treaty of ransom should be so far altered, as to afford time to the French, for removal of the goods; and Labourdonnais and the English, though with some reluctance, agreed, that the period of evacuation should be changed from the 15th of October to the 15th of January. This was all that Dupleix desired. Upon the departure of Labourdonnais, which the state of the season rendered indispensable, the place would be delivered into the hands of Dupleix, and he was not to be embarrassed with the fetters of a treaty.²

¹ Il est expressément défendu au sieur de la Bourdonnais de s'emparer d'aucun établissement ou comptoir des ennemis pour le conserver. Mém. p. 105. This was signed by M. Orry, Contrôleur Général. It appears, by the orders both to Labourdonnais and Dupleix, that the French government and East India Company shrunk from all idea of conquest in India.—M.

The letter to the proprietors explains the purport of M. Labourdonnais' instructions more correctly. He was not to form any new settlement, and the only alternatives in his power with regard to Madras, were to restore or destroy it. The object of the French East India Company was to improve their existing settlements, at least before new ones were established.—W.

² Mémoire, ut supra, pp. 142—220. Orme, i. 69—72. Dupleix, in his apo-

BOOK IV. The remaining history of Labourdonnais may be shortly
 CHAP. I. adduced. Upon his return to Pondicherry, the opposition,
 1746. which he had formerly experienced, was changed to open hostility. All his proposals for a union of councils and of resources were rejected with scorn. Three fresh ships had arrived from the islands; and, notwithstanding the loss occasioned by the storm, the force of the French was still sufficient to endanger, if not to destroy, the whole of the English settlements in India.¹ Convinced, by the counteraction which he experienced, that he possessed not the means of carrying his designs into execution, Labourdonnais acceded to the proposition of Dupleix that he should proceed to Acheen with such of the ships as were able to keep the sea, and return to Pondicherry after they were repaired; resigning five of them to Dupleix to carry out next year's investment to Europe. At its departure, the squadron consisted of seven ships, of which four were in tolerable repair; the rest were in such a condition that it was doubted whether they could reach Acheen; if this was impracticable, they were to sail for the islands. In conformity with this plan, Labourdonnais divided them into two parts. The first, consisting of the sound vessels, was directed to make its way to Acheen, without waiting for the rest; he himself remained with the second, with intention to follow, if that were in his power. The first division outsailed, and soon lost sight

logy, involves the cause of his opposition to Labourdonnais in mystery. It was a secret, forsooth! And a secret, too, of the ministry and the company! The disgrace, then, was tripartite: Great consolation to Labourdonnais! And great satisfaction to the nation! "Le Sieur Dupleix," says the Mémoire, "respecte trop les ordres du ministère et ceux de la Compagnie pour oser publier ici ce qu'il lui a été enjoint d'ensevelir dans le plus profond secret:" p. 27. In the usual style of subterfuge and mystery, this is ambiguous and equivocal. The word *ordres* may signify orders given to him to behave as he did to Labourdonnais; and this is the sense in which it is understood by Voltaire, who says, "Le gouverneur Dupleix s'excusa dans ses Mémoires sur des ordres secrets du ministère. Mais il n'avait pu recevoir à six mille lieues des ordres concernant une conquête qu'on venait de faire, et que le ministère de France n'avait jamais pu prévoir. Si ces ordres funestes avaient été donnés par prévoyance, ils étoient formellement contradictoires avec ceux que la Bourdonnais avait apportés. Le ministère aurait eu à se reprocher la perte de neuf millions dont on priva la France en violant la capitulation, mais surtout le cruel traitement dont il paya le génie, la valeur, et la magnanimité de la Bourdonnais."—Fragm. Histor. sur l'Inde, Art. 3. But the word *ordres* may also signify, orders merely not to disclose the pretended secret. This is a species of defence which ought ever to be suspected; for it may be as easily applied to the greatest villany as to the greatest worth, and is far more likely to be so.

² Orme, i. 69, 73.

of the other; with which Labourdonnais, finding it in vain to strive for Acheen, at last directed his course to the islands. Hastening to Europe, to make his defence, or answer the accusations of his enemies, he took his passage in a ship belonging to Holland. In consequence of the declaration of war she was forced into an English harbour. Labourdonnais was recognized, and made a prisoner; but the conduct which he had displayed at Madras was known and remembered. All ranks received him with favour and distinction. That he might not be detained, a Director of the East India Company offered to become security for him with his person and property. With a corresponding liberality, the government declined the offer, desiring no security but the word of Labourdonnais. His treatment in France was different. The representations of Dupleix had arrived: A brother of Dupleix was a Director of the East India Company; Dupleix had only violated a solemn treaty; Labourdonnais had only faithfully and gloriously served his country; and he was thrown into the Bastile. He remained in that prison three years; while the vindication which he published, and the authentic documents by which he supported it, fully established his innocence, and the ardour and ability of his services. He survived his liberation a short time, a memorable example of the manner in which a blind government encourages desert.¹

He had not taken his departure from Madras, when the troops of the Nabob appeared. Dupleix had been able to dissuade that native ruler from yielding his protection to Madras, a service which the English, who had prevailed on Commodore Barnet to abstain from molesting Pondicherry, claimed as their due. Dupleix had gained him by the promise of Madras. The Moor (so at that time the Moslems in India were generally called) quickly however perceived, that the promise was a delusion; and he now proposed to take vengeance by driving the French from the place. As soon as Labourdonnais and his fleet disappeared, a numerous army of the Nabob, led by his son, invested Madras. From the disaster, however, which had

¹ Mémoire, ut supra, pp. 221—280. Orme, i. 72, Raynal, liv. iv. sect. 20. Voltaire, amid other praises, says of him, "Il fit plus; il dispersa une escadre Angloise dans la mer de l'Inde, ce qui n'étoit jamais arrivé qu'à lui, et ce qu'on n'a pas revu depuis." *Fragm. Histor. sur l'Inde*, Art. 3.

BOOK IV. befallen the fleet, Labourdonnais had been under the necessity of leaving behind him about 1200 Europeans, disciplined by himself: the French, therefore, encountered the Indians; astonished them beyond measure by the rapidity of their artillery; with a numerical force which bore no proportion to the enemy, gained over them a decisive victory; and first broke the spell which held the Europeans in subjection to the native powers.¹

CHAP. I.

1746.

The masters of mankind, how little soever disposed to share better things with the people, are abundantly willing to give them a share of their disgrace. Though, on other occasions, they may affect a merit in despising the public will, they diligently put on the appearance of being constrained by it in any dishonourable action which they have a mind to perform. In violating the treaty with the English, Dupleix recognised his own baseness; means were therefore used to make the French inhabitants of Pondicherry assemble and draw up a remonstrance against it, and a prayer that it might be annulled. Moved by respect for the general voice of his countrymen, Dupleix sent his orders to declare the treaty of ransom annulled; to take the keys of all magazines; and to seize every article of property, except the clothes of the wearers, the moveables of the houses, and the jewels of the women: orders which were executed with avaricious exactness. The governor and principal inhabitants were carried prisoners to Pondicherry, and exhibited, by Dupleix, in a species of triumph.²

The English still possessed the settlement of Fort St.

¹ Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 28; Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 243. "It was now more than a century," says Mr. Orme, i. 76, "since any European nations had gained a decisive advantage in war against the officers of the Great Mogul. The experience of former unsuccessful wars, and the scantiness of military abilities which prevailed in all the colonies, from a long disuse of arms, had persuaded them that the Moors were a brave and formidable enemy; when the French at once broke through the charm of this timorous opinion, by defeating a whole army with a single battalion."

² Mémoire pour Labourdonnais, i. 252. Orme, i. 77. Dupleix, in his apology (Mém. p. 27), declines defending this breach of faith, repeating the former pretence of secrecy, to which, he says, the Ministry and the Company enjoined him. Experience justifies three inferences: 1. That the disgrace was such as explanation would enhance; 2. That the Ministry and the Company were sharers in it; 3. That having such partners, his safety did not depend upon his justification. He adds, that it is certain he was innocent, because the Ministry and the Company continued to employ him. It was certain, either that he was innocent, or that the Ministry and the Company were sharers in his guilt. And it was a maxim at that time in France, that a Ministry never can have guilt; if so, the inference was logical.

David, on the coast of Coromandel. It was situated twelve miles south from Pondicherry ; with a territory still larger than that of Madras. Besides Fort St. David, at which were placed the houses of the Company, and other Europeans, it contained the town of Cuddalore, inhabited by the Indian merchants, and other natives ; and two or three populous villages. The fort was small ; but stronger than any of its size in India. Cuddalore was surrounded, on the three sides towards the land, by walls flanked with bastions. On the side towards the sea, it was open, but skirted by a river, which was separated from the sea by a mound of sand. A part of the inhabitants of Madras had, after a violation of the treaty of ransom, made their way to Fort St. David ; and the agents of the Company at that place now took upon themselves the functions of the Presidency of Madras, and the general administration of the English affairs on the Coromandel coast.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1746.

Dupleix lost no time in following up the retention of Madras with an enterprise against Fort St. David, the reduction of which would have left him without a European rival. In the night of the 19th of December, a force consisting of 1700 men, mostly Europeans, of which fifty were cavalry, with two companies of the *Katire* slaves trained by Labourdonnais, set out from Pondicherry, and arrived next morning in the vicinity of the English fort. The garrison, including the men who had escaped from Madras, amounted to no more than about 200 Europeans, and 100 *Topasses*. At this time the English had not yet learned to train Sepoys in the European discipline, though the French had already set the example, and had four or five disciplined companies at Pondicherry.² They had hired, however, 2000 of the undisciplined soldiers of the country, who are armed promiscuously with swords and targets, bows and arrows, pikes, lances, matchlocks or muskets, and known among the Europeans by the name of *Peons* ; among these men they had distributed eight or nine hundred muskets, and destined them for the defence of Cuddalore. They had also applied for assistance to the

¹ Orme, i. 78.

² The two important discoveries for conquering India were : 1st, The weakness of the native armies against European discipline : 2dly, The facility of imparting that discipline to natives in the European service. Both discoveries were made by the French.

BOOK IV. Nabob ; and he, exasperated against the French, by his
 CHAP. I. defeat at Madras, engaged, upon the promise of the English
 1747. to defray part of the expense, to send his army to assist
 Fort St. David. The French, having gained an advantageous post, and laid down their arms for a little rest, were exulting in the prospect of an easy prey, when an army of nearly 10,000 men advanced in sight. Not attempting resistance, the French made good their retreat, with twelve Europeans killed, and 120 wounded. Dupleix immediately entered into a correspondence with the Moors, to detach them from the English ; and, at the same time, meditated the capture of Cuddalore by surprise. On the night of the 10th of January, 500 men were embarked in boats, with orders to enter the river and attack the open quarter of the town at daybreak. But, as the wind rose, and the surf was high, they were compelled to return.¹

Dupleix was fertile in expedients, and indefatigable in their application. He sent a detachment from Madras into the Nabob's territory, in hopes to withdraw him to its defence. The French troops disgraced themselves by the barbarity of their ravages ; but the Indian army remained at Fort St. David, and the resentment of the Nabob was increased. On the 20th of January, the four ships of Labourdonnais' squadron, which had sailed to Acheen to refit, arrived in the road of Pondicherry. Dupleix conveyed to the Nabob an exaggerated account of the vast accession of force which he had received ; describing the English as a contemptible handful of men, devoted to destruction. "The governments of Indostan," says Mr. Orme on this occasion, "have no idea of national honour in the conduct of their politics ; and as soon as they think the party with whom they are engaged is reduced to great distress, they shift, without hesitation, their alliance to the opposite side, making immediate advantage the only rule of their action." A peace was accordingly concluded ; the Nabob's troops abandoned the English ; his son, who commanded the army, paid a visit to Pondicherry ; was received, by Dupleix, with that display in which he delighted ; and was gratified by a considerable present.²

¹ Orme, i. 79—83.

² *Mémoire pour Labourdonnais*, i. 259. *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 29. Orme, i. 84, 85.

Blocked up, as it would have been, from receiving supplies, by the British ships at sea, and by the Nabob's army on land, Pondicherry, but for this treaty, would soon have been reduced to extremity.¹ And now the favourable opportunity for accomplishing the destruction of Fort St. David was eagerly seized. On the morning of the 13th of March, a French army was seen approaching the town. After some resistance, it had crossed the river, which flows a little way north from the fort, and had taken possession of its former advantageous position; when an English fleet was seen approaching the road. The French crossed the river with precipitation, and returned to Pondicherry.²

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

1747.

The fleet under Captain Peyton, after it was lost sight of by Labourdonnais, on the 18th of August, off Negapatnam, had tantalized the inhabitants of Madras, who looked to it with eagerness for protection, by appearing off Pullicat, about thirty miles to the northward, on the 3rd of September, and again sailing away. Peyton proceeded to Bengal; because the sixty-gun ship was in such a condition as to be supposed incapable of bearing the shock of her own guns. The fleet was there reinforced by two ships, one of sixty and one of forty guns, sent from England with Admiral Griffin; who assumed the command, and proceeded with expedition to save Fort St. David, and menace Pondicherry. The garrison was reinforced by the arrival of 100 Europeans, 200 Topasses, and 100 Sepoys, from Bombay, besides 400 Sepoys from Tellicherry; in the course of the year 150 soldiers were landed from the Company's ships from England: and in the month of January, 1748, Major Lawrence arrived, with a commission to command the whole of the Company's forces in India.³

The four ships which had arrived at Pondicherry from Acheen, and which Dupleix foresaw would be in imminent danger, when the English fleet should return to the coast, he had, as soon as he felt assured of concluding peace with the Nabob, ordered from Pondicherry to Goa. From Goa they proceeded to Mauritius, where they were joined by three other ships from France. About the middle of June,

¹ So says Dupleix himself, *Mém.* p. 29.

² Orme, i. 87. *Mém.* pour Dupleix, p. 29.

³ Orme, i. 66, 87, 88.

BOOK IV. this fleet was despatched off Fort St. David, making sail, as if
 CHAP. I. it intended to bear down upon the English. Admiral
 1747. Griffin waited for the land wind, and put to sea at night, expecting to find the enemy in the morning. But the French Admiral, as soon as it was dark, crowded sail, and proceeded directly to Madras, where he landed 300 soldiers, and £200,000 in silver, the object of his voyage ; and then returned to Mauritius. Admiral Griffin sought for him in vain.¹ But Dupleix, knowing that several days would be necessary to bring the English ships back to Fort St. David, against the monsoon, contrived another attack upon Cuddalore. Major Lawrence, by a well-executed feint, allowed the enemy at midnight to approach the very walls, and even to apply the scaling ladders, under an idea that the garrison was withdrawn, when a sudden discharge of artillery and musketry struck them with dismay, and threw them into precipitate retreat.²

The Government of England, moved by the disasters of the nation in India, and jealous of the ascendancy assumed by the French, had now prepared a formidable armament for the East. Nine ships of the public navy, one of seventy-four, one of sixty-four, two of sixty, two of fifty, one of twenty guns, a sloop of fourteen, a bomb-ketch with her tender, and an hospital-ship,³ commanded by Admiral Boscawen ; and eleven ships of the Company, carrying stores and troops to the amount of 1400 men, set sail from England toward the end of the year 1747. They had instructions to capture the island of Mauritius in their way ; as a place of great importance to the enterprises of the French in India. But the leaders of the expedition, after examining the coast, and observing the means of defence, were deterred, by the loss of time which the enterprise would occasion. On the 9th of August they arrived at

¹ Admiral Griffin, on his return to England, was brought to a court-martial and suspended the service, for negligence in not having stood out to sea upon first receiving information of the enemy's approach : by doing which, it was argued, he might have frustrated the object of the French's squadron, if not have brought them to action. He published an appeal against the sentence, grounding his defence upon his having missed the land-wind on the day before the squadron was in sight, in necessary preparations to strengthen his own ships for an encounter with what his information represented as a superior force, by which he expected to be attacked.—W.

² Orme, l. 88--91. Orme says that 200 soldiers only were landed by the French at Madras. Dupleix himself says, *Trois cent hommes, tant sains que malades*. Mémoires, p. 32.

Fort St. David, when the squadron, joined to that under Griffin, formed the largest European force that any one power had yet possessed in India.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. I.

1748.

Dupleix, who had received early intelligence from France of the preparations for this armament, had been the more eager to obtain an interval of friendship with the Nabob, and to improve it to the utmost for laying in provisions and stores at Pondicherry and Madras; knowing well, as soon as the superior force of the English should appear, that the Nabob would change sides, and the French settlements, both by sea and land, would again be cut off from supplies.²

Preparations at Fort St. David had been made, to expedite the operations of Boscawen, and he was in a very short time ready for action; when all Englishmen exulted in the hope of seeing the loss of Madras revenged by the destruction of Pondicherry. Amid other points of preparation for attaining this desirable object, there was one, to wit, knowledge, which they had, unfortunately, overlooked. At a place called Ariancopang, about two miles to the south-west of Pondicherry, the French had built a small fort. When the English arrived at this place, not a man was found who could give a description of it. They resolved, however, to take it by assault; but were repulsed, and the repulse dejected the men. Time was precious; for the season of the rains, and the change of monsoon, were at hand: A small detachment, too, left at the fort, might have held the feeble garrison in check: but it was resolved to take Ariancopang at any expense: batteries were opened; but the enemy defended themselves with spirit: Major Lawrence was taken prisoner in the trenches. Several days were consumed, and more would have been added to them, had not a part of the enemy's magazine of powder taken fire, which so terrified the garrison, that they blew up the walls and retreated to Pondicherry. As if sufficient time had not been lost, the English remained five days longer to repair the fort, in which they resolved to leave a garrison, lest the enemy should resume possession during the siege.

They advanced to Pondicherry, and opened the trenches

¹ Orme, t. 94—98.

² Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 31, 32.

BOOK IV. on the north-west side of the town, at the distance of
 CHAP. I. 1,500 yards from the wall, though it was even then cus-

1748.

tomary to open them within 800 yards of the covered way. The cannon and mortars in the ships were found capable of little execution; and, from want of experience, the approaches, with much labour, went slowly on. At last they were carried within 800 yards of the wall; when it was found impossible to extend them any further, on account of a large morass; while, on the northern side of the town, they might have been carried to the foot of the glacis. Batteries, at the distance of 800 yards, were constructed on the edge of the morass; but the enemy's fire proved double that of the besiegers; the rains came on; sickness prevailed in the camp; very little impression had been made on the defences of the town; a short time would make the roads impracticable; and hurricanes were apprehended, which would drive the ships from the coast. It was therefore determined, by a council of war, thirty-one days after the opening of the trenches, that the siege should be raised. Dupleix, as corresponded with the character of the man, made a great ostentation and parade on this unexpected event. He represented himself as having gained one of the most brilliant victories on record; he wrote letters in this strain, not only to France, but to the Indian princes, and even to the Great Mogul himself; he received in return the highest compliments on his own conduct and bravery, as well as on the prowess of his nation; and the English were regarded in India as only a secondary and inferior people.¹

In November news arrived that a suspension of arms had taken place between England and France: and this was shortly after followed by intelligence of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in which the French Government had agreed to restore Madras. It was delivered up in August, with its fortifications much improved. At the distance of four miles south from Madras, was the town of San Tomé, or St. Thomas, built by the Portuguese, and, in the time of

¹ Orme, i. 80, 98—106. Dupleix (Mém. p. 32) says that the trenches were open forty-two days, and that the siege altogether lasted fifty-eight. The memoir drawn up by the French East India Company, in answer to Dupleix, alleges more than once that Dupleix was defective in personal courage; and says he apologized for the care with which he kept at a distance from shot, by acknowledging *que le bruit des armes suspendoit ses réflexions, et que le calme seul convenoit à son génie.* p. 18.

their prosperity, a place of note. It had long, however, been reduced to obscurity, and though inhabited mostly by Christians, had hardly been regarded as a possession by any of the European powers. It had been found that the Roman Catholic priests, from the sympathy of religion, had conveyed useful information to the French in their designs upon Madras. To prevent the like inconvenience in future, it was now taken possession of by the English, and the obnoxious part of the inhabitants ordered to withdraw.¹

No events of any importance had occurred at the other presidencies, during these years of war. The Viceroy of Bengal had prohibited the French and English from prosecuting their hostilities in his dominions. This governor exacted contributions from the European colonies, for the protection which he bestowed; that, however, which he imposed upon the English did not exceed £100,000. A quantity of raw silk, amounting to 300 bales, belonging to the Company, was plundered by the Mahrattas; and the distress which the incursions of that people produced in the province, increased the difficulties of traffic.²

The trade of the Company exhibited the following results:—

	Gold and Stores exported.	Bullion do.	Total.
1744	£231,318	£458,544	£689,862
1745	91,364	476,853	568,217
1746	265,818	560,020 ..	825,838
1747	107,979	779,256	887,235
1748	127,224	706,890	834,114

The Bills of Exchange for which the Company paid during those years were:—

1744	£103,349	1747	£441,651
1745	98,213	1748	178,419
1746	417,647		

The amount of sales for the same years (including thirty per cent of duties, which remained to be deducted) was:

1744	£1,997,506	1747	£1,739,159
1745	2,480,966	1748	1,768,041 ³
1746	1,602,388		

¹ Orme, i. 107, 75, 131.

² Orme, ii. 55.

³ Third Report from the Committee of Secrecy, 1773, p. 75.

BOOK IV. The official value at the Custom-house of the imports
 CHAP. II. and exports of the Company, during that period, was as
 follows :

1749.		Imports.		Exports.
	1744	£743,508	£476,274
	1745	973,705	293,113
	1746	646,697	893,540
	1747	128,733	345,526
	1748	1,098,712	306,357 ¹

The dividend was eight per cent. per annum, during the whole of the time.²

During the same period, the trade of the nation, notwithstanding the war, had considerably increased. The imports had risen from £6,362,971 official value, to £8,136,408; and the exports from £11,429,628 to £12,351,433; and, in the two following years, to £14,099,366 and £15,132,004.³

CHAPTER II.

Origin, Progress, and Suspension, of the Contest for establishing Mohammed Ali, Nabob of the Carnatic.

A NEW scene is now to open in the history of the East India Company. Before this period they had maintained the character of mere traders, and, by humility and submission, endeavoured to preserve a footing in that distant country, under the protection or oppression of the native powers. We shall now behold them entering the lists of war; and mixing with eagerness in the contests of the princes. Dupleix, whose views were larger than, at that time, those of any of the servants of the Company, had already planned, in his imagination, an empire for the French, and had entered pretty deeply into the intrigues of the country powers. The English were the first to draw the sword; and from no higher inducement than the promise of a trifling settlement on the Coromandel coast.

A prince who, amid the revolutions of that country, had, some years before, possessed and lost the throne of Tanjore, repaired to Fort St. David, and entreated the as-

¹ Sir C. Whitworth's Tables, part ii. p. 9.

² Report, ut supra, p. 74.

³ Whitworth's Tables, p. i. part 78.

sistance of the English. He represented his countrymen as ready to co-operate for his restoration ; and promised the fort and country of Devi-Cotah, with the payment of all expenses, if, with their assistance, he should recover his rights. The war between the French and English had brought to the settlements of both nations in that quarter of India, a greater quantity of troops than was necessary for their defence ; and with the masters of troops it seems to be a law of nature, whenever they possess them in greater abundance than is necessary for defence, to employ them for the disturbance of others. The French and English rulers in India showed themselves extremely obedient to that law. The interests of the Tanjore fugitive were embraced at Fort St. David ; and, in the beginning of April, 1749, 430 Europeans and 1000 Sepoys, with four field-pieces and four small mortars, marched with him for Tanjore.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.
1749.

Tanjore was one of those rajaships, or small kingdoms, into which the Mohammedans, at their first invasion of India, found the country in general divided. It occupied little more than the space enclosed and intersected by the numerous mouths of the river Cavery. The Coleroon, or most northern branch of that river, bounded it on the north, and it extended about seventy miles along the coast, and nearly as much inland from the sea. Like the rest of the neighbouring country, it appears to have become dependent upon the more powerful rajaship of Beejanuggur, before the establishment of the Mohammedan kingdoms in the Deccan ; and afterwards upon the kingdom of Beejapore, but subject still to its own laws and its own sovereign or raja, who held it in the character of a Zemindar. In the time of Aurungzeb, it has been already seen, that a very remarkable personage, the father of Sivajee, who had obtained a footing in the Carnatic, had entered into a confederacy with the Raja or Polygar of Mudkul or Madura, against the Raja or Zemindar or Naig (for we find all these titles applied to him) of Tanjore, whom they defeated and slew ; that afterwards quarrelling with the Raja of Mudkul, about the division of the conquered territory, the Mahratta stripped him of his dominions, took possession both of Mudkul and Tanjore, and transmitted them to his pos-

BOOK IV. terity.¹ His grandson Shaojee was attacked and taken
 CHAP. II. prisoner by Zulfikar Khan, who, to strengthen his party,
 1749. restored him to his government or zemindary, upon the
 death of Aurungzeb. Shaojee had two brothers, Shurfajee
 and Tukojee. They succeeded one another in the govern-
 ment, and all died without issue, excepting the last.
 Tukojee had three sons, Baba Saib, Nana, and Sahujee.
 Baba Saib succeeded his father, and died without issue.
 Nana died before him, but left an infant son, and his widow
 was raised to the government, by the influence of Seid, the
 commander of the fort. This powerful servant soon de-
 prived the Queen of all authority, threw her into prison,
 and set up as raja a pretended son of Shurfajee. It suited
 the views of Seid to allow a very short existence to this
 prince and his power. He next placed Sahujee, the
 youngest of the sons of Tukojee, in the seat of govern-
 ment. Sahujee also was soon driven from the throne.
 Seid now vested with the name of sovereign, Prataup
 Sing, a son by one of the inferior wives of Tukojee. This
 was in 1741. The first act of Prataup Sing's government
 was to assassinate Seid. It was Sahujee who now craved
 the assistance of the English.² And it was after having
 corresponded for years with Prataup Sing, as King of Tan-
 jore; after having offered to him the friendship of the
 English nation; and after having courted his assistance
 against the French; that the English rulers now, without
 so much as a pretence of any provocation, and without
 the allegation of any other motive than the advantage of
 possessing Devi-Cotah, despatched an army to dethrone
 him.³

¹ Vide supra. Also Aurungzeb's Operations in the Deccan, by Scott, p. 6.—M. Also Duff's History of the Mahrattas, i. 199.—W.

² History and Management of the East India Company, from an authentic MS. account of Tanjore. See also Orme, i. 168, who, in some particulars, was misinformed.—M. Duff calls him Syajee, and adds he was a legitimate son. Prataup Sing was the son of a concubine.—W.

³ "The meaning of this letter is to let your Majesty know, I shall esteem it a great honour to be upon such terms with your Majesty, as may be convenient to both; for which reason, I hope, this will meet with a gracious acceptance, as likewise the few things I send with it." Letter from Governor Floyer to Prataup Sing, King of Tanjore, dated 30th November, 1746.—"I received your letter, and am glad to hear of the King of Tanjore's regard and civility towards the English: You may be assured, that after the arrival of our ships, which will be very soon, I will serve the King, and all the people that will do us good against the French, who are enemies to all the world." Letter from Governor Floyer to Maccajeeeniko, officer of the King of Tanjore, dated 3d Jan. 1747.—"This is to acquaint your Majesty of the good news we have received from Europe two days past. The French nation (enemies both to your Majesty and

The troops proceeded by land, while the battering-BOOK IV.
cannon and provisions were conveyed by sea. They had CHAP. II.
begun to proceed when the monsoon changed, with a violent hurricane. The army, having crossed the river Coleroon, without opposition, were on the point of turning into a road among the woods, which they would have found inextricable. Some of the soldiers, however, discovered a passage along the river, into which they turned by blind but lucky chance; and this led them, after a march of about ten miles, to the neighbourhood of Devi-Cotah. They had been annoyed by the Tanjorines; no partisans appeared for Sahuje; it indeed appears not that so much as a notice had been conveyed to them of what was designed; and no intelligence could be procured of the ships, though they were at anchor only four miles off at the mouth of the river. The army threw at the fort what shells they had, and then retreated without delay.

1749.

The shame of a defeat was difficult to bear; and the rulers of Madras resolved upon a second attempt. They exaggerated the value of Devi-Cotah; situated in the most fertile spot on the coast of Coromandel; and standing on the river Coleroon, the channel of which, within the bar, was capable of receiving ships of the largest burden, while there was not a port from Masulipatam to Cape Comorin, which could receive one of 300 tons: it was true the mouth of the river was obstructed by sand; but if that could be removed, the possession would be invaluable. This time, the expedition, again commanded by Major Lawrence,¹ proceeded wholly by sea; and from the mouth of the river the troops and stores were conveyed up to

the English) had fitted out a force with design to drive the English out of India: and had they been successful, they would never have stopped there; but would have made settlements in whatever parts of your country they liked best, as they have already done at Carical. But it pleased God that their vile designs have been prevented; for our ships met them at sea, and took and destroyed the whole of them..... I do not at all doubt, but that in a short time we shall be able to put you in possession of Carical, which I hear you so much wish for." Letter from Governor Floyer to the King of Tanjore, dated 19th Jan. 1743. See i. 25, 26, of a Collection of Papers, entitled Tanjore Papers, published by the East India Company in three 4to volumes, in 1777, as an Appendix to a Vindication of the Company, drawn up by their counsel, Mr. Rous, in answer to two pamphlets; one entitled, "State of Facts relative to Tanjore:" the other, "Original Papers relative to Tanjore." This Collection of Papers I shall commonly quote, under the short title of Rous's Appendix.

¹ Major Lawrence did not command on the first invasion of Tanjore, the force was led by Captain Cope. Rous's Appendix, 30.—W.

BOOK IV. Devi-Cotah in boats. The army was landed on the side of the river opposite to the fort, where it was proposed to erect the batteries, because the ground on the same side of the river with the fort, was marshy, covered with wood, and surrounded by the Tanjore army. After three days' firing a breach was made ; but no advantage could be taken of it till the river was crossed. This was dangerous, as well from the breadth and rapidity of the stream, as from the number of soldiers in the thickets which covered the opposite shore. To the ingenuity of a common ship's carpenter, the army was indebted for the invention by which the danger was overcome. A raft was constructed sufficient to contain 400 men ; but the difficulty was to move it across. John Moore, the man who suggested and constructed the raft, was again ready with his aid. He swam the river in the night ; fastened to a tree on the opposite side a rope which he carefully concealed in the bushes and water ; and returned without being perceived. Before the raft began to move, some pieces of artillery were made to fire briskly upon the spot where the rope was attached ; and moved the Tanjorines to a distance too great to perceive it. The raft was moved across ; it returned, and recrossed several times, till the whole of the troops were landed on the opposite bank. Major Lawrence resolved to storm the breach without delay. Lieutenant Clive, who had given proofs of his ardent courage at the siege of Pondicherry, offered to lead the attack. He proceeded with a platoon of Europeans and 700 Sepoys ; but rashly allowing himself, at the head of the platoon, to be separated from the Sepoys, he narrowly escaped with his life ; and the platoon was almost wholly destroyed. Major Lawrence advanced with the whole of his force, when the soldiers mounted the breach, and after a feeble resistance took possession of the place. An accommodation between the contending parties was effected soon after. The reigning king agreed to concede to the English the fort for which they contended, with a territory of the annual value of 9000 pagodas ; and they, on their part, not only renounced the support of him for whom they had pretended to fight as the true and lawful king, but agreed to secure his person, in order that he might give no further molestation to Prataup Sing, and

CHAP. II.

1749.

demanded only 4000 rupees, about £400, for his annual expenses.¹ It may well be supposed, that to conquer Tanjore for him would have been a frantic attempt. But no such reflection was made when a zeal for the justice of his cause was held up as the impelling motive of the war; nor can it be denied that his interests were very coolly resigned. It is even asserted that, but for the humanity of Boscawen, he would have been delivered into the hands of Prataup Sing.² He found means to make his escape from the English; who imprisoned his uncle and kept him in confinement for nine years, till he was released by the French, when they took Fort St. David in 1758.³

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

1749.

While the English were occupied with the unimportant conquest of Devi-Cotah, the French had engaged in transactions of the highest moment; and a great revolution was accomplished in the Carnatic. This revolution, on which a great part of the history of the English East India Company depends, it is now necessary to explain. Carnatic is the name given to a large district of country along the coast of Coromandel, extending from near the river Kistna, to the northern branch of the Cavery. In extending westward from the sea, it was distinguished into two parts, the first, including the level country between the sea and the first range of mountains, and entitled Carnatic below the Ghauts; the second, including the table land between the first and second range of mountains, and called Carnatic above the Ghauts. A corresponding tract, extending from the northern branch of the Cavery to Cape Comorin, sometimes also receives the name of Carnatic; but in that case it is distinguished by the title of the Southern Carnatic.⁴

¹ Orme, i. 109—119. History and Management of the East India Company p. 64—70.

² History and Management, p. 69.

³ This is related by Orme, (ii. 318,) who tells us not who this uncle was (he must have been maternal) but only that he was the guide of his nephew, and the head of his party.

⁴ According to Colonel Wilks, (p. 5,) the ancient name was Canara, and the Canara language is only found within a district bounded by a line, beginning near the town of Beder, about sixty miles N.W. from Hyderabad, waving S.E. by the town of Adoni, then to the west of Gooti, next by the town of Anantpoor, next Nundidroog, next to the eastern Ghauts, thence along the range of the eastern Ghauts southwards to the pass of Guffelhutty, thence by the chain of the western hills, between the towns of Coimbatore, Palaichi, and Palgaut, thence northwards along the skirts of the western Ghauts, nearly as far as the sources of the Kistna, thence in an eastern and afterwards north-eastern direction to Beder. He adds, (p. 6,) that the Tamul language was spoken in the tract extending from Pullicat, (the boundary of the Talinga language on the south,) to Cape Comorin, and from the sea to the eastern Ghauts. This tract bore,

BOOK IV. The district of Carnatic had fallen into dependence upon
 CHAP. II. the great rajaships of Beejanuggur and Warankul ; and
 1749. after the reduction of these Hindu powers, had been
 united to the Mohammedan kingdoms of Beejapore and
 Golconda. Upon the annexation of these kingdoms to the
 Mogul empire, in the reign of Aurungzeb, the Carnatic was
 included in the general subjugation, and formed part of
 the great Subah of the Deccan. In the smaller provinces
 or viceroyalties, the districts or subdivisions, were propor-
 tionally small ; and the sub-governors of these divisions
 were known by the titles of Zemindar, and Phouzdar or
 Foujdar. In the great Subahs, however, particularly that
 of the Deccan, the primary divisions were very large, and
 the first rank of sub-governors proportionally high. They
 were known by the name of nabob or deputy ; that is,
 deputy of the Subahdar or Viceroy, governor of the Subah ;
 and under these deputies or nabobs were the Zemindars
 and Foujdars of the districts. The Carnatic was one of
 the nabobships, or grand divisions of the great Subah of
 the Deccan. During the vigour of the Mogul government,
 the grand deputies or nabobs, though immediately subject
 to the Subahdar, or Viceroy, were not always nominated
 by him. They were often nominated immediately by the
 Emperor ; and not unfrequently as a check upon the dan-
 gerous power of the Subahdar. When the Subahdar, how-
 ever, was powerful, and the Emperor weak, the nabobs
 were nominated by the Subahdar.

When Nizam al Mulk was established Subahdar of the
 Deccan, a chief, named Sadatullah, was nabob of the Car-
 natic, and held that command under the Nizam till the
 year 1732, when he died. Sadatullah, who had no issue
 male, adopted the two sons of his brother : Dost Ali, and
 Bâkir Ali. Bâkir Ali he made governor of Velore : and he
 had influence to leave Dost Ali in possession of the nabob-
 ship at his death. Nizam al Mulk claimed a right to
 nominate his deputy in the government of the Carnatic ;
 and took displeasure that Dost Ali had been intruded
 into the office with so little deference to his authority ;

anciently, the name of Dravida, "although," says the Colonel, "the greater
 part of it is known to Europeans exclusively by the name of Carnatic." It was
 called by the Mohammedans, Carnatic below the Ghauts, as Canara proper was
 called Carnatic above the Ghauts.

but he happened to be engaged at the time in disputes with the Emperor, which rendered it inconvenient to resent the affront. Dost Ali had two sons and four daughters. Of these daughters one was married to Mortiz Ali, the son of his brother Bâkir Ali, governor of Velore; another to Chunda Saheb, a more distant relative, who became dewan, or minister of the finances, under Dost Ali, his father-in-law.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

1749.

Trichinopoly was a little sovereignty bordering on the west upon Tanjore. Though subdued by the Mogul, it had been allowed, after the manner of Tanjore, to retain, as Zemindar, its own sovereign, accountable for the revenues and other services, required from it as a district of the Mogul empire. The rajas of Tanjore and Trichinopoly were immediately accountable to the nabobs of the Carnatic; and, like other Zemindars, frequently required the terror of an army to make them pay their arrears. In the year 1736 the Raja of Trichinopoly died, and the sovereignty passed into the hands of his wife. The supposed weakness of female government pointed out the occasion as favourable for enforcing the payment of the arrears; or for seizing the immediate government of the country. By intrigue and perfidy, Chunda Saheb was admitted into the city; when, imprisoning the queen, who soon died with grief, he was appointed, by his father-in-law, governor of the kingdom.¹

The Hindu Rajas were alarmed by the ambitious proceedings of the Nabob of the Carnatic and his son-in-law,

¹ By Mr. Orme, i. 41. Colonel Wilks states, on verbal authority, that the Mahrattas were invited by the eldest son of the Nabob, jealous of Chunda Saheb, ubi supra, p. 251.—M.

This is rather incorrectly abridged from Orme, who states that the collection of the revenue was only a pretext, the real object being to take advantage not of female weakness, but of a disputed succession. The Hindu princes of Tanjore and Trichinopoly had never been subdued by the Mogul, and although at times compelled to purchase the forbearance of the Mohammedan states of Bijapur or Golconda, they had preserved their independence from a remote date. The expulsion of their native princes was owing to domestic dissensions, which transferred Tanjore to a Mahratta ruler, and gave Trichinopoly to a Mohammedan. The latter was a relic of the Hindu kingdom of Madura, and according to original authorities, Chanda Sahib obtained possession of it, not under the circumstances described by the European writers, who were avowedly ill informed of the real merits of the case, but by an act of treachery to his ally Minakshi Amman, the reigning queen, whose adopted son he had zealously defended against a competitor for the principality—grateful for his support, and confiding in his friendship, the Queen gave him free access to the citadel, and he abused her confidence by making himself treacherously master of the fortress. See *Historical Sketch of the Kingdom of Pandya*. J. Roy. As. Society, vol. iii. p. 199.—W.

BOOK IV. and incited the Mahrattas, as people of the same origin
 CHAP. II. and religion, to march to their assistance. The attention
 1749. of Nizam al Mulk was too deeply engaged in watching the
 motions of Nadir Shah, who, at that very time, was prosecuting his destructive war in Hindustan, to oppose a prompt resistance to the Mahrattas; it has, indeed, been asserted, though without proof, and not with much probability, that as he was but little pleased with the appointment or proceedings of Dost Ali, he instigated the Mahrattas to this incursion, for the sake of chastising the presumption of his deputy.

An army, commanded by Ragojee Bonslah, appeared on the confines of Carnatic, in the month of May, 1740. The passes of the mountains might have been successfully defended by a small number of men; but an officer of Dost Ali, a Hindu, to whom that important post was committed, betrayed his trust, and left a free passage to the Mahrattas. Dost Ali encountered the invaders; but lost his life in the battle. Sufder Ali, the eldest son of the deceased, retired to the strong fort of Velore, and began to negotiate with the Mahrattas. A large sum of money was partly promised, and partly paid; and Trichinopoly, which rendered Chunda Sahib an object of jealousy to the new Nabob, was secretly offered to them, if they chose the trouble of making the conquest. They returned in a few months and laid siege to Trichinopoly. Chunda Sahib defended himself gallantly for several months, but was obliged to yield on the 26th of March, 1741; and was carried a prisoner to Satarah; while Morari Row, a Mahratta chief, was left Governor of Trichinopoly. Sufder Ali, afraid to trust himself in the open city of Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, took up his residence at Velore. Bakir Ali was dead, the late governor of Velore, and uncle of the Nabob; and Mortiz Ali, his son, was now governor in his place. By instigation of this man, whose disposition was perfidious and cruel, Sufder Ali was assassinated; and an attempt was made by the murderer to establish himself in the government of the province; but, finding his efforts hopeless, he shut himself up in his fort of Velore; and the infant son of Sufder Ali was proclaimed Nabob.¹

¹ For this part of the History of the Deccan in detail, see Orme, i. 36—62; Cambridge's War in India, p. 1—6; History and Management of the East India

Nizam al Mulk, however, had now left the court of Delhi, and returned to his government of the Deccan. To arrange the troubled affairs of the Carnatic, he arrived at Arcot in the month of March, 1743. He treated the son of Sufder Ali with respect; but appointed his general Cojah Abdoolla, to the government of the Carnatic; and compelled Morari Row, and the Mahrattas, to evacuate Trichinopoly. Cojah Abdoolla died suddenly, apparently through poison, before he had taken possession of his government; and the Nizam appointed Anwar ad din Khan, to supply his place. Anwar ad din Khan, the son of a man noted for his learning and piety, had been promoted to a place of some distinction, by the father of Nizam al Mulk, and after his death attached himself to the fortunes of his son. When Nizam al Mulk became Subahdar of the Deccan, he made Anwar ad din Nabob of Ellore and Rajamundry where he governed from the year 1725 to 1741; and from that period till the death of Cojah Abdoolla, he served as Governor of Golconda. In ostent, Nizam al Mulk conferred the government of the Carnatic upon Anwar ad din, only for a time, till Seid Mohammed, the young Son of Sufder Ali, should arrive at the years of manhood; but, in the mean while, he consigned him to the guardianship of Anwar ad din, and in a short time the young Nabob was murdered by a party of Patan soldiers, who clamoured for arrears of pay, due to them, or pretended to be due, by his father. Anwar ad din escaped not the imputation of being the author of the crime, but he was supported by Nizam al Mulk, and appointed Nabob in form. It was Anwar ad din, who was the Governor of the Carnatic when the French and English contended for Madras, and whom Dupleix treated alternately as a friend and a foe.

Nizam al Mulk, whose abilities and power were calculated to confirm the arrangements which he had made in the Deccan, died in 1748, after a whole life spent in the toils and agitations of oriental ambition, at the extraordinary age of 104. The government of Sadatullah and his family had been highly popular in the Carnatic; that of

Company, p. 50—72; Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 35—43; Mémoire contre Dupleix, p. 19—59; Révolution des Indes, l. 67--289. This last work was published anonymously in two volumes 12mo, in 1757. It is written with partiality to Dupleix; but the author is well informed, and a man of talents. The leading facts are shortly noticed by Wilks, ch. vii.

BOOK IV. Anwar ad din Khan was very much hated. A strong desire prevailed that the government of Anwar ad din should be subverted, and that of the family of Sadatullah restored :
 CHAP. II. 1749. the death of Nizam al Mulk opened a channel through which the hope of change made its way. Chunda Saheb was the only member of the family of Sadatullah, who possessed talents likely to support him in the ascent to the proposed elevation. The keen eye of Dupleix had early fixed itself upon the prospect of the ascendancy of Chunda Saheb ; and if that chief should, by the assistance of the French, acquire the government of the Carnatic, the most important concessions might be expected from his gratitude and friendship. At the first irruption of the Mahrattas, the whole family of Dost Ali had been sent to Pondicherry, (so strongly had the Indians already learned to confide in the superiority of European power,) as the place of greatest safety in the province. They received protection and respect ; and the wife and family of Chunda Saheb, during the whole time of his captivity, had never been removed. Dupleix treated them with the attention calculated to make a favourable impression on the man whom he wished to gain. He even corresponded with Chunda Saheb in his captivity ; and agreed to advance money to assist in raising the sum which the Mahrattas demanded for his ransom. He was liberated in the beginning of the year 1748, and even furnished, it is said, with 3000 Mahratta troops. He entered immediately into the quarrels of some contending Rajas, whose dominions lay inland between the coast of Malabar and the Carnatic, with a view to increase his followers, and collect treasure ; and he was already at the head of 6000 men, when the death of Nizam al Mulk occurred.

To maintain his authority, in his absence, both at court and in his province, Nizam al Mulk had procured the high office of Ameer al Omrah, for his eldest son, Ghazee ad din Khan, who always attended the person of the Emperor. His second son, Nazir Jung, had resided for the most part in the Deccan, and had officiated as his father's deputy as often as the wars of the empire, or the intrigues of the court, had called him away. Though the obedience of Nazir Jung had been so little perfect as to have been

lately chastised even by imprisonment, he was present **BOOK IV.**
 when his father died; the army was accustomed to obey **CHAP. II.**
 him; he got possession of his father's treasures; the Em-
 peror was far too weak to assert his right of nomination;
 and Nazir Jung assumed the power and titles of Subahdar
 of the Deccan. 1749.

There was, however, a favourite grandson of Nizam al Mulk, the son of a descendant of Sadhoollah Khan, Vizir to Shah Jehan, by a daughter of Nizam al Mulk. His name was Hedayet Mohy ad din; to which he added the title of Moozuffer Jung. He had been Nabob of Beejapore for several years, during the life of his grandfather; who, it was now given out and believed, had nominated him successor by his will.¹ Such a competitor for the government of the Deccan appeared to Chunda Saheb the very man on whom his hopes might repose. He offered his services, and they were greedily received. To attain the assistance of Dupleix was regarded by them both as an object of the highest importance; and in a Subahdar of the Deccan, and a Nabob of the Carnatic, whom he himself should be the chief instrument in raising to power, Dupleix contemplated the highest advantages, both for himself and for his country. Chunda Saheb persuaded Moozuffer Jung that they ought to commence their operations in the Carnatic; where the interest of the family of Chunda Saheb would afford advantages. Their troops had increased to the number of 40,000 men, when they approached the confines of the Carnatic. They were joined here by the French, who consisted of 400 Europeans, 100 Caffres, and 1800 Sepoys, commanded by M. d'Auteuil.² They immediately advanced towards Anwar ad din, whom on the 3rd of August, 1749, they found encamped under the fort of Amboor, fifty miles west from Arcot. The French offered to storm the intrenchment; and though twice beaten back, they advanced three times to the charge, and at last prevailed. Anwar ad din was slain in the engagement, at the uncommon age of 107 years; his eldest son was taken prisoner; and his second son Mohammed Ali, with the wreck

¹ Seer Mutakhareen, iii. 115. Wilks says he was governor of the strong fort of Adoni, ch. vii.

² Mémoire pour la Compagnie des Indes contre le Sieur Dupleix, p. 39.

BOOK IV. of the army, escaped to Trichinopoly, of which he was
 CHAP. II. Governor.¹

1749.

Dupleix affirms, that had the victorious leaders, according to his advice, advanced without delay against Trichinopoly, while the consternation of defeat remained, they would have obtained immediate possession of the place, and the success of their enterprise would have been assured. They chose, however, to go first to Arcot, that they might play for a while the Subalidar and Nabob; they afterwards paid a visit at Pondicherry to M. Dupleix, who gratified himself by receiving them with oriental display; and was gifted with the sovereignty of eighty-one villages in the neighbourhood of the settlement.²

They marched not from Pondicherry till the very end of October; and instead of proceeding directly against Trichinopoly, as they had settled with Dupleix, they directed their march to the city of Tanjore. The urgency of their pecuniary wants, and the prospect of an ample supply from the hoards of Tanjore, made them undervalue the delay. The king was summoned to pay his arrears of tribute, and a large sum as compensation for the expense of the war. By negotiation, by promises, and stratagems, he endeavoured, and the softness of his enemies enabled him, to occupy their time till the very end of December, when news arrived that Nazir Jung, the Subahdar, was on his march to attack them.³

Nazir Jung had been summoned, upon his accession, to the imperial presence; and had advanced with a considerable army as far as the Nerbudda, when a counter-order arrived. Informed of the ambitious designs of his nephew, he accelerated his return; and was arrived at Aurungabad, when he heard of the overthrow and death of the Nabob of the Carnatic.⁴ The impolitic delays of his enemies afforded

¹ Orme, i. 127; *Mémoire*, ut supra, p. 40; *Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix*, p. 45.

² *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 47. The French Company assert, in their Memoir against Dupleix (p. 44), that it was to gratify his vanity by this display, that the chiefs delayed the march to Trichinopoly: which seems the invention of malignity. Orme says, with better reasons, that to keep the army in obedience, it was necessary to obtain money, which they levied by contribution in the province.

³ Orme, i. 133—136; *Mém. pour Dupleix*, p. 51. The French Company accuse Dupleix again falsely of being the author of the ill-timed invasion of Tanjore: *Mém. contre Dupleix*, p. 45.

⁴ Seer Mutakhareen, iii. 115. Mr. Orme (i. 136) is mistaken when he says that Nazir Jung had marched toward Delhi, to oppose his elder brother: it was at a subsequent date that Ghazee ad din marched for the Deccan.

time for his preparations; and they were struck with consternation when they now heard of his approach. They broke up their camp with precipitation; and, harassed by a body of Mahrattas, in the service of Nazir Jung, returned to Pondicherry.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.
1749.

Dupleix was admirably calculated for the tricks of Indian policy. Though he exerted himself with the utmost vigour to animate the spirits, and augment the force of his allies; lending them 50,000*l.*, declaring that he would lend them still more, and increasing the French forces to the number of 2000 Europeans; yet contemplating now, with some terror, the chance of a defeat, he sought to be prepared for all events, and endeavoured secretly to open a negotiation with Nazir Jung. He addressed to him a memorial, in which he set forth the enmity which was borne by Anwar ad din to the French nation; and the necessity under which they were placed to avail themselves of any allies, to secure themselves from its effects; that the death of that Nabob, however, had now freed them from such obligation, and they were ready to detach themselves from the enemies of Nazir Jung; that they had already manifested their friendly dispositions towards him, in sparing Tanjore, and suspending the siege of Trichinopoly, which the victorious army of them and their allies, there was no doubt, might have easily taken.² It was only, says Dupleix, the arrival of an English force in the camp of Nazir Jung, that prevented the Subahdar from embracing the proposal.³

From the beginning of 1747, the English had been intriguing, both with Nizam al Mulk and with Nazir Jung, against the French. Besides a letter from the English Governor to the same effect, Commodore Griffin, in a letter to Nizam al Mulk, dated March 6, 1747, said, "I shall not enter into a particular detail of all the robberies, cruelties, and depredations, committed on shore upon the King my Master's subjects, by that insolent, perfidious nation the French; connived at, and abetted by those under your Excellency, (the Nabob of Arcot,) whose duty it was to have preserved the peace of your country, instead of selling the interest of a nation, with whom you have had the

¹ Orme, i. 136, 137.

² *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 53.

³ *Ibid.* p. 54.

BOOK IV. strictest friendship time out of mind ; a nation that has
 CHAP. II. been the means not only of enriching this part of the
 1749. country, but the whole dominions of the grand Mogul ; and
 that to a people who are remarkable all over the world
 for encroaching upon, and giving disturbances and disquiet
 to all near them ; a people who are strangers in your country,
 in comparison of those who have been robbed by them
 of that most important fortress and factory, Madras ; and
 now they are possessed of it, have neither money nor credit,
 to carry on the trade.—And now, excellent Sir, we have
 laid this before you, for your information and consideration ;
 and must entreat you, in the name of the King of Great
 Britain, my Royal Master, to call the Nabob to an account
 for his past transactions, and interpose your power to restore,
 as near as possible in its original state, what has been so
 unjustly taken from us.” Application was at the same time
 made to Nazir Jung for his interest with his father, which
 that prince assures the English by letter he had effectually
 employed. A favourable answer was received from Nizam
 al Mulk, and a mandate was sent to Anwar ad din Khan,
 called at that time by the English Anaverdy Khan in which
 were the following words : “ The English nation, from
 ancient times, are very obedient and serviceable to us :
 besides which they always proved to be a set of true people,
 and it is very hard that they met with these troubles,
 misfortunes, and destruction. I do therefore write you,
 to protect, aid, and assist them in all respects, and use
 your best endeavours in such a manner, that the French
 may be severely chastised and rooted off, that his Majesty’s
 sea-port town may be recovered, and that the English
 nation may be restored to their right, establish themselves
 in their former place, as before, and carry on their trade
 and commerce for the flourishment of the place.” An
 agent of the English, a native, named Hajec Hodee, who
 dates his letter from Arcot, the 10th of March, 1747,
 presents them with the real state of the fact in regard
 to Anwar ad din, the Nabob : “ I take the liberty to
 acquaint your worship, that as the Nabob is but a *Renter*,
 he does not much regard the distress of the people of this
 province, but in all shapes has respect to his own interest
 and benefit ; therefore there is no trusting to his promises.
 The French are very generous in making presents of other

people's goods, both to the old and young." He advises the English to be equally liberal with their gifts, and says, "Don't regard the money, as Governor Morse did, but part with it for the safety of your settlement." Another of their agents, Boundla Mootal, informed them that if they expected any cordial assistance from Anwar ad din, they must send him money for it. The second son of Anwar ad din, Mohammed Ali Khan, showed himself during this period of French ascendancy, rather favourable to the English: probably, from that spirit of discord which prevails in the ruling families of the East, because his eldest brother displayed a partiality to the French.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.
1749.

When, after the deaths of Nizam al Mulk and Anwar ad din Khan, and the captivity of the eldest son of Anwar ad din Khan, Nazir Jung marched into the Carnatic against Chunda Saheb and Moozuffier Jung, he summoned Mohammed Ali to join him from Trichinopoly, and sent to Fort St. David to solicit assistance from the English. The arrival of Moozuffier Jung, the defeat of Anwar ad din, which happened when they were engaged in the attack of Tanjore, and the apprehended schemes of Dupleix, had struck the English with alarm. "They saw," says Mr. Orme, "the dangers to which they were exposed, but were incapable of taking the vigorous resolutions which the necessity of their affairs demanded." They allowed Mr. Boscawen, with the fleet and troops, to set sail for England at the end of October, and sent only 120 Europeans to support Mohammed Ali at Trichinopoly.² The presence, however, of Nazir Jung, at the head of a great army, encouraged them to command the detachment at Trichinopoly to accompany Mohammed Ali; and a few days after their arrival in the camp, Major Lawrence, with 600 Europeans from Fort St. David, joined the army of the Subahdar.

The two armies were now sufficiently near to skirmish; when thirteen French officers, displeased that they had not shared in the spoils of Tanjore, resigned their commissions, and infused terror and alarm into the men they were destined to command. D'Auteuil, considering it no longer safe to venture into action with men thus affected, decamped the night before the expected battle, and retreated in the direction of Pondicherry, leaving Moozuffier

¹ Rons's Appendix, i. 8—22.

² Orme, i. 130, 133, 138.

BOOK IV. Jung and Chunda Saheb, in a state of despair. Moozuffer
 CHAP. II. Jung thought it best to yield himself up to his uncle, by
 1749. whom he was immediately put in fetters ; Chunda Saheb,
 with his own troops, made his way to Pondicherry.¹

The dangers were formidable and imminent which now stared Dupleix in the face ; but he had confidence in the resources of his own genius, and the slippery footing of an oriental prince. He sent an embassy to the camp of the victorious Subahdar, offering terms of peace ; and at the same time entered into correspondence with some disaffected chiefs in his army ; these were leaders of the Patan troops, which Nizam al Mulk, as the principal instrument of his ambition, had maintained in his service ; and of which he had made the principal captains Nabobs of different districts in his Subah. It was the standing policy of all the Mohammedan princes in India to compose a great part of their armies of men drawn from the more hardy people of the north, the Tartars and Afghans. Of these people the men who arrived in India were mere soldiers of fortune, accustomed to seek for wealth and distinction through crimes. If the master whom they served were able to chastise their perfidy, and feed their hopes of plunder and aggrandizement by the prospect of his conquests, they were useful and important instruments. The moment they appeared to have more to gain by destroying than by serving him, they were the most alarming source of his danger.

Nazir Jung had the usual character of a man educated a prince. He devoted his time to pleasure, and withdrew it from business ; decided without consideration, hence unwisely ; and was at once too indolent and too proud to correct his mistakes. Under such a master, the Patan lords expected, by selling their services to a competitor, to add both to their treasures, and to the territories of which the government was lodged in their hands.

The deputies of Dupleix had returned from the camp of Nazir Jung, when D'Auteuil, who continued to watch the motions of the army, observing the negligence with which the camp was guarded during the night, detached an

¹ Cambridge's War in India, p. 6—11 ; Orme, i. 138—142 ; History and Management of the East India Company, p. 73 ; Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 54 ; Mémoire contre Dupleix, p. 47 ; Révolution des Indes, i. 232—238.

officer with 300 hundred men, who entered it unobserved; penetrated into it a mile; spread terror and alarm; killed upwards of a thousand of the enemy; and returned with the loss of only two or three men; another proof of the extraordinary weakness of an Indian army, when opposed to the force of the European mind.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. II.

1750.

The Subahdar, alarmed at the presence of so enterprising an enemy, hastened to Arcot; while the English quarrelling with him about the performance of his promises, and the abandonment of their cause by withdrawing his army, left the camp in disgust, and removed the only important obstacle to the machinations of the conspirators and Dupleix.

While the Subahdar spent his time at Arcot in the pleasures of the harem and the chase, of both of which he was immoderately fond, the French exhibited new specimens of their activity and enterprise. A small body of troops sailed to Masulipatam, at the mouth of the river Kistna, once the principal mart of that region of India; attacked it by surprise in the night, and gained possession with a trifling loss; and another detachment seized the Pagoda of Trivadi, about fifteen miles west from Fort St. David. Mohammed Ali obtained permission to detach himself from the army of the Subahdar, for the purpose of dislodging them from Trivadi; in this he obtained assistance from the English, who were deeply interested in preventing the French from gaining a position so near. Some attacks which Mohammed Ali and the English made upon the pagoda were unsuccessful; and these allies began to quarrel. Mohammed Ali would neither advance pay to the English, nor move his troops between the pagoda and Pondicherry; upon which they left him. The French, who expected this event, waited for its arrival; attacked Mohammed Ali; gained an easy victory, and made him fly to Arcot, with two or three attendants. The French, still aiming at further acquisitions, advanced against the celebrated Fort of Gingee, situated on a vast insulated rock, and deemed the strongest fortress in the Carnatic. They stormed the fortifications to the very summit of the mountain; and contemplating afterwards the natural strength of the place, felt astonished at their own success.

BOOK IV. This last exploit disturbed the tranquillity and the
 CHAP. II. amusements of the Subahdar ; and he offered to enter upon
 negotiation. The demands of the French were lofty ; Nazir

1750.

Jung, therefore began his march to Gingee. But it was now October, 1750, and the rains began. The Subahdar kept the field ; but felt exceedingly weary of the contest ; and at last appeared inclined to concede whatever was demanded by the French. Dupleix negotiated at once with the traitors and the Subahdar. He had just concluded his treaty with the Subahdar, when his commander at Gingee receives from the traitors the concerted call. He marches with his whole force ; attacks the camp of the Subahdar, and is joined by the traitors ; by one of whom Nazir Jung is shot through the heart. In his Memoir, Dupleix affirms, that he wrote immediately to inform the Commander at Gingee of the conclusion of the treaty, and to prevent further hostilities, but that his letter arrived not till after the revolution was performed.¹

Moozuffer Jung was now freed from his imprisonment, and vested with the authority of Subahdar. Immediately, however, the enormous demands of the Patan nobles, to whose perfidy he owed his power, began to oppress him ; and he only parried their importunities by asserting the necessity of forming his arrangements in concert with Dupleix. Lofty were the hopes,¹ in which that ambitious leader seemed now entitled to indulge himself. Moozuffer Jung advanced to Pondicherry, and lavished upon him every testimony of gratitude and friendship. Dupleix exerted himself to satisfy the Patan lords ; who, seeing his determination to support their master, permitted him to retrench their demands, and treasured up their resentments for a future day. An adept in Indian policy, when he had men of their dangerous character within the walls of Pondicherry, would have taken care how they made their escape.

Dupleix was appointed Governor of the Mogul domi-

¹ It is worthy of remark that the death of Nazir Jung, and the troubles that ensued, might possibly have been prevented if there had been one amongst the English qualified to converse with the Subahdar in any native language. Major Lawrence had been informed of some of the intrigues between the Patans and the French, and "at an audience endeavoured to acquaint Nazir Jung with what he had heard, but his interpreter had not courage to make a declaration which would probably have cost him his life, and misrepresented what he was ordered to say.—Orme i. 145.—W.

nions on the coast of Coromandel from the river Kistna to Cape Comorin; and Chunda Saheb his Deputy at Arcot. Mohammed Ali, who had fled to Trichinopoly, upon the assassination of Nazir Jung, now offered to resign his pretensions to the nabobship of the Carnatic, provided Dupleix, who listened to the overture, would obtain from the new Subahdar a command for him, in any other part of his dominions.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

1751.

Moozuffer Jung left Pondicherry in the month of January, 1751, accompanied by a body of French troops, with M. Bussy, who had signalized himself in the late transactions, at their head. The army had marched about sixty leagues; when a disturbance, in appearance accidental, arose among a part of the troops; presently it was discovered, that the Patan chiefs were in revolt; and that they had seized a pass in front through which it behoved the army to proceed. They were attacked with great spirit; the French artillery carried every thing before it; and a victory was gained, when the impetuosity of the Subahdar carried him too far in the pursuit, and he was shot dead with an arrow.¹ M. Bussy was not a man who lost his presence of mind, upon an unexpected disaster. He represented to the principal commanders the necessity of agreeing immediately upon the choice of a master; and as the son of Moozuffer Jung was an infant, and the present state of affairs required the authority of a man of years, he recommended Salabut Jung, the eldest surviving son of Nizam al Mulk, who was present in the camp, and who without delay was raised to the vacant command. Salabut Jung promised the same concessions to the French which had been made by his predecessor, and the army continued its march towards Golconda.²

The Europeans in India, who hitherto had crouched at the feet of the meanest of the petty governors of a district, were astonished at the progress of the French, who now

¹ Orme says he was killed in personal conflict with the Nabob of Canoul, by whom he was thrust through the forehead with a javelin. i. 64.—W.

² For the above details see Orme, i. 142—166. History and Management of the East India Company, p. 74—79; Cambridge's War in India; p. 10—16: Seer Mutakhareen, iii. 116—118, the author of which says that Moozuffer Jung had a plot against the Patans, who on this occasion were not the aggressors; Mémoire pour Dupleix, p. 55—68, who says he entered into the conspiracy against Nazir Jung because he would not listen to peace; Mémoire contre Dupleix, p. 47—61: Wilks, chap. vii., with whom Dupleix is a favourite.

BOOK IV. seemed to preside over the whole region of the Deccan.

CHAP. II. A letter to Dupleix, from a friend in the camp of Salabut Jung, affirmed that in a little time the Mogul on his throne would tremble at the name of Dupleix; ¹ and however presumptuous this prophecy might appear, little was wanting to secure its fulfilment.

1751.

The English, sunk in apathy or despair, were so far as yet from taking any vigorous measures to oppose a torrent by which they were likely to be overwhelmed, that Major Lawrence, the commander of the troops, on whose military talents and authority their whole dependence was placed, took the extraordinary resolution, not opposed, it would seem, by the Council, of returning at this critical juncture to England. They used their influence, indeed, to prevent Mohammed Ali from carrying into execution the proposal he had made to the French of surrendering Trichinopoly; but Mohammed Ali, and the English in concert, made offer to acknowledge Chunda Saheb, Nabob of all the Carnatic, with the exception of Trichinopoly and its dependencies. This the French treated as a departure from the original proposal of Mohammed Ali, and replied with haughtiness and contempt. The English now engaged to support him, and he resolved to hold out. The governor of Madura, however, a small adjacent province, formerly a Hindu rajaship, declared for Chunda Saheb, and an attempt, made by a party of the English, to reduce it, was repelled.

Towards the beginning of April, Chunda Saheb began his march from Arcot; and about the same time Captain Gingens, with the English, was despatched from Fort St. David. Chunda Saheb was encamped near the Fort of Volcondah, on the great road between Trichinopoly and Arcot, when the English approached. A battle was brought on; but the English officers spent so much time in deliberation as to discourage the men; and the European soldiers fled shamefully from the field, even while the Caffres and native troops maintained the contest. The army retreated; and though it posted itself, and encamped at two different places, Utatoor and Pichonda; it quitted both upon the arrival of the enemy, and at last took shelter under the walls of Trichinopoly. Chunda

¹ *Mémoire contre Dupleix.*

Saheb and the French lost no time in following, and sat down on the opposite side of the town. BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

The city of Trichinopoly, at the distance of about ninety miles from the sea, is situated on the south side of the great river Cavery, about half a mile from its bank ; and, for an Indian city, was fortified with extraordinary strength. About five miles higher up than Trichinopoly, the Cavery divides itself into two branches, which, after separating to the distance of about two miles, again approached, and being only prevented from uniting, about fifteen miles below Trichinopoly, by a narrow mound, they form a peninsula, which goes by the name of the Island of Seringham ; celebrated as containing one of the most remarkable edifices, and one of the most venerated pagodas, in India ; and henceforward remarkable for the struggle, constituting an era in the history of India, of which it was now to be the scene.

1751.

The presidency of Fort St. David, somewhat roused by seeing the army of Mohammed Ali driven out of the Carnatic, and obliged to take shelter beyond the Cavery, made several efforts to reinforce the troops they had sent him ; whom, after all, they were able to augment to the number of only 600 men. There was another misfortune ; notwithstanding the urgency with which, in the depressed and alarming state of their affairs, the English were called upon for the utmost exertions of their virtue, "a fatal spirit of division," says Major Lawrence, "had unhappily crept in among our officers, so that many opportunities and advantages were lost, which gave the country alliance but an indifferent opinion of our conduct."¹ The French, however, made but feeble efforts for the reduction of the place ; and the English were too much impressed with an opinion of their own weakness to hazard any enterprise to dislodge them.²

¹ Lawrence's Narrative in Cambridge's War in India, p. 28. "In the middle of July," says Orme, i. 182, "the discontent which prevailed among the officers, made it necessary to remove several of them, at a time when there were very few fit to succeed to their posts."

² Law, the commander of the French forces, whom I am much more inclined to believe than Dupleix, one of the most audacious contemners of truth that ever engaged in crooked politics, asserts his want of strength for any efficient operation ; as Dupleix, who had entered into a correspondence with Mohammed Ali, and relied upon his promise to open to the French the gates of Trichinopoly, sent him, not to attack Trichinopoly, but to receive possession of it. He adds, that when they were surprised by Mohammed Ali's firing upon

BOOK IV. While the war thus lingered at Trichinopoly, Clive,

CHAP. II.

1751.

who had been made a captain, to supply some of the removals occasioned by the recent discontents, persuaded the Presidency to create a diversion, by sending him to attack Arcot, the capital of Chunda Saheb, left with a very slender defence. This young man was the son of a gentleman of small fortune in Shropshire. From the untractableness of his own disposition, or the unsteadiness of his father's, he was moved when a boy from one to another, through a great variety of schools; at which he was daring, impetuous, averse to application, and impatient of control. At the age of nineteen he was appointed a writer in the service of the East India Company, and sent to Madras. There his turbulence, though he was not ill-natured, engaged him in quarrels with his equals; his dislike of application and control prevented his acquiring the benevolence of his superiors.¹ When the capitulation with Madras was violated, Clive made his escape in a Mohammedan dress to Fort St. David, and when the siege of Pondicherry was undertaken, he was allowed to enter into the military service, with the rank of an ensign. At the siege of Pondicherry, and the enterprise against Devi-Cotah, he rendered himself conspicuous by courting posts of danger, and exhibiting in them a daring intrepidity. Discerning men, however, perceived, along with his rashness, a coolness and presence of mind, with a readiness of resource in the midst of danger, which made Lawrence at an early period, point him out as a man of promise. Upon the conclusion of the affair at Devi-Cotah, Clive returned to his civil occupation; but no sooner did his countrymen resume the sword, than his own disposition

them from the walls, they had not a single piece of battering or heavy cannon in the camp; that it was three months before they were supplied with any: that at first the whole army consisted of 11,860, but after the detachment sent for the recovery of Arcot, it consisted only of 6,680, of whom 600 only were Europeans. See *Plainte du Chevalier Law, contre sieur Dupleix*, p. 21 - 23. Dupleix, on the other hand (*Mémoire*, p. 74), speaking in round numbers, says that the natives who had joined Chunda Saheb, raised the army to 30,000 men. So widely asunder are the statements of these two men, at the head of the departments, civil and military.

¹ See a panegyric life of him, for which his family furnished materials, in Kippis's *Biographia Britannica*, vol. iii. art. Clive.—M.

The late biographer of Clive, Sir J. Malcolm, adverting to this passage, remarks, that the justice of the application of the epithet turbulent, is not borne out by the facts. Certainly there is nothing in the history of his adolescence to warrant the application; he seems to have been stubborn and dogged, rather than turbulent.—W.

and the scarcity of officers, again involved him in operations, far better suited to his restless, daring, and contentious mind. He had accompanied the troops sent for the defence of Trichinopoly, till after the affair at Volcondah, and had been employed by the Presidency in conducting the several reinforcements which they had attempted to forward. He was now furnished with 200 Europeans and 300 Sepoys ; and to spare even these, Fort St. David and Madras were left, for their defence, the one with 100, and the other with fifty men. To command them he had eight officers, of whom six had never been in action, and four were young men in the mercantile service of the Company, whom his own example had inflamed. For artillery they had three field-pieces ; and two eighteen pounders were sent after him. The enemy, who remained in garrison at Arcot, which was an open town, defended by a fort, abandoned the place, and gave him possession without resistance. Expecting a siege, he exerted his utmost diligence to supply the fort ; and that he might prevent the fugitive garrison, who hovered around, from resuming their courage, he made frequent sallies ; beat up their camp in the middle of the night ; defended himself with vigour when assailed ; and harassed them by incessant and daring attacks. In the meantime Chunda Saheb detached 4000 men from his army at Trichinopoly, which were joined by his son with 150 Europeans from Pondicherry ; and, together with the troops already collected in the neighbourhood, to the number of 3000, entered the city. Clive immediately resolved upon a violent attempt to dislodge them. Going out with almost the whole of the garrison, he with his artillery forced the enemy to leave the street in which they had posted themselves ; but filling the houses they fired upon his men, and obliged him to withdraw to the fort. In warring against the people of Hindustan, a few men so often gain unaccountable victories over a host, that on a disproportion of numbers solely no enterprise can be safely condemned as rash ; in this, however, Clive ran the greatest risk, with but a feeble prospect of success. He lost fifteen of his Europeans, and among them a lieutenant ; and his only artillery officer, with sixteen other men, was disabled.

Next day the enemy was reinforced with 2000 men from

BOOK IV. Velore. The fort was more than a mile in circumference ;

CHAP. II. the walls in many places ruinous ; the towers inconvenient and decayed ; and everything unfavourable to defence : yet Clive found the means of making an effectual resistance. When the enemy attempted to storm at two breaches, one of fifty and one of ninety feet, he repulsed them with but eighty Europeans and 120 Sepoys fit for duty ; so effectually did he avail himself of his feeble resources, and to such a pitch of fortitude had he exalted the spirit of those under his command. During the following night the enemy abandoned the town with precipitation, after they had maintained the siege for fifty days. A reinforcement from Madras joined him on the following day ; and, leaving a small garrison in Arcot, he set out to pursue the enemy. With the assistance of a small body of Mahrattas, who joined him in hopes of plunder, he gave the enemy, now greatly reduced by the dropping away of the auxiliaries, a defeat at Arni, and recovered Conjeveram, into which the French had thrown a garrison, and where they had behaved with barbarity to some English prisoners ; among the rest two wounded officers, whom they seized returning from Arcot to Madras, and threatened to expose on the rampart, if the English attacked them. After these important transactions, Clive returned to Fort St. David about the end of December. The enemy no sooner found that he was out of the field than they re-assembled, and marched to ravage the Company's territory. Reinforced by some troops which had arrived from Bengal, he went out to meet them in the end of February. They abandoned their camp upon his approach ; but with intent to surprise Arcot, from which the principal part of the garrison had marched to the reinforcement of Clive. They expected the gates to be opened by two officers of the English Sepoys, whom they had corrupted ; but the plot being discovered, and their signals not answered, they did not venture to make an attack, and suddenly withdrew. Though informed of their retreat, Clive was still hastening his march to Arcot, when at sun-set his van was unexpectedly fired upon by the enemy's artillery ; and a hot engagement ensued. The superior force of the enemy afforded them great advantages, and seemed likely to decide the contest, unless by

1752.

some expedient their cannon could be seized. At ten at night Clive detached a party, who, favoured by the darkness, came upon it unexpectedly in the rear; defeated the troops who were placed for its defence; and succeeded completely in that important enterprise. After this disaster, the enemy dispersed; and before Clive could undertake any new exploit, he was ordered to the presidency; where it was determined to send him, with all the troops under his command, to Trichinopoly. It was fortunate that the enemy, dispirited by the last, in addition to so many former disappointments and defeats, disbanded themselves at the same moment; the country troops departing to their homes, and the French being recalled to Pondicherry.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.
1752.

While these active operations were performing in the province of Arcot, Mohammed Ali, though he appeared to have little to fear from the attacks of the French upon Trichinopoly, began to have everything to dread from the deficiency of his funds. The English, whom he engaged to maintain out of his own treasury, were now obliged to be maintained at the cost of the Presidency. His own troops were without pay, and there was no prospect of keeping them long from mutiny or dispersion. He had applied for assistance to the Government of Mysore, a considerable Hindu kingdom, which had risen out of the wreck of the empire of Beejanugger, and viewed with dread the elevation of Chunda Saheb, who had formerly aimed at its subjugation. Mohammed Ali renewed his importunities; and, by promising to the Mysoreans whatever they chose to ask, prevailed upon them to march to his assistance. They arrived at Trichinopoly about the middle of February, 20,000 strong, including 6000 Marhattas, who had entered into their pay, and of whom a part were the same with those who had assisted Clive after the siege of Arcot. Their arrival determined the King of Tanjore, who till then had remained neutral, to send 5000 men. A few days after Clive was recalled to Fort St. David, he was again prepared to take the field; but on the 26th of March, Major Lawrence returned from England, and put himself at the head of the reinforcement which consisted of 400 Europeans and 1100 Sepoys, with eight field-pieces, and a large quantity of military stores.

BOOK IV. Both parties had their eyes fixed upon the reinforcement,
 CHAP. II. and Dupleix sent repeated orders that it might be inter-
 1752. cepted at all events. The efforts, however, of the enemy,
 proved unavailing; and Lawrence in safety joined the
 camp.¹

It was now determined to attack the enemy in their camp. This attack the French had not the resolution, or the means to withstand, and formed the determination of passing over to the island of Seringham. Chunda Saheb, it is said, remonstrated, but without avail. In the hurry of their retreat, the enemy were able to carry over only a part of their baggage, and burned what they were unable to remove of the provisions which they had collected in their magazines.²

As delay was dangerous to the English, from the circumstances of their allies, it was their policy to reduce the enemy to extremities within the shortest possible time. With this view Clive advised them to detach a part of the army to the other side of the Coleroon, for the purpose of intercepting the enemy's supplies. Though there was hazard in this plan; for an enterprising enemy, by

¹ Dupleix accuses Law with great violence, for not intercepting this convoy; and the English writers have very readily joined with him. But, if the facts asserted by Law are true, it was from want of means, not of capacity or inclination, that he failed. He says, that the whole army, even after it was joined by the remains of the detachment sent to Arcot, and by the body under Aulum Khan, did not amount to 15,000; while the enemy were three times the number. That the cavalry of Chunda Saheb, who had long been without pay, refused to act; and were joined by several other corps of the native army. That from the importunate commands of Dupleix, to blockade and starve Trichinopoly, he had extended his posts much beyond what the smallness of his means rendered advisable; and was weak at every point. That he made every effort to intercept the convoy at a distance, but the cavalry of Chunda Saheb refused to act; and Aulum Khan, after promising to support the detachment, failed, on the pretext that there was not a farthing to give him. See the details, as stated by Law, *Plainte*, p. 23—28. The Company, in their reply to Dupleix, defend the conduct of Law. *Mem. contre Dupleix*, p. 74.

² This movement has been violently condemned, and Dupleix ascribes to it the defeat of his schemes; but Major Lawrence (*Narrative*, p. 31) says, that "they (the English officers) reckoned it a prudent measure at the time." From the weakness of the French, a retreat was unavoidable. Law asserts that had they permitted the English to take possession of Seringham, they were taken in Caudine forks. He asserts, also, that they were already suffering for want of provisions; and that, between abandoning Trichinopoly altogether, and the resolution which he adopted, there was no middle course. The wise course would have been, no doubt, to abandon Trichinopoly; and of this, Law says, he was abundantly aware. But this, the reiterated and pressing commands of Dupleix, absolutely forbid. I confess the defence of Law seems to me satisfactory. *Plainte du Chev. Law*, p. 29—31. Orme says that the enemy burned a great store of provisions, when they passed over into Seringham; but what Law says, is much more probable—that the army was already beginning to be in want.

attacking one of the divisions, might gain a decisive advantage before the other could arrive, Lawrence accepted the advice ; and Clive was detached for the performance of the service. It was executed with his usual activity, spirit, and success. Dupleix made the strongest exertions to reinforce and supply his army ; but was baffled in every attempt. D'Auteuil, at the head of a large convoy, was first compelled to suspend his march ; was afterwards attacked in the fort to which he had retired, and at last taken prisoner. The enemy were soon in distress for provisions ; their camp was cannonaded by the English ; the troops of Chunda Saheb left his service ; and he himself, looking round for the means of personal safety, chose at last to trust to the generosity of the King of Tanjore, and delivered himself, under the promise of protection, into the hands of the Tanjorine commander. The French soon after capitulated, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. II.

1752.

The fate of Chunda Saheb was lamentable. He was immediately put in fetters by the faithless Tanjorine. A dispute, under the power of which of them he should remain, arose between the Mysorean and Mahratta chiefs, the Tanjorine Generals, and Mohammed Ali. To compromise the dispute, Major Lawrence proposed that he should be confined in one of the English forts. The parties separated without coming to an agreement ; and the Tanjorine immediately ordered him to be assassinated. Dupleix affirms that he was murdered by the express command of Major Lawrence, which it is difficult to suppose that Dupleix must not have known to be untrue. But it is true, that Lawrence showed an indifference about his fate which is not very easy to be reconciled with either humanity or wisdom. He well knew that his murder was, in the hands of any of them, the probable, in those of some of them, the certain consequence, of their obtaining the charge of his person. He well knew, that if he demanded him with firmness, they would have all consented to his confinement in an English fort.¹ And, if he did not know, it is not the less true, that in the hands of the English he

¹ Orme says it was so proposed by Lawrence, but that the confederates would not assent. At this period, the English were not so well assured of their power as to pretend to dictate to the native princes with whom they co-operated.—W.

BOOK IV. might have become a powerful instrument with which to
 CHAP. II. counterwork the machinations of Dupleix. At any rate,
 1752. Dupleix, of all men, on this ground, had the least title to
 raise an accusation against the English, since he had re-
 solved to imprison for life his unfortunate ally, and to
 reign sole Nabob of the Carnatic himself.¹

The failure of the enemy at Trichinopoly, the possession
 of which both parties appear to have valued too high,
 produced in the breasts of the English hopes of undisputed
 superiority and of that tide of riches, which unbounded
 sway in the affairs of the Carnatic promised to their
 deluded imaginations. Major Lawrence was in haste to
 march through the province, investing his triumphant
 Nabob; and saw no place, except Gingee, which he ima-
 gined would retard his progress.²

He was not a little surprised when the delays of the
 Nabob indicated much less impatience. The Nabob was,
 in fact, engaged in a troublesome dispute. Among the
 inducements which he had employed to gain the assistance
 of the Mysoreans, he had not scrupled to promise the
 possession of Trichinopoly and its dependencies. The
 Mysorean chief now insisted upon performance; and the
 Mahratta captain, who eagerly desired an opportunity of
 obtaining Trichinopoly for himself, encouraged his pre-
 tensions.

Intelligence of this dispute was a thunderstroke to Law-
 rence. His country had paid dear for Trichinopoly; yet
 now it appeared that it could not be retained, by him for
 whom it was gained, without a flagrant violation of honour
 and faith. The violation of honour and faith the Nabob,
 in the Indian manner, treated as a matter of entire insig-
 nificance. The Mysorean could not but know, he said,

¹ This is directly affirmed by the French East India Company (*Mémoire contre Dupleix*, p. 70), and evidenced by extracts which they produce from the letters to Dupleix, written by his own agent at the court of the Subahdar. Mr. Orme says (i. 252), that the patent of Nabob was actually procured before Chunda Saheb's death. The truth is, that each of them, Chunda Saheb and himself, wished to get rid of the other, and to be Nabob alone; and they were endeavouring, by mutual treachery, to disappoint each other's designs. *Mém. ut supra*, and its Appendix, No. vi. For the above details, from the death of Moozuffer Jung, see Orme, i. 186—242; *History and Management of the East India Company*, p. 80—82; *Cambridge's War in India*, 16—37; *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 71—77; *Mémoire contre Dupleix*, p. 70—74; *Plainte du Chevalier Law*, p. 19—36. Law says, p. 33, that they made some attempts for the escape of Chunda Saheb by water, but the river was too shallow at the time to float the boat.

² Lawrence's Narrative, p. 38.

that such a promise was never made to be fulfilled ; and doubtless no Indian can believe of any man, that he will keep more of a promise than it is his interest, or than he is compelled, to keep.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.
1752.

After some time lost in altercation, the Nabob promised to fulfil his engagement, and deliver up the fort in two months ; and with this the Mysorean, finding no more could be obtained, allowed himself for the present to appear satisfied. The English, leaving a garrison in the fort, set forward to establish their Nabob ; but the auxiliary troops of Tanjore, and of Tondeman, had marched to their homes ; and the Mysoreans and Mahrattas refused to depart from Trichinopoly.

Dupleix was not reduced to despondency, by the stroke which the English imagined had realized their fondest hopes. As it was the character of this man to form schemes, which from their magnitude appeared romantic, so was it his practice to adhere to them with constancy, even when the disasters which he encountered in their execution seemed to counsel nothing but despair. Nor did the resources of his mind fail to second its firmness. He still found means to oppose a nearly equal, in a little time a more than equal, force to his opponents.

It was resolved, and very unwisely, that the first operation of the English should be the reduction of Gingee ; garrisoned by the French ; and the only place in the province expected to yield a serious resistance. Major Lawrence condemned this plan of operations, and recommended the previous recovery of the province, and the collection of the rents ; but by the influence of Mr. Sanders, the President, his opinion was over-ruled.² Dupleix despatched a force for the purpose of seizing the passes of the mountains by which Gingee is surrounded, and of intercepting the English convoys. The detachment of the English army, which had arrived at Gingee, marched to dislodge them ; but, instead of succeeding in their object, sustained a defeat.

The French, elevated by this advantage, reinforced their victorious party with as many troops as they found it pos-

¹ Colonel Wilks is very severe on the treachery of the Nabob, and on the English for abetting it. *Historical Sketches*, u. supra, p. 285—291.

² Lawrence's Narrative, p. 42.

BOOK IV. sible to send into the field. This army, by way of triumph,
 CHAP. II. marched close to the very bounds of Fort St. David. A
 1752. company of Swiss, in the English service, were sent on
 this emergency from Madras to Fort St. David, in boats,
 contrary to the advice of Lawrence, who entreated they
 might be sent in a ship of force ; and Dupleix, unrestrained
 by the vain forms of a treaty of peace, subsisting be-
 tween England and France, while both parties were vio-
 lating the substance of it every day, took them prisoners
 of war by a ship from Pondicherry road. Lawrence has-
 tened toward the enemy. His force consisted of 400
 Europeans, 1700 Sepoys, 4000 troops belonging to the
 Nabob, and nine pieces of cannon. The French army
 consisted of 400 Europeans, 1500 Sepoys, and 500 horse ;
 who declined a battle, till Lawrence, by a feigned retreat,
 inspired them with confidence. The action, which took
 place near Bahoor, two miles from Fort St. David, was
 decidedly in favour of the English ; but would have been
 far more destructive to the French had the Nabob's cavalry
 done their duty, who, instead of charging the routed foe,
 betook themselves to the more agreeable operation of
 plundering their camp. After this seasonable victory,
 Captain Clive was employed, with a small detachment, to
 reduce the two forts, called Covelong and Chingliput,
 which he executed with his usual vigour and address ;
 and then returned to Europe for his health. About the
 same time the monsoon compelled the army to withdraw
 from the field.

During these transactions, Nunjeraj, the Mysorean
 General, was not idle before Trichinopoly. He made
 several attempts to get into the fort by surprise, as well
 as to corrupt the troops ; and his efforts held Captain
 Dalton, commanding the English garrison, perpetually on
 the watch. The views of that chief were now, also, directed
 toward the French ; and so much progress had been made
 in the adjustment of terms, that a body of 3000 Mahrattas
 were actually on their march to join the enemy, when the
 victory at Bahoor produced a revolution in their minds ;
 and they joined the English, as if they had marched from
 Trichinopoly with that express design. During the inter-
 val of winter-quarters, the negotiations with the French
 were completed, and the Mahrattas, at an early period,

marched to Pondicherry; while the Mysoreans, to give themselves all possible chances, remained before Trichinopoly, as still allies of the English; but they declared themselves, before the armies resumed their operations; and attacked an advanced post of Captain Dalton's, defended by sixty Europeans and some Sepoys, whom they destroyed to a man.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

1752.

Before these designs of the Mysorean and Mahratta chiefs were brought to maturity, Major Lawrence had given his advice to seize them, in one of their conferences with Captain Dalton.¹ If there was any confidence, during negotiation, reposed in the English by the Indians, beyond what they reposed in one another, a confidence of which the loss would have been risked by such a blow, we are not informed; the danger which might have been averted by securing the persons of those enemies, was of considerable amount.

Dupleix, though so eminently successful in adding to the number of combatants on his side, was reduced to the greatest extremity for pecuniary supplies. The French East India Company were much poorer than even the English; the resources which they furnished from Europe were proportionally feeble; and though perfectly willing to share with Dupleix in the hopes of conquest, when enjoyment was speedily promised, their impatience for gain made them soon tired of the war; and they were now importunately urging Dupleix to find the means of concluding a peace. Under these difficulties Dupleix had employed his own fortune, and his own credit, in answering the demands of the war; and, as a last resource, he now turned his thoughts to Mortiz Ali, the Governor of Velore. He held up to him the prospect of even the Nabobship itself, in hopes of drawing from him the riches which he was reputed to possess. Mortiz Ali repaired to Pondicherry, and even advanced a considerable sum; but finding

¹ In justice to Major Lawrence, it must be remarked that this advice was given only upon the detection of a plot, set on foot by the Mysorean general, to assassinate Captain Dalton, and surprise Trichinopoly, there being no open rupture yet even with Mohammed Ali, much less with the English. "It was on the discovery of this," says the Major, "that I proposed Dalton should seize on the Malisorean and Morarow, which he might easily have done by a surprise, as he often had conferences with them; and I must own I thought, in justice, it would have been right to have done it, but the Presidency were of another opinion." Lawrence's Narrative, p. 39.—W.

BOOK IV. that much more was expected, he broke off the negotiation,
 CHAP. II. and retired to his fort.

1752.

The contending parties looked forward with altered prospects to the next campaign. By the co-operation of the Mysoreans, and the junction of the Mahrattas, the latter of whom, from the abilities of their leader, and their long experience of European warfare, were no contemptible allies, the French had greatly the advantage in numerical force. In the capacity, however, of their officers, and in the quality of their European troops, they soon felt a remarkable inferiority. Lawrence, without being a man of talents, was an active and clear-headed soldier; and the troops whom he commanded, both officers and men, appeared, by a happy contingency, to combine in their little body all the virtues of a British army. The European troops of the enemy, on the other hand, were the very refuse of the French population; and Lawrence, himself, candidly confesses that their officers were frequently seen, in the hour of action, making the greatest efforts, and without effect, to retain them in their ranks. Among their commanders, not a man showed any talents; and Dupleix with great bitterness complains, that, with the exception of Bussy, he never had an officer on whose ability he could place the smallest reliance.¹

¹ In his letter to the French minister, dated 16th October, 1753, he says the recruits whom the Company sent him were, "enfants, décroteurs, et bandits." He says, "L'exemple que vous a présenté l'Angleterre en n'envoyant que des troupes aguerries auroit dû engager la Compagnie à avoir la même attention dans le choix." He adds, "Je ne sais que penser de celui qui est chargé des recrues, mais je crois qu'il n'y emploie pas la somme que la Compagnie lui passe pour chaque homme: ce n'est sans doute pas votre intention ni la sienne, mais il n'en est pas moins vrai que tout ce qui nous parvient n'est qu'un ramassis de la plus vile canaille.—Permettez moi, monseigneur, de vous supplier de donner à ce sujet les ordres les plus précis; la gloire du roi y est intéressée, ce motif vous paroîtra plus que suffisant pour exiger toute votre attention. Je n'ose vous dire tous les mauvais propos qui se tiennent sur l'envoi de ces malheureuses troupes; l'Anglois en fait de gorges chaudes, il n'a eu que trop d'occasions de les mépriser; les Maures et les Indiens commencent à perdre la haute idée qu'ils avoient conçue de nous, et nos officiers ne se mettent que malgré eux à leur tête; ce n'est qu'un cri à ce sujet." *Mémoire pour Dupleix, Pièces Justific.* Lett. de M. Dupleix, à M. de Machault, p. 50. In the same letter he says, "Pour les officiers il y en a peu, ou pour mieux dire point du tout qui soient en état de commander; la bravoure ne leur manque point, mais les talens n'y répondent pas; dans le nombre sur-tout de ceux arrivés l'année dernière, la plupart n'étaient que des enfans, sans la moindre teinture du service; le soldat s'en moque, et souvent avec juste raison." *Ibid.* p. 51. Speaking in the same letter of the services of Bussy, along with Salabut Jung, he says, "Si j'en avois un second ici, Je vous proteste, monseigneur, que toutes les affaires de cette partie seroient terminées, il y a plus de deux ans." *Ibid.* p. 57. Nor was this an empty boast: So near was he to the accomplishment of his object, without any such important assistance, that the talents of a man like Bussy, in the Carnatic, would soon have placed him at its head.

Early in January the two armies again took the field : **BOOK IV.**
 the French, consisting of 500 European infantry and sixty horse ; 2000 Sepoys ; and 4000 Mahrattas, commanded by **CHAP. II.**
 Morari Row. The English consisted of 700 European in-
 fantry, 2000 Sepoys, and 1500 horse belonging to the **1753.**
 Nabob. The French, to avail themselves of their supe-
 riority in cavalry, avoided an action, and employed them-
 selves in making war upon the English convoys. This
 they did, with so much effect, that Major Lawrence was
 frequently obliged to escort his stores and provisions with
 his whole army from Fort St. David. In this manner the
 time was consumed till the 20th of April, when an express
 arrived from Captain Dalton, that he had only three weeks'
 provisions remaining in the fort.

When the English, after the capitulation of the French
 at Seringham, marched from Trichinopoly, and left Captain
 Dalton Commandant of the English garrison, the brother of
 the Nabob was at the same time appointed Governor of
 the town. By an unhappy oversight the magazines were
 left under direction of the Mohammedan Governor ; and
 Captain Dalton satisfied himself with asking, from time
 to time, in what condition they remained. When the
 Mysoreans, however, had shut him up in his fort, and,
 scouring the adjacent country with their cavalry, had
 prevented for some time the arrival of supplies, it occurred
 to him, rather too late, that he had better see with his own
 eyes on what he had to depend. His ally, he found, had
 been selling the provisions at an enormous price to the
 people of the town ; and he was left in that alarming con-
 dition, of which he hastened to make report to Major
 Lawrence.

Only one resolution was left to the English commander,
 that of marching directly to the support of Trichinopoly.
 His army suffered greatly on the march, both by desertion
 and sickness ; and, upon his arrival at the place, he found
 that all the force he could muster for offensive operations,
 after leaving the proportion necessary for the duties of the
 garrison, consisted of 500 Europeans, and 2000 Sepoys.
 The Nabob had 3000 horse, but they were badly paid, and
 executed their duty with proportional neglect and disobe-
 dience. The French followed with 200 Europeans and 500
 Sepoys, to the support of the Mysoreans ; and Trichinopoly

BOOK IV. became once more the seat of a tedious and harassing warfare.

CHAP. II.

1751.

It deserves remark, that Major Lawrence, who had recommended the seizure of the Mysorean and Mahratta chiefs, uniformly disapproved of the attempt to retain Trichinopoly after the promise to give it up.¹ It is equally worthy of remark, that the delicacy of the Presidency withheld their hands from the persons of the hostile chiefs; but easily endured the violation of the engagement respecting Trichinopoly. Delicacy would have been less violated in the one instance, by following the advice of Lawrence, and prudence would have been more consulted by following it in both. The cession of Trichinopoly to the Mysoreans would have enabled the English to establish their nabob, with little opposition, in the sovereignty of the Carnatic, and would have saved them from two years of expensive warfare.

It was on the 6th of May, 1753, that Major Lawrence again arrived at Trichinopoly; and from that day to the 11th of October, 1754, the most active operations were carried on. Neither the French, with their allies, were sufficiently powerful to reduce Trichinopoly; nor had the English sufficient force to compel them to raise the siege. The two parties, therefore, bent their endeavours; the English, to supply the garrison with a sufficient quantity of food, to enable them to prosecute their objects in another quarter; the French, by cutting off the supplies, to compel the garrison to surrender. On both sides the greatest exertions were made; severe conflicts were frequently sustained, in some of which decisive advantages, at one time on one side, at another on the other, were on the point of being gained: and never did English troops display more gallantry and good conduct, than in defence of the unimportant city of Trichinopoly. More than a year had been spent; and neither of the contending parties seemed nearer their object, when a new scene was introduced.²

¹ This fact is stated on the satisfactory authority of Col. Wilks, who had an opportunity of perusing the correspondence of Lawrence with the Presidency. Historical Sketches, ut supra, p. 342.

² For this war, Lawrence's Narrative, in Cambridge's War, p. 38—95; Orme, i. 245—249, 253—322, 337—365; Mém. pour Duplex, p. 78—111; Wilks, ut supra, p. 285—340, yield the most important materials.

The objects, which fired the ambition of the European BOOK IV.
Governors in India, were too distant to warm the imagi- CHAP. II.
nations of the Directors and Proprietors of the French and
English Companies in Europe ; and to them the burden of 1754.
the war had become exceedingly hateful. Aware of the
passion for peace which now animated his employers, and
of the opinion disseminated in Europe of his ambitious
and warlike views, Dupleix had opened a negotiation with
Saunders, the Governor of Madras, in January, 1754. The
real point in dispute was whether or not Mohammed Ali
should be acknowledged Nabob of the Carnatic ; the
English contending that he should be recognised by the
French, the French contending that he should be given up
by the English. The parties were far from being disposed,
on either side, to concede the point ; and the state of cir-
cumstances was little calculated to facilitate a compromise :
the negotiation turned, therefore, on matters of form ; and
never, surely, did negotiation find more ridiculous matters
of form on which to employ itself. In a country in which
all questions of dominion are determined by the sword ;
in a question which, without any consideration of right,
they themselves had, during four years, been labouring to
decide by the sword, they affected to sit down gravely to a
comparison of pretended titles and grants. The authority
to which both parties appealed was that of the Mogul,
though the Mogul himself, in the district in question, was
a usurper, and that of a very recent date ; though the
power, too, of the Mogul was such, that he had no more
authority in the Deccan than he had at Rome. The autho-
rity on which the government of the Carnatic immediately
depended was that of the Subahdar of the Deccan ; and
the Subahdar of the Deccan was Salabut Jung, the friend
of the French : so far, in point of title, they had the
undoubted advantage. The patents, however, which Du-
pleix had received from Salabut Jung, and which placed
the nabobship of the Carnatic entirely at his disposal, he
asserted to have been confirmed by the Mogul. The Eng-
lish, on their side, affirmed that they had a patent consti-
tuting Mohammed Ali Nabob of the Carnatic ; and they
called upon the French to produce their documents. The
French did exhibit some papers which the English, and
probably with truth, asserted to be forged. The English

BOOK IV. were called upon to produce their pretended patent, and
 CHAP. II. had none to produce : upon this, with mutual crimination, the proceedings broke off.¹

1754.

The parties upon whom the decision depended in Europe came together with minds more disposed to accommodation. The English Company had, from an early period of the war, importuned the ministry with complaints, that during the existence of a treaty of peace between England and France, they were oppressed by the burden of a dangerous war, produced by the ambition of a French governor in India. The same subject had formed the matter of remonstrance between the English and French governments ; and it was at last agreed that the dispute should be terminated by a distinct negotiation. M. Duvelaer arrived in London, vested with the powers of the French East India Company ; Lord Holdernessee negotiated on the part of the English ; while the Duke of Newcastle, as minister of England, and the Duc de Mirepoix, as ambassador of France, shared, when, necessary, in the conferences and decisions.

Dupleix, in stating afterwards the reasons of his conduct, asserted that, in the situation into which the Deccan was thrown, upon the death of Nizam al Mulk, an interference in the affairs of the country was not a matter of choice. The chiefs who contended for power, supreme and subordinate, were all ready to tempt, and by the most important concessions, the European nations to grant them support. If one nation, from an extraordinary effort of self-denial, should decline such advantages, what was to be expected but that another would embrace them ? and that, rising in power above its rivals, it should first oppress, and finally expel them from the country ? Dupleix was the first to perceive these consequences ; and, from the promptitude and decision of his character, the first to act upon

¹ Orme, i. 337 ; Lawrence's Narrative, p. 81 ; *Mém. pour Dupleix*, p. 83 ; Wilks, p. 338. The English writers, with the exception of Wilks, make no allusion to any pretence of a patent held out by the English. But it is so distinctly asserted by Dupleix, who appeals to the letters of Saunders, to which his opponents had access, that I doubt not the fact. The English writers, who are very severe upon the French forgeries, say that the conferences were broken off when the French, who had permitted their papers to be so far copied by the English, withdrew them upon the English allegations that they were forged. Dupleix, on the other hand, says, that he refused to permit the French papers any longer to be copied, when the English failed to produce any on their side which might undergo the same operation.

this discovery. This priority, which naturally promised to be advantageous to him, was the reverse. It stamped his whole career with the character of aggression; though the English themselves drew the same conclusions, as soon as they were suggested to them by the proceedings of Dupleix; and guided their proceedings by the belief that it was not safe for them to see their rival aggrandized by favour of the native powers. That to play a high game in India, was a wish dear to the heart of Dupleix, sufficiently appears; but that there were strong reasons for the part which he acted, no one acquainted with the affairs of India will attempt to dispute.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

1754.

The French East India Company, however, and the French Ministers, were but little acquainted with the affairs of India; those who envied, and those who hated Dupleix, accused him of wasting the resources of the Company in ambitious wars; and the English Company and the English ministry accused him of embroiling the two nations in India; and there was a general prejudice against him and his proceedings, both in France and in England, at the time when the conferences in London were held. The English ministry prudently despatched a considerable fleet to India, while the negotiation was still proceeding. The French ministry had no fleet to spare; and dreaded the superiority which such a force might bestow. The French Company were, at the same time, extremely eager to taste the gains of commerce, which they promised themselves in peace; and, from all these causes, were disposed to make ample concessions. It ultimately appeared, that no definite arrangement could be made except upon the spot. The English, however, exclaimed against any negotiation which was to be conducted by Dupleix, the object of which, they affirmed, his ambition and artifice would be sure to defeat. The French ministry were not far from harbouring the same opinion; and easily enough assented to the proposition of sending commissioners from Europe to settle the differences of the two nations in India.

A point was thus gained in favour of the English, on which their fortune in India very probably hinged; for when, after the short interval of two years, war was renewed between the English and French; when the English

BOOK IV. were expelled from Bengal; and the influence of Bussy
 CHAP. II. was paramount at the court of the Subahdar; had Du-
 1754. plex remained at the head of French affairs in India, the
 scheme of that enterprising governor, to render himself
 master of the Carnatic, and the Subahdar master of Ben-
 gal, would have stood a fair chance of complete accom-
 plishment.

On the second of August, 1754, M. Godheu, appointed commissary to negotiate a peace with the English, and vested with authority to supersede Dupleix in the government of all the French possessions in India, arrived at Pondicherry. Dupleix affirms, that in the negotiations at London, for the sake of removing all local prejudices and views, it had been established that the governors in India on both sides should be removed; and commissioners, free from all bias, should be sent from England to terminate the costly disputes.¹ If this was a condition really made, the French, it would appear, consented to a departure from it, as they raised no complaint against Mr. Saunders, who continued the President of Madras. The English, in this manner, obtained the important advantage of having the negotiation conducted on their side by a person conversant with the affairs and interests of the two nations in India, while it was conducted, on the part of their antagonists, by a man to whom they were in a great measure unknown.

Godheu lost no time in taking upon himself the exercise of his authority, and in commencing his negotiations with Saunders. The strong desire of his employers for peace appears to have been the predominating consideration in his mind; and he manifested, from the beginning, a disposition to concede, of which the English made ample advantage. On the 11th of October, a suspension of arms was established for three months; and on the 26th of December, a provisional treaty, to be confirmed or altered in Europe, was signed at Pondicherry. By this treaty, everything for which they had been contending was gained by the English; every advantage of which they had come into possession was given up by the French. By the sti-

¹ *Mém. pour Dupleix*, p. 89. As this assertion (made before persons highly competent to contradict it, and for which an appeal is made to the *Journal of Dupleix*) is not denied in the Answer of the Company to the *Mémoire* of Dupleix, it is entitled to credit.

pulation to withdraw effectually from interference in the affairs of the native princes, Mohammed Ali was left, by the fact, Nabob of the Carnatic or Arcot. And by the stipulation to arrange the territorial possessions of the two nations on the principle of equality, the important acquisition of the four Circars was resigned.¹ Till the decision of the two Companies in Europe should be given, the contracting parties were to abstain from hostilities, direct or indirect ; and their possessions to remain as they were.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.
1754.

That the severe strictures which Dupleix made upon this treaty were in some degree overcharged, is not to be denied. There is no reason to believe him, when he asserts that Trichinopoly was on the point of surrendering for want of supplies ; for, at the time of the suspension of arms, the relative advantages of the contending parties appear to have been nearly the same as they had been twelve months before. It is equally impossible to believe, what the English writers affirm, that the advantages of the English were now so great as to make it politic on the part of the French to conclude the treaty, unfavourable as it was. Admiral Watson had indeed arrived with a fleet, consisting of three ships and a sloop ; having on board a king's regiment of 700 men, with forty artillerymen, and 200 recruits. But 1500 European troops had arrived with Godheu on the part of the French ;² and Dupleix boasts, with some reason, that he could have added to these the Mahrattas, the Mysoreans, and, on certain conditions, the King of Tanjore.³ Bussy, too, had improved with so much ability his situation with Salabut

¹ Col. Wilks (p. 345) must have read the treaty very carelessly, to imagine that "the substantial Moorish government and dignity of the extensive and valuable provinces of the Northern Circars were not noticed in the treaty," when the very first article of the treaty says, "The two Companies, English and French, shall renounce for ever *all* Moorish government and dignity, and shall never interfere in any differences that arise between the princes of the country." Mr. Orme, too (so easily is the judgment warped of the best of men when their passions are engaged), imagined it would have been no infringement of the treaty, to assist the Mahrattas with English troops from Bombay, for the purpose of compelling Salabut Jung to dismiss Bussy and the French, and deprive them of the Northern Circars. Orme, i. 406.

² This is the number stated by Lawrence, Narrative, p. 95 ; Orme, i. 371, calls it 1200 ; Godheu, in his letter to Dupleix, received two days before his landing, calls it 2000 (*Mém. pour Dupleix*, p. 101). And Dupleix himself asserts (*Ibid.* p. 111), that by the troops newly arrived his force was rendered superior to that of the English.

³ *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 111.

BOOK IV. Jung, that he ruled in a great measure the councils of the
 CHAP. II. Subahdar of the Deccan.

1751.

After displaying, in the most brilliant manner, the extraordinary superiority of European soldiers, in the subjugation of the Patan rebels, he compelled Salabut Jung to raise the son of Moozuffer Jung, the late Subahdar, and friend of the French, to the government, originally enjoyed by that unfortunate prince, of the strong-hold of Adoni and its territory, augmented by the possessions of two of the Patan nobles, by whose treachery the father was slain. "An example of generosity," says Mr. Orme, "which, if true, could not fail to raise admiration in a country, where the merits of the father are so seldom of advantage to the distresses of the son."¹

The settlement of the dominions of Salabut Jung was formidably opposed by the Mahrattas, who, in the weakness which ensued upon the death of Nizam al Mulk, were actively employed in adding to their conquests as much as possible of the Subah of the Deccan. A Mahratta general, named Balajee Row, had opposed himself, at the head of 25,000 horse, to the march of the Subahdar, between the Kistnah and Golconda, but, by negotiation and a suitable present, was induced to withdraw. Within a few months he appeared again, with a force which would have enabled him to gain important advantages, had not the talents of Bussy, and the execution of European firearms, which astonished the Indians, decided in a variety of engagements the fortune of the day. Danger came not from one quarter alone. Ghazee ad din Khan, the eldest son of Nizam al Mulk, destined by his father to maintain the interests of his family at the court of the Mogul, had apparently acquiesced in the accession of his second brother to the government of the Deccan, to which, as to a destined event, he had been accustomed to look. Upon the death, however, of Nazir Jung, as he had become very uneasy in his situation at court, he solicited, as the eldest son and successor of Nizam al Mulk, the appointment of Subahdar of the Deccan. The assent of the Emperor, which was now a mere form without power, was easily obtained; and Ghazee ad din arrived at Aurungabad in the beginning of October, 1752, at the head, it is said, of

¹ Orme, i. 249.

150,000 men, of whom a large body were Mahrattas, com- BOOK IV.
manded by Holkar Malhar Rao. At the same time Balajee CHAP. II.
Row, and another Mahratta general, named Ragojee Bonsla,
in concert, it is said, with Ghazee ad din Khan, entered
the province of Golconda with 100,000 horse. To meet
these formidable armies, Salabut Jung and Bussy took the
field with very unequal numbers; when Ghazee ad din
Khan suddenly died. He was an old man, worn out by
the pleasures of the harem; and his sudden death was by
no means a surprising event; but, as it was singularly
opportune for Salabut Jung, it was ascribed to poison, said
to be administered, at his instigation, by the mother of
the deceased; and, as the event was favourable to the
French, the story of its odious cause has been adopted,
with patriotic credulity, by the English historians.¹ The
Mahratta generals still continued the war; but were in
every encounter repulsed with so much slaughter by the
French, that they soon became desirous of peace, and
Salabut Jung was happy to purchase their retreat by the
cession of some districts to Balajee Row, in the neigh-
bourhood of Boorhanpore, and to Ragojee Bonsla, in the
neighbourhood of Berar; where that Mahratta chief had
acquired for himself an extensive dominion. By the ser-
vices which, in all these dangers, Bussy had rendered to
the cause of Salabut Jung,² whom he alone preserved upon
the throne, his influence with that prince had risen to the
greatest height: and though the envy and jealousy of the
ministers, and the weak character of the Subahdar, ex-
posed his power to perpetual jeopardy; and on one occa-
sion, when he was absent for the recovery of his health,
had almost destroyed it; the prudence and dexterity of
that able leader enabled him to triumph over all opposi-
tion. In the latter end of 1753, he obtained for his country

1754.

¹ The author of the *Seer Mutakhareen*, whom, as better informed, I follow in all affairs relating at this period to the Court of Delhi, says (iii. 19), that he died suddenly, without any mention of poison. The story of the poison is indeed, presented in a note by the translator; who does not, however, impute the fact to the mother of Ghazee ad Din, but to the ladies of his harem in general.

² The oriental historian describes the efficacy of the French operations in battle in such expressions as these: "At which time the French, with their quick musketry and their expeditious artillery, drew smoke from the Mahratta breasts:" "they lost a vast number of men, whom the French consumed in shoals at the fire-altars of their artillery." *Seer Mutakhareen*, ii. 118.

BOOK IV. the four important provinces of Mustaphanagar, Ellore,
 CHAP. II. Rajamundry, and Chicacole, called the Northern Circars ;
 1751. "which made the French," says Mr. Orme, "masters of
 the sea-coast of Coromandel and Orixá, in an uninterrupted
 line of 600 miles from Medapilly to the Pagoda of Jager-
 naut ;"¹ and "which," says Colonel Wilks, "not only
 afforded the requisite pecuniary resources, but furnished
 the convenient means of receiving reinforcements of men
 and military stores from Pondicherry and Mauritius ; and
 thus enabled Bussy to extend his political views to the
 indirect or absolute empire of the Deccan and the south."²
 All these brilliant advantages were now cordially resigned
 by M. Godheu ; and it will certainly be allowed that few
 nations have ever made, to the love of peace, sacrifices
 relatively more important.

"Dupleix," says Mr. Orme, whose concluding strictures
 upon his enemy are equally honourable to the writer and
 the subject, "departed on his voyage to Europe, on the
 14th of October, having first delivered his accounts with
 the French Company to M. Godheu, by which it appeared
 that he had disbursed on their account near three millions
 of rupees more than he had received during the course of
 the war. A great part of this sum was furnished out of
 his own estate, and the rest from moneys which he bor-
 rowed at interest, from the French inhabitants at Pondi-
 cherry, upon bonds given in his own name. M. Godheu
 referred the discussion of these accounts to the Directors
 of the Company in France, who, pretending that M. Du-
 pleix had made these expenses without sufficient authority,
 refused to pay any part of the large balance he asserted to
 be due to him ; upon which he commenced a law-suit
 against the Company ; but the ministry interfered and put
 a stop to the proceedings by the king's authority, without
 entering into any discussion of M. Dupleix's claims, or
 taking any measures to satisfy them. However, they gave
 him letters of protection to secure him from being pro-
 secuted by any of his creditors. So that his fortune was
 left much less than that which he was possessed of before
 he entered upon the government of Pondicherry, in 1742.
 His conduct certainly merited a very different requital
 from his nation, which never had a subject so desirous

¹ Orme, i. 334.² Wilks, ut supra, p. 338.

and capable of extending its reputation and power in the East Indies; had he been supplied with the forces he desired immediately after the death of Anwar-ad-din Khan, or had he afterwards been supported from France in the manner necessary to carry on the extensive projects he had formed, there is no doubt but that he would have placed Chunda Saheb in the Nabobship of the Carnatic, given law to the Subah of the Deccan, and perhaps to the throne of Delhi itself, and have established a sovereignty over many of the most valuable provinces of the empire; armed with which power he would easily have reduced all the other European settlements to such restrictions as he might think proper to impose. When we consider that he formed this plan of conquest and dominion at a time when all other Europeans entertained the highest opinion of the strength of the Mogul government, suffering tamely the insolence of its meanest officers, rather than venture to make resistance against a power which they chimerically imagined to be capable of overwhelming them in an instant, we cannot refrain from acknowledging and admiring the sagacity of his genius, which first discovered and despised this illusion."¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

1754.

In a short time after the conclusion of this treaty, both Saunders and Godheu took their departure for Europe; pleasing themselves with the consideration that, by means of their exertions, the blessings of peace between the two nations in India were now permanently bestowed. Never was expectation more completely deceived. Their treaty procured not so much as a moment's repose. The English proceeded to reduce to the obedience of their Nabob the districts of Madura and Tinivelly. The French exclaimed against these transactions, as an infringement of the treaty with Godheu; but finding their remonstrances without avail, they followed the English example, and sent a body of troops to reduce to their obedience the petty sovereignty of Terriore.

Madura was a small kingdom, bordering on Trichinopoly towards the south; and Tinivelly was a kingdom of similar extent, reaching from the southern extremity of Madura

¹ Orme, i. 377. Voltaire says (*Précis du Siècle de Louis XIV.* ch. xxxix.), Dupleix fut réduit à disputer à Paris les tristes restes de sa fortune contre la Compagnie des Indes, et à solliciter des audiences dans l'anti-chambre de ses juges. Il en mourut bientôt de chagrin.

BOOK IV. to Cape Comorin. These countries had acknowledged the
CHAP. II. supremacy of the Mogul government of the Deccan, and
 1754. had paid tribute through the Nabob of Arcot. When Chunda Saheb was master of Trichinopoly, he had set up his own brother as Governor of Madura; but during the disturbances which followed, a soldier of fortune, named Aulum Khan, obtained possession of the city and government. When Aulum Khan marched to the assistance of Chunda Saheb at Trichinopoly, where he lost his life, he left four Patan chiefs to conduct his government, who acted as independent princes, notwithstanding the pretensions of Mohammed Ali, as Nabob of Arcot. To compromise the dispute about Trichinopoly, Mohammed Ali had offered to resign Madura to the Mysoreans. And upon his liberation from the terror of the French arms, by the treaty of Godheu, he prevailed upon the English to afford him a body of troops to collect, as he hoped, and as the English believed, a large arrear of tribute from the southern dependencies of his nabobship.

The troops proceeded to the city of Madura, which they took. The Polygars, as they are called; the lords, or petty sovereigns of the several districts; overawed by the terror of European arms, offered their submissions, and promised to discharge the demanded arrears; but for the present had little or nothing which they were able to pay. Instead of the quantity of treasure which the Nabob and the English expected to receive, the money collected sufficed not to defray the expense of the expedition. The disappointment and ill-humour were consequently great. The conduct of the English officer who commanded became the subject of blame. He formed a connexion, which promised to be of considerable importance with Marawar, a district, governed by two Polygars, which extended along the coast on the eastern side of Madura, from the kingdom of Tanjore till it joined Tinivelly; but this connexion gave umbrage to the Polygar Tondeman, and the Raja of Tanjore, in satisfaction to whom it was renounced. With Maphuz Khan the brother of the Nabob, who attended the expedition, as future governor of the country, the officer formed an agreement, at a rent which was afterwards condemned, as not one half of the requisite amount: and the English detachment, upon its return, was imprudently exposed in a narrow pass, where it suffered severely by the people of

the country. From all these causes, the existing displeasure found an object and a victim, in the unlucky officer, who was tried, and dismissed from the Company's service.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. II.

1755.

About the same time with these transactions in Madura, Salabut Jung, accompanied by Bussy and the French troops, marched against the kingdom of Mysore, to extort arrears of tribute, said to be due from it, as a dependency of the Subah of the Deccan. Upon this emergency, the Mysorean army before Trichinopoly (the Mysoreans had refused to abandon their pretensions upon Trichinopoly, when the treaty was concluded between the English and French,) was recalled. As the Mysoreans were threatened at the same time by an army of Mahrattas under Balajee Row, they were happy to acquire the protection of Salabut Jung, by acknowledging his authority, and paying as large a sum as it was possible for them to raise.

By the departure of the Mysoreans from Trichinopoly, Mohammed Ali was left without an ostensible opponent in the Carnatic; and he was vested, as pompously as circumstances would permit, with the ensigns of his office and dignity, at Arcot. It still remained to compel the Zemindars or Polygars, and other Governors of forts and districts, to yield him a revenue. The English, after stipulating to receive one half of all the moneys collected, sent with him a large detachment to enforce a tribute from the northern chiefs, who recognised the authority of the Nabob, and produced a portion of the demanded sums. The reputed riches of Mortiz Ali, the Governor of Velore, rendered his subjugation the main object of desire. The English detachment was strongly reinforced, and encamped with the Nabob within cannon-shot of the fort. Mortiz Ali applied to the French. M. Deleyrit, who was Governor of Pondicherry, informed the English Presidency, that he regarded their proceedings at Velore as a violation of the treaty, and that he should commence hostilities, if their troops were not immediately withdrawn. The English rulers, soon aware that Velore could not be easily taken, and unwilling to put to proof the threat of Deleyrit, who had made 700 Europeans and 2000 Sepoys take the field, recalled the army to Madras. An attempt was made to

¹ Orme, i. 380—387; Cambridge's War in India, p. 109—113.

BOOK IV. obtain a contribution for the Company from Mortiz Ali,
 CHAP. II. but the negotiation terminated without any effect.¹

1755.

Meanwhile the Polygars of Madura and Tinivelly, who had made an ostensible submission during the presence of the English troops, were affording dangerous employment to the Governor Maphuz Khan. A confederacy was formed, which it soon appeared that the Governor was altogether unable to withstand. The English sent a large body of Sepoys; but in spite of this support, the refractory chiefs continued unsubdued; the country was thrown into confusion by a petty warfare which extended itself into every corner of the provinces, and no tribute could be raised. Highly dissatisfied with the unproductive state of a country which they had fondly believed to be the richest dependency of the Carnatic Nabob, the English determined to manage it themselves; and Maphuz Khan was ordered to return to Trichinopoly. But the chief entered immediately into confederacy with the Polygars; set himself in opposition to the English; obtained possession of the town and fort of Madura by a stratagem: and, with much uneasiness to the English, the disturbances in Madura and Tinivelly were prolonged for several years.²

During these transactions of the English, not very consistent with their agreement not to interfere in the disputes of the native princes, or add to their territory in India, the French were restrained from that active opposition which, otherwise, it is probable, they would have raised, by the dangerous situation of their affairs under the government of the Subahdar.

The enemies of Bussy, in the service and in the confidence of Salabut Jung, were both numerous and powerful; and exerted themselves in concert and with eagerness, to change the confidence and attachment of their feeble-minded master into distrust and hatred. It was now about two years and a half since the grant of the northern Circars; when certain favourable circumstances³

¹ Orme, i. 388, 398, 419; Cambridge, p. 111, 117, 119.

² Orme, i. 399, 420; Cambridge, p. 188.

³ It is not extraordinary that there should have been a strong party in the court of the Nizam opposed to the French, who were ready to avail themselves of every opportunity to influence the mind of Salabut Jung against them. Native accounts confirm the statement of Orme, that Shahnawaz Khan, the chief minister, was at their head; the circumstance of which he made present use might have been related, as it is fully detailed by Orme. The Nizam had laid

enabled them to make so deep an impression on the mind of this prince, that the French troops were ordered to quit his territories without delay. Bussy, in expectation, probably, that the necessities of the Subahdar would speedily make him eager to retract his command, showed no hesitation in commencing his march. It was continued for eight days without interruption: but his enemies had a very different intention from that of allowing him to depart in safety. When he approached the city of Hyderabad, he found his progress impeded by large bodies of troops, and the road obstructed by all the chiefs of the neighbouring countries, who had orders to intercept his march. Upon this he resolved to occupy a post of considerable strength, adjoining the city of Hyderabad, to defend himself, and try the effect of his arms, and of his intrigues among the chiefs, whom he well knew, till the reinforcements which he expected from Pondicherry should arrive. Though surrounded by the whole of the army of the Subahdar, and so feeble in pecuniary means, that his Sepoys deserted for want of pay, and he durst not venture them in sallies, for fear of their joining the enemy, he found the means of supplying himself fully with provisions, and of resisting every attack, till his succours arrived; when the Subahdar sent to demand a reconciliation, and he was restored to a still higher degree of influence and authority than he had previously enjoyed.

Among the means which had been employed to reconcile the mind of Salabut Jung to the dismissal of the French, was the prospect held up to him of replacing them by the English. No sooner, therefore, were the measures against Bussy devised, than an application was made for a body of troops to the Presidency of Madras. To the Presidency of Madras, few things could have presented a more dazzling

BOOK IV.

CHAP. II.

1755.

siege to Savanore, the residence of a disobedient vassal, who was supported in his resistance by the Mahratta partisan, Morari Rao. The government of Pondicherry was indebted to the latter, who finding himself and his ally hard pressed, engaged to relinquish his claims upon the French on condition that Bussy, who was with the Nizam, should negotiate a peace, and the preservation of the citadel of Savanore. The condition was effected, and Shahnavaaz Khan represented to the Nizam what was no more than the truth, that Bussy had preferred the interests of his countrymen to those of Salabut Jung. It was in resentment of this conduct that the French were dismissed from his service, upon the strong representation, as is stated by the author of the life of Shahnavaaz Khan, of that nobleman. *Calcutta Quarterly Magazine*, Dec. 1825.—W.

BOOK IV. prospect of advantage ; and in any ordinary situation of
CHAP. III. their affairs, the requisition of the Subahdar would have
 1755. met with an eager acceptance. But events had before this
 time taken place in Bengal, which demanded the utmost
 exertions of the English from every quarter ; made them
 unable to comply with the proposal of the Subahdar ; and
 thenceforward rendered Bengal the principal scene of the
 English adventures in India.¹

CHAPTER III.

*Suraja Dowla, Subahdar of Bengal—takes Calcutta—
 attacked by an army from Madras—dethroned—Meer
 Jaffier set up in his stead.*

DURING the latter part of the reign of Aurungzeb, the
 Subahs of Bengal and Orissa, together with those of
 Allahabad and Bahar, were governed by his grandson
 Azeem-oos-Shan, the second son of Shah Aulum, who suc-
 ceeded to the throne. Azeem-oos-Shan appointed as his
 deputy, in the provinces of Bengal and Orissa, Jaffier
 Khan, who had been for some time the dewan, or super-
 intendent of the finances, in Bengal ; a man of Tartar
 descent, but a native of Boorhanpore in the Deccan, who
 had raised himself to eminence in the wars of Aurungzeb.
 Upon the death of Shah Aulum, and the confusions which
 ensued, Jaffier Khan remained in possession of his im-
 portant government, till he was too powerful to be
 removed. While yet a resident in his native city, he had
 married his daughter and only child to a man of eminence
 in the same place, and of similar origin with himself, by
 name Shujah Khan. This relative had repaired with him
 to Bengal ; and when Jaffier Khan was elevated to the
 Subahdarry of Bengal and Orissa, Orissa was placed under
 the government of Shujah Khan, as deputy or nawab of
 the Subahdar.²

¹ Orme, i. 429—436, and ii. 89—104 ; Wilks, p. 380—388. It is amusing to compare the account of Bussy's transactions on this trying occasion, in the pages of Owen Cambridge (*War in India*, p. 132—135), written under half information, and fulness of national prejudice, with the well-informed and liberal narratives of Orme and of Wilks.

² *Seer Mutakhareen*, i. 17, 43, 296.

Among the adventurers who had been in the service of Azeem Shah, the second son of Aurungzeb, was a Tartar, named Mirza Mohammed. Upon the death of that prince, and the ruin of his party, Mirza Mohammed remained without employment, and was overtaken, after some years, with great poverty. His wife not only belonged to the same place from which the family of Shujah Khan was derived, but was actually of kin to that new ruler. By this wife he had two sons: the eldest named Hajee Ahmed; the youngest, Mirza Mohammed Ali. Upon the news of the elevation of their kinsman, it was determined, in this destitute family, that Mirza Mohammed, with his wife, should repair to his capital, in hopes of receiving his protection and bounty. The disposition of Shujah Khan was benevolent and generous. He received them with favour. The success of his father and mother induced Mirza Mohammed Ali, the youngest of the two sons, to hope for similar advantages. With great difficulty his poverty allowed him to find the means of performing the journey. He obtained employment and distinction. His prospects being now favourable, he sent for his brother Hajee Ahmed, and removed the whole of his family to Orissa. The talents of the two brothers were eminent. Hajee Ahmed was insinuating, pliant, discerning, and in business equally skilful and assiduous. Mirza Mohammed Ali to all the address and intelligence of his brother added the highest talents for war. They soon acquired a complete ascendancy in the councils of Shujah Khan, and by their abilities added greatly to the strength and splendour of his administration.

Jaffier Khan died in 1725; but destined Sereffraz Khan his grandson, instead of Shujah Khan, the father of that prince, with whom he lived not on friendly terms, to the succession. By the address and activity of the two brothers, the schemes of Jaffier were entirely defeated; patents were procured from Delhi; and Shujah Khan, with an army, was in possession of the capital and the government before any time was given to think of opposition. The province of Bahar was added to the government of Shujah Khan in 1729; and the younger of the two brothers, on whom was bestowed the title of Aliverdi Khan, was intrusted with its administration. He exerted

BOOK IV. himself, with assiduity and skill, to give prosperity to the province, and to acquire strength in expectation of future events.¹ In 1739, the same year in which Nadir Shah ravaged Delhi, Shujah Khan died, and was succeeded by Sereffraz Khan, his son. Sereffraz Khan had been educated a prince; and had the incapacity, and the servile subjection to pleasure, which that education usually implies. He hated the brothers; and began with disgusting and affronting when he should have either exterminated, or reconciled. The resolution of Aliverdi was soon taken. He employed his influence, which was great, at Delhi, to obtain his nomination to the government of Bengal and the united provinces; and marched with an army to dethrone Sereffraz, who lost his life in the battle. With the exception of the Governor of Orissa, whom he soon reduced, the whole country submitted without opposition. He governed it with unusual humanity and justice; and defended it with splendid ability and unwearied perseverance.

The Mahrattas, who had spread themselves at this time over a great part of the continent of India, seemed resolved upon the conquest of Bengal, the richest portion of the Mogul empire.² The dependence of the greatest events upon the slightest causes is often exemplified in Asiatic story. Had Sereffraz Khan remained Subahdar of Bengal, the Mahrattas might have added it, and all the adjoining provinces, to their extensive dominion. The English, and other European factories, might have been expelled. Nothing afterwards remained to check the Mahratta progress. The Mohammedans might have been exterminated; and the government of Brahmens and Kshatriyas might have extended once more from Caubul to Cape Comorin.

Aliverdi was on his return from the expedition against the Governor of Orissa, and had disbanded a great portion of his army, in contemplation of tranquillity and enjoyment, when he learned that a large army of Mahrattas had entered through the valleys in the mountains, at eight days' journey west of his capital Moorshedabad. The Mahrattas, besides possessing themselves of Kandeish and

¹ Holwell (Interesting Historical Events, l. 70) represents his conduct as highly cruel and unjust, and gives an account of five baskets of human heads, which he saw conveying to him in a boat.

² Seer Mutakhareen, l. 293—382; Orme, li. 26—32.

Malwa, had, before this period, overrun and subdued the whole province of Berar, where a general, named Ragojee Bonsla, of the family of Sivajee, had established himself in a widely-extended sovereignty which acknowledged but a nominal subjection to the primitive throne. The dominions of Ragojee Bonsla were separated from Bahar, Bengal, and Orissa, by only a chain of mountains, which it was easy for the Mahrattas to penetrate in many parts. And now it was that the said chief, either urged by the hope of adding the richest part of Hindustan to his empire, or at the instigation, as was alleged, of Nizam al Mulk, sent an army under a Brahmen general to invade Bengal.¹ Aliverdi marched against them instantly with the small number of troops which he had about his person, and was hardy enough to venture a battle; but the Afghan troops in his service were discontented with some recent treatment, and were inclined to make their advantage of his necessities. They acted coldly and feebly during the engagement. Aliverdi found it difficult to avoid a total defeat, and remained surrounded on all sides by a numerous and active enemy. He resolved to fight his way back; and though he suffered prodigiously from the sword, from fatigue, and from famine, he effected a glorious retreat; but reached not his capital till a detachment of the enemy had taken and plundered the suburbs.²

The Mahrattas, instead of returning to their own country, determined to remain during the period of the rains: and collected the revenue of almost the whole of territory south of the Ganges. Aliverdi made the greatest exertions to collect an army; and marching out at the termination of the rains, surprised the Mahrattas in their camp, and put them to flight; pursued them from post

¹ The Mahratta accounts, which appear to be most authentic, refer the invasion of Bengal to a different cause—the invitation of Meer Hubeeb, the Dewan of the Governor of Orissa. The Mahrattas, however, were too late in their invasion of the latter province, and therefore turned northwards, penetrating into the districts of Midnapore and Burdwan; in the latter they defeated Aliverdi Khan. They were prevented from following up their success, and marching to Moorsheadabad, by the rise of the Ganges, but a party of horse under Meer Hubeeb made a predatory incursion to the capital, where he carried off his brother, and plundered the banker Jagat Set of two millions and a half sterling, in Arcot Rupees. *Seer Mutakhareen*, i. 426.—W.

² Holwell, who was in the province, and must have had opportunities of learning many of the particulars, gives (*Interesting Historical Events*, i. 118) a detailed account of this retreat, which he celebrates as one of the most brilliant exploits in the annals of warfare.

BOOK IV. to post; and at last compelled them to evacuate his dominions.¹

CHAP. III.

1755.

If Aliverdi flattered himself that he was now delivered from a dangerous foe, he knew not the people with whom he had to contend. The Mahrattas appeared the very next year with Ragojee Bonsla himself at their head. Another army of Mahrattas, belonging to the government of Satarah, entered the province; but whether with hostile or friendly intentions, is variously asserted. It is not doubtful that, at this time, Aliverdi delivered himself from his enemies by a sum of money, upon receipt of which they retired.²

After a little time the general of Ragojee again entered by the province of Orissa, whence he advanced towards Bengal. By a train of artful and base negotiation, he was brought to trust himself at a conference in the tent of Aliverdi. He was there assassinated; and his death was the signal of dispersion to his troops.

The next invasion of the Mahrattas was encouraged by the rebellion of one of Aliverdi's principal officers. The good fortune of that chief still seconded his vigour. The formidable rebel was killed in battle, and the Mahrattas were compelled to retire.

The Mahratta pressure, incessantly returning, though frequently repelled, seldom failed, in the long run, to make the opposing body recede. The subjects of Aliverdi were grievously harassed, and the produce of his dominions was greatly impaired by these numerous invasions, and by the military exertions which were necessary to oppose them. In a new incursion, headed by Janojee, the son of Ragojee, the Mahrattas possessed themselves almost com-

¹ Seer Mutakhareen, i. 407—438; Orme, ii. 35. Both Orme and the author of the Seer Mutakhareen mention the instigation of Nizam al Mulk, but after all it seems to have been only a vague conjecture; and there were motives enough to Ragojee Bonsla without prompting. Holwell (Interesting Historical Events, i. 108) says they were instigated by the Court of Delhi.

² The author of the Seer Mutakhareen, who had the best opportunities of knowing, says (i. 450), that the Emperor claimed, as due on account of the payment of the chout, the assistance, for the province of Bengal, of the government of Sattarah, against Ragojee Bonsla; and that it was in compliance with this request, that the army of Balajee Row came into Bengal. Holwell, i. 140, and Orme, ii. 37, say that the two armies came in concert, and only differed about the division of the plunder.—M.

The native authority is best entitled to confidence; especially as the Peshwa and Ragojee Bonsla had been at variance, and were but imperfectly reconciled. Duff, Mahrattas, ii. 10.—W.

pletely of Orissa. The attention of the Subahdar was engaged in another quarter. Discontent again prevailed among his Afghan and Tartar officers, which it required some address to allay. His youngest nephew, who was the most distinguished for ability of all his relations, and whom he had appointed Nabob or Deputy Governor of Bahar, had taken into his pay two Afghan officers, who had retired in discontent from the service of Aliverdi. These leaders murdered their young master, the nephew of the Subahdar; and with a body of Mahrattas, who had entered the province on purpose to join them, and a considerable army of their own countrymen, whom the host of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, then covering the upper provinces of Hindustan, enabled them to collect, erected against Aliverdi the standard of revolt. Never was that governor, or rather king, for it was but a nominal obedience which he now paid to the throne of Delhi, in greater danger. He was obliged to meet the enemy, with a very inferior force; yet he gained a complete victory; and the Afghan lords were killed in the battle. The Mahrattas, however, only retired on the road towards Orissa, without crossing the mountains, and halted at Midnapore. He followed; pursued them into Orissa, with great slaughter; and even recovered the capital Cuttack; but was obliged to leave the province in so defenceless a condition, that the Mahrattas were not long deprived of their former acquisitions.

During the fifteen years of Aliverdi's government or reign, scarcely a year passed free from ruinous invasions of the Mahrattas; though, during the infirmities of his latter years he had, by a tributary payment, endeavoured to procure some repose. He died at the age of eighty on the 9th of April, 1756.¹ Aliverdi never had a son. He had three daughters, and his brother had three sons.² He married his three daughters to his three nephews; all of whom were men of considerable merit. The youngest was slain by the Afghan lords, as already related; and the two elder both died a little before the decease of Aliverdi.

¹ For a minute and very interesting account of the government of Aliverdi, see Seer Mutakhareen, i. 355—681. The narrative of Orme (ii. 28—52), and that of Holwell (Interesting Historical Events i. 85—176), do not exactly agree either with Gholam Hosein or with one another. Scrafton's account (Reflection, &c.) Holwell says was stolen from him.

² Orme, ii. 34, says that Aliverdi had only one daughter. The author of the *Seer Mutakhareen*, who was his near relation, says he had three, i. 304.

BOOK IV. The eldest son of his youngest nephew had from his birth

CHAP. III. been taken under the immediate care of Aliverdi himself; and was the object of extreme and even doting fondness.

1756. The youth, on whom had been bestowed the title of Suraj-ad-dowla, was, upon the death of his uncles, regarded as the destined successor of Aliverdi; ¹ and took the reins of government without opposition upon his decease.

Suraj-ad-dowla was educated a prince, and, with more than even the usual share of princely consideration and indulgence. He had, accordingly, more than the usual share of princely vices. He was ignorant; he was voluptuous; on his own pains and pleasures he set a value immense, on the pains and pleasures of other men, no value at all; he was impatient, irascible, headstrong.

The first act of Suraj-ad-dowla's government was to plunder his aunt, the widow of his senior uncle, eldest daughter of Aliverdi, reputed immensely rich. To this uncle had belonged the government of the province of Dacca; and orders were despatched to that place, to seize the receivers and treasurers of the family. His second uncle, who was Nabob of Poorania or Purneah, a province on the northern side of the Ganges, died during the last illness of Aliverdi, and left the government in the hands of his son, whose conduct was imprudent, and his mind vicious. Jealousy, or the desire of showing power by mischief, excited the young Subahdar to resolve upon the destruction of his cousin, the Nabob of Purneah. He had advanced as far as Raj Mahl, when he received intelligence that one of the principal officers of finance in the service of his late uncle at Dacca, had given the slip to his guards and found an asylum at Calcutta.

Suraj-ad-dowla had manifested aversion to the English, even during the life of his grandfather; the appearance of protection, therefore, shown to a man who had disappointed his avarice, and was probably imagined to have escaped with a large treasure, kindled his rage; the army was that moment commanded to halt, and to march back towards the capital. A messenger was despatched to Cal-

¹ Orme, ii. 47, says that Aliverdi had declared Suraj-ad-dowla his successor, before the death of his uncle. But the author of the *Seer Mutakhareen*, who was in the confidential service of Seid Hamet, the surviving nephew, tells us that he regarded himself as the successor of Aliverdi till the time of his death; which was during the last illness of Aliverdi.

cutta to remonstrate with the governor ; but as the messenger entered the town in a sort of disguise, the governor thought proper to treat him as an impostor, and dismissed him from the Company's territory. With a view to the war between France and England, the Presidency had begun to improve their fortifications. This, too, was matter of displeasure to the Subahdar ; and the explanation offered by the English, which intimated that those strangers were audacious enough to bring their hostilities into his dominions, still more inflamed his resentment. The factory at Cossimbuzar, near Moorshedabad, was seized ; and its chief, Mr. Watts, retained a prisoner. The Presidency were now very eager to appease the Subahdar ; they offered to submit to any conditions which he pleased to impose ; and, trusting to the success of their humility and prayers, neglected too long the means of defence. The Subahdar had a wish for a triumph, which he thought might be easily obtained ; and he was greedy of riches, with which, in the imagination of the natives, Calcutta was filled.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. III.

1756.

The outposts of Calcutta were attacked on the 18th of June, 1756. There was but little of military skill in the place, and it was badly defended. After a short experiment of resistance, a general consultation decided upon the policy of retreat. It was agreed that the women and effects should be put on board the ships in the course of the next day ; and that the persons employed in the work of defence should escape in the same manner the following night. There was hardly a chance of mishap, for the natives always close their operations with the close of the day ; but by some strange inadvertence no orders were published respecting the mode in which the plan was to be carried into effect. It was generally known that retreat was intended : when the embarkation next morning began, every person imagined he was to shift for himself, and hurried on board by the readiest conveyance. During the confusion, an apprehension arose in the ships respecting the security of their situation ; and they began to move down the river : the danger of being left without the means of retreat now flashed on the minds of the spectators on shore ; and the boats were filled and gone in an instant. " Among those who left the factory in this un-

BOOK IV. accountable manner were, the Governor Mr. Drake, Mr. **CHAP. III.** Macket, Captain Commandant Minchin, and Captain Grant."¹ Great was the indignation among the people of the fort, upon hearing that they were in this manner abandoned. Mr. Holwell, though not the senior servant, was by the general voice called to assume the command; and exerted himself with great vigour to preserve order, and maintain the defence. "Signals were now thrown out," says Mr. Cooke, "from every part of the fort, for the ships to come up again to their stations, in hopes they would have reflected (after the first impulse of their panic was over) how cruel as well as well as shameful it was, to leave their countrymen to the mercy of a barbarous enemy, and for that reason we made no doubt they would have attempted to cover the retreat of those left behind, now they had secured their own; but we deceived ourselves; and there never was a single effort made, in the two days the fort held out after this desertion, to send a boat or vessel to bring off any part of the garrison."² "Never, perhaps," says Mr. Orme, "was such an opportunity of performing an heroic action so ignominiously neglected; for a single sloop, with fifteen brave men on board, might, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, have come up, and anchoring under the fort, have carried away all who suffered in the dungeon."³ During these trying days Mr. Holwell made several efforts, by throwing letters over the wall, to signify his wish to capitulate; and it was during a temporary pause in the fire of the garrison, while expecting an answer, that the enemy approached the walls in numbers too great to be resisted, and the place was carried by storm. The Subahdar, though humanity was

1756.

¹ Evidence of John Cooke, Esq. (who at that time was Secretary to the Governor and Council of Calcutta), in the First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, appointed "to inquire into the Nature, State, and Condition of the East India Company," in 1772.—M.

Mr. Holwell adds to these Messrs. Manningham and Franckland, members of the Council, who set the example of this disgraceful desertion. They, in the *Dodaly*, dropped down the river on the night of the 18th of June. The *President*, with the rest of the ships, followed on the morning of the 19th. The Fort was taken on the 20th. There can be no doubt that the whole of the garrison might have been carried off by the shipping had there been either conduct or courage amongst the principal servants of the Company. Holwell's Address to the Secret Committee. India Tracts.—W.

² Report, ut supra. Mr. Cooke, from notes written immediately after the transactions, gives a very interesting narrative, from the death of Aliverdi, till the morning after the night of the *Black Hole*.

³ Orme, ii. 78.

no part of his character, appears not on the present occasion to have intended cruelty; for when Mr. Holwell was carried into his presence with his hands tied, he ordered them to be set loose, and assured him, upon the faith of a soldier, that of the heads of him and his companions, not a hair should be touched. When evening, however, came, it was a question with the guards to whom they were intrusted, how they might be secured for the night. Some search was made for a convenient apartment; but none was found; upon which information was obtained of a place which the English themselves had employed as a prison. Into this, without further inquiry, they were impelled. It was unhappily a small, ill-aired, and unwholesome dungeon, called the Black Hole; and the English had their own practice to thank for suggesting it to the officers of the Subahdar as a fit place of confinement.¹ Out of 146 unfortunate individuals thrust in, only twenty-three were taken out alive in the morning. The horror of the situation may be conceived, but it cannot be described. "Some of our company," says Mr. Cooke, "expired very soon after being put in; others grew mad, and having lost their senses, died in a high delirium." Applications were made to the guard, with the offer of great rewards; but it was out of their power to afford relief. The only chance consisted in conveying intelligence, by means of a bribe,

BOOK IV.

CHAP. III.

1756.

¹ The atrocities of English imprisonment at home, not then exposed to detestation by the labours of Howard, too naturally reconciled Englishmen abroad to the use of dungeons: of *Black Holes*. What had they to do with a *black hole*? Had no *black hole* existed (as none ought to exist anywhere, least of all in the sultry and unwholesome climate of Bengal), those who perished in the Black Hole of Calcutta would have experienced a different fate. Even so late as 1782, the common gaol of Calcutta is described by the Select Committee, "a miserable and pestilential place." That Committee examined two witnesses on the state of the common gaol of Calcutta. One said, "The gaol is an old ruin of a house; there were very few windows to admit air, and those very small. He asked the gaoler how many souls were then confined in the prison? Who answered, upwards of 170, blacks and whites included—that there was no good allowance, that many persons had died for want of the necessaries of life. The nauseous smells, arising from such a crowded place, were beyond expression. Besides the prisoners, the number of women and attendants, to carry in provisions and dress victuals, was so great, that it was astonishing that any person could long survive such a situation. It was the most horrible place he ever saw, take it altogether." The other witness said, "It is divided into small apartments, and those very bad; the stench dreadful, and more offensive than he ever experienced in this country—that there is no thorough draft of air—the windows are neither large nor numerous—the rooms low—that it would be impossible for any European to exist any length of time in the prison—that debtors and criminals were not separated—nor Hindoos, Mohammedans, and Europeans." First Report, Appendix, No. xi.

BOOK IV. to some officer of high authority ; and to no one does it appear that this expedient occurred.¹

CHAP. III. The news of the capture of Cossimbuzar arrived at Madras on the 15th of July, of that of Calcutta on the 1756.

¹ The account of the capture of Calcutta has been taken from the Report above quoted ; from the accounts of Mr. Holwell and Mr. Watts ; from Scrafton, p. 52—62 ; Orme, ii. 49—80 ; and Seer Mutakhareen, i. 716—721. The translator of this work says, in a note, " There is not a word here of those English shut up in the Black Hole, to the number of 131, where they were mostly smothered. The truth is, that the Hindostanees, wanting only to secure them for the night, as they were to be presented the next morning to the prince, shut them up in what they heard was the prison of the fort, without having any idea of the capacity of the room ; and indeed the English themselves had none of it. This much is certain, that this event, which cuts so capital a figure in Mr. Watts' performance, is not known in Bengal ; and even in Calcutta it is unknown to every man out of the 400,000 that inhabit that city : at least, it is difficult to meet a single native that knows anything of it : so careless, and so incurious are those people. Were we, therefore, to accuse the Indians of cruelty, for such a thoughtless action, we should of course accuse the English, who, intending to embark 400 Gentoo Sepoys, destined for Madras, put them in boats, without one single necessary, and at last left them to be overset by the bore, when they all perished after a three days' fast."—M.

The spirit in which this transaction is noticed, in this and the preceding note, as well as in the text, is wholly unjustifiable. It extenuates a deliberate act of wanton cruelty by erroneous assumptions and inapplicable analogies. The Black Hole was no dungeon at all ; it was a chamber above ground—small and ill-aired only with reference to the number of persons forced into it, but affording abundant light and air to many more than it had ever lodged under the English administration. According to Holwell (Letter to Dr. Davis, 28th Feb. 1757 ; published in Holwell's India Tracts), it was a room eighteen feet square, with a door on one side, and two windows on another. In 1808 a chamber was shown in the Old Fort of Calcutta then standing, said to be the Black Hole of 1756 : its situation did not correspond exactly with Mr. Holwell's description of it, but if not the same, it was a room of the same description and size, such as is very common amongst the offices of both public and private buildings in Calcutta, and no doubt accurately represented the kind of place which was the scene of this occurrence. It bore by no means the character of a prison. It was much more light, airy, and spacious, than most of the rooms used formerly by the London watch, or at present by the police, for purposes of temporary durance. Had a dozen or twenty people been immured within such limits for a night, there would have been no hardship whatever in their imprisonment, and in all probability no such number of persons ever was confined in it. The English, then, in the objectionable sense in which the author chooses to understand the " Black Hole," never had such a prison. The state of the Calcutta gaol, in 1782, like that of the common gaols in England or in Europe, was, no doubt, bad enough ; but it is not said that its inmates had ever died of want of air, or that one hundred and twenty perished in a single night, and, as the story which the translator of the Seer Mutakhareen relates, it requires to be authenticated. If the boats were upset by the bore, the men perished in the Ganges ; but, if they were in the Ganges, it is quite impossible that they should have been there three days without food. There is no doubt some gross exaggeration in the anecdote, but a case of inadvertency, however culpable, is no set-off against deliberate persevering barbarity. Even if the excuse of inconsiderateness might be urged for driving the prisoners into a space so utterly inadequate to their numbers, there was abundant opportunity to correct the mistake, when it was seen what suffering it occasioned. The whole transaction admits of no defence : it was an exemplification of Mohammedan insolence, intolerance, and cruelty ; and in contemplating the signal retribution by which it has been punished, a mind susceptible of reverence, though free from superstition, can scarcely resist the impression, that the course of events was guided by higher influences than the passions and purposes of man.—W.

5th of August. It was fortunate that Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive were now both upon the coast. Admiral Watson was commander of the squadron which the English ministry had prudently sent to India during the progress of the negotiation in 1754. Soon after his arrival on the coast of Coromandel, the monsoon obliged him to sail to Bombay, from which he returned in the January following, by a very able navigation against a contrary monsoon; and was now joined by Mr. Pocock, who had arrived from England with two ships of superior force. He remained on the coast of Coromandel till the 10th of October, when he again sailed to Bombay, to escape the monsoon. At this place matters of great importance were already in agitation.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. III.

1756.

Captain Clive had arrived from England, where he had obtained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in his Majesty's service, and the appointment of Deputy Governor of Fort St. David. He had landed at Bombay, with three companies of the king's artillery, and between three and four hundred of the king's troops, with a view to a project, concerted in England, of attacking Salabut Jung, in conjunction with the Mahrattas, and driving the French out of the Deccan. The report which the directors in England had received of the brilliant exploits of Captain Clive in India had made them desirous of intrusting to *him* a service, highly delicate, of the greatest importance, and requiring the fullest acquaintance with the manners and circumstances of the country. "But from that dependence on the ministry," says Mr. Orme, "to which their affairs will always be subject, whilst engaged in military operations, the Court of Directors, in compliance with very powerful recommendations, appointed Lieutenant Colonel Scott to command the expedition."¹ This officer had sailed to India, in the capacity of Engineer-General, the preceding year. Clive was still directed to land at Bombay, in hopes that some accident might take the business out of the hands of Scott; which in reality happened, for that officer died before the other arrived. But in the meantime, the truce had been concluded between the

¹ Orme, I. 406. "Colonel Scott," says Clive himself, in his evidence before the Committee (See Report, *ut supra*), "had been strongly recommended by the Duke of Cumberland."

BOOK IV. English and French ; and the Presidency of Bombay

CHAP. III. refused to engage in a measure by which it would be violated. There was another enterprise, however, in which
 1756. they had already embarked, and in which, with the great

force; military and naval, now happily assembled at Bombay, they had sanguine hopes of success.

The Mahrattas, as early as the time of Sivajee, had raised something of a fleet, to protect them against the enterprise of the Siddees. In this service a common man distinguished himself ; and rose from one post to another, till he became Admiral of the fleet. He was appointed Governor of a strong fort, called Severndroog, situated on a rocky island, within cannon-shot of the continent, about eight miles north from Dabul. This adventurer quarrelled with the Mahratta government ; and revolted with the greater part of the fleet. He not only set the Mahratta state at defiance, but was able to render himself master of the coast to an extent of sixty leagues, from Tanna to Rajapore ; and the Mahrattas compounded their dispute with him, by receiving a small annual tribute as a mark of subjection. The name of the successful rebel was Conajee Angria ; and he made piracy his trade.¹ The nature of the coast is well adapted to that species of depredation ; because it is intersected by a great number of rivers, and the breezes compel ships to keep close to the land. The European nations had been harassed by this predatory community for nearly half a century ; they had made several efforts to subdue them, but the power of Angria had always increased ; and his fleets now struck terror into all commercial navigators on the western coast of India.

Several approaches towards the formation of a union for the extirpation of these corsairs had been made by the English and Mahrattas ; but without effect, till 1755, when an English squadron, under Commodore James, and a land-army of Mahrattas, attacked Severndroog, and took it, as well as the fort of Bancoote. It was toward the conclu-

¹ These circumstances are not quite correctly stated. It was the father of Kanhajee who first acquired distinction in the service of Sivajee, he was made admiral of the fleet by Raja Ram, and took part with his widow against Shao, the grandson of Sivajee, but was induced to acknowledge the latter by the grant of ten forts, including Severndroog and Viziadroog, or Gheriah. Duff's Mahrattas, l. 436.—W.

sion of the same year that Admiral Watson with his fleet, and Colonel Clive with his forces, arrived at Bombay : the final reduction of the piratical state was therefore decreed. On the 11th of February, 1756, the fleet, consisting of eight ships, besides a grab, and five bomb-ketches, having on board 800 Europeans and 1000 Sepoys commanded by Colonel Clive, arrived at Gheriah : while a Mahratta army approached on the other side. Gheriah, the capital of Angria, stood on a rocky promontory, nearly surrounded by the sea, and had a fort of extraordinary strength. But the number of the assailants, and the violence of the cannonade, terrified both Angria and his people, and they made a feeble use of their advantages.¹ Angria, with a view to effect an accommodation, placed himself in the hands of the Mahrattas ; the fort surrendered ; and the object of the expedition was completely attained.² Watson arrived at Madras on the 16th of May, and Clive repaired to his government at Fort St. David, from which, in the month of August, he was summoned to assist in the deliberations for recovering Calcutta.³

BOOK IV.
CHAP. III.

1756.

It was resolved, after some debate, that the reestablishment of the Company's affairs in Bengal should be pursued at the expense of every other enterprise. A dispute, however, of two months ensued, to determine in what manner prizes should be divided ; who should command ; and what should be the degree of power intrusted with the commander. The parties, of whom the pretensions were severally to be weighed, were Mr. Pigot, who had been Governor of Madras since the departure of Saunders, but was void of military experience ; Colonel Aldercron, who claimed as senior officer of the King, but was unacquainted with the irregular warfare of the natives ; Colonel Lawrence, whose experience and merit were unquestionable, but to whose asthmatical complaints the close and sultry climate of Bengal was injurious ; and Clive, to whom none of these exceptions applied. It was at last determined, that Clive

¹ This was Toolajee Angria, son of Kanhajee.—W.

² The author was not aware of the circumstances under which Gheriah was taken and retained by the English, in contravention of the terms under which they were engaged to co-operate with the Mahrattas, whom they contrived to anticipate in a mutually projected scheme of deception. See Duff's *Mahratta History*, ii. 88.—W.

³ See for this account, Orme, i. 406—417 ; Cambridge's *War in India*, p. 120—130 ; Lord Clive's Evidence, Report, ut supra.

BOOK IV. should be sent. It was also determined, that he should be
CHAP. III. sent with powers independent of the Presidency of Calcutta. Among his instructions, one of the most peremptory was, that he should return, and be again at Madras with the whole of the troops, in the month of April; about which time it was expected that in consequence of the war between France and England, a French fleet would arrive upon the coast. It was principally, indeed, with a view to this return, that independence of the Calcutta rulers, who might be tempted to retain him, was bestowed upon Clive.

1756.

The force which sailed from the road of Madras, on the 16th of October, consisted of five King's ships with Admiral Watson as Commander, and five Company's ships, serving as transports; having on boards 900 European troops, and 1500 Sepoys. All the ships, with the exception of two, arrived in the Ganges on the 20th of December, and found the fugitives from Calcutta at Fulta, a town at some distance down the river, to which the ships had descended, and where they had found it practicable to remain.

After forwarding letters, full of threats, to Suraj-ad-dowla, which the Governor of Calcutta sent word that he dared not deliver, it was resolved to commence operations, by the capture of a fort, which stood, on the river, between Fulta and Calcutta. On the 27th of December, at the time when the fort was to be attacked by the ships, Clive marched out, with the greater part of the troops, to lay an ambush for intercepting the garrison, who were not expected to make a tedious defence. The troops, fatigued in gaining their position, were allowed to quit their arms to take a little repose; "and from a security," says Mr. Orme, "which no superiority or appearances in war could justify, the common precaution of stationing sentinels was neglected." In a few minutes they were all asleep; and in this situation, surprised by a large body of the enemy. The presence of mind and steady courage, which never deserted Clive in sudden emergencies, enabled him, even in those unfavourable circumstances, to disperse a band of irregular troops, led by a cowardly commander. "But had the enemy's cavalry," says Orme, "advanced and charged at the same time that the infantry

began to fire, it is not improbable that the war would have been concluded on the very first trial of hostilities."¹ .

BOOK IV.
CHAP. III.

The ships came up and cannonaded the fort; but the garrison frustrated the project of Clive; and, totally unperceived, made their escape in the night. The other forts on the river were deserted, as the English approached; and, on the 2d of January, 1757, the armament arrived at Calcutta. The garrison withstood not the cannon of the ships for two hours; and evacuated the place. The merchandise belonging to the Company was found mostly untouched, because it had been reserved for the Subahdar; but the houses of individuals were totally plundered.

1757.

Intelligence was received from the natives, who began to enter the town, that Hoogly, a considerable city, about twenty-three miles up the river from Calcutta, was thrown into great consternation by these recent events. In this situation an attack upon it was expected to produce a very favourable result. One of the ships sent on this service struck on a sandbank, and five days retarded the progress of the detachment. On the 10th of January they reached the spot; made a breach in the wall before night; and the troops no sooner mounted the rampart, than the garrison fled and escaped.

During the expedition to Hoogly news arrived of the commencement of hostilities between England and France.² The French in Bengal had a force of 300 Europeans, and a train of field artillery; which, if added to the army of the Subahdar, would render him an irresistible enemy. The English were now very desirous to make their peace with that formidable ruler; but the capture of Hoogly, undertaken solely with a view to plunder,³ had so augmented his

¹ Scrafton, p. 62, sinks the culpable circumstances.—M. Sir J. Malcolm himself a soldier, shows that no such catastrophe was possible, "the thick jungle which concealed the approach of the infantry, was impervious to cavalry, who had no means of advancing, except through openings where they must have been seen, and the possibility of surprise defeated." *Life of Clive*, i. 152.—W.

² The Indian historian gives an amusing account of the relations between England and France: "Just at this crisis," says he, "the flames of war broke out between the French and English: two nations who had disputes between themselves of five or six hundred years' standing; and who, after proceeding to bloodshed, wars, battles, and massacres, for a number of years, would lay down their arms by common agreement, and take breath on both sides, in order to come to blows again, and to fight with as much fury as ever." *Seer Mutakharee*, i. 759.

³ As observed by the biographer of Clive, there are no facts to warrant the imputation that plunder was the sole object of the attack upon Hoogly. The

BOOK IV. rage, that he was not in a frame of mind to receive from
 CHAP. III. them any proposition ; and his army received its orders to
 1757. march. Happily for the English the same spirit by which Dupleix was reproached for not having negotiated a neutrality between the French and English Companies in India, though the nations were at war in Europe, prevailed in the Councils at Chandernagor. The rulers at that settlement refused to assist Suraj-ad-dowla ; and proposed that they and the English should engage by treaty, notwithstanding the war between their respective countries, to abstain from hostilities against one another in Bengal.¹ Still the power of the Subahdar presented an appalling aspect to Clive ; and no sooner had he received intimation of an abatement in the irritation of that enemy, than he renewed his application for peace. The Subahdar received his letter, and even proposed a conference ; but continued his march, and on the 3d of February surrounded Calcutta with his camp. Clive resolved to surprise it before dawn of the following morning. The design was no less politic than bold ; both as the audacity of it was likely to alarm a timorous enemy ; and as the difficulty of procuring provisions, surrounded by a large body of cavalry, must soon have been great. The execution, however, was badly planned ; and a thick mist augmented the causes of misfortune. The troops suffered considerably ; and were several times exposed to the greatest dangers. Yet they marched through the camp ; and produced on the minds of the Subahdar and his army the intended effect. Eager

opportunity of striking a successful blow against an enemy's town, was so obvious a reprisal for his capture of Calcutta, that it is very unnecessary to seek for any other motives than the most ordinary rules of warfare.—W.

¹ There is some contradiction in the statements of different authorities on this subject, which can be reconciled only by a consideration of dates and circumstances. It appears probable, that the French were not informed of the war in Europe, until after the march of the Nawab to Calcutta, and the negotiations for peace with the English. They could not, therefore, have joined him sooner, and to prevent that junction taking place, was one of Clive's reasons for agreeing to the treaty more readily than was thought advisable by Admiral Watson. He writes to the Chairman, "I know there are many who think I have been too precipitate in the conclusion of the treaty, but they never knew that the delay of a day or two might have ruined the Company's affairs, by the junction of the French with the Nawab, which was on the point of being carried into execution." *Life*, i. 179. With the conclusion of the treaty, the French lost their opportunity of co-operating with the Nawab. Their negotiations for a neutrality were subsequent to the Nawab's retreat ; and if Clive's account of the matter be correct, the English had not much reason to be grateful for their forbearance.—W.

to be removed from an enemy capable of those daring attempts, Suraj-ad-dowla was now in earnest to effect an accommodation. Overtures were received and returned; and on the 9th of February a treaty was concluded, by which the Nabob, as he was styled by the English, agreed to restore to the Company their factories, and all the privileges they had formerly enjoyed; to permit them to fortify Calcutta; and to make compensation to them for such of the plundered effects as had been brought to account in the books of his government. So greatly was he pleased with this treaty, that two days after its conclusion, he proposed to conclude with the English an alliance offensive and defensive; a contract which the English eagerly formed, and which both parties ratified on that very day.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. III.

1757.

In return to the French for that neutrality of theirs which had saved the English,¹ Clive, at the very moment of making peace with the Nabob, sounded him to know if he would permit the English to attack the settlement at Chandernagor, for which there still would be time before the setting in of the southern monsoon. The proposition was hateful to the Subahdar; but for the present he returned an evasive answer. As this was not a prohibition, Clive resolved to construe it as a permission; and he sent his army across the river. The Subahdar now interfered with efficacy; sent an express prohibition; and took measures for opposing the attempt.

The Council at Calcutta, no longer expecting the consent of the Subahdar, and alarmed at the thought of attempting the enterprise in defiance of his authority, entered into negotiation with the French. They had mutually agreed upon terms; and obtained the assent of the Subahdar to guarantee between them a treaty of neutrality and pacification. But the factory at Chandernagor was dependent on the government of Pondicherry, and could only ratify the treaty provisionally; the government of Calcutta signed with definitive powers. This difference started a scruple in the brain of Admiral Watson; and he refused to sign. In the opinion of Clive, there was but one alternative: that of embracing the neutrality, or instantly attacking Chandernagor. But Watson

¹ See preceding note.

BOOK IV. refused to attack without the Nabob's consent ; and Clive
CHAP. III. urged the necessity of accepting the neutrality. In a

1757.

letter to the Select Committee he said, "If the neutrality be refused, do but reflect, Gentlemen, what will be the opinion of the world of these our late proceedings. Did we not, in consequence of a letter received from the Governor and Council of Chandernagor, making offers of a neutrality within the Ganges, in a manner accede to it, by desiring they would send deputies, and that we would gladly come into such neutrality with them ?¹ And have we not, since their arrival, drawn out articles that were satisfactory to both parties ; and agreed that such articles should be reciprocally signed, sealed, and sworn to ? What will the Nabob think, after the promise made him on our side, and after his consenting to guarantee this neutrality ? He, and all the world, will certainly think, that we are men without principles, or that we are men of a trifling insignificant disposition."² While the altercations on this subject continued, news reached the Subahdar, that Ahmed Shah, the Abdallee, had taken Delhi ; and meant to extend his conquests to the eastern provinces of the Mogul empire. This intelligence, which filled him with consternation, suggested the vast importance of securing the co-operation of the English ; and he immediately sent a letter to Colonel Clive, the object of which was to pave the way for attaining it, on almost any terms. The very same day on which the letter of the Nabob reached Calcutta, the arrival was announced of three ships with troops from Bombay, and of one of the ships, also bearing troops, which sailed with Clive from Madras, but was compelled to return. "With such additions," says Mr. Orme, "the English force was deemed capable of taking Chandernagor, although protected by the Nabob's army. Colonel Clive therefore immediately dismissed the French deputies, who were then with him waiting to sign the treaty, which was

¹ Admiral Watson asserts, in a letter to the Nawab, that the proposal for a neutrality originated with the English. *Life of Clive*, i. 187. This account of the failure of the negotiation, agrees in the main with that in the text ; but there can be little doubt, that neither of the parties had the power of exempting themselves from the consequences of international warfare. It was the duty of the English to attempt the reduction of Chandernagore, as it would have been that of the French to capture Calcutta, had they been in sufficient strength.—W.

² Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. vi.

even written out fair, and which they supposed had been BOOK IV.
entirely concluded.”¹

CHAP. III.

1757.

The English force advanced; while the scruples of Admiral Watson, under the great accession of force, were vanquished by some supposed contradictions in the letters of the Subahdar; and the opposition of the Subahdar was suspended by his apprehension of the Afghans. On the 14th of March, the detachment from Bombay having joined the English army, hostilities commenced. The French defended themselves with great gallantry: the Nabob, roused at last,² and eager to prevent their fall, sent peremptory orders to the English to desist; and even put a part of his army in motion. But the fire from the ships was irresistible, and the reduction of the fort anticipated the effects of his intended resistance. The resentment of the Nabob was checked by his remaining dread of the Abdallees; and he still courted the friendship of the invaders. He, however, eluded their request to give up all the other French factories and subjects in his dominions; and afforded protection to the troops who had escaped from the fort of Chandernagor.

The time was now arrived when, according to his instructions, Clive ought no longer to have deferred his return to Madras. He himself, in his letter to the Select Committee, dated the 4th of March, had said respecting Watson's objection to the treaty of neutrality; “this leads me to consider seriously the situation of the Company's affairs on the coast, and the positive orders I have received from the President and the Committee at Madras, to return at all events with as great a part of the forces under my command as could possibly be spared.”² “The situation of

¹ Orme, ii. 139. Clive himself gives a curious account of the deliberation upon this measure: “That the members of the Committee were—Mr. Drake (the Governor), himself (Col. Clive), Major Kilpatrick, and Mr. Becher:—Mr. Becher gave his opinion for a neutrality, Major Kilpatrick, for a neutrality; he himself gave his opinion for the attack of the place; Mr. Drake gave an opinion that nobody could make anything of. Major Kilpatrick then asked him, whether he thought the forces and squadron could attack Chandernagor and the Nabob's army at the same time?—he said, he thought they could; upon which Major Kilpatrick desired to withdraw his opinion, and to be of his. They voted Mr. Drake's no opinion at all; and Major Kilpatrick and he being the majority, a letter was written to Admiral Watson, desiring him to co-operate in the attack on Chandernagor.” Report, ut supra. There is something ludicrous in voting a man's opinion, to be no opinion; yet the undecided, hesitating, ambiguous propositions, of men who know not what resolution to take, cannot, in general, perhaps, be treated by a better rule.

² Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. vi.

BOOK IV. the Company's affairs on the coast," that is in the Carnatic, was indeed in no small degree alarming, if they remained without the protection of their military force, sent for the restoration of the settlements in Bengal. The Presidency of Madras had not left themselves troops sufficient to make head against the French even then in the country; and it was known at Madras, before the departure of Clive, that, in consequence of the expected hostilities, a powerful armament was destined by the French government for India; and without doubt would make its first landing in the Carnatic. On the other side Clive beheld an opening for exploits, both splendid and profitable, in Bengal; overlooked all other considerations; violated his instructions; and remained.¹

1757.

The French, who had collected themselves at Cossimbazar, became the first subject of dispute. Instead of yielding them up, on the repeated solicitations of the English, the Nabob furnished M. Law, who was the head of the factory at Cossimbazar, with money, arms, and ammunition, and sent them into Bahar; Clive, to the great displeasure of his new ally, threatening, and even preparing to detach a part of his army to intercept them. By the author of the *Seer Mutakhareen*, we are told that M. Law, before his departure, revealed to Suraj-ad-dowla the disaffection of his principal officers; the connexion which they would be sure to form with the English for his destruction; and the necessity of retaining the French about his person if he wished to preserve himself from that deplorable fate. The persons, however, who meditated his ruin, and who saw the importance of removing the French, pressed upon his mind the impolicy of quarrelling with the victorious English on account of the vanquished and fugitive French. He therefore dismissed M. Law, telling him, "that if there should happen any thing

¹ It is quite clear that Clive judged soundly what was his duty, when he determined to remain. To have withdrawn any part of the force from Bengal, would have been not only to forfeit the advantages that had been gained, but would have ensured the expulsion of the English from the province. The feelings of Suraj-ad-dowla were unchanged, his power was unbroken, and he had now the certain assistance of the French. It is quite impossible that the English could have made head against them, or could have hoped for any conditions whatever. Clive would have been a traitor, not only to his own fame, but the interests of his country, had he obeyed the calls from Madras, where the danger was less imminent, and the consequences of discomfiture less irreparable.—W.

new, he would send for him again.”—“Send for me again ?” **BOOK IV.**
 answered Law, “Be assured, my lord Nawab, that this is **CHAP. III.**
 the last time we shall see each other; remember my
 words,—we shall never meet again; it is nearly impos-
 sible.”¹ 1757.

Lord Clive, in his statement to the House of Commons, said, “that after Chandernagor was resolved to be attacked, he repeatedly said to the committee, as well as to others, that they could not stop there, but must go further; that, having established themselves by force, and not by consent of the Nabob, he would endeavour to drive them out again; that they had numberless proofs of his intentions, many upon record; and that he did suggest to Admiral Watson and Sir George Pococke, as well as to the Committee, the necessity of a revolution; that Mr. Watson and the gentlemen of the Committee, agreed upon the necessity of it;² and that the management of that revolution was, with consent of the committee, left to Mr. Watts, who was resident at the Nabob’s capital, and himself; that great dissatisfaction arising among Suraj-ad-dowla’s troops, Meer Jaffier was pitched upon to be the person to place in the room of Suraj-ad-dowla, in consequence of which a treaty was formed.”³

A complicated scene took place, which it would be little instructive to unfold,⁴ of plotting and intrigue. The first proposals were made by an officer named Yar Khan Latty; and they were greedily embraced; till intimation was received that Meer Jaffier Khan was inclined to enter into a confederacy for deposing the Subahdar. This was a personage of much greater power and distinction. He had

¹ Seer Mutakhareen, i. 762.

² Captain Brereton, who was Lieutenant with Admiral Watson, declared in evidence, “that he had heard Admiral Watson say, he thought it an extraordinary measure to depose a man they had so lately made a solemn treaty with.” Report, ut supra.—M.

Better evidence, Admiral Watson’s own, proves, that he entirely approved of the proceedings. He writes to Clive: “I am glad to hear that Meer Jaffier’s party increases, I hope every thing will turn out, in the expedition, to your wishes, and that I may soon have to congratulate you on the success of it.” Life of Clive, i. 242.—W.

³ Report, ut supra.—M. From the manner in which this is stated, it would seem as if the project of a revolution originated with the English, although, from what follows, it is clear that it was suggested to them by proposals from the principal persons at Murshedabad, both Mohammedan and Hindu: amongst the latter, and a most influential individual, was the opulent banker Juggut Set. Life of Clive, i. 227.—W.

⁴ It has been done with exemplary minuteness and patience by Mr. Orme, ii. 149—175.

BOOK IV. been married at an early period to the sister of Aliverdi,
 CHAP. III. and held a high rank in his army. Between him and Ali-
 1757. verdi had not been always the best understanding; and
 Meer Jaffier had at one time entered into a project of
 treason. But the interest of the two parties taught them
 to master their dissatisfaction; and at the death of Ali-
 verdi, Meer Jaffier was paymaster general of the forces,
 one of the highest offices in an Indian government. Suraj-
 ad-dowla hated Meer Jaffier, and was too ignorant and
 headstrong to use management with his dislikes. Shortly
 after his accession, Meer Jaffier was removed from his
 office, and remained exposed to all that might result from
 the violent disposition of the Subahdar. According to the
 constitution, however, of an Indian army, in which every
 General maintains his own troops, a considerable portion
 of the army belonged to Meer Jaffier; and this he exerted
 himself to increase, by enlisting as many as possible of the
 adventurers, with whom the nature of Indian warfare
 made the country abound.

In manufacturing the terms of the confederacy, the
 grand concern of the English appeared to be money. "The
 Committee really believed," says Mr. Orme, "the wealth
 of Suraj-ad-dowla much greater than it possibly could be,
 even if the whole life of the late Nabob Aliverdi had not
 been spent in defending his own dominions against the
 invasion of ruinous enemies; and even if Suraj-ad-dowla
 himself had reigned many, instead of only one year."¹
 They resolved accordingly not to be sparing in their
 demands; and the situation of Jaffier Khan, and the man-
 ners and customs of the country, made him ready to pro-
 mise whatever they desired. In name of compensation for
 losses by the capture of Calcutta, 10,000,000 rupees were
 promised to the English Company, 5,000,000 rupees to
 English inhabitants, 2,000,000 to the Indians, and 700,000
 to the Armenians. These sums were specified in the
 formal treaty. Over and beside this, it was resolved by
 the Committee of the Council, that is, the small number
 of individuals by whom the business was performed, that
 a donation of 2,500,000 rupees should be asked for the
 squadron; and another of equal amount for the army.²

¹ Orme, ii. 163.

² These presents, which were afterwards made use of by the personal enemies
 of Clive, to effect his annoyance and attempt his ruin, detract much from the

"When this was settled," says Lord Clive,¹ "Mr. Becher (a member) suggested to the Committee, that he thought that Committee, who managed the great machine of government, was entitled to some consideration, as well as the army and navy." Such a proposition, in such an assembly, could not fail to appear eminently reasonable. It met with a suitable approbation. Mr. Becher informs us, that the sums received were 280,000 rupees by Mr. Drake the Governor; 280,000 by Colonel Clive; and 240,000 each, by himself, Mr. Watts, and Major Kilpatrick, the inferior members of the Committee.² The terms obtained in favour of the Company were, that all the French factories and effects should be given up; that the French should be for ever excluded from Bengal; that the ter-

BOOK IV.

CHAP. III.

1757.

splendour of his reputation, and reflect discredit upon all who were parties to their acceptance. That General, Admiral, and Members of the Select Committee, were alike influenced by a grasping and mercenary spirit is undeniable, and they seized, with an avidity which denoted a lamentable absence of elevated principles, upon an unexpected opportunity of realizing princely fortunes. At the same time, many considerations may be urged in their excuse, and a more disinterested conduct would have exhibited in them, a very extraordinary exception to the prevailing practices and feelings of the times. The servants of the Company had never been forbidden to receive presents from the natives of rank, and as they were very ill paid, it was understood that they were at liberty to pay themselves in any manner they could which did not injure their employers. The making of presents was an established practice amongst the natives, and is one which they even yet consider as a necessary part of friendly or formal intercourse, and although, agreeably to their notions, it is most incumbent on the inferior to approach his superior with an offering, yet on great public occasions, and especially upon any signal triumph, the distribution of liberal donations to the army and the chief officers of the court is a natural result. There was nothing more than customary, therefore, in the gift of large sums of money by Mir Jaffier to those to whom he was indebted for his accession; and, as there was neither law nor usage opposed to the acceptance of his donations by the servants of the Company, and as they were avowedly expected and openly received, there was nothing dishonest in the transaction. That the amount of the presents was excessive, may be attributed, in some degree, to the erroneous opinion entertained probably by Mir Jaffier, and certainly by the Company's servants, of the great wealth in the treasury of Suraj-ad-dowla, which admitted of such deduction. With a just regard to circumstances and seasons, therefore, it is unjust to expect from the servants of the Company a lofty disregard of personal advantage, although they would have merited more unqualified admiration had they disdained their private enrichment in the noble aim of promoting the public good: much unhappiness would have been avoided by themselves, much misery would have been spared to Bengal.

¹ Evidence before the Committee, Report, *ut supra*.

² *Ibid*. These latter receipts were the occasion of a dispute. "Upon this being known," said Clive (Report, *ut supra*) "Mr. Watson replied, that he was entitled to a share in that money. He (Clive) agreed in opinion with the gentlemen, when this application was made, that Mr. Watson was not one of the Committee, but at the same time did justice to his services, and proposed to the gentlemen to contribute as much as would make his share equal to the Governor's and his own; that about three or four consented to it, the rest would not."

BOOK IV. ritory surrounding Calcutta to the distance of 600 yards
CHAP. III. beyond the Mahratta ditch, and all the land lying south of
 1757. Calcutta as far as Culpee, should be granted them on
 Zemindary tenure, the Company paying the rents in the
 same manner as other Zemindars.

For effecting the destruction of Suraj-ad-dowla it was concerted, that the English should take the field, and that Meer Jaffier should join them at Cutwa, with his own troops, and those of as many of the other commanders as it should be in his power to debauch. When the English arrived at Cutwa, no allies, however, appeared: Letters were received from Moorshedabad by some of the natives in the camp, stating that the conspiracy was discovered, and that Meer Jaffier had obtained his pardon, on condition of aiding the Nabob with all his resources against the English. Instead of Meer Jaffier and his troops, a letter from Meer Jaffier arrived. In this it was stated, that the suspicions of the Nabob had been raised; that he had constrained Meer Jaffier to swear fidelity on the Koran; that it had thus become impossible for Meer Jaffier to join the English before the day of battle; but that it would be easy for him, in the action, to desert the Nabob, and decide the fortune of the day. The mind of the English commander was disturbed. The treachery of Meer Jaffier could not be regarded as improbable; and "he thought it extremely hazardous" (to use his own words) "to pass a river which is only fordable in one place, march 150 miles up the country, and risk a battle, when, if a defeat ensued, not one man would have returned to tell it."¹

In these difficulties he called a council of war. "It is very rare," says Mr. Orme, "that a council of war decides for battle."² Clive himself says, "that this was the only council of war that ever he held, and if he had abided by that council, it would have been the ruin of the East India Company."³ The singularity is, that in the council Clive himself was of the same opinion with the majority, and by delivering his opinion first, which was far from the usual practice, had no doubt considerable influence in determining others; yet that afterwards he disregarded that

¹ Evidence, *ut supra*.

³ Evidence, Report, *ut supra*.

² Orme, *il.* 171.

decision, and took upon himself to act in direct opposition to it. The army was ordered to cross the river the next morning; and at a little past midnight arrived at Plassy.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. III.

1757.

At this place, a part of the army of the Subahdar had been intrenched for a considerable time; and the Subahdar himself had reached it with the remainder of his forces the evening before the arrival of the English. The army with which he was now to contend for his power and his life consisted of 50,000 foot, 18,000 horse, and fifty pieces of cannon.² Of the English force, 900, including 100 artillery-men and fifty sailors, were Europeans; 100 were Topasses; and 2100 Sepoys. The battle was nothing but a distant cannonade. This was maintained during the greatest part of the day, and sufficed to terrify the Subahdar, who, by the advice of those who desired his ruin, issued orders of preparation for retreat. Upon this, Jaffier Khan was observed moving off with his troops: Clive was then convinced of his intention to join him: he now, therefore, ordered the English to advance, and attack that part of the line which still maintained its position. The knowledge of these two events determined the mind of the Subahdar, he mounted a fleet camel and fled with 2000 attendants. No further resistance was offered; and the English entered the camp at five o'clock, having, by the assistance of a weak and vicious sovereign, determined the fate of a great kingdom, and of 30,000,000 of people, with the loss of twenty Europeans killed and wounded, of sixteen Sepoys killed, and only thirty-six wounded.³

The army advanced, about nine miles, to Daudpore, the

¹ Scrafton (Reflections, p. 90) says, that the Colonel's resolution was founded upon a letter he received from Jaffier in the course of the day. Orme, who loves a little of the marvellous, says, "that as soon as the council of war broke up he retired alone into the adjoining grove, where he continued near an hour in deep meditation; and gave orders, on his return to his quarters, that the army should cross the river the next morning." *il.* 170.—M.

It is clear that the alteration in Clive's views must have been the result of his private meditations; and the circumstances particularized by Orme, are not unlikely to have been communicated to him by Clive himself.—W.

² Clive says 15,000 horse and 35,000 foot, and forty pieces of cannon. Letter to the Secret Committee. *Life*, i. 263.

³ Lord Clive stated (Report, *ut supra*), "that the battle's being attended with so little bloodshed arose from two causes; first, the army was sheltered by so high a bank that the heavy artillery of the enemy could not possibly do them much mischief; the other was, that Suraje-ad-dowla had not confidence in his army, nor his army any confidence in him, and therefore they did not do their duty upon that occasion."

BOOK IV. same evening, with little occasion to pursue the enemy, who had almost entirely dispersed. At this place, Meer Jaffier sent a message to the English commander, that he, with many more of the great officers, and a considerable part of the army, waited his commands. The next morning Clive sent to conduct him to his quarters; and he arrived, under some apprehensions, which the Colonel, thinking it no time for reproaches, hastened to dispel. It was arranged that Meer Jaffier should march to the capital immediately, to prevent the escape of Suraj-ad-dowla, and the removal of his wealth.

CHAP. III.

1757.

That wretched prince had arrived at his palace the night after the battle, where, now apprized that he had not a friend on whom he could rely, and utterly uncertain what course to pursue, he remained till the evening of the following day, when Meer Jaffier entered the city. Then his fears dictated a resolution. He disguised himself in a mean dress, and about ten o'clock at night went secretly out of a window of the palace, with his favourite concubine and a single eunuch, intending to join M. Law, and escape into Bahar, where he counted upon the protection of the Governor. The rowers, however, of his boat, worn out before the morning with fatigue, stopped at Raj Mahl, where he endeavoured to conceal himself in a garden. He was there, at break of day, discovered by a man, whom he had formerly treated with cruelty, and who now revealed him to the Governor. Covered with indignity, he was hurried back to Moorshedabad, and presented to Meer Jaffier, who placed him under the custody of his son. The son, a brutal, ferocious youth, the same night gave orders for his assassination. M. Law, who received the summons to join the Nabob as soon as war with the English appeared inevitable, immediately began his march; but had not passed Tacriagully when he received reports of the battle of Plassy, and halted for further information. "Had he immediately proceeded twenty miles further," says Mr. Orme, "he would the next day have met and saved Suraj-ad-dowla, and an order of events, very different from those which we have to relate, would, in all probability, have ensued."¹

The battle was fought on the 23rd of June, and on the

¹ Orme, li. 185.

25th Colonel Clive with his troops arrived at Moorsheda-BOOK IV.
bad. On the next day a meeting was held to confer about CHAP. III.
the stipulated moneys; when the chief officer of finance
declared that the whole of Suraj-ad-dowla's treasures was
inadequate to the demand. "The restitution," says Mr.
Orme, "with the donations to the squadron, the army, and
the committee, amounted to 22,000,000 of sicca rupees,
equal to 2,750,000*l*. But other donations were promised,
which have since been the foundation of several fortunes."¹
The scantiness of the Bengal treasury was most unex-
pected, as well as most painful news, to the English, who
had been accustomed to a fond and literal belief of Oriental
exaggeration on the subject of Indian riches. With great
difficulty were they brought to admit so hateful a truth.
Finding at last that more could not be obtained, they con-
sented to receive one half of the moneys immediately, and
to accept of the rest by three equal payments in three
years. Even of the portion which was now to be received,
it was necessary to take one third not in specie, which was
all exhausted, but in jewels, plate, and other effects, at a
valuation. Before the 9th of August, after a multitude of
difficulties, the stipulated half, all but 584,905 rupees, was
delivered and discharged.²

¹ Ibid. ii. 180.

² A piece of consummate treachery was practised upon an individual. Among the Hindu merchants established at Calcutta was Omichund, "a man," says Mr. Orme, "of great sagacity and understanding," who had traded to a vast amount, and acquired an enormous fortune. "The extent of his habitation," continues Mr. Orme, "divided into various departments, the number of his servants continually employed in various occupations, and a retinue of armed men in constant pay, resembled more the state of a prince than the condition of a merchant. His commerce extended to all parts of Bengal and Bahar, and by presents and services he had acquired so much influence with the principal officers of the Bengal government, that the Presidency, in times of difficulty, used to employ his mediation with the Nabob. This pre-eminence, however, did not fail to render him the object of much envy." (Orme, ii. 50.) When the alarm, excited by the hostile designs of Suraj-ad-dowla, threw into consternation the minds of Mr. Drake and his council, among other weak ideas which occurred to them, one was, to secure the person of Omichund, lest, per-adventure, he should be in concert with their enemies. He was seized and thrown into confinement. His guards, believing that violence, that is dishonour, would next fall upon his house, set fire to it, after the manner of Hindus, and slaughtered the inmates of his harem. Notwithstanding this, when Mr. Holwell endeavoured to parley with the Nabob, he employed Omichund to write letters to his friends, importuning them to intercede, in that extremity, with the prince. At the capture, though his person was liberated, his valuable effects and merchandise were plundered. No less than 400,000 rupees in cash were found in his treasury. When an order was published that such of the English as had escaped the black hole might return to their homes, they were supplied with provisions by Omichund, "whose intercession," says Orme, "had probably procured their return." Omichund, upon the ruin of Calcutta, followed the Nabob's army, and soon acquired a high degree of con-

BOOK IV. Upon the news of the seizure and death of Suraj-ad-dowla, M. Law, with the French party, hasted back to

1757. fidence both with the Nabob's favourite, and with himself. After the recovery of Calcutta, when the Nabob, alarmed at the attack of his camp, entered into negotiation, and concluded a treaty, Omichund was one of the principal agents employed. And when Mr. Watts was sent to Moorshedabad as agent at the durbar (court) of Suraj-ad-dowla, "he was accompanied," says Mr. Orme (ii. 137), "by Omichund, whose conduct in the late negotiation had effaced the impression of former imputations, inasmuch that Mr. Watts was permitted to consult and employ him without reserve on all occasions." He was employed as a main instrument in all the intrigues with Jaffier. It was never surmised that he did not second, with all his efforts, the projects of the English; it was never denied that his services were of the utmost importance. Mr. Orme says expressly (p. 182), that "his tales and artifices prevented Suraj-ad-dowla from believing the representations of his most trusty servants, who early suspected, and at length were convinced, that the English were confederated with Jaffier." When the terms of compensation for the losses sustained by the capture of Calcutta were negotiated between Mr. Watts and Meer Jaffier, 3,000,000 of rupees were set down to Omichund, which, considering the extent of his property, and that "most of the best houses in Calcutta were his," (Orme, ii. 128), was probably not more than his loss. Looking forward to the rewards, which he doubted not that Jaffier, if successful, would bestow upon those of the English who were the chief instruments of his exaltation; estimating also the importance of his own services, and the risk, both of life and of fortune, which, in rendering those services, he had incurred, Omichund conceived that he too might put in his claim for reward; and, according to the example of his countrymen, resolved not to injure himself by the modesty of his demand. He asked a commission of five per cent., on the money which should be received from the Nabob's treasury, and a fourth part of the jewels; but agreed, upon hearing the objections of Mr. Watts, to refer his claims to the committee. When the accounts were sent to Calcutta, the sum to be given to Omichund, even as compensation for his losses, seemed a very heavy grievance to even who panted for more to themselves. To men whose minds were in such a state, the great demands of Omichund appeared (the reader will laugh—but they did literally appear) a crime. They were voted a crime; and so great a crime, as to deserve to be punished—to be punished, not only by depriving him of all reward, but depriving him of his compensation, that compensation which was stipulated for to everybody: it was voted that Omichund should have nothing. They were in his power, however, therefore he was not to be irritated. It was necessary he should be deceived. Clive, whom deception, when it suited his purpose, never cost a pang, proposed, that two treaties with Meer Jaffier should be drawn up, and signed. One, in which satisfaction to Omichund should be provided for, which Omichund should see; another, that which should really be executed, in which he should not be named. To his honour be it spoken, Admiral Watson refused to be a party in this treachery. He would not sign the false treaty; and the committee forced his name. When Omichund, upon the final adjustment, was told that he was cheated, and found that he was a ruined man, he fainted away, and lost his reason. He was from that moment insane. Not an Englishman, not even Mr. Orme, has yet expressed a word of sympathy or regret.—M.

In this statement some very material circumstances are omitted, which palliate, if they do not justify the deception that was practised. Before the attack upon Calcutta, Omichund was in friendly correspondence with the ministers and servants of the Nawab, and upon its being taken, was treated with civility by Suraj-ad-dowla, whom he accompanied to Murshedabad, and there obtained from him repayment of the money which in the plunder of Calcutta had been carried off from his house. Notwithstanding this, he was one of the first, through his connexion, no doubt, with the Hindu ministers, and sets the bankers, to engage in the plot against Suraj-ad-dowla. The English had, therefore, no great reason to look upon him as their friend, and as it is evident that he was a stranger to every principle except love of money, there is nothing in his character to awaken any sympathy for his fate. Still it is undeniable, that thus far he merited no treachery, and that his services were

join the Governor of Bahar at Patna, the capital of the province. Upon the assassination of the father of Suraj-ad-dowla, Aliverdi had nominated Suraj-ad-dowla himself to the nabobship of that important province; but appointed Ramnarain, a Hindu, in whom he reposed great confidence, to be Deputy Governor in the absence of the Prince. Ramnarain had administered the affairs of the province during the life of Aliverdi, and had continued in the government since the accession of Suraj-ad-dowla. From him Meer Jaffier expected no co-operation, and displayed anxiety that the French party should be pursued. He suspected, however, the fidelity of any part of his own army; and a large detachment of the English were sent under Major Coote. They were detained too long in preparation; they were poorly provided with the means of expedition; and the European part of the detachment,

BOOK IV.

CHAP. III.

1757.

entitled to consideration. It was intended to reimburse his losses and remunerate his assistance, but his want of principle incited him to enrich himself by the secret to which he had been admitted, and when all was prepared for action, he waited on Mr. Watts, the agent at Cassimbazar, and threatened to acquaint the Nizam with the conspiracy, unless a donation was secured to him of thirty lacs of rupees, about 350,000*l*. The demand was exorbitant, and infinitely beyond the amount of any losses he could have sustained by the plunder of Calcutta, for which losses, also, it is to be remembered, he had already received compensation. Mr. Mill thinks it probably not more than his loss, because the best houses in Calcutta, according to Orme, were his. But admitting that they were of great value, which is not very likely, they were still his. Calcutta was not razed to the ground, the buildings were still there, and on its recapture had of course reverted to their owners. The claim was wholly inadmissible, and its unreasonableness was aggravated by the threat of treachery with which it was enforced. What was to be done? To have rejected it at once would have been followed by the certain murder of the Company's servants at Cassimbazar, and of Mir Jaffier with all his family and adherents, and by the probable defeat of the British projects and their destruction. The menaced treason of Omichund, and its fatal consequences, are scarcely adverted to in the preceding account, although it was that, and not the mere demand of extravagant compensation, which was naturally enough denounced by the committee as a crime, and determined to be worthy of punishment. Clive, who had all along advocated his cause, and defended his character, "received with equal surprise and indignation the incontrovertible proofs offered of his guilt. Viewing him as a public enemy, he considered, as he stated at the period, and publicly avowed afterwards, every artifice that "could deceive him to be not only defensible, but just and proper." There may be a difference of opinion, on this subject, and it would have been more for the credit of the European character, that however treacherously extorted, the promise should have been performed, the money should have been paid; but there can be no doubt, that in order to appreciate with justice the conduct of Clive and the Committee, the circumstance of Omichund's menaced treason should not be kept out of sight. As to the reputed effects of his disappointment upon his intellects and life, there is good reason to doubt their occurrence, for in the month of August following, Clive recommends him to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, as "a person capable of rendering great services, and, therefore, not wholly to be discarded." See *Life of Clive*, i. 289.—W.

BOOK IV. exasperated at the fatigue they had to endure, behaved
 CHAP. IV. mutinously on the way. Before they reached Patna the
 1757. French had arrived; and, to obviate disputes, had been
 sent forward by Ramnarain into the territory of the Subahdar of Oude, with whom he had begun to negotiate an alliance. Major Coote was at first instructed to endeavour by intrigue and by force to wrest the government from Ramnarain: but while he was meditating the execution of these orders, he received further instructions which led to an accommodation;¹ and he returned to Moorshedabad on the 13th of September. The detachment which he had conducted was stationed at Cossimbuzar, near Moorshedabad; the rest of the army was sent into quarters at Chandernagor, as a more healthy situation than the seat of the Presidency; and on the day after the arrival of Major Coote, Colonel Clive left Moorshedabad and returned to Calcutta.²

CHAPTER IV.

Renewal of the War with the French in the Carnatic.—Arrival of Lally.—French power superior to the English.—English power superior to the French.—Pondicherry taken.—And the French driven out of the Carnatic.

WHEN the English detachment for the recovery of Calcutta, and the French detachment for the relief of Bussy, left the Carnatic, the contending parties were so far diminished in force as to meditate quietness and forbearance: the English, till the troops which they had sent to Bengal should return, the French, till the armament should arrive which they expected from Europe. In the mean time it was felt by the English as a grievous mis-

¹ Ramnarain was avowedly a subject of the Subahdar of Bengal and Behar. His conduct was equivocal, and it was necessary to compel him to submission, or deprive him of his government. As soon as he saw that Meer Jaffer was resolutely supported by the English, he satisfied Clive of his being free from all treasonable intentions, and there was no longer any motive for his removal.—W.

² The chief authorities which have been followed for this series of transactions in Bengal, have been the *Scer Mutakhareen*, i. 298—772; the First Report from the Committee on the Nature, State, and Condition of the East India Company, in 1772, which is full of curious information; Orme's *War in India*, ii. 28—196; and the tracts published by the various actors in the scene, Scrafton, Watts, &c.

fortune, that though their Nabob Mohammed Ali was now without a rival in the Carnatic, its pecuniary produce was remarkably small.¹ The governors of forts and districts, the zemindars, polygars, and renters, employed, as usual, all their means of artifice and force to withhold their payments; and the rabble employed by Mohammed Ali as soldiers, ill paid and weakly governed, were found altogether inadequate to the establishment of an efficient authority in the province. The notion which was early entertained of the great pecuniary supplies capable of being drawn from Madura and Tinivelly, appears still to have maintained a determining influence in the councils of Madras; and notwithstanding the general resolution to remain inactive, Captain Calliaud, the commanding officer at Trichinopoly, before the end of the year 1756, received instructions to renew his attempts for the reduction of those dependencies. In the hope of prevailing upon the King of Tanjore to afford some assistance—a hope which, as usual, he took care to disappoint—Captain Calliaud directed his march through Tanjore, and crossing Maravar, arrived in Tinivelly. The troops who accompanied him, joined to the body of Sepoys who had remained in the country, and the troops of the Polygars who had espoused the English interest, composed a formidable army. But it was unable to proceed to action for want of money; and the utmost exertions of Calliaud produced but an insignificant supply. Intelligence that the rebellious polygars were treating with the Mysoreans, who had a station at the fort of Dindigul, presented in strong colours the necessity of expedition; yet he was unable to leave Tinivelly before the 10th of April, when he marched to attack Madura with 180 Europeans, 2500 Sepoys, six field-pieces, and 500 horse. Upon arriving at the town he found it a place of much greater strength than he had been led to suppose; and, without battering cannon, not easy, if possible to be reduced. He planned an effort to take it by surprise. The first ladders were planted; and Calliaud himself, with twenty men, had got into the *fausse-bray*, when the guard within received the alarm, and they were obliged to retreat. Two companies of

BOOK IV.

CHAP. IV.

1757.

¹ It was a real evil to the government, that the revenues were withheld by refractory tributaries and contumacious dependants.—W.

BOOK IV. Sepoys were soon after despatched to bring pieces of battering artillery from Trichinopoly; and Calliaud had commenced an intrigue with some of the jemadars, or captains of the enemy's troops, when he received intelligence that the French had arrived at Trichinopoly.

CHAP. IV.

1757.

During these efforts to obtain possession of the revenues of Madura and Tinivelly, similar efforts had been undertaken in other parts of the province. A brother of the Nabob, by name Nujeeb Oolla, who was Governor of Nelore and its district, situated in the northern quarter of the Carnatic, evaded or refused payment of the sums demanded of him; and the Nabob, who possessed not the means of coercion, was urgent with the English to perform it in his stead. The rupture between the two brothers took place towards the end of February, and it was the 1st of April before the English troops were ready to march. By the end of the month they had erected batteries against the fort; on the 2d of May a breach was effected, which they deemed practicable; and a storm was attempted the next morning. But the English were repulsed from the breach, nor was it deemed expedient to renew the attack till more battering-cannon should be received from Madras. In the mean time the detachment received orders to return to the Presidency with all expedition.

The Government of Pondicherry, notwithstanding the pacific policy inculcated by the recall of Dupleix, and the commands which they had received to abstain from all operations of hazard till the arrival of the forces which they expected from Europe, determined, when they saw the English so largely at work, and their small force separated to such a distance as Tinivelly and Nelore, to avail themselves of an opportunity which good fortune seemed to present. They took the field on the 6th of April; but, to cover their designs, with only a small number of troops, and for an object of minor importance. By forced marches they appeared before Ellavanasore on the 10th, a fort possessed by a chief who had hitherto refused to acknowledge either the English or the French Nabob. In a sally, in which he threw the French army into great jeopardy, he received a mortal wound, of which he died in a few days, and the garrison, during the night, evacuated the

fort. The French, after this acquisition, marched in the direction leading to the territory of some polygars with whom they had disputes; and Captain Calliaud received a letter from the Madras Presidency, on the very day on which he attempted to surprise Madura, that from the late intelligence received of the motions of the French, no design on their part was apprehended against Trichinopoly.¹ The season for the arrival of the English troops from Bengal was elapsed; and it was impossible now that any should return before September. The French, therefore, suddenly barring their garrisons; leaving in Pondicherry itself none but invalids; and enrolling the European inhabitants to man the walls, despatched every soldier to the field; and the army took post before Trichinopoly on the 14th of May. The garrison, deprived of the troops which had marched to Madura, were insufficient to guard the walls; and they had 500 French prisoners in the fort. Calliaud received intelligence before Madura of the imminent danger of Trichinopoly, at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 21st; at six he was on his march; on the 25th, at day-break, he halted nineteen miles from Trichinopoly. An army five times as great as his watched his approach, and guarded every avenue by which it was supposed he could enter the fort. On one side of the town was a large plain, about seven miles in extent, consisting of rice-fields covered with water, which the French deemed impassable. Calliaud continued his march, as if he intended to enter by one of the ordinary inlets, till night; when he suddenly took another direction, and arrived at the margin of the rice-fields about ten o'clock. The fatigue of marching through the rice-fields up to the knees in mud, after forced marches of several days, was excessive. At day-break, however, the main body of the detachment reached the fort, and were received with that ardent welcome by its inmates, which the greatness of the danger, and the exertions which the detachment had made to save it, naturally inspired. The French commander, astonished at the news of their entrance, and now despairing of success, marched away for Pondicherry the following day.²

BOOK IV.

CHAP. IV.

1757.

¹ Cambridge, p. 140.² Orme, ii. 197—217; Cambridge's War in India, pp. 137—153; Wilks' Historical Sketches of the South of India, pp. 392, 393.

BOOK IV. Intelligence of the march of the French against Trichi-

CHAP. IV. nopoly, and of the repulses sustained by their own troops, in the two assaults upon Madura and Nelore, reached the Presidency of Madras at nearly the same time. They recalled immediately the detachment from Nelore; sent as many troops as possible into the field; and were uncertain whether, to relieve Trichinopoly, they should recall the French to the defence of their own settlements, or march to attack them before the place; when the welcome news arrived of the fact and consequences of Calliaud's return.

1757.

To possess and garrison the forts which were scattered over the country, and which, by commanding the adjacent districts, afforded the only chance of revenue, was a principal object of desire to both contending parties. Several transactions took place about this time, relating to places of minor importance; but Wandewash was a fortress to the reduction of which peculiar value was attached. The Governor of Wandewash had paid no revenue since 1752; he had perpetually favoured the French, who from that station had been enabled to make incursions into every part of the province; it not only afforded a large revenue, it was also a barrier to the surrounding districts. In hopes that it might be taken before the French army could arrive from Trichinopoly to its relief, the English commander sent to the attack was ordered to push his operations with the greatest vigour. He got possession of the town, which was contiguous to the fort, after a slight resistance. The French, however, were now hastening to its relief; and Colonel Aldercron, whose march had not displayed any wonderful despatch, thought it prudent to renounce the enterprise before they arrived. At his departure he set fire to the defenceless town: though no peculiar circumstance is alleged to justify an act so cruel to the innocent inhabitants.

The English Presidency, to whom the Nabobship of Arcot continued as yet but little productive, were straitened in their treasury. Anxious therefore to diminish expense, they gave directions, upon hearing that the army had retired from Wandewash, for its proceeding immediately to the Presidency. Unhappily the enemy were in the field, of which they were thus left entirely the masters; and they performed a successful incursion as far as Conje-

veram, where they burned the town, to revenge the outrage committed upon Wandewash. The Presidency, now aware of their blunder, ordered back the army into the field. The two armies were nearly equal. The English offered battle; but the French kept within their intrenchments. The English, after remaining in their presence for some weeks, retired again at the end of July, and marched to the several stations from which they had been drawn. The French were no sooner masters of the field, than they renewed their incursions, collected the revenues, and levied contributions in several districts.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.

1757.

A pressure was now sustained of another description. The Mahratta general Balajee Row had paid a visit of exaction to the kingdom of Mysore the preceding season; and, upon marching back to his own country, before the period of the rains, left an officer with a large detachment, who, after taking several intervening forts, made himself master of one of the passes into the Carnatic, about sixty miles north-west from the city of Arcot, and sent a peremptory demand of the chout for the whole nabobship. The city of Arcot was thrown into the utmost alarm: the Nabob dreaded the incursion of Mahratta parties into the very town; and accepted the invitation of the English to send his family to Madras. The Mahrattas pretended that the chout had been settled by Nizam al Mulk, at 600,000 rupees a year; two thirds for the Carnatic, and one for Trichinopoly and the southern dependencies. Of this they asserted that six years were due; and presented their demand, in the whole, at 4,000,000 of rupees. The Nabob, who knew the weakness of his physical, if not of his intellectual resources, was glad to negotiate. After much discussion, the Mahratta agent consented to accept of 200,000 rupees, in ready money, and the Nabob's draughts upon the governors of forts and polygars for 250,000 more. To these terms the Nabob agreed; but he required that the money should be found by the English, and should be furnished out of the revenues which he had assigned to them for the expenses of the war. At this time the English might have obtained important assistance against the Mahrattas. Morari Row, and the Patan Nabobs of Savanore, Canoul, Candanore, and Cudapa, who, since the assassination of Nazir Jung, had maintained a sort of

BOOK IV. independence, offered their alliance. But the English
CHAP. IV. could spare no troops, and were as much afraid to admit
 1757. such allies into the province as the Mahrattas themselves.
 After as much delay and evasion as possible, they were induced, notwithstanding the danger of the precedent, in fear of greater evils, to comply with the demand.

During all this period, the attention of the Presidency of Madras may be considered as chiefly divided between two objects; the French in the Carnatic, and the Polygars of Madura and Tinivelly. When Calliaud was obliged to march from Madura for the defence of Trichinopoly, he left about sixty Europeans, and upwards of 1000 Sepoys, who were not inactive; and, as soon as he was convinced that no further danger was to be apprehended from the French, he despatched a reinforcement from Trichinopoly. In compliance with the recommendation of the Presidency Calliaud himself, with as great a portion of the troops from Trichinopoly as it was safe to withdraw, marched on the 25th of June, and arrived at Madura on the 3rd of July. Having effected a breach on the 10th, he resolved to storm. He was repulsed with great loss. For some days the operations of the besiegers were retarded by the sickness of their leader. The admission of supplies into the town was now, however, cut off; and the negotiations for its surrender were renewed. After some time was spent in bargaining about the price, Calliaud, on the 8th of August, on payment of 170,000 rupees, was received into the town.

On the 8th of September a French fleet of twelve ships anchored in Pondicherry road; but, after landing about a thousand men, it again set sail for Mauritius. This was not the grand armament which the government of Pondicherry expected; and, till the arrival of which, all operations of magnitude were to be deferred. The army, however, which had been scouring the country, was still in its camp at Wandewash. It was now strongly reinforced by the troops newly arrived; and marched against the fort of Chittapet. The Nabob, Mohammed Ali, had a personal dislike to the Governor of Chittapet, and had infused into the English suspicions of his fidelity, which imprudently diminished the efforts necessary for his support. He fell, defending his fort to the last extremity; and thus another

place of considerable importance was gained by the French. From Chittapet they marched to Trincomalee, which was abandoned by the Governor and garrison, upon their approach. After this they divided themselves into several detachments; and before the 6th of November, when they were recalled, they had reduced eight forts in the neighbourhood of Chittapet, Trincomalee, and Gingee; and established collectors in the dependent districts.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.

1757.

On the news of the arrival of the French fleet, Captain Calliaud returned to Trichinopoly, with all the Europeans, and was soon after followed by the Sepoys, who, however, went back as soon as it appeared that Trichinopoly was not in danger. The Mysoreans, who had been long expected to the assistance of the confederate Polygars, arrived in the month of November, took the fort of Sholavenden, and plundered to the walls of Madura, under which they remained for several days. They allowed themselves, however, to be attacked in a narrow pass, by the commander of the British Sepoys, and suffered a severe defeat. In the mean time Captain Calliaud, under the safeguard of a passport from Pondicherry, repaired in person to the Presidency, to represent the state of the southern dependencies, for the reduction of which so many useless efforts had been made; and declared his opinion that the settlement of the country could not be achieved, or a revenue drawn from it, without a greater force, or the removal of Maphuz Khan. It was agreed with the Nabob that an annual income, adequate to his maintenance should be offered to this his elder brother, provided he would quit the province and disband his troops. Maphuz Khan, however, would listen to no terms importing less than the government of the whole country; and the confederates continued in formidable force.

Though after the recall of the French troops in November, no army was in the field; the garrisons left in the several forts continued to make incursions one upon another, and mutually ravaged the unhappy country. As these operations, "being always levelled at defenceless villages, carried," says Mr. Orme, "the reproach of robbery, more than the reputation of war;" each side, too, losing by them more than it gained; the French officer at Wandewash proposed a conference, for the purpose of

BOOK IV. ending this wretched species of warfare ; and an English officer was authorized to conclude an agreement. The

CHAP. IV.

1757.

governments of Madras and Pondicherry were both now disposed to suspend their efforts—the French, till the arrival of the forces which they boasted were to render them irresistible in the Carnatic—the English, that they might husband their resources for the danger with which they were threatened. In this situation they continued till the 28th of April, when a French squadron of twelve sail arrived in the road of Fort St. David.

Upon the breaking out of the war between France and England in 1756, the French ministry resolved to strike an important blow in India. The Count de Lally, a member of one of those Irish families, which had transported themselves into France along with James II., was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the French forces in India. He had distinguished himself in the battle of Fontenoy, where he took several English officers with his own hand, and received the rank of Colonel from the King upon the field of battle: it was he who proposed the daring plan of landing in England with 10,000 men, while the Prince, Charles Edward, was trying his fortune for a crown in another part of the island: and his hatred of the English, and his reputation for courage, now pointed him out as the fittest person to crush the pretensions of that nation on the coast of Coromandel. He was accompanied by his own regiment of Irish, 1080 strong; by fifty of the royal artillery, and a great number of officers of distinction. They left the port of Brest on the 4th of May, 1757, when a malignant fever raged in the town, of which they carried the infection along with them. No fewer than 300 persons died in the fleet before they reached Rio Janeiro, where they remained for two months, and after all, departed with a residue of the sickness on board. At Mauritius they were joined by a part of the ships which had landed the troops at Pondicherry in the preceding year: and, after a tedious voyage, made the coast of Coromandel on the 26th of April, 1758.

The court of Versailles anticipated nothing but triumphs from this splendid armament: and the presumption of Lally well assorted with that of his government. It was even laid down in the instructions of the ministers, that

he should commence his operations with the siege of Fort St. David. For this purpose, before communicating with the land, he made the fleet anchor at the place of attack. He proceeded with two of the vessels to Pondicherry, where he arrived at five in the afternoon;¹ and before the night closed he had 1000 Europeans, and as many Sepoys, on their march to Fort St. David. In military operations, notwithstanding the importance of despatch, something more than despatch is necessary. The troops marched without provisions, and with unskilful guides, who led them astray, and brought them to Fort St. David at seven o'clock in the morning, worn out with hunger and fatigue.² This gave them a motive and an apology for commencing a system of plunder and insubordination, from which they could not easily be recalled.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.

1758.

These troops had scarcely arrived at Fort St. David, when the ships in the road descried the English fleet making way from the south. Mr. Pococke, with the ships of war from Bengal, had arrived at Madras on the 24th of February; on the 24th of the following month a squadron of five ships from Bombay had arrived under Admiral Stevens; and on the 17th of April, the whole sailed to the southward, looking out for the French. Having in ten days worked as high to the windward as the head of Ceylon, they stood in again for the coast, which they made, off Negapatnam, on the 28th, and proceeding along shore, discovered the French fleet, at nine the next morning, riding near Cuddalore. The French immediately weighed, and bore down towards Pondicherry, throwing out signals to recall the two ships which had sailed with Lally; and the English Admiral gave the signal for chase. The summons for the two ships not being answered, the French

¹ He himself complains that little preparation was made to co-operate with him. Among the proofs of carelessness, one was that he was saluted with five discharges of cannon, loaded with ball, of which three pierced the ship through and through, and the two others damaged the rigging. *Mémoire pour Lally*, i. 39.

² Lally complains, and with good reason, of the deplorable ignorance of the French Governor and Council. They could not tell him the amount of the English forces on the coast; nor whether Cuddalore was surrounded with a dry wall or a rampart: nor whether there was any river to pass between Pondicherry and Fort St. David. He complains that he lost forty-eight hours at Cuddalore, because there was not a man at Pondicherry who could tell him that it was open on the side next the sea; that he was unable to find twenty-four hours' provisions at Pondicherry; and that the Governor, who promised to forward a portion to him on the road, broke his word; whence the troops were two days without food, and some of them died. *Ibid.* 40, 41.

BOOK IV. fleet stood out to sea, and formed the line of battle. The
 CHAP. IV. French consisted of nine sail, the English only of seven;
 1758. The battle was indecisive; the loss of a few men, with some
 damage to the ships, being only the result.¹ Both fleets
 fell considerably to leeward during the engagement; and
 the French were six days in working up to the road of
 Pondicherry, where the troops were landed. Lally himself
 had some days before proceeded to Fort St. David
 with the whole force of Pondicherry, and the troops from
 the fleet were sent after him, as fast as they came on
 shore.

The English were thrown into the greatest alarm. So
 much was the power of the enemy now superior to their
 own, that they scarcely anticipated any other result, than
 their expulsion from the country; and had Dupleix been
 still the guide and conductor of the enemy's affairs, it is
 more than probable that their most gloomy apprehensions
 would have been realized.² Not only had an overwhelming
 addition been made to a force, against which they had
 previously found it difficult to maintain themselves; but
 in the meantime, Bussy, in the northern parts of the Dec-
 can, had obtained the most important advantages, and
 brought upon the English the heaviest disasters. After
 the brilliant exploit of 1756, when he defended himself at
 Hyderabad against the whole power of the Subahdar, and
 imposed his own terms upon his enemies, he had pro-
 ceeded to the Northern Circars, where his presence was
 necessary, to collect the revenues, and, by an adjustment
 of the government, to provide for the future regularity of
 their payment. He began his march on the 16th of No-
 vember of that year, with 500 Europeans and 4000 Sepoys;
 leaving only a small detachment to attend to the person
 of the Subahdar.³ In accomplishing his progress through

¹ A French ship was driven on shore, and obliged to be abandoned; but this was owing to an accident after the battle.

² Lord Clive himself said, in his evidence before the Committee, in 1772: "Mr. Lally arrived with a force as threatened not only the destruction of all the settlements there, but of all the East India Company's possessions, and nothing saved Madras from sharing the fate of Fort St. David, at that time, but their want of money, which gave time for strengthening and reinforcing the place." Report, *ut supra*.

³ Orme (ii. 103) says he left 100 Europeans and 1000 Sepoys. Wilks (Histor. Sketches, p. 387) says he left 200 Europeans and 500 Sepoys. Orme again (Ibid. p. 264) speaks of the detachment as consisting of 200 Europeans and 500 Sepoys.

the country, he encountered no considerable resistance. **BOOK IV.**
 The Polygar of Bobilee defended his fort to the last extremity ; and exhibited the customary spectacle of Hindu desperation, the fortress in flames, and the people in garrison butchered by their own hands. But he was excited to this desperation by the command to exchange the government of his present for that of another district, on account of the annoyance he gave to a neighbouring chief, from whom Bussy had received a train of important services. When Bussy had nearly completed the arrangement which he intended to make, he received, about the 1st of April, letters from Suraj-ad-dowla, inviting him, by the largest offers, to assist him in expelling the English from Bengal. Bussy waited on his northern frontier, ready to march through Orissa into Bengal, as soon as he should receive satisfactory intelligence ; but, learning the capture of Chandernagor, and the imbecility of the Subahdar, he changed his purpose, and proceeded to the attack of the English establishments within the Circars. There were three factories, on three different branches of the Godavary, in a district remarkable for the excellence and cheapness of its cloths. They were places of no strength, and surrendered on the first requisition. Vizagapatam, however, was one of the places of greatest importance belonging to the English in India. It was a fort, garrisoned by 150 Europeans, and 300 Sepoys ; but so injudiciously constructed, that the attempt to defend it was unanimously determined to be vain. The van of Bussy's army appeared before it on the 24th of June ; and a capitulation was concluded ; that all the Europeans, both military and civil, should be regarded as prisoners, and all the effects of the Company as prize of war. The Sepoys, and other natives, Bussy allowed to go where they pleased ; he also promised to respect the property of individuals. "And he kept his word," says Mr. Orme, "with the utmost liberality, resigning, without discussion, whatsoever property any one claimed as his own."

CHAP. IV.

1758.

During these transactions, however, a great revolution was preparing in the army of Salabut Jung. He had two younger brothers, whom Bussy, acquainted with the temper of Oriental governments, had advised the Subahdar to provide with establishments, and every indul-

BOOK IV. gence suitable to their rank, but from whom he had ex-
CHAP. IV. horted him carefully to withhold those governments and
 1758. places of power, which, in the hands of the near relations
 of the prince, were the cause of so many revolutions in
 India. This prudent course was pursued till the period of
 the alienation from Bussy of the mind of the Subahdar ;
 when that prince was easily persuaded, by his designing
 courtiers, to reverse the policy which the sagacity of
 Bussy had established. The eldest of the two brothers,
 Bassalut Jung, was appointed Governor of the strong fort
 and country of Adoni; and Nizam Ali, the youngest and
 most dangerous, was made Governor of Berar, the most
 extensive province of the Deccan, of which the Mahrattas
 now possessed the principal part.

Towards the end of the year 1757, while a body of Mah-
 rattas insulted Aurungabad, which was then the residence
 of the Subahdar, a mutiny, under the usual shape of
 clamour for pay, was excited in his army. The utmost
 alarm was affected by the Dewan, or minister, who took
 shelter in a strong fort. The Subahdar, without resources,
 was driven to dismay : Nizam Ali, who had acquired some
 reputation, and intrigued successfully with the troops,
 offered to interpose and allay the tumult, provided the
 requisite powers, and among other things the great seal of
 the Subah, were committed to his hands : the requisition
 was obeyed : and Nizam Ali, leaving only the name of
 Subahdar to his brother, grasped the whole powers of the
 state. With an affectation of indifference he committed
 the seal to his brother Bassalut Jung, but under sufficient
 security that it would be used agreeably to his directions.¹

Bussy received intelligence of these events in the be-
 ginning of January ; immediately began his march with
 the whole of his army ; and by a road never travelled
 before by European troops, arrived in twenty-one days at
 Aurungabad, a distance by the perambulator of nearly

¹ There are some important differences between Orme's account of these events, and that given by the biographer of Shahinawaz Khan, the dewan or minister of Salabut Jung. The discontent was real, and the dewan only saved his life by flying to Dowlatabad. Bassalut Jung was concerned in the disturbance, but the other brother, Nizam Ali, was not on the spot, nor did he join his brother for two or three months. The result of his junction was that described in the text. Nizam Ali was declared heir and successor of Salabut Jung, and associated with him in the government, engrossing the real authority. *Calcutta Magazine*, Dec. 1825.—W.

400 miles.¹ Four separate armies were encamped about the city; that of Nizam Ali from Berar; that of the Subah, of which Nizam Ali had now the command; that of Bassalut Jung from Adoni; and that of the Mahrattas commanded by Balajee Row. The presence of Bussy, with his handful of Europeans, imposed respect upon them all; and every eye was fixed upon his movements. His first care was to restore the authority of the Subahdar, whom the presence alone of the French detachment, which had vigilantly guarded his person, had probably saved from the assassination which generally forms the main ingredient of Indian revolutions.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.

1758.

The two brothers at first assumed a high tone; and when obliged to part with the seal, exhibited unusual marks of rage and indignation. Bussy clearly saw that the safety of the Subahdar, and the existence of the present government, demanded the resumption of the power which had been intrusted to Nizam Ali; but when the proposition of a large pension was made to him in lieu of his government, he had the art to interest his troops in his behalf, and Bussy found it necessary to temporize. To remove still further the umbrage which he found was gaining ground at the uncontrollable authority with which a stranger disposed of the powers of the Deccan, and of the sons of the great Nizam al Mulk, he re-committed the seal of state to Bassalut Jung, but under securities which precluded any improper use.

To provide a permanent security for his predominating influence in the government of the Subah, there was wanting, besides the distant provinces which yielded him the necessary revenue, a place of strength near the seat of government, to render him independent of the sudden machinations of his enemies. The celebrated fortress of Dowlatabad, both from locality and strength, was admirably adapted to his views. It was at present in possession of the prime minister, the mortal foe of Bussy, the chief actor in the late commotions, and the assured instrument of others in every hostile design. By a sum of money, Bussy gained the Deputy Governor to admit him secretly with his troops into the fort: and this invaluable instru-

¹ Mr. Orme states the days on report merely; but we may presume it was the best information which that careful historian could procure.

BOOK IV. ment of power was gained without the loss of a man. As
 CHAP. IV. the utmost efforts, however, of the resentment of the
 1758. minister were now assured, Bussy secured the means of
 rendering him a prisoner in the midst of the camp of the
 Subahdar, at the very hour when he himself was received
 into the fort Dowlatabad. These events alarmed Nizam Ali
 into submission ; and an accommodation was effected, by
 which he agreed to divest himself of his government of
 Berar, and accept of Hyderabad in its stead. When hold-
 ing his court, to receive the compliments of the principal
 persons, before his departure for his new government, he
 was waited upon, among others, by Hyder Jung, the De-
 wan of Bussy. This personage¹ was the son of a Governor
 of Masulipatam, who had been friendly to the French ;
 and he had attached himself to Bussy, since his first
 arrival at Golconda. Bussy was soon aware of his talents,
 and discovered the great benefit he might derive from
 them. He became a grand and dexterous instrument for
 unravelling the plots and intrigues against which it was
 necessary for Bussy to be incessantly on his guard ; and a
 no less consummate agent in laying the trains which led
 to the accomplishment of Bussy's designs. To give him
 the greater weight with his countrymen, and more com-
 plete access to the persons and the minds of the people
 of consequence, he obtained for him titles of nobility,
 dignities, and riches ; and enabled him to hold his Durbar,
 like the greatest chiefs. He was known to have been
 actively employed in the late masterly transactions of
 Bussy ; and an occasion was chosen, on which a blow might
 be struck, both at his life, and that of Salabut Jung. A
 day was appointed by the Subahdar for paying his devo-
 tions at the tomb of his father, distant about twenty miles
 from Aurungabad ; and on the second day of his absence,
 Nizam Ali held his court. Hyder Jung was received with
 marked respect ; but, on some pretext, detained behind
 the rest of the assembly, and assassinated. The first care
 of Bussy, upon this new emergency, was to strengthen
 the slender escort of Salabut Jung. The next was to

¹ His original name was Abd-al-Rahman, he was taken whilst young to Pondicherry, and early employed as an interpreter to Bussy's detachment, in which capacity he gained the confidence of that officer. *Life of Shahnawaz Khan.*—W.

secure the person of the late minister ;¹ of whose share **BOOK IV.**
 in the present perfidy he had no doubt, and whom he had **CHAP. IV.**
 hitherto allowed to remain under a slight restraint in the
 camp. That veteran intriguer, concluding that his life
 was in danger, excited his attendants to resist, and was
 slain in the scuffle. Struck with dismay, upon the news
 of this unexpected result, Nizam Ali abandoned the camp
 in the night, taking with him his select cavalry alone ; and
 pursued his flight towards Boorhanpore, about 150 miles
 north from Aurungabad, with all the speed which the
 horses could endure. Thus was Bussy delivered from his
 two most formidable enemies, by the very stroke which
 they had aimed against him ; and in this state of uncon-
 trollable power in the wide-extended government of the
 Deccan, was he placed, when the arrival of Lally produced
 an extraordinary change in his views ; and ensured a new
 train of events in the Subah.

1758.

The character of that new Governor was ill adapted to the circumstances in which he was appointed to act. Ardent and impetuous, by the original structure of his mind, his early success and distinction had rendered him vain and presumptuous.

With natural talents of considerable force, his knowledge was scanty and superficial. Having never experienced difficulties, he never anticipated any. For him it was enough to will the end ; the means obtained an inferior portion of his regard. Acquainted thoroughly with the technical part of the military profession, but acquainted with nothing else, he was totally unable to apply its principles in a new situation of things. Unacquainted with the character and manners of the people among whom he was called upon to act ; he was too ignorant of the theory of war to know, that on the manage-

¹ According to the Mazir al Omra, whence the biography of Shahnawaz Khan is derived, he was already in confinement through the treachery of Hyder Jung, who was plotting, it is asserted, the arrest of Nizam Ali, when he paid that prince the visit in the course of which he was murdered. Upon the death of Hyder Jung, the prince mounted his horse and fled, and in the alarm which these occurrences excited amongst the French, some of Bussy's attendants hastened to the place where the minister was confined, and killed him, along with his youngest son, and another of Salabut Jung's chief officers, Yamin-ad-dowlah. The native historian is, no doubt, misled by his prejudices, in ascribing to the French commandant any share, however indirect, in the assassination of the dewan ; but had Clive been implicated in any similar transaction, it is very probable that the English historian would have given a very different account of it.—W.

BOOK IV. ment of his intellectual and moral instruments, the
 CHAP. IV. success of the general mainly depends.

1758.

He began by what he conceived a very justifiable act of authority ; but which was in reality a cruel violation of the customs, the religion, and, in truth, the legal rights of the natives. As there was not at Pondicherry, of the persons of the lower castes, who are employed in the servile occupations of the camp, a sufficient number to answer the impatience of M. Lally, in forwarding the troops to Fort St. David, he ordered the native inhabitants of the town to be pressed, and employed, without distinction of caste, in carrying burdens, and performing whatever labour might be required. The terror and consternation created by such an act, was greater than if he had set fire to the town and butchered every man whom it contained. The consequence was, that the natives were afraid to trust themselves in his power ; and he thus ensured a deficiency of attendants.¹

The feeble bullocks of the country, and the smallness of the number which the Governor and Council of Pondicherry were able to supply, but ill accorded with Lally's ideas of a sufficiency of draught cattle. The very depressed state of the treasury precluded the possibility of affording other facilities, the want of which his impatience rendered a galling disappointment. He vented his uneasiness in reproaches and complaints. He had carried out in his mind one of those wide and sweeping conclusions, which men of little experience and discrimination are apt to form ; that his countrymen in India were universally rogues. And to this sentiment, that ignorance and avidity at home, which recalled Duplex, were well calculated to

¹ This, at least, is stated by the English historians, and by the numerous and too successful enemies of Lally. In the original correspondence, there is no proof that I can perceive. In one of Lally's letters (to De Leyrit, 18th of May), he presses him to prevail upon the inhabitants of Pondicherry, by extra rewards, to lend their assistance. This looks not like a general order to oppress the inhabitants. The truth is, that he himself brings charges, which were too well founded, of oppression committed by others against the natives. In his letter to De Leyrit, 25th of May, 1758, he says, " J'apprend que dans votre civil et dans votre militaire, il se commet des vexations vis-à-vis des gens du pays qui les éloignent et les empêchent de vous faire les fournitures nécessaires à la subsistance de l'armée." Lally says, in his Mémoire, p. 50, " Des employés du Sieur Des Vaux, protégé par le Sieur de Leyrit, arrêtoient des provisions qui arrivoient au camp, et exigeoient de l'argent des noirs, pour leur accorder la liberté du passage. Un de ces brigands avoit été pris en flagrant délit. On avoit saisi sur lui un sac plein d'espèces et de petits bijoux enlevés aux paysans."

conduct him. The Directors had told him in their instructions; "As the troubles in India have been the source of fortunes, rapid and vast, to a great number of individuals, the same system always reigns at Pondicherry, where those who have not yet made their fortune hope to make it by the same means; and those who have already dissipated it hope to make it a second time. The Sieur de Lally will have an arduous task to eradicate that spirit of cupidity; but it would be one of the most important services which he could render to the Company."¹ Every want, therefore, which he experienced, every delay which occurred, he ascribed to the dishonesty and misconduct of the persons employed;² and had so little prudence as incessantly to declare those opinions in the most pointed and offensive terms which his language could supply. These proceedings rendered him in a short time odious to every class of men in the colony; precluded all cordial co-operation, and ensured him every species of ill-office which it was safe to render. The animosity at last between him and his countrymen became rancour and rage; and the possibility of a tolerable management of the common concerns was utterly destroyed.

On the 1st of May, Lally himself arrived at Fort St. David; and when joined by the troops from the ships, and those whom he had drawn from the forts in the Carnatic, he had, according to Mr. Orme, 2500 Europeans, exclusive of officers, and about the same number of Sepoys, assembled for the attack. The garrison consisted of 1600 natives, and 619 Europeans, of whom eighty-three were sick or infirm, and 250 were seamen.³ The place

¹ Mém. pour Lally, p. 21. In their letter of the 20th March, 1759, they say, "Vous voudrez bien prendre en considération l'administration des affaires de la Compagnie, et l'origine des abus sans nombre que nous y voyons: *Un despotisme absolu* nous paroît la première chose à corriger."—They add, "Nous trouvons par-tout des preuves de la prodigalité la plus outrée, et du plus grand désordre."

² There is no doubt at all, that the neglect of all preparation, to enable him to act with promptitude, though they had been expecting him at Pondicherry for eight months, was extreme, and to the last degree culpable. There was a total want of talent at this time at Pondicherry; a weak imagination that the expected armament was to do everything, and that those who were there before had no occasion to do anything; otherwise, with the great superiority of force they had enjoyed since the arrival of the 1000 Europeans, in the beginning of September, they might have performed actions of no trifling importance, and have at least prepared *some* of the money and other things requisite for the operations of Lally.

³ Orme. Lally (Mém. p. 42) says, "Il y avoit dans le Fort de Saint David sept cent Européens, et environ deux mille Clapays. Les troupes du Comte de

BOOK IV. held out till the 1st of June, when, having nearly expended
CHAP. IV. its ammunition, it yielded on capitulation. It was expected to have made a better defence; and the English
 1758. historians have not spared the conduct of the commanding officer. He had courage and spirit in sufficient abundance; but was not very rich in mental resources, or very accurate in ascertaining the conduciveness of his means. In consequence of instructions brought from France, Lally immediately issued orders for razing the fortifications to the ground. As soon as the fort capitulated, he sent a detachment against Devi-Cotah, which the garrison immediately abandoned; and on the 7th of June, he returned with the army, in triumph, and sung *Te Deum* at Pondicherry.

The English, in full expectation that the next operation of Lally would be the siege of Madras, had called in the troops from all the forts in the interior, except Trichinopoly; and had even debated whether they should not abandon that city itself. All the troops from Tinivelly and Madura were ordered to return to Trichinopoly, and, together with the garrison, to hold themselves in readiness for any emergency.

The great poverty, however, of the French exchequer, and the inability, created or greatly enhanced by the unpopular proceedings of Lally, of supplying its deficiencies by credit, cramped his operations, and sharpened the asperities of his temper. He had written from Fort St. David to the Governor of Pondicherry, in the following terms: "This letter shall be an eternal secret between you, Sir, and me, if you afford me the means of accomplishing my enterprise. I left you 100,000 livres of my own money to aid you in providing the funds which it requires. I found not, upon my arrival, in your purse, and in that of your whole council, the resource of 100 pence. You, as well as they, have refused me the support of your credit. Yet I imagine you are all of you more

Lally consistoient en seize cents Européens, et six cents noirs, tant cavalerie qu'infanterie, ramassés à la hâte. Son régiment qui avoit essayé un combat de mer, où il avoit perdu quatre-vingt-quatre hommes, et à qui on n'avoit donné depuis son débarquement à Pondicherry, que quarante-huit heures de repos, étoit à peine en état de lui fournir deux piquets." It is at least to be remembered, that this statement of facts was made in the face of Lally's numerous and bitter enemies.

indebted to the Company than I am. If you continue to leave me in want of everything, and exposed to contend with universal disaffection, not only shall I inform the King and the Company of the warm zeal which their servants here display for their interest, but I shall take effectual measures for not depending, during the short stay I wish to make in this country, on the party spirit and the personal views with which I perceive that every member appears occupied, to the total hazard of the Company.”¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.

1758.

Despairing of funds from any other source, he resolved to devote to this object the next operations of the war.² He at the same time recalled Bussy, against whose character he fostered the strongest prejudices, and the importance of whose transactions under the Subahdar he treated as interested pretence and imposture.

Two plans presented themselves for the supply of his wants. All the western and northern districts of the Nabobship, evacuated by the English, lay open to his incursions, and in the rents which might be collected offered a certain resource. But the collection of rents was a tedious operation, and the expected produce a scanty supply. The King of Tanjore, when pressed in 1751 by Chunda Sahib and the French, had, among his other efforts to procrastinate and evade, given his bond, which still remained at Pondicherry, for 5,600,000 rupees. This sum, could it only be extorted from him, was a large and present resource; and in Fort St. David, as a prisoner, had been found the pretender to the throne of Tanjore, who

¹ Mémoire, ut supra, Pièces Justificatives, p. 30. De Leyrit defended himself by asserting the want of means; “Je vous rendrai compte,” says he, “de ma conduite, et de la disette de fonds dans laquelle on m’a laissé depuis deux ans, et je compte vous faire voir que j’ai fait à tous égards plus qu’on ne devoit attendre de moi. Mes ressources sont aujourd’hui épuisées, et nous n’en avons plus à attendre que d’un succès. Où en trouverois-je de suffisantes dans un pays ruiné par quinze ans de guerre, pour fournir aux dépenses considérables de votre armée et aux besoins d’une escadre, par laquelle nous attendions bien des espèces de secours, et qui se trouve au contraire dénuée de tout?” Ibid. No. 20. Lett. du Sieur De Leyrit au Comte de Lally, 24th May. 1758. Lally, however, asserts that he had received two millions of livres by the arrival of the fleet. Mém. p. 49.

² This at least is the account of the English historians. Lally himself says, that it was his own design to proceed directly from Fort St. David to Madras; but the commander of the fleet absolutely refused to co-operate with him; would go upon a cruise to the south, for the purpose of intercepting such vessels as might arrive from England; and carried with him the detachment which Lally had put on board to prevail upon him to trust himself again at sea after the first engagement. Mém. p. 57.

BOOK IV. might now be employed as an instrument to frighten the
 CHAP. IV. Rajah into compliance. The expedition against Tanjore
 was accordingly undertaken; and on the 18th of June
 1758. Lally took the field.¹

From the terror of the natives, the alienation of the Europeans, and the want of money, the equipment of the expedition, in attendants, draught cattle, and even provisions and ammunition, was in the highest degree defective. In seven days the army arrived at Carical, not without suffering, at this early stage, both from fatigue and from hunger.² At this place Lally was met by a messenger from the King, who was desirous to treat. Lally understood, that some of his predecessors had been duped into impolitic delay, by the artful negotiations of the King of Tanjore. He resolved to display superior wisdom, by a conduct directly the reverse. He proceeded to Nagore, a town accounted rich, about four miles to the north of Negapatnam; but the merchants had time to remove their most valuable effects, and the acquisition yielded only a trifle. On the 28th he arrived at Kiveloor, the seat of a celebrated Pagoda, which eastern exaggeration represented as containing enormous riches, the accumulated offerings of the piety of ages: had it been plundered by a Mohammedan conqueror, and the transaction recorded by a Persian historian, he would have described his hero as bearing away, in his fortunate chariots, a mountain of gold. Under the vulgar persuasion, Lally ransacked, and even dug the houses; dragged the tanks, and took away the idols; but no treasures were found, and the idols, instead of gold were only of brass. Six unhappy Brahmens lingered about the camp, in hopes, it is probable, of recovering some of their beloved divinities. The suspicions of Lally took them for spies; his violence and precipitation took his

¹ Lally repeats with what regret he postponed the siege of Madras; and shows that it was by earnest persuasions of the Governor, and the Jesuit Laval (a missionary of a most intriguing spirit, who had contrived to gain a vast influence in the Councils of Pondicherry), that he undertook the expedition to Tanjore. *Mém.* p. 62.

² Lally was, of course, obliged to trust to the information of those acquainted with the country; and the letters of Laval and De Leyrit, make it sufficiently appear that they extenuated beyond measure the difficulties of the undertaking; and made him set out upon representations which they knew to be false, and promises which were never intended to be fulfilled. In fact, it would have required a cooler and a more fertile head than that of Lally, to counteract the malignity, to stimulate the indifference, and to supply the enormous deficiencies, by which he was surrounded.

suspicious for realities ; and he ordered the six Brahmens to be treated as the Europeans are accustomed to treat the natives convicted as spies ; that is, to be shot away from the muzzles of the guns. The King's army took the field ; and after a slight show of resistance, retreated to the capital, near which Lally arrived on the 18th of July. Conferences ensued : The King offered a sum of money, but greatly inferior to what was required : Lally offered to abate in his pecuniary demand, provided he were furnished with 600 bullocks, and a supply of gunpowder. His agents were more prudent than himself, and suppressed the article of gunpowder, the deficiency of which, if known to the King, was not likely to improve his disposition to compliance ; and the bullocks, the King observed, that his religion did not permit him to grant. The cannonade and bombardment began. After a few days, the King renewed his efforts for an accommodation. The obliquities of Eastern negotiation wore out the temper of Lally ; and he threatened to carry the King and all his family slaves to Mauritius. This outrage produced in the Hindu a final resolution to defend himself to the last extremity. He had early, among his applications for assistance, implored the co-operation of the English ; and Captain Calliaud at Trichinopoly was commissioned to make all those efforts in his favour which his own security might appear to allow. That officer sent to him without delay a small detachment, which might feed his hopes of a more efficient support, and afford him no apology for making his peace with the French. But he was afraid to intrust him with any considerable portion of his troops, fully aware that the French might at any time make with him an accommodation, and receive his assistance to destroy the very men who had come to protect him. Upon this last occurrence Calliaud inferred that the time for accommodation was elapsed, and sent an additional detachment. Lally continued his operations, and on the 7th of August effected a breach.

At this time, however, only 150 charges of powder for the cannon, not twenty cartouches a man for the troops, and not provisions for two days, remained in the camp.¹

¹ This is the statement of Orme (II. 27). That of Lally is, "qu'il ne restoit au parc d'artillerie que trois milliers de poudre pour les canons, et vingt coups

BOOK IV. The next morning intelligence was received that the English fleet, after a fresh engagement with the French, had

CHAP. IV. anchored before Carical, from which alone the French

1758. army could derive its supplies. Lally summoned a council of war. Out of thirteen officers, two, the Count d'Estaing, and M. Saubinet, advised an immediate assault, considering the success as certain, and the landing of the English at Carical, while the French fleet kept the sea, as highly improbable. It was determined, in conformity with the opinion of the other eleven, to raise the siege.¹ Intelligence of this resolution of the enemy, and of the negligence and security in which they encamped, encouraged the Tanjorines to attempt a surprise; which brought Lally and his army into imminent danger. After a disastrous march, in which they suffered severely, from the enemy, from fatigue, and from famine,² they arrived on the 28th at Carical, and saw the English fleet at anchor off the mouth of the river.

After the first of the naval engagements, the English fleet, before they could anchor, were carried a league to the north of Sadras; the French, which had suffered less in the rigging, and sailed better, anchored fifteen miles to the windward. The English, as soon as possible, weighed again, and after a fruitless endeavour to reach Fort St. David, discovered the French fleet on the 28th of May in the road of Pondicherry. The next day, the French, at the remonstrance of Lally, who sent on board a considerable body of troops, got under sail; but instead of bearing down on the English, unable to advance against the wind, proceeded to Fort St. David, where they arrived on the evening after the surrender. The English sailing

par soldat en cartouche." He adds, that he had no other balls for the cannon but those which were shot by the enemy, of which few corresponded with the calibre of his guns; that twenty-four hours' battering were still requisite to make the breach practicable; that he had but a few days' provisions for the European part of his army, while the native part and the attendants were entirely without provisions, and had, the greater part of them, deserted. *Mém. ut supra*, p. 73.

¹ Lally says, that he had at the same time received a letter from the commanding officer at Pondicherry, announcing that a body of 1,200 English, who had marched from Madras, were menacing Pondicherry; and one from Gopal Row, the Mahratta, threatening with a visit the territory of the French, if their army did not immediately evacuate Tanjore. *Mém.* p. 73.

² Notwithstanding their hardships and fatigues, Lally asserts that they lost but little. *Ibid.* p. 81.

badly, fell to leeward as far as Alamparva, where intelligence was received of the loss of the fort. The admiral, therefore, not having water on board for the consumption of five days, made sail, and anchored the next day in the roads of Madras. The fleet had numerous wants; Madras had very scanty means of supply; and nearly eight weeks elapsed before it was again ready for sea. On the 3rd of July, three of the Company's ships arrived from Bengal, with money, merchandise, and stores, but no troops. The monsoon had obliged them to make the outward passage towards the Acheen, and they came in from the southward. The French admiral, after touching at Fort St. David, had stood to the southward, to cruize off Ceylon; in opposition to the remonstrances of Lally, who desired the fleet to co-operate in the destined enterprize against Madras. Lally hastened from Fort St. David to Pondicherry, and summoned a council by whose authority he recalled the fleet. The injunction reached the admiral at Carical on the 16th of June, and he anchored the next day in the road of Pondicherry. Had he continued his destined course to the southward, he could not have missed the three English East Indiamen from Bengal, and by their capture would have obtained that treasure, the want of which alone disconcerted the scheme of English destruction. On the 25th of July, the English fleet were again under sail; and on the 27th appeared before Pondicherry, where the French lay at anchor. They put to sea without delay: but the difficulties of the navigation, and the aims of the commanders, made it the 2nd of August before the fleets encountered off Carical. The French line consisted of eight sail; the English, as before, of seven. The fight lasted scarcely an hour; when three of the French ships, being driven out of the line, the whole bore away, under all the sail they could carry. The English Admiral gave chase; but in less than ten minutes the enemy were beyond the distance of certain shot. Toward night the English gave over the pursuit, and came to anchor off Carical. The French steered for Pondicherry, when the Admiral declared his intention of returning to Mauritius. Lally sent forward the Count d'Estaing to remonstrate with him on the disgrace of quitting the sea before an inferior enemy, and to urge him to renewed operations.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. IV.

1758.

BOOK IV. D'Estaing offered to accompany him on board, with any
 CHAP. IV. proportion of the troops. Lally himself moved with the
 1758. army from Carical on the 24th of August, and, having
 passed the Coleroon, hurried on with a small detachment
 to Pondicherry, where he arrived on the 28th. He immediately summoned a mixed council of the administration and the army, who joined in a fresh expostulation to the Admiral on the necessity of repairing to Madras, where the success of an attack must altogether depend upon the union of the naval and military operations. That commander, representing his ships as in a state of the greatest disablement, and his crews extremely enfeebled and diminished by disease, would yield to no persuasion, and set sail with his whole fleet for Mauritius on the 2nd of September.¹

If we trust to the declaration of Lally, his intention of besieging Madras, still more his hopes of taking it, were abandoned from that hour. Before the fleet departed, an expedition against Arcot, with a view to relieve the cruel pressure of those pecuniary wants which the disastrous result of the expedition to Tanjore had only augmented, was projected and prepared. Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, had been left under the government of one of the principal officers of Mohammed Ali, the English Nabob, with a small body of Sepoys and native cavalry. With this officer, Rajah Sahib, (the eldest son of the late Chunda Sahib,) now decorated by the French with the title of Nabob, had opened a correspondence; and a treaty was concluded, according to which the Governor was to deliver up the place, to receive as a reward 13,000 rupees, and to be taken, along with his troops, into the pay and service of Lally. As auxiliary measures, the previous possession of the secondary forts of Trivatore, Trincomalee, Carangoly, and Timery, was deemed expedient. Lally divided his army into four parts, to two of which the forts of Carangoly and Timery surrendered without resistance; Trivatore and Trincomalee were taken by assault. On the

¹ These events are minutely recorded by Orme, li. 197—352. The *Sketches and Criticisms* of Colonel Wilks, p. 379—398, are professional and sensible. Cambridge, p. 135—185, goes over the same ground. A spirited abstract is given, p. 96—102, by the author of the *History and Management of the East India Company*. For the operations of Lally, his own *Memoir*, with the original documents in the Appendix, is in the highest degree instructive and entertaining.

BOOK IV. would be able to make, that he could prevail upon Lally
CHAP. IV. to send him back, and with augmented force, to his important station. Having, on his march, been joined by Moracin, the Governor of Masulipatam, who with his troops was also recalled, he left the march to be conducted by Moracin, and under a safeguard granted him from Madras, hastened to the meeting with Lally.

1758.

The head of that General was filled with the importance of his own project, the expulsion of the English from India; and with contempt for the schemes of Bussy, as of all other men who had different views from his own. In his letter to Bussy, upon the taking of Fort St. David, he had said, "It is the whole of British India which it now remains for us to attack. I do not conceal from you that, having taken Madras, it is my resolution to repair immediately, by land or by sea, to the banks of the Ganges, where your talents and experience will be of the greatest importance to me." Bussy employed every effort to convince him of the importance of retaining the advantages which he had gained in the dominions of the Subahdar; and the most pressing and passionate letters arrived from the Subahdar himself.¹ But Lally, who had already treated the representations of Bussy as the visions of a madman, and had told the Governor of Pondicherry that he thought himself too condescending in reading his letters, lent a deaf ear to remonstrances which inwardly he regarded as the fruit of delusion or imposture.² Apprized of the money which Dupleix had raised on his personal credit, he was not without hopes that Bussy might be possessed of similar resources; and he states as a matter of great surprise, mixed with incredulity, the averment of Bussy, that in this way he was altogether incapable of aiding the general cause.

A high testimony from another quarter was yielded to the merits of Bussy. His rank as an officer was only that of Lieutenant-Colonel. Besides a Major-General, six Colonels had arrived with the army of Lally. The six Colo-

¹ Lally himself informs us, that these letters uniformly began with such expressions as these, "Renvoyez M. de Bussy avec un corps de troupes; vous savez que je ne peux pas m'en passer;" or, "vous savez que je ne peux pas me passer de M. de Bussy; renvoyez le moi avec un corps de troupes," &c. *Mém. pour le Comte de Lally*, p. 93.

² Letter to De Leyrit, 28th of June, 1758. *Mém. nt supra*, Appen. No. xxxvi.

nels, yielding to the nobler impulses of the human mind, signed a requisition that Bussy might supersede them. "Their names," says Mr. Orme, "highly worthy of record on this occasion, were mostly of ancient and noble descent; d'Estaign, de Landivisiau, de la Faire, Breteuil, Verdrière, and Crillon."

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.

1758.

To whatever quarter Lally turned his eyes, he found himself beset with the greatest difficulties. The government of Pondicherry declared, as they had frequently declared before, that in their exhausted situation it was altogether impossible for them to find the means of subsisting the army at Pondicherry. When a council of war was called, the Count d'Estaign, and other officers, pronounced it better to die by a musket ball, under the ramparts of Madras, than by hunger, within those of Pondicherry. The idea of undertaking a siege, says Lally, the total want of funds excluded from the mind of every one. But it was deemed expedient to bombard the place, to shut up the English within the fort, to obtain the pillage of the black town, and to lay waste the surrounding country.¹

The Governor of Pondicherry declared that he was destitute of every species of resource, either for the pay or the maintenance of the soldiers. Lally advanced 60,000 rupees of his own money, and prevailed upon some members of the council, and other individuals in Pondicherry, to follow, in some degree, his example. From this species of contribution or loan, he obtained 34,000 rupees, which, added to his own, made a sum of 94,000. This was the treasure with which, at the head of 2700 European troops, and 4000 Indians, he marched against Madras.

The expedition was ready for its departure at the beginning of November, but the continuance of the rains retarded its arrival before Madras till the 12th of December, when Lally had not funds to ensure the subsistence of the army for a single week. The English had made active use of the intervening period for providing themselves with the means of defence. When Admiral Pocock quitted the coast in October to avoid the monsoon, he left behind him the marines of the squadron, and was expected back in January. A body of cavalry, under an adventurer of the

¹ Mém. ut supra, i. 98, 100.

BOOK IV. country, was taken into pay; and so posted, along with the
 CHAP. IV. Sepoys from Trichinopoly, as to make war upon the line
 1758. of the enemy's convoys. The veteran Lawrence, who was still in Madras, was put at the head of the troops; and took post with the greater part of the army on elevated ground at some distance from the town. It was not, however, his intention to run the risk of an action; and as the enemy advanced, he gradually yielded ground, till on the 12th he entered the fort with all his army. The command in the fort belonged to the Governor Pigot. But he was an intelligent, and an active man; and the harmony of the defence experienced no interruption. The military within the walls now consisted of 1758 Europeans, 2220 Sepoys, and 200 horse of the Nabob, on whom by experience little dependance was placed. The other Europeans were 150 men, who were employed without distinction in serving out stores, and other auxiliary operations.

On the 13th the enemy remained on the plain, and reconnoitred the place. On the 14th, early in the morning, they took possession of the black town, where the soldiery, from want of skill or authority on the part of their commander, abandoned themselves to intemperance and disorder. In hopes of profiting by this opportunity, the English made a strong sally with 600 chosen men. They penetrated into the black town before the enemy were collected in sufficient numbers; but were at last opposed by a force which they could not withstand; and, had the division of the enemy, which was under the command of Bussy, advanced with sufficient promptitude to cut off their retreat, it is highly probable that few of them would have made their escape. Lally adduces the testimony of the officers, who commanded under Bussy, that they joined in urging him to intercept the English detachment; but that he, alleging the want of cannon, absolutely refused. Mr. Orme says that he justified himself by the delay of Lally's orders, without which it was contrary to his duty to advance. To gain, however, a great advantage at a critical moment, a zealous officer will adventure somewhat, under some deficiency both of cannon and of orders. The loss on the part of the English was not less than 200 soldiers, and six officers. In mere numbers that of the enemy was nearly the same.

The capture of the black town had furnished to Lally BOOK IV.
 for the demands of the service only 80,000 livres, lent to CHAP. IV.
 him by an Armenian merchant, whom he had saved from
 plunder; and to these were added 12,000 livres furnished
 by a Hindu partisan. With these funds he began to con-
 struct his batteries, in the intention, as he repeats, of only
 bombarding the place, when intelligence was brought, on
 the 24th of December, that a frigate from the islands had
 arrived at Pondicherry with a million of livres. It was
 this circumstance, he says, which now determined him to
 convert the bombardment into a siege. 1758.

With only two engineers, and three artillery officers, excepting the few who belonged to the Company, all deficient both in knowledge and enterprise; with officers in general dissatisfied and ill-disposed, with only the common men on whom he could depend, and of whose alacrity he never had reason to complain, he carried on the siege with a vigour and activity which commanded the respect even of the besieged, though they were little acquainted with the difficulties under which he toiled. By means of the supplies which had plentifully arrived from Bengal, and the time which the Presidency had enjoyed to make preparation for siege, the English were supplied with an abundance both of money and of stores. The resolution to defend themselves to the utmost extremity, which has seldom been shared more universally and cordially by any body of men, inspired them with incessant vigilance and activity. The industry of the enemy was perpetually counteracted by a similar industry on the part of their opponents. No sooner had those without erected a work, than the most active, and enterprising, and often skilful exertions were made from within to destroy it. Whatever ingenuity the enemy employed in devising measures of attack, was speedily discovered by the keen and watchful eyes of the defenders. A breach, in spite of all those exertions, was however effected; and the mind of Lally was intensely engaged with preparations for the assault; when he found the officers of his army altogether indisposed to second his ardour. Mr. Orme declares his opinion that their objections were founded on real and prudential considerations, and that an attempt to storm the place would

BOOK IV. have been attended with repulse and disaster. Lally,
 CHAP. IV. however, says that the most odious intrigues were carried
 1758. on in the army, and groundless apprehensions were propagated, to shake the resolution of the soldiers, and prevent the execution of the plan : that the situation of the General was thus rendered critical in the highest degree, and the chance of success exceedingly diminished ; yet he still adhered to his design, and only waited for the setting of the moon, which in India sheds a light not much feebler than that of a winter sun, on the very day on which an English fleet of six sail arrived at Madras.

The fleet under Admiral Pocock, which had left Madras on the 11th of October, had arrived at Bombay on the 10th of December, where they found six of the Company's ships, and two ships of the line, with 600 of the King's troops on board. On the 31st of December the Company's ships, with all the troops, sailed from Bombay, under the convoy of two frigates, and arrived on the 16th of February, at a critical moment, at Madras. "Words," says Lally, "are inadequate to express the effect which the appearance of them produced. The officer who commanded in the trenches deemed it even inexpedient to wait for the landing of the enemy, and two hours before receiving orders retired from his post."

Lally was now constrained to abandon the siege. The officers and soldiers had been on no more than half pay during the first six weeks of the expedition, and entirely destitute of pay during the remaining three. The expenses of the siege and the half pay had consumed, during the first month, the million livres which had arrived from the islands. The officers were on the allowance of the soldiers. The subsistence of the army for the last fifteen days had depended almost entirely upon some rice and butter, captured in two small vessels from Bengal. A very small quantity of gunpowder remained in the camp ; and not a larger at Pondicherry. The bombs were wholly consumed three weeks before. The Sepoys deserted for want of pay, and the European cavalry threatened every hour to go over to the enemy. The defence of Pondicherry rested upon 300 invalids ; and, within twelve hours, the English, with their reinforcements, might land and take possession

of the place. On the night of the 17th the French army BOOK IV.
decamped from Madras; and the English made no efforts CHAP. IV.
to molest their retreat.¹

We may judge of the feelings towards one another, of Lally and his countrymen, when he tells us, that the retreat of the army from Madras produced at Pondicherry the strongest demonstrations of joy, and was celebrated by his enemies as an occasion of triumph.

1758.

The Nabob, Mohammed Ali, who had retreated into Madras when the French regained the ascendancy in the province, had been removed during the siege to Trichinopoly; and of his two refractory brothers Abdul Wahab and Nujeeb Oolla, who had taken the side of the French, the former returned to the English connexion, before the siege of Madras, and was joined to the party of the English kept in the field to act upon the enemy's communications; the latter, induced by the event of the siege to anticipate success to the party which he had renounced, murdered all the French in his service, except a single officer, and professed himself a partisan of the English.

The English now elevated their hopes to the recovery of the province, but found their operations cramped by the narrowness of their funds. It was the 6th of March before the army, consisting of 1156 Europeans, rank and file, 1570 Sepoys, 1120 collieries (irregular troops of the southern Polygars,) and 1956 horse, was in a condition to move. The countries of Madura and Tinivelly at the same time recalled the attention of the Presidency. No sooner had the troops been withdrawn for the defence of Madras, than the refractory chiefs began their encroachments. Only the towns of Madura and Palam-Cotah, preserved by the steadiness of the Sepoys in garrison, remained in obedience to the English. And Mohammed Issoof, who had commanded with reputation the Company's native troops, in their former attempts in that country, was now sent back in the quality of renter, with a body of Sepoys, for the recovery of the country.

¹ Orme, ii. 383—459; Mém. pour Lally, p. 99—117. Of the sick and wounded, those who were too ill to be removed, to the number of thirty-three, according to Lally's own account, to that of forty-four according to Mr. Orme's, were left behind, and recommended by a letter of Lally to the English commander. They were treated, as Lally himself declares, with all the care which the laws, both of war and of humanity, prescribed.

BOOK IV. The French army had marched from Madras in the direction of Conjeveram; and there the French and English armies remained in sight of one another, without any operation of importance, for two and twenty days. The English, at the end of this time, made a march upon Wandewash; took possession of the town, and began to open ground against the fort. This brought the French army to defend it; upon which the English decamped in the night; by a forced march of two days arrived at Conjeveram, and took it by assault. The two armies continued to watch one another till the 28th of May, when they both went into cantonments.

CHAP. IV.

1759.

On the 28th of April, Admiral Pococke had arrived upon the coast from Bombay, but had continued to windward of Pondicherry, and principally at Negapatnam, with a view to intercept the French squadron, which was expected from the isles. And near the end of June three of the usual ships arrived at Madras, with 100 recruits of the Company, and intelligence that Lieutenant-Colonel Coote, with 1000 of the King's troops, might be shortly expected on the coast. The satisfaction, however, which this good fortune was calculated to excite, was grievously damped by an attendant piece of advice; that the Court of Directors, "dazzled," as Mr. Orme expresses it, "by representations of the great wealth acquired by the conquest of Bengal, and of its sufficiency to supply their other presidencies, had determined to send no more treasure to any of them till the year 1760." From the first moment of Indian conquests to a late period in their history, were the Company led into blunders, and were but too successful in misleading the councils of the nation, by their absurd estimates of the pecuniary value of Indian dominion. This intelligence was so disastrous, and full of discouragement, "that for every reason," says Mr. Orme, "it was kept within the Council."

Towards the end of July, five of the expected ships, with the first division of the troops, arrived at Negapatnam, and having given out the provisions and stores which they had brought for the use of the squadron, sailed for Madras. On the 20th of August the squadron left Negapatnam, and sailed for Trincomalee, in the island of Ceylon, where the French fleet was descried, on the 2d of September. D'Aché

had been reinforced by the arrival of three ships from France; but as the resources of the islands were inadequate to refit and supply the fleet, not only much time had been lost, but he had been compelled to return to sea in a state of very imperfect equipment. It was the 10th of September before the state of the winds and the weather permitted the encounter of the fleets. The English, having the wind, came down a-breast, while the French, who were farthest out at sea, lay-to in line of battle a-head. The English squadron consisted of nine ships of the line, a frigate, the *Queensborough*, two of the Company's ships, and a fire-ship. The French were eleven sail of the line, and three frigates; and their total battery exceeded that of the English by 174 guns, and consequently, by eighty-seven in action. The engagement lasted scarcely two hours, when the greater part of the French ships having quitted the line, the whole fleet sailed away, and, in a few minutes, were beyond the reach of the English shot. Such was the indecisive character of naval actions in general, at the period to which we now refer. The English, though they had clearly the victory, had also the principal share of the loss. In point of men the injury was supposed to be nearly equal on both sides; but all the French ships, one only excepted, carried topsails when they retired from the fight; none of the English ships, after the engagement, could set half their sails, and two were obliged to be taken in tow. The English fleet anchored the next day in the road of Negapatnam, and the French in four days arrived at Pondicherry.

As nothing could exceed the distress of the French in respect to supplies, so their hopes were ardent of relief by the arrival of the ships. The fort of Covrepawh had surrendered upon summons to a detachment of the English army in the beginning of July. In the beginning of August, Lally's own regiment mutinied for want of pay, and, by their example, subverted the discipline of the whole army. The confidence of the English had mounted so high, that Major Brereton, who commanded the troops, and who burned for an opportunity of performing some exploit before the arrival of Coote, persuaded the Presidency to sanction an attempt for the reduction of Wandewash. After waiting till the roads were passable, the whole army

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.
1759.

BOOK IV. marched from Conjeveram on the 26th of September. The

CHAP. IV.

1759.

principal part of the French forces were concentrated at Wandewash; and the enterprise was unsuccessful. The English made a spirited attack on the night of the 29th, but were resisted with great gallantry, and finally repulsed with a loss of more than 200 men. In this action, a detachment of grenadiers were very expeditiously quitting the vicinity of danger; when their officer, instead of calling after them, an imprudence which would, in all probability, have converted their retreat into a flight, ran till he got before them, and then, turning suddenly round, said, "Halt," as giving the ordinary word of command. The habit of discipline prevailed. The men stopped, formed according to orders, and marched back into the scene of action. But this success of the French, however brilliant, neither clothed the men nor supplied them with provisions. Neither the English nor the French had ever been able to draw from the districts which they held in the country sufficient funds to defray the expense of the troops, employed in conquering and defending them. A considerable portion of those districts, which the French had been able to seize upon the arrival of Lally, the English had again recovered. The Government of Pondicherry, left almost wholly destitute of supplies from Europe, was utterly exhausted, first, by the long and desperate struggle in which they had been engaged; and secondly, (for the truth must not be disguised, though the complaints of Lally have long been treated with ridicule,) by the misapplication of the public funds: a calamity, of which the violent passion of individuals for private wealth was a copious and perennial fountain. Lally had, from his first arrival, been struggling on the borders of despair, with wants which it was altogether out of his power to supply. The English had received, or were about to receive, the most important accession to their power. And nothing but the fleet, which had now arrived, and the supplies which it might have brought, could enable him much longer to contend with the difficulties which environed him.

M. d'Aché had brought, for the use of the colony, 16,000*l.* in dollars, with a quantity of diamonds, valued at 17,000*l.*, which had been taken in an English East India

mān ; and, having landed these effects, together with 180 men, he declared his resolution of sailing again immediately for the islands. Nothing could exceed the surprise and consternation of the colony upon this unexpected and alarming intelligence. Even those who were the most indifferent to the success of affairs, when the reputation of Lally, and the interest of their country alone were at stake, now began to tremble, when the very existence of the colony, and their interests along with it, were threatened with inevitable destruction. All the principal inhabitants, civil and military, assembled at the Governor's house, and formed themselves into a national council. A vehement protest was signed against the departure of the fleet. But the resolution of the Admiral was inflexible ; and he could only be induced to leave 400 Caffres, who served in the fleet, and 500 Europeans, partly marines and partly sailors.

At the same time the departure of Bussy had been attended, in the dominions of the Subahdar, with a rapid succession of events, ruinous to the interests of the French. An expedition from Bengal, fitted out by the English against the Northern Circars, those important districts of which Bussy had obtained the dominion from Salabut Jung, had been attended with the most brilliant success ; had not only driven the French entirely out of the country, but had compelled the Subahdar to solicit a connexion with the English. Nizam Ali, whose audacious and aspiring character rendered him extremely dangerous to the feeble resources and feebler mind of his brother, had returned from his flight, to which he had been urged by the spirit and address of Bussy, at the head of a considerable army ; and compelled the Subahdar to replace him in that commanding situation, from which he had recently been driven. Bassalut Jung, the second of the three brothers, who anticipated the revolution which the victorious return of Nizam Ali portended, promised himself important advantages from the assistance of the French, in the changes which he expected to ensue : and despatched a letter to Lally, in which he told him he was coming to throw himself into his arms.¹ Bussy urged in strong terms the policy of declaring Bassalut Jung Nabob

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.

1759.

¹ Mém. pour Lally, p. 135.

BOOK IV. of the Carnatic. This was opposed by the step which had
 CHAP. IV. been recently taken by Lally, of making this declaration,
 1759. with much ceremony and pomp, in favour of the son of
 Chunda Saheb. It was, however, agreed that a body of
 troops, under the command of Bussy, should be sent to
 join Bassalut Jung, who hovered upon the borders of the
 Carnatic. He had left Hyderabad, under pretence of
 regulating the affairs of his government of Adoni; but he
 soon directed his march toward the south-east, supporting
 his army by levying contributions as he proceeded, and
 approached Nelore in the month of July.

M. Bussy arrived at Wandewash the very day after the
 repulse of the English; and, having placed himself at the
 head of the detachment, which was destined to accompany
 him to the camp of Bassalut Jung, proceeded on his march.
 But the French army, which had long been enduring ex-
 traordinary privations, now broke out in the most alarming
 disorders. More than a year's pay was due to them; they
 were destitute of clothing, and many times ill-supplied
 with provisions. The opinion was disseminated, that a
 much larger sum than was pretended had been left by the
 fleet; and that the General was acquiring immense wealth
 by dilapidation. On the 16th of October the whole army
 was in mutiny, and the officers deprived of all authority.
 Intelligence of these disastrous events overtook Bussy at
 Arcot, and induced him to suspend his march. The troops
 were at last restored to obedience by the payment of six
 months of their arrears, and a complete amnesty. But the
 delays which had intervened had exhausted the resources
 which enabled Bassalut Jung to remain on the borders of
 the Carnatic. He was at the same time solicited, by a
 promised enlargement of his territory, to join with Nizam
 Ali, who dreaded the re-appearance of M. Bussy in the
 territories of the Subahdar: his ardour for the French
 alliance was cooled by the intelligence of the disorders
 among their troops: he was alarmed by the presence of
 an English corps of observation, which had been sent to
 act upon his rear, if he should advance into the province:
 and on the 19th of October he struck off across the hills
 into the district of Kurpa; where Bussy, who followed
 him by a different route, arrived on the 10th of November.
 Bassalut Jung offered to accompany the French detach-

ment to Arcot, provided he was recognised by the French as sovereign of the Carnatic, and furnished with four lacks of rupees for the payment of his troops. The French were not without objections to the first of these conditions, and altogether incapable of fulfilling the last. The negotiation, therefore, proved fruitless; and Bussy returned, with an addition, however, of 400 good horse, whom he had found the means of attaching to his service.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.
1759.

Urged by the necessity of making efforts for the supply, and even subsistence, of the army, Lally, shortly after the reconciliation of his troops, thought proper to divide his army into two parts; with the one of which he proposed to collect the rents of the southern; with the other, stationed at Wandewash and Arcot, to protect what belonged to the French in the northern districts. De Leyrit and the Council of Pondicherry represented the danger, which could not be concealed from Lally himself, of dividing the army in the presence of a superior enemy; but they pointed out no means by which it was possible to preserve it together. On the 20th of November, the division which marched to the south took possession of the rich island of Seringham, which the garrison at Trichinopoly was too feeble to defend.

The English took the field. Colonel Coote, with the last division of his regiment, had arrived on the 27th of October; and on the 21st of November proceeded to Conjeeveram, where the troops were cantoned for the rains. The first of his acts was to assemble a council of the principal officers; that he might obtain from them a knowledge of facts, and profit by their observations. To divide the attention of the enemy, he began with movements which indicated an attack upon Arcot; but his real intention was to gain possession of Wandewash, which was attacked and carried on the 29th. The inaction of the French army, at Chittapet, which, probably deeming itself too weak, made no effort for the protection of Wandewash, induced the English to march immediately to Caran-

¹ In the account of Bussy's march, I have followed his own and Orme's account. Lally (Mém. p. 136) complains of his delays, and insinuates that to the misconduct through which these delays took place, the loss of Bassalut Jung's alliance ought to be ascribed.

BOOK IV. goly, which made a feeble resistance, and surrendered on
 CHAP. IV. the 10th of December.

1759.

The loss of Arcot, and with it the command of all the northern districts of the province, now presented itself to the eyes of Lally as threatening to an alarming degree. The greater part of the troops was hastily recalled from Seringham ; Bussy at the same time arrived from his expedition to the camp of Bassalut Jung ; a Mahratta chief and his body of horse were taken into pay ; and Lally was eager to strike a blow for the recovery of Wandewash.

Bussy, on the other hand, was of opinion, as the French were superior in cavalry, which would render it dangerous for the English to hazard a battle, except in circumstances of advantage, that they should avail themselves of this superiority, by acting upon the communications of the English, which would soon compel them either to fight at a disadvantage, or retire for subsistence to Madras ; whereas if they besieged Wandewash, the English would have two important advantages ; one, that of fighting with only a part of the French army, while another part was engaged in the siege ; the other, that of choosing the advantage of the ground, from the obligation of the French to cover the besiegers.

At the same time the motives of Lally were far from groundless. The mental state of the soldiers required some brilliant exploit to raise them to the temper of animated action. He was deprived of all means of keeping the army for any considerable time in the field. By seizing the English magazines, he counted upon retarding for several days their march to the relief of Wandewash ; and as the English had breached the fort and taken it in forty-eight hours, he counted, and not unreasonably, upon rendering himself master of the place before the English could arrive.


Amusing the English, by some artful movements, he surprised and took Conjeveram, which he concluded was the place of the English magazines. The fact however was, that the English had no magazines, but were dependent on the purchases of the day, and already straitened for supplies by the extensive excursions of his Mahratta horse. Lally repaired to Wandewash ; but several days

elapsed before his battery was ready to play; and in the meantime the English approached. Lally throws the blame upon his engineer, whom he ordered to batter in breach with three cannon upon one of the towers of the fort, which was only protected by the fire of a single piece, and which, five weeks before, the English with inferior means had breached in forty-eight hours. But the engineers insisted upon erecting a battery in exact conformity with the rules of the schools; and the soldiers in derision asked if they were going to attack the fortifications of Luxemburgh.¹

The project of Lally having in this manner failed, now was the time, at any rate, to have profited by the judicious advice of Bussy, and, abandoning the siege, to have made war upon the English means of supply. But Lally, who was aware that his character had fallen low with the army, could not brook the imputation of retreating before his enemy; he prepared, therefore, to meet the attack of the English army, and to continue his operations. It was the policy of the English commander to leave the enemy at work, till they were ready to assault the fort, when he was sure of attacking separately, at his choice, either the troops engaged in the siege, or those who covered them. His movements were judiciously made; and on the morning of the 22d, he was on the ground before the French camp, his army drawn up in two lines in a most advantageous position, where he had a free communication with the fort, and one of his flanks protected by its fire. The French occupied the ground in front of their line, where the field of battle had previously been marked out. The English army consisted of 1900 Europeans, of whom eighty were cavalry, 2100 Sepoys, 1250 black horse, and twenty-six field-pieces. The French, including 300 marines and sailors from the squadron, consisted of 2250 Europeans, and 1300 Sepoys; for the Mahattas kept aloof at the distance of some miles from the field of battle.² Lally, and apparently with reason, com-

¹ Mém. pour Lally, p. 161; Orme (ii. 577) says that cannon for the battery, which did not open till the 20th, six days after Lally took possession of the Pettah or town adjoining the fort, were brought from Valdore on carriages sent from Pondicherry.

² Orme, ii. 582. Lally (Mém. p. 161) gives a very different account of the respective numbers: that the French had 900 infantry, 110 cavalry, 300 marines.



BOOK IV. plains that his troops did their duty ill in the action.

CHAP. IV. While the English army were advancing, Lally, who imagined he perceived some wavering on their left, occasioned by the fire of his artillery, though Mr. Orme says they had not yet come within cannon-shot, put himself at the head of the cavalry, to profit by the favourable moment. The cavalry refused to march. The General suspended the Commanding Officer, and ordered the second Captain to take the command. He, also, disobeyed. Lally addressed himself to the men; and a Cornet crying out that it was a shame to desert their General in the day of battle, the officer who commanded on the left offered to put the troop in motion. They had not advanced many paces, when a single cannon-shot, says Lally, the rapid firing of two pieces, says Mr. Orme, put them to flight, and they galloped off, leaving him absolutely alone upon the plain.¹ Lally returned to the infantry, and brought up his line. The French fired rashly, and ineffectually, both with artillery and musketry; the English leader, who was cool, and perfectly obeyed, made his men reserve their fire, till sure of its execution. The regiment that occupied the enemy's right, when the distance between them and the English was now inconsiderable, threw themselves into column, and rushed forward at a rapid pace. Coote, directing the opposite regiment to be firm, and preserve their fire, gave the command when the enemy were at fifty yards' distance. The fire fell heavy, both on their front and flanks. Yet it stopped not the course of the column; and in an instant the two regiments were mingled at the push of the bayonet. The weight of the column bore down what was opposed to it; but as it had been left unprotected by the flight of the cavalry posted on its right, its flanks were

and sailors, in all 1350 Europeans, with 1800 Sepoys; and that the English had 2500 infantry, and 100 cavalry, all Europeans; of black troops nearly an equal number with the French.—There is some appearance that Mr. Orme's account of the French force is conjectural, and hence exaggerated, as all his numbers are round numbers, one regiment 400, another 700, another 400, cavalry 300, &c. Perhaps we ought to trust to Lally's account of his own forces, because it was given in the face of his enemies, who were interested, and well able, to contradict it if untrue; and we need not hesitate to take Mr. Orme's account of the English, where his knowledge was complete.

¹ Mr. Orme (ii. 583) says, that two field-pieces, which fired several times in one minute, and brought down ten or fifteen men or horses, caused the flight.

completely exposed, and in a few moments the ground was covered with the slain, when it broke, and fled in disorder to the camp. Almost at the same time a tumbril blew up in the redoubt in front of the enemy's left; and during the confusion which this accident produced, the English took possession of the post. No part of the French line continued firm much longer. When ordered to advance, the Sepoys absolutely refused. Bussy, who put himself at the head of one of the regiments, to lead them to the push of the bayonet, as the only chance of restoring the battle, had his horse wounded under him, was abandoned by the troops, and taken prisoner. Lally frankly acknowledges, that his cavalry, who had behaved so ill at the beginning of the action, protected his retreat with great gallantry: he was thus enabled to wait for the junction of the detachment at Wandewash, and to carry off his light baggage and the wounded. The black cavalry of the English were too timid, and the European too feeble in numbers, to impede the retreat.

Lally retired to Chittapet, from which, without strengthening the garrison, he proceeded the following day towards Gingee. The enterprise next resolved on by Colonel Coote was the reduction of Arcot, toward which, the day after the battle, he sent forward a body of troops. Intelligence, however, of the defenceless state in which the enemy had left Chittapet, gave him hopes of making that a previous acquisition. In two days the English effected a breach, and the garrison surrendered. On the 1st of February, Coote arrived at Arcot. On the 5th three batteries opened on the town. On the night of the 6th the army began their approaches. Although operations were retarded for want of ammunition, on the morning of the 9th the sap was carried near the foot of the glacis; and by noon, two breaches, but far from practicable, were effected; when, to the great surprise of the English, a flag of truce appeared, and the place was surrendered. Not three men had been lost to the garrison, and they might have held out ten days longer, before the assault by storm could have been risked.

From Gingee Lally withdrew the French troops to Val-dore, both to prevent the English from taking post between them and Pondicherry, and to protect the districts to the

BOOK IV.

CHAP. IV.

1760.

BOOK IV. south, from which alone provisions could be obtained.

CHAP. IV. The difficulties of Lally, which had so long been great, were now approaching to extremity. The army was absolutely without equipments, stores, and provisions, and he

1760. was destitute of resources to supply them. He repaired to Pondicherry to demand assistance, which he would not believe that the governor and council were unable to afford. He represented them as embezzlers and peculators; and there was no imputation of folly, of cowardice, or of dishonesty, which was spared against him in return.

To proceed with the reduction of the secondary forts which the enemy held in different parts of the province; to straiten Pondicherry, and, if sufficient force should not arrive from France for its relief, to undertake the reduction of that important place, was the plan of operations which the English embraced.¹ The country between Alamparva and Pondicherry was plundered and burnt; Timery surrendered on the 1st of February; Devi-Cotah was evacuated about the same time: on the 29th of the same month Trincomalee surrendered; the fort of Permacoil was taken after some resistance in the beginning of March; and Alamparva on the 12th. Carical now remained the only station on the coast, except Pondicherry, in possession of the French; and of this it was important to deprive them, before the shortly expected return of the fleet. A large armament was sent from Madras, and the officer who commanded at Trichinopoly was ordered to march to Carical with all the force which could be spared from the garrison. Lally endeavoured to send a strong detachment to its relief; but the place made a miserable defence, and yielded on the 5th of April before assistance could arrive. On the 15th of that month Valdore surrendered after a feeble resistance; as did Chillumbaram on the 20th. Cuddalore was taken about the same time, and several strong attempts by the enemy to regain it were successfully resisted.

¹ Lally says (*Tableau Histor. de l'Expédition de l'Inde*, p. 32), and apparently with justice, "Il n'est pas douteux que si l'ennemi se fût porté tout de suite [after the battle of Wandewash] sur Pondichéry, il s'en fût rendu maître en huit jours. Il n'y avoit pas un grain de riz dans la place; les lettres, prières, ordres, et menaces que le Comte De Lally employoit depuis deux ans vis-à-vis du Sieur de Leyrit, n'avoient pu le déterminer à y former un seul magasin." The English leaders appear to have had no conception of the extremely reduced state of the French, and how safe it would have been to strike a decisive blow at the seat of the colony.

By the 1st of May the French army was confined to the bounds of Pondicherry, and the English encamped within four miles of the town ; the English powerfully reinforced from England, and elated with remembrance of the past, as well as hope for the future ; their antagonists abandoned, by neglect at home, to insuperable difficulties ; and looking with eager eyes to the fleet, which never arrived. On the part of the English, Admiral Cornish had reached the coast with six ships of the line, before the end of February : On the 25th of April Admiral Stevens, who now commanded in room of Pocock, arrived with four ships of the line ; and on the 23d of May came another ship of the line, with three companies of the royal artillery on board.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.

1760.

As the last remaining chance of prolonging the struggle for the preservation of the French colony, Lally turned his eyes towards the natives ; and fixed upon the Mysoreans as the power most capable of rendering him the assistance which he required. The adventurer Hyder Ali was now at the head of a formidable army, and, though not as yet without powerful opponents, had nearly at his disposal the resources of Mysore. Negotiation was performed ; and an agreement was concluded. On the one hand the Mysorean chief undertook to supply a certain quantity of bullocks for the provision of Pondicherry, and to join the French with 3000 select horse, and 5000 Sepoys. On the other hand the French consented to give the Mysoreans immediate possession of the fort of Thiagar, a most important station, near two of the principal passes into the Carnatic, at an easy distance from Baramhal, about fifty miles E.S.E. from Pondicherry. Even Madura and Tinivelly were said to be promised, if by aid of such valuable allies the war in the Carnatic were brought to a favourable conclusion. This resource proved of little importance to the French. The Mysoreans (who routed however a detachment of the English army sent to interrupt their march) were soon discouraged by what they beheld of the condition of the French ; and soon recalled by an emergency which deeply affected Hyder at home. They remained in the vicinity of Pondicherry about four weeks, during which time Lally had found it impossible to draw from them any material service ; and departing in the night, without his know-

BOOK IV. ledge, they marched back to Mysore. A few days before
CHAP. IV. their departure six of the English Company's ships arrived
 1760. at Madras with king's troops to the amount of 600 men. On the 2nd of September, one month later, several other ships of the Company arrived, and along with them three ships of war, and a portion of a Highland regiment of the King, increasing the fleet in India to the amount of seventeen sail of the line.*

Lally had now, and it is no ordinary praise, during almost eight months since the total discomfiture of his army at Wandewash, imposed upon the English so much respect as deterred them from the siege of Pondicherry; and notwithstanding the desperate state of his resources, found means to supply the fort, which had been totally destitute of provisions, with a stock sufficient to maintain the garrison for several months. And he still resolved to strike a blow which might impress them with an opinion that he was capable of offensive operations of no inconsiderable magnitude. He formed a plan, which has been allowed to indicate both judgment and sagacity, for attacking the English camp by surprise in four places on the night of the 4th of September. But one of the four divisions, into which his army was formed for the execution of the enterprise, fell behind its time, and disconcerted the operations of the remainder.

A circumstance now occurred in the English army which affords another proof (we shall find abundance of them as we proceed) of the impossibility of governing any country well from the distance of half the circumference of the globe. No government, which had any regard to the maxims either of justice or of prudence, would deprive of his authority a commander, who, like Colonel Coote, had brought a great and arduous service to the verge of completion, at the very moment when, without a chance of failure, he was about to strike the decisive blow which would give to his preceding operations the principal part of their splendour and renown. Yet the East India Company, without intending so reprehensible a conduct, and from their unavoidable ignorance of what after many months was to be the state of affairs, had sent out a commission, with the fleet just arrived, for Major Monson the second in command, to supersede Coote, who was destined

for Bengal. Monson was indeed directed to make no use of his commission while Coote remained upon the coast; but the spirit of Coote would not permit him to make any advantage of this indulgence; and had he been less a man of sense and temper, had he been more governed by that boyish sensibility to injury, which among vulgar people passes for honour, this imprudent step of the Company would have been attended with the most serious consequences. When Coote was to proceed to Bengal it was the destination of his regiment to proceed along with him. The Council of Madras were thrown into the greatest alarm. Monson declared that if the regiment were removed he would not undertake the siege of Pondicherry. Coote consented that his regiment should remain, to encircle the brows of another with laurels which belonged to his own.

Around Pondicherry, like many other towns in India, ran a hedge of the strong prickly shrubs of the country, sufficiently strong to repel the sudden incursions of the irregular cavalry of the country. As the position of the French was contrived to give it whatsoever protection this rampart could yield, the first operation of Monson was intended to deprive them of that advantage. The attack was, indeed, successful; but through mismanagement on the part of some of the officers, the plan was badly executed; and considerable loss was incurred. Among the rest, Monson himself was wounded, and rendered incapable for a time of acting in the field. Colonel Coote had not yet sailed for Bengal; and Monson and the Council joined in requesting him to resume the command. He returned to the camp on the 20th of September, and actively proceeded with the reduction of the outposts. When the rains began, in the beginning of October, the camp was removed to an elevated ground at some distance from the town; and during the rains no efforts were made, except those on the part of the French, to introduce provisions, and those on the part of the English, to frustrate their attempts. About the beginning of December, the rains drawing to a close, preparations were made for improving the blockade into more expeditious methods of reduction. Several batteries were prepared, which played on the town from the 8th to the 30th of December. On that day a

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IV.
1760.

BOOK IV. dreadful storm arose, which stranded three of the English ships in the road, and seriously damaged the greater part of the fleet; while it tore up the tents of the soldiers, and threw the camp into the utmost confusion. Fortunately the inundation produced by the storm rendered it impracticable for the enemy to move their artillery, nor could the troops carry their own ammunition dry. The greatest diligence was exerted in restoring the works. An attempt failed, which was made on the 5th of January, to obtain possession of a redoubt still retained by the enemy. But on the 12th of January the trenches were opened. The enemy were now reduced to the last stage of privation. Lally himself was sick; worn out with vexation and fatigue. The dissensions which raged within the fort had deprived him of almost all authority: a very feeble resistance was therefore made to the progress of the English works. The provisions, which such arduous efforts had been required to introduce into the fort, had been managed without economy; the importunities of Lally to force away the black inhabitants, who consumed the stores of the place with so much rapidity, were resisted, till matters were approaching to the last extremity. While provisions for some days yet remained, Lally urged the Council, since a capitulation must regard the civil as well as the military affairs of the colony, to concert general measures for obtaining the most favourable terms; and procured nothing but chicanery in return. The device of the Council was to preserve to themselves, if possible, the appearance of having had no share in the unpopular transaction of surrender, and the advantage, dear to their resentments, of throwing with all its weight the blame upon Lally. When at last not two days' provisions remained in the magazines, Lally informed them that he was reduced to the necessity of delivering up the military possession of the place; for the civil affairs it rested with them to make what provision was in their power. Towards the close of day on the 14th, a commissioner from Lally, together with a deputation from the council, approached the English camp. The enemy claimed the benefit of a cartel which had been concluded between the two crowns, and which they represented as precluding them from proposing any capitulation for the town of Pondicherry. As

CHAP. V.

1761.

a dispute respecting that cartel remained still undecided, BOOK IV.
 Coote refused to be guided by it, or to accept any other CHAP. IV.
 terms than those of an unconditional surrender. Their 1761.
 compliance, as he concluded with sufficient assurance,
 the necessity of their affairs rendered wholly indis-
 pensable.

On the fourth day after the surrender, there arose between the English civil and military authorities a dispute, which, had the military been as daring as the civil, might have been attended with the most serious consequences. Mr. Pigot, the Governor of Madras, made a formal demand, that Pondicherry should be given up to the Presidency, as the property of the East India Company. Coote assembled a council of war, consisting of the chief officers, both of the fleet and the army, who were of opinion that the place ought to be held for the disposal of the King. Pigot, with a hardihood which subdued them; though, in a man without arms in his hands, toward men on whose arms he totally depended, it might have been a hardihood attended with risk; declared that, unless Pondicherry were given up to the Presidency, he would furnish no money for the subsistence of the King's troops or the French prisoners. Upon this intimation the military authorities submitted.

Two places in the Carnatic, Thiagar, and the strong fort of Gingee, still remained in possession of the French. The garrisons, however, who saw no hope of relief, made but a feeble resistance; and on the 5th of April Gingee surrendered, after which the French had not a single military post in India: for even Mahé and its dependencies, on the Malabar coast, had been attacked and reduced by a body of troops which the fleet landed in the month of January. The council of Madras lost no time in leveling the town and fortifications of Pondicherry with the ground.¹

Dreadful was the fate which awaited the unfortunate Lally, and important are the lessons which it reads. By the feeble measures of a weak and defective government, a

¹ This, as Orme remarks, was in retaliation of the design of the French Government, avowed as the object of the expedition of Labourdonnais, the policy of Dupleix, and the armament of Lally, the utter extirpation of the English, and destruction of their settlements in the Peninsula. ii. 734.—W.

BOOK IV. series of disasters, during some preceding years, had fallen upon France ; and a strong sentiment of disapprobation prevailed in the nation against the hands by which the machine of government was conducted. When the total loss of the boasted acquisitions of the nation in India was reported, the public discontent was fanned into a flame : and the ministry were far from easy with regard to the shock which it might communicate to the structure of their power. Any thing was to be done which might have the effect to avert the danger. Fortunately for them, a multitude of persons arrived from India, boiling with resentment against Lally, and pouring out the most bitter accusations. Fortunately for them, too, the public, swayed as usual by first appearances, and attaching the blame to the man who had the more immediate guidance of the affairs upon which ruin had come, appeared abundantly disposed to overlook the ministry in their condemnation of Lally. The popular indignation was carefully cultivated ; and by one of those acts of imposture and villany of which the history of ministries in all the countries of Europe affords no lack of instances, it was resolved to raise a screen between the ministry and popular hatred, by the cruel and disgraceful destruction of Lally. Upon his arrival in France, he was thrown into the Bastille ; from the Bastille, as a place too honourable for him, he was removed to a common prison. An accusation, consisting of vague or frivolous imputations, was preferred against him. Nothing whatsoever was proved, except that his conduct did not come up to the very perfection of prudence and wisdom, and that it did display the greatest ardour in the service, the greatest disinterestedness, fidelity and perseverance, with no common share of military talent, and of mental resources. The grand tribunal of the nation, the parliament of Paris, found no difficulty in seconding the wishes of the ministry, and the artificial cry of the day, by condemning him to an ignominious death. Lally, confident in his innocence, had never once anticipated the possibility of any other sentence than that of an honourable acquittal. When it was read to him in his dungeon, he was thrown into an agony of surprise and indignation ; and taking up a pair of compasses, with which he had been sketching a chart of the Coromandel

coast, he endeavoured to strike them to his heart ; but his arm was held by a person that was near him. With indecent precipitation he was executed that very day. He was dragged through the streets of Paris in a dirty dung-cart ; and lest he should address the people, a gag was stuffed into his mouth, so large as to project beyond his lips. Voltaire, who had already signalized his pen by some memorable interpositions in favour of justice and the oppressed, against French judges and their law, exerted himself to expose, in a clear light, the real circumstances of this horrid transaction ; which Mr. Orme scruples not to call "a murder committed with the sword of justice." It was the son of this very man, who, under the name of Lally Tolendal, was a member of the Constituent Assembly, and by his eloquence and ardour in the cause of liberty, contributed to crumble into dust a monarchy, under which acts of this atrocious description were so liable to happen. Thus had the French East India Company, within a few years, destroyed three, the only eminent men who had ever been placed at the head of their affairs in India, Labourdonnaix, Dupleix, and Lally. It did not long survive this last display of its imbecility and injustice.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1761.

CHAPTER V.

First Nabobship of Meer Jaffier.—Expedition against the Northern Circars.—Emperor's eldest Son, and Nabobs of Oude and Allahabad, invade Bengal.—Clive resigns the Government, and is succeeded by Mr. Vansittart.—Jaffier dethroned, and Meer Cusin set up.—Disorders by the private Trade of Company's Servants.—War with Casim.—He is dethroned, and Jaffier again set up.—War with the Nabob of Oude.—Death of Jaffier.—His Son made nominal Nabob.—Courts of Proprietors and Directors.—Clive sent back to govern Bengal.

A DEFECTIVE treasury is the grand and perennial source of the difficulties which beset the sovereigns of India. This evil pressed with peculiar weight upon

¹ For these events see Mém. pour le Comte de Lally ; Mém. pour le Sieur De Leyrit ; Mém. pour Busy ; Orme, vol. ii. ; Cambridge ; Wilks ; Voltaire, *Fragments Hist. sur l'Inde, et sur la Mort du Comte de Lally.*

BOOK IV. Meer Jaffier. Before the battle of Plassy, which rendered

CHAP. V. him Subahdar, his own resources were scanty and precarious. The liberality of Aliverdi, the expence of his war with the Mahrattas, and the ravages of that destructive enemy, left in the treasury of the province a scanty inheritance to Suraj-ad-dowla. The thoughtless profligacy of that prince, even had his reign been of adequate duration, was not likely to add to the riches of the state. To purchase the conspiracy of the English, Meer Jaffier, with the prodigality of Eastern profession, had promised sums which he was altogether unable to pay; the chiefs whom he had debauched by the hopes of sharing in his fortunes, were impatient to reap the fruits of their rebellion; and the pay of the troops was deeply in arrear. In these circumstances it was almost impossible for any man to yield satisfaction. The character of Meer Jaffier was ill calculated for approaching to that point of perfection.

1757.

In making promises, with a view to the attainment of any great and attractive object, an Indian sovereign seldom intends to perform any more than just as much as he may, find it unavoidable to perform; and counts in general, too, with a well-grounded certainty, upon evading a considerable part at least of that for which he had engaged. To Meer Jaffier the steadiness with which the English adhered to the original stipulations appeared, for a time, the artifice merely of cunning men, who protract an accommodation for the purpose of rendering it more advantageous. Private bribes to defeat public ends, in Oriental politics, an engine seldom worked in vain, were applied with some perseverance. When he found the rigid fulfilment of the vast engagements to the English, still peremptorily and urgently claimed, he was not only surprised but exasperated; and began to hope, that some favourable event would deliver him from such obstinate and troublesome associates.¹

The English were not the parties against whom his animosities were first displayed. Aliverdi Khan, aware of the rebellious and turbulent spirit which almost always reigned among those adventurers from Iran and Turan, who commonly rose to the chief command in the armies of the Mohammedan princes in Hindustan, had adopted

¹ Clive's Letter to the Proprietors of E. I. Stock, in 1764, p. 30.

PROCEEDINGS OF MEER JAFFIER.

the sagacious policy of bringing forward the gentle, the less enterprising, and less dangerous Hindus. And he had raised various individuals of that race to the principal places of power and emolument under his government. Of Ramnarain, whom he intrusted with the important government of Berar, the reader has already received information. Dooloob Ram, another Hindu, held the grand office of Dewan, or Superintendent of the Finances. That celebrated family, the Sets, of Moorsshedabad, who by merchandise and banking had acquired the wealth of princes, and often aided him in his trials, were admitted largely to share in his councils, and to influence the operations of his government. Aliverdi had recommended the same policy to Suraj-ad-dowla ; and that prince had met with no temptation to depart from it.¹

Meer Jaffier was placed under the deepest obligations to Dooloob Ram. When he was convicted of malversation in his office, and stood in disgrace with his master, it was Dooloob Ram who had made his peace.² In the late revolution, Dooloob Ram had espoused his interests, when the influence of that minister, and his command of treasure, might have conferred the prize upon another chief. Whether he dreaded the power of the Hindu connexion, or was stimulated with a desire of their wealth, Meer Jaffier resolved to crush them ; and with Dooloob Ram, as the most powerful individual, it was prudent to begin. Before the departure of Clive, he had summoned Ramram-sing, the Governor of Midnapore, and head of the Spy-office, to repair to the capital to answer for the arrears of his government ; but the cautious Hindu, already alarmed, evaded the mandate by sending two of his relations. The Nabob—so by the English now was Jaffier styled, threw both into prison ; and easily reconciled Clive, by informing him, that Ramramsing was an enemy to the English, and had been the agent through whom the correspondence between Suraj-ad-dowla and Bussy had been carried on. A close connexion had long subsisted between Ramram-sing and Dooloob Ram ; and the latter, to whose sagacity the designs of Jaffier were not a secret, regarded the present step as a preliminary part of the plan which was laid for his own destruction.

¹ Orme, ii. 53.

² Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 8.

BOOK IV. Meantime opposition began to display itself in various

CHAP. V. parts of the provinces. The Raja of Midnapore took arms upon the news of the detention of his relatives: an insurrection in favour of a son of Sereffraz Khan, whom Aliverdi deposed, was raised at Dacca: in the province of Poorania, the dewan of the late government had raised a creature of his own to the chief command: and Jaffier had resolved on the removal of Ramnarain from the province of Berar.

1757. Colonel Clive found the means of reconciling Ramramsing; and, with the assistance of the English, the insurrection at Dacca was easily quelled. But when the troops were drawn out to proceed to Poorania, they refused to march, without payment of their arrears. Clive was preparing to join the Nabob; but his troops, with the prize-money distributed among them in consequence of the battle of Plassy, had indulged in such intemperance, that many of the Europeans had died, a still greater proportion were sick, and the army was unable to leave Chandernagor before the 17th of November.

The Nabob's troops were ordered to march on the 6th of October. Partial payments, and other means of overcoming their disobedience, were employed till the 7th of November, when the Nabob repaired to the camp. No sooner had he left the city, than his son Meeran, who was to act as Governor, distributed intelligence that a confederacy was formed, under the authority of the Emperor at Delhi, between Ramnarain, the Subahdar of Oude, and Dooloob Ram, to raise to the government of Bengal the son of a younger brother of Suraj-ad-dowla.¹ He then commissioned a band of ruffians to enter in the night the palace of the widow Aliverdi, with whom the mother of Suraj-ad-dowla, and grandmother of the prince, resided. They murdered the child, and sent the two princesses to Dacca. The Nabob, who denied all participation in the action, received from the English, says Mr. Orme, "no reproaches."²

¹ Orme, ii. 272. Clive, however (Report, ut supra, and the author of the *Seer Mutakhareen* (ii. 8), both say that the murdered prince was a brother of Suraj-ad-dowla.

² There can be no doubt that many treasonable projects were on foot against Mir Jaffier for some time after his accession, which were only prevented from effecting his downfall and destruction by dread of his English friends. His fears, and those of his son, explain, if they do not excuse, some of their cruelties. It may also be observed, that although some acts of atrocity are unques-

Clive arrived at Moorshedabad on the 25th of November, where Dooloob Ram, who, under pretence of sickness, had refused to accompany Jaffier, remained with his troops. On the 3d of December he joined the Nabob at Raj Mahl. Cuddum Hussun, who had long been an associate in the pleasures of Jaffier, was destined for the government of Poorania;¹ and some days had elapsed since he crossed the river into that province with a body of troops. The terror inspired by the Nabob's army, the intrigues which Cuddum Hussun, by means of letters and spies, was able to raise in the enemy's camp, together with the rawness of the insurgent troops, made them take flight and disperse, upon the very approach of Cuddum Hussun; who took quiet possession of the government, and began immediately to gratify his avarice by the severest exactions.

The mind of the Nabob, now tranquil on account of other quarters, turned itself to the more arduous proceedings which it meditated in Bahar. Clive perceived his opportunity, and refused to proceed with him, unless all the sums due upon the agreements with the English were previously discharged. No payments could be made without Dooloob Ram. A reconciliation, therefore, was necessary; and, Clive undertaking for his security, Dooloob Ram joined the camp with 10,000 troops. Twenty-three lacks of rupees were now due: orders were signed upon the treasury for one half; and tuncaws, that is, orders to the local receivers to make payment out of the revenues as they come in, were granted on certain districts for the remainder.

Clive, however, now stated, as objections to the removal of Ramnarain; the strength of his army; the probability that he would receive assistance from the Subahdar of

tioned, yet we must not assent to all that is avouched by the author of the *Seer Mutakhareen* without hesitation. He and the other members of his family had been intimate with Mir Jaffier and his son before the elevation of the former, and somewhat too sanguinely anticipated distinguished notice from him. For reasons that do not appear they were treated with contumely, and ordered not to approach Murshedabad. The author himself afterwards became intimate with Ramnarain, and still further, therefore, an object of dislike to the Nawab. The resentment thus inspired, pervades all his notices of Mir Jaffier and his son.—W.

¹ Orme calls him Jaffier's relation; but the author of the *Seer Mutakhareen* (il. 9), who had better opportunities of knowing, says he was only the son, by a concubine, of a man who had married Jaffier's sister.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1757.

BOOK IV. Oude; the likelihood that the English would be recalled
 CHAP. V. to the defence of their own settlement by the arrival of
 1758. the French; and the danger lest Ramnarain should bring
 an army of Mahrattas to his aid. Jaffier was not willing
 to oppose directly an opinion of Clive; and offered to ac-
 cept his mediation; reserving in his mind the use of every
 clandestine effort to accomplish his own designs. The
 army began its march to Patna; and was joined by Rama-
 rain, after receipt of a letter by Clive, assuring him, that
 both his person and government should be safe. The in-
 tended delays and machinations of the Nabob were cut
 short, by intelligence that the Subahdar of Oude, with the
 French party under M. Law, and a great body of Mahratta
 horse, was about to invade the province; and by the actual
 arrival of a Mahratta chief, who came in the name of the
 principal Mahratta commanders to demand the arrears of
 chout, amounting to twenty-four lacks of rupees, which
 were due from Bengal. These events produced a speedy
 accommodation with Ramnarain. The Nabob, indeed,
 used various efforts to remain behind the English, in order
 to defeat the securities which that Governor had obtained.
 But Clive penetrated, and disappointed his designs. He
 even extorted from him another grant, of no small import-
 ance to the English treasury. A leading article in the
 European traffic was the salt-petre produced in Bengal,
 the whole of which was made in the country on the other
 side of the Ganges above Patna. This manufacture had
 in general been farmed for the benefit of the Government;
 and Clive saw the advantage of obtaining the monopoly
 for the English. He offered the highest terms which the
 government had ever received; but the Nabob knew he
 could not demand from the English the regular presents
 which he would derive from a renter placed at his mercy;
 he was not, therefore, inclined to the arrangement; but,
 after a variety of objections, the necessity of his circum-
 stances compelled him to comply.

Clive got back to Moorsshedabad on the 15th of May; and,
 on the same day, received intelligence from the coast of
 Coromandel of the arrival of the French fleet, and of the
 indecisive first engagement between it and the English. A
 friend to the use which governments commonly make of
 their intelligence of the events of war, "Clive spread,"

says Orme, "the news he received, as a complete naval victory; two of the French ships sunk in the fight, instead of one stranded afterwards by a mischance; the rest put to flight, with no likelihood of being able to land the troops which they had brought from Pondicherry."

BOOK IV
CHAP. V.
1758.

On the 24th, Clive departed from Moorshedabad without waiting for the Nabob. On the 20th of June, a ship arrived at Calcutta from England; and brought along with it a commission for new modelling the government. A council was nominated consisting of ten; and, instead of one Governor, as in preceding arrangements, four were appointed, not to preside collectively, but each during three months in rotation. The inconvenience of this scheme of government was easily perceived. "But there was another cause," says Mr. Orme, "which operated on opinions more strongly. Colonel Clive had felt and expressed resentment at the neglect of himself in the Company's orders, for no station was marked for him in the new establishment." Convinced that he alone had sufficient authority to over-awe the Nabob into the performance of his obligations, the council, including the four gentlemen who were appointed the governors, came to a resolution, highly expressive of their own disinterestedness and patriotism, but full of disregard and contempt for the judgment and authority of their superiors.¹ This high legislative act of the Company they took upon them to set aside, and, with one accord, invited Clive to accept the undivided office of President. With this invitation he assures us, that "he hesitated not one moment to comply."²

¹ Mr. Scrafton (*Reflections on the Government, &c. of Indostan*, p. 115) says, "At this crisis, when military virtue and unanimity were more immediately necessary, the Directors, divided by violent contests among themselves, which certainly did them no honour, were so unfortunate in their judgment, as to appoint four Governors of Bengal, to govern each four months, and left Colonel Clive entirely out of this list. The absurdity of such a system was too apparent to take place," &c. &c. — M.

There was no display of disregard or contempt, however for their superiors. The council, in writing to Clive, express their belief "that had their employers been apprized of the present state of affairs in Bengal, they would have placed the presidency in some one person, as the clearest and easiest method of conducting their concerns." And that they had rightly judged, appeared from the event, for as soon as the Directors heard of the battle of Plassy, they appointed Clive to the station of Governor. *Life*, i. 352. — W.

² Report, *ut supra*. The influence of the Colonel is depicted by the following anecdote. There was an officer of rank, to whom Jaffier had been often indebted before his elevation, remarkable for his wit. Thus, from their former intimacy, and a jealousy of pre-ent neglect, he did not spare on the Nabob himself. While the armies of the Nabob and of Clive were at Patna, he was

BOOK IV. In the mean time considerable events were preparing at
 CHAP. V. Moorshedabad. On the approach of Clive and Dooloob
 1758. Ram, Meeran had thrown the city into violent agitation, by quitting it with demonstrations of fear, summoning all the troops and artillery of the government, and giving it out as his intention to march for the purpose of joining his father. Clive wrote with much sharpness to the Nabob; and Meeran apologized in the most submissive strain. Though inability to discharge the arrears due to the troops, who could with much difficulty be preserved from tumults, compelled the Nabob to delay his proceedings, he was impatient for the destruction of Dooloob Ram; the severity of his despotism increased; and he declared to one of his favorites, who betrayed him, "that if a French force would come into the province he would assist them, unless the English released him from all their claims of money, territory, and exemptions."¹ Among the Hindus, who had risen to high employment under the encouraging policy of the late Subahdars, was Nuncomar, who acted as Governor of Hoogly at the time of Suraj-ad-dowl's march against Calcutta. Nuncomar had followed the armies to Patna, and, as conversant with the details of the revenue, was employed by Dooloob Ram. When the difficulties of obtaining payment upon the tuncaws granted to the English began to be felt, he proffered his assistance; and, if supported by the government of the Nabob, assured the English, that he would realize the sums. He was vested with such authority as the service appeared to require; but as he expected not to elude the knowledge of Dooloob Ram, in the practices which he meditated, for raising out of his employment a fortune to himself, he resolved to second the designs of the Nabob for the removal

one day accused to the Nabob of having permitted a fray between some of his own soldiers and some of Clive's. "It chanced," says the author of the *Seer Mutakhareen*, ii. 19, "that Mirza Shemseddin himself made his appearance at that very moment: it was in full durbar and in the hall of audience. The Nawab fixed his eyes upon him, and spoke a few words that seemed to border upon reprimand: 'Sir,' said he, 'your people have had a fray with the Colonel's people: Is your honour to learn who is that Colonel Clive, and in what station heaven has seated him?' 'My Lord Nawab,' answered the Mirza, getting up instantly, and standing bolt-upright before him: 'Me, to quarrel with the Colonel! me! who never get up in the morning, without making three profound bows to his very jackass! How then could I be daring enough, after that, to fall out with the rider himself!'"

¹ Orme, ii. 356.

of that vigilant Dewan. He persuaded the Sets to with-
draw their protection from this troublesome inspector, by
awakening their fears of being called upon for money, if
Dooloob Ram withheld the revenues, and supplied not the
exigencies of the state. He assured the Nabob and Mee-
ran, that the English would cease to interfere in their
government if the money was regularly paid. Dooloob
Ram took the alarm, and requested leave to retire to Cal-
cutta, with his family and effects. Permission was refused,
till he should find a sum of money sufficient to satisfy the
troops. Under profession of a design to visit Colonel
Clive at Calcutta, the Nabob quitted the capital; but
under pretence of hunting, remained in its neighbourhood.
On the second day after his departure, Meeran incited a
body of the troops to repair to the residence of Dooloob
Ram, and to clamour tumultuously for their pay. The
English agent interfered; but as the troops were directed
by Meeran to make sure of Dooloob Ram, the agent found
great difficulty in preserving his life. Clive at last desired
that he should be allowed, with his family, to repair to
Calcutta; and the consent of the Nabob was no longer
withheld.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.
1758.

Within a few days after the return of the Nabob from
Calcutta, a tumult was excited in his capital by the soldiers
of one of the chiefs, and assumed the appearance of being
aimed at the Nabob's life. A letter was produced, which
bore the character of a letter from Dooloob Ram to the
commander of the disorderly troops, inciting him to the
enterprise, and assuring him that the concurrence of Clive,
and other leading Englishmen, was obtained. Clive sus-
pected that the letter was a forgery of Jaffier and Meeran,
to ruin Dooloob Ram in the opinion of the English, and
procure his expulsion from Calcutta; when his person and
wealth would remain in their power. All doubts might be
resolved by the interrogation and confrontation of the
commander, to whom the letter was said to be addressed.
But he was ordered by the Nabob to quit his service, was
way-laid on his departure, and assassinated.

In the mean time advices had arrived from the Presi-
dency at Madras, that Fort St. David had yielded, that a
second engagement had taken place between the fleets,
that the French army was before Tanjore, that M. Bussy

BOOK IV. was on his march to join Lally: and the most earnest
 CHAP. V. solicitations were subjoined, that as large a portion of the
 1759. troops as possible might be sent, to afford a chance of
 averting the ruin of the national affairs in the Carnatic.
 "No one," says Orme, "doubted that Madras would be
 besieged as soon as the monsoon had sent the squadrons off
 the coast, if reinforcements should not arrive before."¹
 Clive chose to remain in Bengal, where he was master,
 rather than go to Madras, where he would be under com-
 mand; and determined not to lessen his power by sending
 troops to Madras, which the Presidency, copying his ex-
 ample, might forget to send back. An enterprise, at the
 same time, presented itself, which, though its success
 would have been vain, had the French in the Carnatic pre-
 vailed, bore the appearance of a co-operation in the strug-
 gle, and afforded a colour for detaining the troops.

One of the leading Polygars in the Northern Circars,
 fixing his eye upon the advantages which he might expect
 to derive from giving a new master to the provinces, com-
 municated to the English in Bengal his desires to co-ope-
 rate with them in driving out the French, while Bussy was
 involved in a struggle with the brothers of the Subahdar.
 The brilliancy of the exploit had no feeble attractions for
 the imagination of Clive; and after the recall of Bussy to
 Pondicherry, he imparted his intentions to the Council.
 The project met with unanimous condemnation.² But
 Clive, disregarding all opposition, prepared his armament.
 It consisted of 500 Europeans, 2000 Sepoys, and 100 Las-
 cars, with six field-pieces, six battering cannon, one howitzer,
 and one eight-inch mortar. This expedition, commanded
 by Colonel Forde, was destined to proceed by sea; but
 the altercations in the council, which the disapprobation
 of the measure produced, and the delays which occurred
 in the equipment of the ships, retarded its departure till
 the end of September.³

¹ Orme says (ii. 363), "Clive did not entertain a surmise that it would be taken whilst it had provisions." But Clive himself says (Report, *ut supra*), "Nothing saved Madras from sharing the fate of Fort St. David, but their [the French] want of money, which gave time for strengthening and reinforcing the place."

² Orme only says (ii. 364), "The measure was too vigorous to be acceptable to all the members of the council." But Clive himself says (Report, *ut supra*), that he undertook it, "contrary to the inclination of his *whole* council."

³ Orme, ii. 269—287, and 352—363; Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 4—24.

On the 20th of October Colonel Forde disembarked at Vizagapatam, and joined his troops with those of the Raja Anunderauz; at whose instigation the exploit was undertaken. It was expected, that this chief would afford money for the maintenance of the troops; and hence but a small supply of that necessary article was brought from Bengal. The Raja was in the usual state of Rajas, Nabobs, Subahdars, and Emperors in India; he was reputed by the English immensely rich, while in reality he was miserably poor: he was, therefore, not very able to provide the sums expected from him; and still less willing. The delays by which he contrived to elude the importunities of the English were highly provoking; and by retarding their movements, threatened to deprive them of all the great advantages of rapidity and surprise. A sort of treaty was at last concluded by which it was agreed that, excepting the seaports, and towns at the mouths of the rivers, the conquered country should all be given up to Anunderauz, upon the condition of his advancing a certain monthly sum for the maintenance of the troops.

M. Conflans, who had been sent to command the French troops upon the recall of Bussy, had concentrated his forces about Rajamundri; towards which the English and the Raja directed their march. The force, which remained under the command of Conflans, after the departure of the troops which were recalled with Bussy, was still considerably superior to that which had arrived with the English; but when the troops for other services were deducted, he took the field against the English with numbers nearly equal. A battle was brought on; and the French were completely defeated; they were not only stripped of their camp, but fled from Rajamundri.

During the battle, the Raja and his troops remained cowering in the hollow of a dry tank, which protected them from shot. After the battle all his operations were tardy; what was worse, no money could be extracted from him; all the cash which had been brought from Bengal was expended; and during fifty days, when advantage might have been taken of the want of preparation on the part of the enemy, and of the dejection arising from their defeat, the English were unable to move. At last, by a new arrangement, a small sum was obtained from the Raja;

BOOK IV.

CHAP. V.

1759.

BOOK IV. the troops were put in motion, and on the 6th of February
 CHAP. V. arrived at Ellore or Yalore, where they were joined by the
 ——— Zemindar or chief of the district.

1759. Conflans had no longer confidence to meet the English in the field, but withdrew to defend himself in Masulipatam, the principal fort, and principal station of the French, on that part of the coast; while he urged the Subahdar of the Deccan to march to the defence of his own territories, the French being occupants under his authority, and subject to his law, while the English intended to wrest the country wholly from his hands. The views of the courtiers of the Subahdar happened at the moment to coincide with his own wishes to preserve for himself the protection of the French, and he put his army in motion towards Masulipatam.

This prevented not the English commander from hastening to attack the place. He arrived on the 6th of March. The French treated his pretensions with ridicule. Masulipatam, for an Indian town, and against Indian means of attack, was of no inconsiderable strength. The defenders within were more numerous than the besiegers. A considerable army of observation was left in the field. The Subahdar, with the grand army of the Deccan, was on the march; and a reinforcement of Europeans was expected from Pondicherry. A sum of money for the English had arrived from Bengal; but the French army of observation rendered it dangerous, or rather impracticable, to send it to the camp. The English troops mutinied for want of pay; and it was with much difficulty, and by large promises, that they were induced to resume the discharge of their duty.

Three batteries continued a hot fire on three different parts of the town, without having effected any considerable damage, from the 25th of March to the 6th of April, when the situation of the English began to wear a very threatening aspect. Salabut Jung was approaching; the French army of observation had retaken Rajamundri, and might effect a junction with the Subahdar; it was impossible for the English now to retreat by the way which they had come, or even to embark at Masulipatam with their cannon and heavy stores; the monsoon had begun; the reinforcement from Pondicherry was expected; and to

crown all, the engineers reported that no more than two days' ammunition for the batteries remained unconsumed. In these circumstances, however apparently desperate, Colonel Forde resolved to try the chance of an assault. The batteries were directed to play with the utmost activity during the whole of the day ; and the troops to be under arms at ten at night. The attack, in order to divide the attention of the enemy, and render uncertain the point of danger, was to be in three places at once ; and the three divisions of the army were to be on their respective grounds exactly at midnight. The struggle was expected to be severe ; from the superior numbers of the enemy, and the little damage which the works had sustained. A part of the army faltered considerably ; nor did all the officers meet the danger with perfect composure. They got, however, within the walls with comparative ease ; where, being met by superior forces, they might have paid dear for their temerity, had not surprise aided their arms, and had not M. Confians confounded by uncertainty, and by various and exaggerated reports, after a short resistance, surrendered the place.

Within one week two ships appeared with a reinforcement of 300 troops from Pondicherry. The Subahdar, whose arrival had been anticipated but a very few days by the fall of Masulipatam, found himself in circumstances ill calculated to carry on by himself a war against the English. He was anxious on the other hand, being now deprived of the French, to cultivate a friendship with the English, and to obtain from them a body of troops, to protect him against the dangerous ambition of his brother Nizam Ali, who, since the departure of Bussy, had returned at the head of a considerable body of troops, and filled him with serious alarm. Colonel Forde repaired to his camp, where he was received with great distinction, and concluded a treaty, by which a considerable territory about Masulipatam was ceded to the English, and the Subahdar engaged to allow no French settlement for the future to exist in his dominions. The French army of observation, which it was by the same treaty stipulated, should cross the Kistna in fifteen days, joined the army of Bassalut Jung, the elder brother of the Subahdar, who had accompanied him on the expedition to the Northern Circars,

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.
1759.

BOOK IV. and now marched away to the south. The two ships which
 CHAP. V. had brought the reinforcement from Pondicherry, upon
 1759. discovering the loss of Masulipatam, sailed away to the
 north, and landed the troops at Ganjam. They made several efforts to render some useful service, but entirely fruitless; and after enduring a variety of privations, returned greatly reduced in numbers to Pondicherry.¹

While the detachment from the army of Bengal was engaged in these operations, the solicitude of Clive was attracted by an enemy of high pretensions in a different quarter. Toward the close of the history of the Mogul Emperors, it appeared, that the eldest son of the Emperor Aulumgeer II., not daring to trust himself in the hands of the Vizir, the daring Umad al Mulk, by whom the emperor was held in a state of wretched servitude, had withdrawn into the district of Nujeeb ad Dowla, the Rohilla, who was an opponent of the Vizir, and a partisan of the Imperial family. At this time, the revolution effected by the English in Bengal, the unpopularity and disorders of Jaffier's administration, and the presumed weakness of his government, excited hopes in the neighbouring chiefs, that an invasion of his territories might be turned to advantage. The imagination of Mohammed Koollee Khan, the Subahdar of Allahabad, was the most highly elevated by the prospect of sharing in the spoils of the English Nabob. He was instigated by two powerful Zemindars, the Rajas, Sunder Sing, and Bulwant Sing. And the Nabob of Oude, his near kinsman, one of the most powerful chiefs in Hindustan, joined with apparent ardour in the design. The Nabob of Oude entertained a double purpose; that of obtaining, if any thing was to be seized, as great a share as possible of Bahar or Bengal; and that of watching his opportunity, while his ally and kinsman was intent upon his expected acquisitions, to seize by force or stratagem the fort of Allahabad. The influence of the imperial name appeared to them of no small importance in the war with Jaffier; and as the prince, who had fled into Rohilcund, was soliciting them for protection, it was agreed to place him ostensibly at the head of the enterprise. Preparations were made; and the Prince, having obtained from the Emperor legal investiture, as Subahdar of Bengal,

¹ Orme, ii. 375—380, 472—491, 554; Wilks, p. 401.

Bahar, and Orissa, crossed the Carumnassa, a river which bounds the province of Bahar, towards the conclusion of the year 1758. From the exhaustion of the treasury when Jaffier was raised to the government, the great sums which he had paid to the English, the difficulty of extracting money from the people, his own negligent and wasteful administration, and the cruel and brutal character of his son Meeran, Jaffier was ill-prepared to meet a formidable invasion. From his own rabble of ill-paid and mutinous soldiers, he was obliged to turn, and place all his hopes of safety in the bravery and skill of the English, whom, before the news of this impending danger, he had been plotting to expel. The English appear to have had no foresight of such an event. By the absence of the troops in the Northern Circars, their force was so inconsiderable, and both they and Jaffier needed so much time to prepare, that had the invaders proceeded with tolerable expedition and skill, they might have gained, without difficulty, the whole province of Bahar. A blow like this, at so critical a period, would have shaken to such a degree the tottering government of Jaffier, that the incipient power of the English might have despaired of restoring it; and a momentary splendour might again have surrounded the throne of the Moguls.

The march of the Prince and his confederates towards Patna placed Ramnarain the Governor between two dreadful fires. To Jaffier he neither felt, nor owed attachment. But, joining the prince, he risked every thing, if Jaffier should succeed; adhering to Jaffier, he risked as much, if the prince should succeed. The situation was calculated to exercise Hindu duplicity and address. An application to Mr. Amyatt, the chief of the English factory, was the first of his steps; from whom as he could receive no protection, he expected such latitude of advice, as would afford a colour to any measures he might find it agreeable to pursue. It happened as he foresaw. Mr. Amyatt informing him that the English would remain at Patna, if assistance should arrive; if not, would retire from the danger; frankly and sincerely instructed him, to amuse the prince as long as possible; but if all hopes of succour should fail, to provide for himself as events might direct. Ramnarain studied to conduct himself in such a manner as to be able

BOOK IV.

CHAP. V.

1759.

BOOK IV. to join with the greatest advantage the party for whom
 CHAP. V. fortune should declare. He wrote to Bengal importuning
 1759. for succour; and he at the same privately sent a messenger
 to propitiate the Prince. He was even induced, when the
 English of the factory had retired down the river, to pay
 him a visit in his camp; and the troops of the Prince
 might have entered Patna along with him. The oppor-
 tunity however was lost; and the observations which the
 Hindu made upon the Prince's camp and upon the coun-
 cils which guided him, induced him to shut the gates of
 the city when he returned, and to prepare for defence.

The hardihood of Clive was seldom overcome by scruples. Yet the Emperor Aulumgeer was legitimate sovereign of Bengal; and had undoubted right to appoint his eldest son to be his deputy in the government of that province. To oppose him, was undisguised rebellion.¹ The English forces, a slender band, marched to Moorshedabad, and being joined by the best part of Jaffier's troops, commanded by Meeran, they advanced towards Patna; where Ramnarain had amused the prince by messages and overtures as long as possible, and afterwards opposed him. Though the attack was miserably conducted, a breach was made, and the courage and resources of Ramnarain would have been soon exhausted; when intelligence reached the camp, that the Subahdar of Oude, who was on his march with an army under pretence of joining the prince, had treacherously seized the fortress of Allahabad. Mohammed Koollee Khan, by whom the prince's affairs were conducted, and whose forces were his

¹ The prince, Holwell assures us (*Memorial*, p. 2), repeatedly offered to grant the English their own terms, if they would assist him in recovering his rights. On what side justice lay, is evident enough. On what side policy, whether on that which Clive rejected, or that which he chose, is a more subtle inquiry.—M.

It was not a question of policy, but one of good faith. By the treaty with Mir Jaffier, as well as by the nature of their connexion with him,—the English were pledged to assist him against all enemies whatever, and few of the Governors of the Provinces would have scrupled to consider the Emperor as an enemy if he had sought to dispossess them of their Subahs. Even, however, if the theory of obedience to a monarch, who at the very seat of Empire was no longer his own master, could be urged with any show of reason, it would not be applicable in the present instance, for the Shah-zada was not appointed by the Emperor to be his deputy in Bengal, and as Clive pleaded to the Prince himself, no communication of his movements or purposes had been made from Delhi. On the contrary the Prince was there treated as a rebel to his father. He could not plead, therefore, the Emperor's authority for his incursion, and no other pretext could have afforded him the semblance even of right. *Life of Clive*, i. 406.—W.

entire support, resolved to march immediately for the recovery or protection of his own dominions; and though he was joined at four miles' distance from the city by M. Law, who had hastened from Chutterpore with his handful of Frenchmen, and importuned him to return to Patna, of which he engaged to put him in possession in two days, the infatuated Nabob continued his march, and being persuaded by the Subahdar of Oude to throw himself upon his generosity, was first made a prisoner, and afterwards put to death.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.
1759.

When Clive and Meeran approached, the enemy had already departed from Patna; and the unhappy prince, the descendant of so many illustrious sovereigns, the legal Subahdar of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, and the undoubted heir of the throne, once among the loftiest of the globe, was so bereft of friends and resources, that he was induced to write a letter to Clive, requesting a sum of money for his subsistence, and offering in requital to withdraw from the province. Upon these easy terms was Clive, by his good fortune, enabled to extricate himself from a situation of considerable difficulty. Ramnarain obtained, or it was convenient to grant him, credit for fidelity; the Zemindars who had joined the prince hastened to make their peace; and Clive returned to Calcutta in the month of June.¹

This was a fortunate expedition for Clive. So unbounded was the gratitude of Jaffier, that after obtaining for his defender the rank of an Omrah of the empire, he bestowed upon him, under the title of Jaghire, the whole of the revenue or rent which the Company in quality of Zemindar, were bound to pay for the territory which they held round Calcutta. The grant amounted to the enormous sum of 30,000*l.* per annum. "Clive's Jaghire" is an expression of frequent recurrence, and of considerable weight in the History of India.

The Shazada (such was the title by which the eldest son of the Mogul was then distinguished in Bengal) was thus fortunately repulsed, and Colonel Forde with his troops was no less fortunately returned from the south,

¹ Scott's History of Bengal, p. 379—391; Seer Mutakhareen, vol. ii. part ii. p. 42—49; Franklin's Shah Aulum, p. 8—11; First Report of the Select Committee in 1772; Holwell's Memorial, p. 2.—M.

To these may be added Life of Clive, in which Ramnarain's conduct is very differently represented, i. 410.—W.

BOOK IV. when the English were alarmed by the news of a great
CHAP. V. armament, fitted out by the Dutch at Batavia, and destined
1759. for Bengal. The Dutch were not then at war with England, and being excited to cupidity by the lofty reports of the rich harvest lately reaped by the English in Bengal, possibly aimed at no more than a share of the same advantages, or to balance before its irresistible ascendancy the increasing power of their rivals. They had received encouragement from Jaffier ; but that ruler, since the invasion of the Mogul prince, felt so powerfully his dependence on the English, that when called upon by the English for the use of his authority and power, he durst not decline. In the month of August a Dutch ship arrived in the river, filled with troops ; and this was speedily followed by six more, the whole having on board 700 Europeans, and 800 Malays. To attack without provocation the ships or troops of a nation in friendship with this country, was not regarded by Clive as less than a hazardous step. The advantages, however, of standing without a rival in Bengal, outweighed his apprehensions ; he obtained an order of the Subahdar, commanding the Dutch to leave the river ; and, under pretence of seconding his authority, resolved upon hostilities. The seven ships ascended the river as far as a few miles below Calcutta, and landed their troops, which were thence to march to the Dutch factory at Chinsura. Clive detached Colonel Forde with a force, consisting of 300 Europeans, 800 Sepoys, and about 150 of Jaffier's Cavalry, to intercept them ; and at the same time commanded three of the Company's ships, fitted out and manned for the purpose, to attack the Dutch East Indiamen. Colonel Forde, by the dexterity and success of his exploit, converted it into one of the most brilliant incidents of the war ; and of the 700 Europeans, not above fourteen were enabled to reach Chinsura, the rest being either taken prisoners, or slain. The attack upon the ships was equally successful ; after an engagement of two hours, six of them were taken, and the seventh was intercepted by two English ships which lay further down the river. After this heavy blow the Dutch, to prevent their total expulsion from Bengal, were contented to put themselves in the wrong, by paying the expenses of the war ; and the irregularity of his inter-

ference made Clive well pleased to close the dispute, by restoring to the Dutch their ships, with all the treasure and effects. The agreement with the Dutch was ratified on the 5th of December ; and Clive, who for some months had been meditating return with his fortune to Europe, resigned the government early in February, and sailed from Calcutta.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1760.

He left not the country in peace. Meeran, before he departed from Patna, the preceding year, had sown the seeds of a future war. He treated with injustice some officers of considerable rank and influence ; and no sooner was he gone, than a confederacy was formed between them and some neighbouring Zemindars to support the Shazada in a fresh invasion. Intelligence of their designs had reached Calcutta before the contest with the Dutch was decided. And the Nabob of Poorania, whom Meeran had already endeavoured to cut off by treachery, had taken the field, and was expected to join the Mogul prince.

Colonel Calliaud had been called from the Carnatic to take the command of the forces in Bengal, when Clive and Forde, who meditated simultaneous departure, should sail for Europe. He arrived with a reinforcement of troops towards the end of November ; and it was necessary that he should proceed to stop the menaced invasion without a moment's delay. He left Calcutta with a detachment of 300 Europeans, 1000 Sepoys, and fifty artillery-men, with six pieces of cannon, and arrived at Moorshedabad on the 26th of December. He was joined by Clive on the 6th of January, who, having made his arrangements with the Subahdar, or Nabob, set out after a week for Calcutta. Calliaud, being joined by 15,000 horse and foot, and twenty-five pieces of cannon, of the Nabob, under command of Meeran, resumed his march on the 18th.

In the meantime, the Mahrattas, who had been incited by the Vizir, Umad al mulk, to invade the provinces of Oude and Rohilcund, had been defeated and obliged to fly ; while the powerful King of the Abdallees was again

¹ First Report from the Select Committee in 1772 ; Holwell's Memorial ; Calliaud's Narrative. The author of the *Scer Mutakbareen* wonders greatly what could be the reason of Clive's quitting the government ; a sentiment very natural to him, who well understood the pleasures of governing ; but could not so easily conceive the passion of an Englishman to see lodged a princely fortune in his own country.

BOOK IV. on his march for the invasion of Hindustan. Excited by
 CHAP. V. the approach of formidable danger, the Vizir, in a fit of
 1760. exasperation or despair, ordered the murder of the Emperor, the wretched Aulamgeer; and the news of this tragical event reached the Shazada, just as he had passed the Carumnassa into the province of Bahar. He was advised to assume immediately the state and title of Emperor; to confer the office of Vizir upon Shuja-ad-dowla, the Nabob of Oude, and to confirm Nujeeb-ad-dowla in the office of Amder ul Omrah. The majesty of the imperial throne, and his undoubted title, had an influence still upon the minds of men. It was now clear and immediate rebellion to resist him; and whatever guilt could be involved in making war upon their rightful sovereign, must be incurred by those who carried arms against him. The English had already familiarized themselves with the idea of rebellion in India; and the consideration of legitimate sovereignty, though the sovereign would have purchased their protection by unlimited grants, appears not to have excited a scruple in a single breast. The new dignity, however, of Vizir, called upon the Nabob of Oude for some exertions in favour of his sovereign; and the fascination of the imperial title was still of force to collect around him a considerable army.¹

The march of the English was retarded by the necessity of settling terms with the Nabob of Poorania, who had encamped on the left bank of the river between Moorshedabad and Patna, and professed a desire of remaining obedient to Jaffier, provided the English would engage for his security. This negotiation wasted seven days; and in the meantime the Emperor advanced towards Patna. Ramnarain, whom the sagacity of Aliverdi had selected to be deputy Governor of Bahar, on account of his skill in matters of finance, was destitute of military talents; and considering his situation, under the known hatred of Jaffier, as exceedingly precarious, he was unwilling to lay out any of the wealth he had acquired, in providing for the defence of the country. He was still enabled to draw forth a respectable army, reinforced by seventy Europeans and a battalion of English sepoy, commanded by Lieu-

¹ It is stated at 60,000 men by Callaud (Narrative of what happened in Bengal in 1760, p. 7); but this we conceive is an exaggerated conjecture.

tenant Cochrane ; and he encamped under the walls, with a view to cover the city. He had received by letter the strongest injunctions from Calliaud, on no account to hazard a battle till Meeran and he should arrive. An action, however, took place ; the army of Ramnarain was attacked with impetuosity ; some of his officers behaved with treachery ; his troops were giving way on all sides ; and he himself was dangerously pressed ; when he sent an importunate request to the English for immediate assistance. The Lieutenant had advised him at the beginning of the action to place himself, for the security of his person, near the English battalion ; an advice with which his vanity did not permit him to comply. That officer marched to his relief without a moment's delay ; but he imprudently divided his handful of troops ; they were unable to withstand the force of numbers : all the European officers of the Sepoys fell, when the Sepoys dispersed and were cut to pieces. The English, who remained alive, resolved to fight their way to the city ; and such was the awe and terror which the sight of their courage inspired, that the enemy, not daring to resist, opened instantly to the right and left, and allowed them to retire.¹

Had the troops of the Emperor pushed on with vigour, immediately after this victory, when Ramnarain was

¹ The remarks of the Mogul nobleman, who was in Patna at the moment of the action, are amusing at least. "What remained of their people," he says, "was rallied by Doctor William Fullerton, a friend of mine, and possibly by some English officers whose names I know not, who ranged them in order again ; and as one of their guns was to be left on the field of battle, they found means to render it useless and of no avail, by thrusting a large needle of iron into its eye. The other being in good condition, they took it with them, together with its ammunition ; and that handful of men had the courage to retire in the face of a victorious enemy with at once shrinking from their ranks. During their journey, the cart of ammunition chanced to receive some damage ; the Doctor stopped unconcernedly, and after having put it in order, he bravely pursued his route again ; and it must be acknowledged, that this nation's presence of mind, firmness of temper, and undaunted bravery, are past all question. They join the most resolute courage to the most cautious prudence ; nor have they their equals in the art of ranging themselves in battle array, and fighting in order. If to so many military qualifications they knew how to join the arts of government ; if they showed a concern for the circumstances of the husbandman and the gentleman, and exerted as much ingenuity and solicitude in relieving and easing the people of God, as they do in whatever concerns their military affairs, no nation in the world would be preferable to them, or prove worthier of command. But such is the little regard which they show to the people of these kingdoms, and such their apathy and indifference for their welfare, that the people under their dominion groan everywhere, and are reduced to poverty and distress. Oh God ! come to the assistance of thine afflicted servants, and deliver them from the oppressions they suffer." *Seer Mutakhareen*, ii. 101.

BOOK IV. severely wounded, his army panic-struck and dispersed, and the city without defenders, they might have taken Patna with the greatest ease. But they employed themselves in ravaging the open country, and in receiving messengers and overtures from Ramnarain till the 19th of February, when they learned that Meeran and the English were distant from them but twenty-eight miles. The resolution was taken to march and engage them; the next day the two armies approached. Colonel Calliaud urged immediate attack; but Meeran and his astrologers found that the stars would not be favourable before the 22nd. Early on the morning of that day, Calliaud was in motion; but before he could reach the enemy the day was so far spent, "by the insufferable delays," as he himself complains, "of Meeran's march," that, wishing to have time before him, he was unwilling to engage till the following morning. The enemy, however, advanced, and Calliaud drew up his men between two villages which covered both his flanks, advising Meeran to form a second line, the whole of which, except the two wings, would have been covered by the English and the villages. But though this was agreed upon, "he crowded his army upon the right, and, in spite of the most pressing and repeated solicitations, presented to battle a body of 15,000 men, with a front of scarcely 200 yards in a tumultuous unformed heap." With a feigned appearance of directing the main attack upon the English, the enemy advanced with the best part of their army against Meeran, who in about ten minutes began to give way. Colonel Calliaud, however, marched with a battalion of Sepoys to his aid, and immediately decided the fate of the day. The Sepoys drew up within forty yards upon the enemy's flank, and having poured in a couple of fires, advanced with the bayonet, when the enemy recoiled upon one another, and fell into confusion, and, being charged with Meeran's cavalry, dispersed and fled. Calliaud was eager to pursue, but Meeran, who had received a trifling wound in the battle, preferred an interval of ease and pleasure at Patna. He would not even permit the service to be performed without him; and though Calliaud offered to proceed with his own troops alone, if only a few horse, which he earnestly entreated, were granted him, he found all he could urge without avail.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. V.

1760.

The Emperor fled the same night to Bahar, a town about ten miles from the field of battle. Here a measure of great promise suggested itself: to leave Meeran and the English behind: and, marching with the utmost expedition to Bengal, surprise Moorshedabad, and take the Nabob prisoner. It was the 29th of the month before Meeran could be prevailed upon to abandon the indulgences of Patna; when he and the English marched towards Bahar, and were surprised to learn that the enemy had already performed two marches towards Bengal. The strongest motives pressed for despatch: the English embarked in boats, and along with Meeran's cavalry in three days overtook the foe, who adopted a bold and politic resolution. No longer able to proceed along the river, the Emperor directed his march across the mountains; and Calliaud still resolved to follow his steps. The route was long and difficult, and it was near the end of March before the Emperor emerged on the plains of Bengal, about thirty miles west from Moorshedabad. During this interval, intelligence was in sufficient time received by Jaffier to enable him to collect an army and obtain a body of 200 Europeans from Calcutta: but the Emperor was joined by a body of Mahrattas, who had lately broken into that part of the country; and had he rapidly attacked the Nabob, he still enjoyed, in the opinion of Calliaud, the fairest prospect of success. But he lingered till Meeran and the English joined the Nabob on the 4th of April; and on the 7th, when they advanced to attack him, he set fire to his camp and fled. Calliaud again urged for cavalry to pursue, and again was absolutely refused.

One object of hope was even yet reserved to the Emperor. By the precipitation with which his pursuers had followed him, Patna was left in a miserable state of defence. Could he return with expedition, and anticipate the arrival of succour, it must fall into his hands. At this very time M. Law, with his small body of Frenchmen, passing that capital, to join the Emperor, who had again invited him from Chitterpore, threw it into the greatest alarm. It was almost entirely destitute of the means of defence; but Law was ignorant of its situation, and proceeded to Bahar, to wait for the Emperor. At this time the Naib of Poo-
rania took off the mask, espousing openly the cause of the

BOOK IV. Emperor ; and had he seized the present opportunity of
 CHAP. V. marching to Patna, nothing could have prevented it from
 1760. falling into his hands. The exertions, however, of Ram-
 narain, and of the gentlemen of the English factory, had
 collected, before the Emperor was able to arrive, a suffi-
 cient body of defenders to secure the city against the first
 impression ; and Colonel Calliaud, who foresaw the danger,
 formed a detachment of 200 chosen Europeans, and a bat-
 talion of Sepoys, of which he gave the command to Captain
 Knox, and commanded them to march with the utmost
 expedition to Patna. The Emperor had lost no time in
 commencing the siege ; and after several days of vigorous
 operation, during which Mr. Fullerton, the English Sur-
 geon, and Raja Shitabroy, had distinguished themselves
 peculiarly within the walls, Law attempted an assault.
 Though repulsed, he, in two days, renewed the attempt ;
 and, part of the wall being demolished, the rampart was
 scaled. The enemy were still compelled to retire ; but
 the city was now thrown into the greatest alarm ; a re-
 newed assault was expected the following night ; and
 scarcely a hope was entertained of its being withstood ;
 when Captain Knox, with a flying party, was seen ap-
 proaching the walls. He had performed the march from
 Moorshedabad to Patna, under the burning heat of a Bengal
 sun, in the extraordinary space of thirteen days, himself
 marching on foot, as an example and encouragement to
 the men. That very night the Captain reconnoitred the
 enemy's camp in person ; and next day, watching the
 hour of afternoon's repose, surprised them when asleep,
 and drove them from their works, to which they never
 returned.

While the Emperor, conscious of his weakness, with-
 drew to the neighbourhood of Teekaury, waiting the result
 of his applications to the Abdallee Shah, who was now
 commanding, from the ancient seat of the Mogul govern-
 ment, the whole of the upper provinces of Hindustan, the
 Naib or Deputy Governor of Poorania had collected his
 army, and was on the march to join him. To counteract
 his designs, the English army under Calliaud, and that of
 Jaffier under Meeran, rendezvoused at Raje-mahl, on the
 23d of May. They moved upwards on the one side of the
 river, the Naib advancing on the other ; and orders were

forwarded to Captain Knox to cross over from Patna, and harass his march till the main army should arrive ; while his boats, which were not able to ascend the river so fast as he marched, were overtaken and seized. Captain Knox amazed the inhabitants of Patna by declaring his resolution, as soon as the enemy appeared, of crossing the river with his handful of men and giving them battle. Part of Ramnarain's troops were placed under his command ; but as the enterprise appeared to them an act of madness, they formed a determined resolution to have no share in it. Raja Shitabroy having between two and three hundred men in his pay, with whom he had performed important services in the defence of Patna, joined the Captain with a real disposition to act. Two hundred Europeans, one battalion of Sepoys, five field-pieces, and about 300 horse, marched to engage an army of 12,000 men, with thirty pieces of cannon. Arrived within a few miles of the enemy, Knox proceeded in the dark to the quarters of Shitabroy, to communicate his design of surprising the enemy's camp during the night : he found that gallant associate fully prepared to second his ardour ; the troops were allowed a few hours for repose ; and a little after midnight they began to march. The guide having missed his way from the darkness of the night, they wandered till within two hours of day-break, and having lost the time for attacking the enemy by surprise, abandoned the design. They had laid down their arms, and prepared themselves for a little repose, when the vanguard of the enemy appeared. The gallantry of Knox allowed not a moment's hesitation. He took his ground with skill ; and though completely surrounded by the enemy, repulsed them at every point ; sustained a conflict of six hours, in which Shitabroy fought with the greatest activity and resolution ; and having compelled them at last to quit the field, pursued them till night.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1760.

¹ The author of the *Seer Mutakhareen*, who had a distant view of the battle from the walls of Patna, describes, with much effect, the alternation of hopes and fears which agitated the inhabitants, as the various reports of the battle reached the city, or the tokens which came to their eyes and their ears were variously interpreted. At last, he says, " when the day was far spent, a note came to Mr. Amyatt from Captain Knox, which mentioned that the enemy was defeated and flying. This intelligence was sent to all the principal men of the city, and caused a deal of joy. I went to the factory to compliment the gentlemen, when in the dusk of the evening Captain Knox himself crossed over, and

BOOK IV. In consequence of this defeat, the Naib postponed his resolution of joining the Emperor, and marched toward the north. In a few days Calliaud and Meeran crossed the Ganges to pursue him, and, as his army was encumbered with baggage and artillery, soon overtook him. He immediately formed his line, as if to engage; but unloading the treasure, and the most valuable part of the baggage, putting it upon camels and elephants; and skirmishing only till the English came up, he marched away with great expedition, leaving his heavy baggage and artillery behind.¹ The rains were now set in with unusual violence, yet Calliaud, animated by the reports of the rich treasure (the English were credulous on the subject of treasure) which the Naib carried in his train, resolved to make the utmost exertions to overtake him before he could reach the forests and mountains. The pursuit had been continued four days, when during the night of the 2nd of July, which proved exceedingly tempestuous, the tent of Meeran was struck with lightning, and he, with all his attendants, was killed on the spot. The death of their leader is, to an Indian army, the signal to disband. The probability of this event, which would deliver the province of Bahar into the hands of the Emperor, struck the English commander with the utmost alarm. His whole attention was now occupied in keeping the army together till re-conducted to Patna, toward which he marched with

CHAP. V.

1760.

came with Shitabroy in his company. They were both covered with dust and sweat. The Captain then gave some detail of the battle, and paid the great encomiums on Shitabroy's zeal, activity, and valour. He exclaimed several times, 'This is a real Nawab; I never saw such a Nawab in my life.' A few moments after, Ramnarain was introduced. He had in his company both Mustapha Koollee Khan, and the Cutwal of the city, with some other men; consequence, who, on hearing of the arrival of these two men, had flocked to the factory; and on seeing them alone, could not help believing that they had escaped from the slaughter; so far were they from conceiving that a few hundreds of men could defeat a whole army. Nor could they be made to believe (impressed as they were with Hindu notions) that a commander could quit his army so unconcernedly, unless he had indeed run away from it: no would listen to what Mr. Amyatt repeatedly said, to convince Ramnarain of others of their mistake." *Seer Mutakhareen*, ii. 123.

¹ Calliaud, on this occasion, too, complains heavily of Meeran: "The young Nabob and his troops behaved in this skirmish in their usual manner, halting above a mile in the rear, nor ever once made a motion to sustain the English. Had he but acted on this occasion with the least appearance of spirit, and made even a semblance of fighting, the affair must have proved decisive; no could Cuddum Houssein Khan or his treasure have escaped." Calliaud's Narrative, p. 34.

all possible expedition ; and distributed the troops in winter quarters on the 29th of July.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1760.

The political affairs of the province were hastening to another crisis. The government of Jaffier was in a state approaching to dissolution. The English Presidency was distressed by want of pecuniary resources, and the seeds of violent discords were sown in the council.

When Jaffier got possession of the viceroyalty by the lethronement and death of his master Suraj-ad-dowla, and when the English leaders were grasping the advantages which the revolution placed in their hands, both parties, dazzled with first appearances, overlooked the consequences which necessarily ensued. The cupidity natural to mankind, and the credulity with which they believe what flatters their desires, made the English embrace, without deduction, the exaggerations of Oriental rhetoric on the riches of India ; and believe that a country which they saw was one of the poorest, was nevertheless the most opulent upon the surface of the globe. The sums which had been obtained from Jaffier were now wholly expended. "The idea of provision for the future," to use the words of a governor, "seemed to have been lost in the apparent immensity of the sum stipulated for compensation of the Company's losses at Calcutta." No rational foresight was applied, as the same observer remarks, to the increased expenditure which the new connexion with the government of the country naturally produced ; and soon it appeared that no adequate provision was made for it. "In less than two years it was found necessary to take up money at interest, although large sums had been received besides for bills upon the court of Directors."² The situation of Jaffier was deplorable from the first. With an

¹ On the history of this second invasion of the Mogul Prince, see Scott's Hist. of Bengal, p. 392—397 ; Seer Mutakhareen, ii. 91—139 ; Calliaud's Narrative of what happened in Bengal in 1760, p. 1—36 ; Calliaud's Evidence before the Committee of 1772 ; Calliaud's Letters in Holwell's Tracts, p. 27 ; Franklin's Shah Aulum, p. 12.

² Vansittart's Narrative, i. 19, 22. The distress at home, created by these bills, was not inferior to what was endured in India. "The funds of the Company in Europe," says the same unquestionable authority, "were not sufficient to pay the bills when they became due ; and it is a fact well known upon the Royal Exchange, that, in the year 1758, the Directors prevailed, not without difficulty, upon the bill-holders, to grant a further time for the payment of their bills ; if this accommodation had failed, the consequence would have been what I need not name." A Letter to the Proprietors of the East India Stock, from Mr. Henry Vansittart, p. 13.

BOOK IV. exhausted treasury, an exhausted country, and vast engagements to discharge, he was urged to the severest :
 CHAP. V. exactions ; while the profusion with which he wasted his
 1760. treasure upon his own person, and some unworthy favourites, was ill calculated to soothe the wretched people, under the privations to which they were compelled. The cruelties of which he and Meeran were guilty, made them objects of general detestation : the negligence, disorder, and weakness of their government, exposed them to contempt : and their troops, always mutinous from the length of their arrears, threatened them every moment with fatal extremities. When the news arrived at Moorshedabad of the death of Meeran, the troops surrounded the palace, scaled the walls, and threatened the Nabob with instant death ; nor were they, in all probability, prevented from executing their menaces, otherwise than by the interference of Meer Casim, his son-in-law, who, on promise of succeeding to the place and prospects of Meeran, discharged a part of their arrears from his own treasury, and induced them to accept of Jaffier's engagements to pay the whole within a limited time.

When Clive resigned the government of Bengal, instead of leaving the elevation to the chair in the established order of succession, his influence was successfully exerted to procure the nomination of Mr. Vansittart, who was called from Madras. Mr. Holwell, on whose pretensions there had been violent debates in the Court of Directors, was promoted to the office in virtue of his seniority, till July, when Mr. Vansittart arrived. The new governor found the treasury at Calcutta empty, the English troops at Patna on the very brink of mutiny, and deserting in multitudes for want of pay ; the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay totally dependent upon Bengal for pecuniary resources ; the provision of an investment actually suspended ; the income of the Company scarcely sufficient for the current expenses of Calcutta : the allowance paid by the Nabob for the troops several months in arrear ; and the attainment of that, as well as of a large balance upon his first agreements, totally hopeless. Some change by which the revenue of the Company could be placed on a level with their expenditure, was indispensable.¹ They

¹ The necessity of an increased expenditure, and the total want of funds for defraying it, under the arrangements of Clive, is satisfactorily defended

might retire from all concern with the government of the country, and protect themselves with the protection of Calcutta, for which a small body of troops and a small expenditure would suffice. But not to speak of the golden hopes which had been so fondly cherished, fears suggested themselves (fears when they favour wishes are potent counsellors) that the place which the Company might resign in directing the government of the country would be occupied by the French or the Dutch. From the administration of Jaffier, resigned as he was to a set of unworthy favourites—old, indolent, voluptuous, estranged from the English, and without authority—no other consequences were to be expected, than those which had already been experienced. From a strong sense of the incurable vices of Jaffier and his family, Mr. Holwell, during the few months of his administration, had advised the council to abandon him; and, embracing the just cause of the Emperor, to avail themselves of the high offers which that deserted monarch was ready to make. An idea, however, of fidelity to the connexion which they had formed, though with a subject in rebellion to his king, prevailed in the breasts of the council; and a middle course was chosen. Of all the members of Jaffier's family, whose remaining sons were young, Meer Casim, the husband of his daughter, who passed for a man of talents, appeared the only person endowed with qualities adapted to the present exigencies of the government. It was agreed that all the active powers of administration should be placed in his hands; Jaffier not being dethroned in name, but only in reality. A treaty was concluded with Meer Casim on the 17th of September. He agreed, in return for the powers thus placed in his hands, to assign to the Company the revenues of the three districts of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, to pay the balance due by Jaffier, and a present of five lacks for the war in the Carnatic. On the 2d of October, Mr. Vansittart, accompanied by Colonel Calliaud and a detachment of troops, proceeded to Moorshedabad to persuade or to compel the Nabob to accede to the arrangements which had been formed. Jaffier discovered intense reluctance;

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1760.

BOOK IV. and Mr. Vansittart wavered. Meer Casim, who could be
 CHAP. V. safe no longer in the power of Jaffier, exclaimed against
 1760. the perfidy of making and not fulfilling an engagement
 such as that which was contracted between them; and
 formed his resolution of joining the Emperor with all his
 treasure and troops. The resolution of Mr. Vansittart
 was at last confirmed; and ~~an~~ a favourable moment was
 chosen for occupying the palace of Jaffier with the troops.
 When assured that no designs against his person or
 authority were entertained; that nothing was proposed
 beyond a reform of his government in the hands of his
 son-in-law, who would act as his deputy; he replied, with
 disdain, that he was no stranger to the meaning of such
 language; and too well acquainted with the characters of
 men, particularly that of his son-in-law, to be in doubt
 respecting the consequences. He peremptorily refused to
 remain a vain pageant of royalty, and desired permission
 to retire to Calcutta, to lead a private life under the
 English protection.¹

When the pecuniary distresses of the Company's go-
 vernment, and the enormous disclosures in that of the
 Nabob, were under the deliberation of the board at Cal-
 cutta, there was but one opinion concerning the necessity
 of some important change. To vest Meer Casim with the
 power requisite for reforming the government of the
 Nabob, was the plan approved of unanimously in the
 Select Committee. The force which might be necessary
 to subdue his reluctance was provided; and though it was
 not anticipated that he would resign the government
 rather than comply, the step which that resolution made
 necessary was a natural consequence; and was without
 hesitation decreed. When Mr. Vansittart returned to
 Calcutta on the 7th of November, he found there were
 persons by whom those measures were by no means ap-
 proved. Mr. Verelst and Mr. Smyth, two members of the
 Council, who were not of the Select Committee, entered a
 minute on the 8th, in which they complained that a mea-
 sure of so much importance had not been submitted to

¹ First Report of the Committee in 1772; Vansittart's Narrative, i. 19—123
 Holwell's Memorial; Scrafton's Observations on Vansittart's Narrative; Van-
 sittart's Letter to the Proprietors of East India Stock in answer to Scrafton
 Verelst's View of the English Government in Bengal; Seer Mutakhareen, ii
 130—160; Scott's Hist. of Bengal, p. 399—401.

the Council at large ; and laying great stress upon the engagements which had been formed with Jaffier, insinuated their ignorance of the existence of any cause why those engagements should be abandoned and betrayed. When Clive made his plan for the government of Bengal, by the irregular elevation of Mr. Vansittart, he seems to have overlooked, or very imperfectly to have estimated, the passions which it was calculated to excite. Mr. Amvatt, who was a man of merit, and next to the chair, could not behold himself postponed or superseded without dissatisfaction ; and those among the Bengal servants who stood next to him in hopes, regarded their interests as involved in his. A party thus existed with feelings averse to the Governor ; and they soon became a party opposed to his measures. Other passions, of a still grosser nature, were at this time thrown into violent operation in Bengal. The vast sums, obtained by a few individuals, who had the principal management of the former revolution, when Meer Jaffier trode down Suraj-ad-dowla his master, were held in vivid remembrance ; and the persuasion that similar advantages, of which every man burned for a share, were now meditated by the Select Committee, excited the keenest emotions of jealousy and envy. Mr. Amvatt was now joined by Mr. Ellis, a person of a violent temper, whom, in some of his pretensions, the Governor had opposed ; and by Major Carnac, who had lately arrived in the province to succeed Calliaud, but whom the Governor had offended by proposing that he should not take the command till the affairs at Patna, in which Calliaud was already engaged, and with which he was well acquainted, should be conducted to a close. A minute, in which Mr. Ellis and Mr. Smyth coincided, and in which the deposition of Jaffier was formally condemned, was entered by Mr. Amvatt on the 8th of January. No attempt was made to deny the extreme difficulties in which the English government was placed, or the disorders and enormities of Jaffier's administration : it was only denied that any of these evils would be removed by the revolution of which, in violation of the national faith, the English, by the Select Committee, had been rendered the instruments.¹

BOOK IV
CHAP. V.

1760.

¹ Objections to the removal of Jaffier were made not only by those whose personal feelings might be suspected of influencing their judgment, but by

BOOK IV. Meer Casim, aware that money was the pillar by which
 CHAP. V. alone he could stand, made so great exertions that, not-
 1761. withstanding the treasury of Meer Jaffier was found almost
 empty, he paid in the course of a few months the arrears
 of the English troops at Patna ; so far satisfied the troops
 of the Subah, both at Moorshedabad and Patna, that they
 were reduced to order and ready to take the field ; and
 provided six or seven lacks in discharge of his engage-
 ments with the Company, insomuch that the Presidency
 were enabled in November to send two lacks and a half
 to Madras, whence a letter had been received, declaring
 that without a supply the siege of Pondicherry must be
 raised.

In the month of January, Major Carnac arrived at Patna,
 and took the command of the troops. The province of
 Bahar had suffered so much from the repeated incursions
 of the Emperor ; and the finances both of the Nabob and
 of the Company were so much exhausted by the expense
 of the army required to oppose him, that the importance
 was strongly felt of driving him finally from that part of
 the country. The rains were no sooner at an end than
 the English commander, accompanied by the troops of
 Ramnarain, and those which had belonged to Meeran, ad-
 vanced towards the Emperor, who was stationed at Gyah
 Maunpore. The unhappy Monarch made what exertions
 he could to increase his feeble army ; but Carnac reached
 his camp by three days' march ; forced him to an engage-

others, prior to his appointment. The scheme was originally Mr. Holwell's, who communicated in April, to Colonel Callaud, his anticipation of the necessity of deposing Mir Jaffier. The Colonel, in reply, observes, " bad as the man may be whose cause we now support, I cannot be of opinion that we can get rid of him for a better, without running the risk of much greater inconveniences attending on such a change than those we now labour under. I presume the establishing tranquillity in these provinces, would restore to us all the advantages of trade we can wish, for the profit and honour of our employers, and I think we had fairer to bring that tranquillity about by our present influence over the Subah, and by supporting him, than by any change that can be made." *Seraffon's Observations on Vansittart's Narrative*, 12. The removal of Jaffier was an ill-advised measure ; there was no absolute impossibility in his performing his engagements with the English, or paying his own troops, for both objects were speedily accomplished by his successor, and he created no new resources. The same means of acquitting his obligations, were in Mir Jaffier's reach. There only wanted such support as should enable him, and such control as should compel him, to discharge those demands to which he had rendered himself liable, and the due acquittance of which was essential to the maintenance of that English force upon which his own power, and even his existence depended. Had Clive remained in Bengal, there would probably have been no revolution.—W.

ment, and gained a victory. The only memorable incident of the battle was, that M. Law was taken prisoner: and the British officers exalted themselves in the eyes even of the rude natives, by treating him with the highest honour and distinction.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1761.

¹ It is interesting and delightful to hear the account of the native historian. "When the Emperor left the field of battle, the handful of troops that followed M. Law, discouraged by his flight, and tired of the wandering life which they had hitherto led in his service, turned about likewise, and followed the Emperor. M. Law, finding himself abandoned and alone, resolved not to turn his back; he bestrode one of his guns, and remained firm in that posture, waiting for the moment of his death. This being reported to Major Carnac, he detached himself from his main body, with Captain Knox and some other officers, and he advanced to the man on the gun, without taking with him either a guard or any Talungas (Sepoys) at all. Being arrived near, this troop alighted from their horses, and pulling their caps from their heads, they swept the air with them, as if to make him a *salâm*: and this salute being returned by M. Law in the same manner, some parley in their language ensued. The Major, after paying high encomiums to M. Law for his perseverance, conduct, and bravery, added these words: 'You have done everything which could be expected from a brave man; and your name shall be undoubtedly transmitted to posterity by the pen of history: now, loosen your sword from your loins, come amongst us, and abandon all thoughts of contending with the English.' The other answered, 'That if they would accept of his surrendering himself just as he was, he had no objection; but that as to surrendering himself with the disgrace of being without his sword, it was a shame he would never submit to; and that they might take his life if they were not satisfied with that condition.' The English commanders, admiring his firmness, consented to his surrendering himself in the manner he wished: after which the Major, with his officers, shook hands with him, in their European manner, and every sentiment of enmity was instantly dismissed on both sides. At the same time the Major sent for his own palankeen, made him sit in it, and he was sent to camp. M. Law, unwilling to see or to be seen, shut up the curtains of the palankeen for fear of being recognised by any of his friends at camp; but yet some of his acquaintances, hearing of his being arrived, went to him. The Major, who had excused him from appearing in public, informed them that they could not see him for some days, as he was too much vexed to receive any company. Ahmed Khan Koteishee, who was an impertinent talker, having come to look at him, thought to pay his court to the English by joking on the man's defeat; a behaviour that has nothing strange, if we consider the times in which we live, and the company he was accustomed to frequent; and it was in that notion of his, doubtless, that with much pertness of voice and air, he asked him this question; 'And Biby (Lady) Law, where is she?' The Major and officers present, shocked at the impropriety of the question, reprimanded him with a severe look, and very severe expressions: 'This man, they said, has fought bravely, and deserves the attention of all brave men; the impertinences which you have been offering him may be customary amongst your friends and your nation, but cannot be suffered in ours, which has it for a standing rule, never to offer an injury to a vanquished foe.' Ahmed Khan, checked by this reprimand, held his tongue, and did not answer a word. He tarried about one hour more in his visit, and then went away much abashed; and, although he was a commander of importance, and one to whom much honour had been always paid, no one did speak to him any more, or made a show of standing up at his departure. This reprimand did much honour to the English; and, it must be acknowledged, to the honour of those strangers, that as their conduct in war and in battle is worthy of admiration, so, on the other hand, nothing is more modest and more becoming than their behaviour to an enemy, whether in the heat of action, or in the pride of success and victory; these people seem to act entirely according to the rules observed by our ancient commanders, and our men of genius." Seer Muta-khareen, ii. 165, 166.

BOOK IV. At this time the Zemindars of Beerboom and Burdwan,
 CHAP. V. two important districts of Bengal, not far from Moorshe-
 1761. dabad, took arms. It has been alleged that they acted in concert with the Emperor, with whom it had been arranged during his former campaign, that a body of Mah-rattas should penetrate into Bengal immediately after the rains ; that he himself should advance to Bahar, and, by as menacing an appearance as possible, engage the attention of the English and Nabob ; that the Zemindars should hold themselves in readiness, till the Emperor, giving his enemies the slip, should penetrate into Bengal, as he had done the year before ; when they should fall upon the province by one united and desperate effort. There seems in this too much of foresight and of plan for Oriental politicians, especially the weak-minded Emperor and his friends. At any rate the movements of the Zemindars betrayed them. Meer Casim, attended by a detachment of English under Major Yorke, marched in haste to Beerboom, defeated the troops which were opposed to them, reduced both provinces to obedience, and drove the Mah-rattas to the south.

Immediately after the battle with the Emperor, Major Carnac sent to him the Raja Shitabroy, to make an overture of peace, and to ask permission to visit him in his camp. At first, by the instigation of one of the restless Zemindars who supported him, he declined the proposal ; presently afterwards, having listened to other councils, he became eager to make his terms. He was tired of his dependence upon the rude and insolent chiefs who hitherto had upheld his cause ; and cherished hopes that the late revolution at Delhi might produce some turn in his favour. The Abdallee Shah, after his great victory over the Mah-rattas, had acknowledged him as sovereign of Hindustan ; had appointed his son to act in the quality of his deputy at Delhi ; and had recommended his cause to the Afghan chiefs, and to his vizir, the Nabob of Oude. Major Carnac paid his compliments to him as Emperor, in his own camp, and, after the usual ceremonies, conducted him to Patna.

Meer Casim was not easy upon the prospect of a connexion between the Emperor and the English ; and hastened to Patna, to observe and to share in the present

proceedings. Upon his arrival, he declined waiting upon the Emperor in his own camp; either because he was afraid of treachery, of which there was no appearance; or because (so low was the house of Timur fallen) he was pleased to measure dignities with his King. After much negotiation, the English invented a compromise, by planning the interview in the hall of the factory, where a musnud was formed of two dining tables covered with cloth. The usual ceremonies were performed; and Meer Casim, upon condition of receiving investiture as Subahdar of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, engaged to pay annually twenty-four lacks of rupees to the Emperor, as the revenue of the provinces, with the government of which he was intrusted. After a short stay at Patna, where the intrigues of the Nabob had as yet prevented his being proclaimed as sovereign, Shah Aulum accepted the invitation of the Subahdar of Oude, of Nujeeb-ad-dowla, and other Afghan chiefs, to whom his cause was recommended by the Abdallee Shah, to place himself under their protection, and marched toward his capital. He was escorted by Major Carnac to the boundaries of the province of Bahar; and made a tender to the English of the dewanee of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, for which, and all their other privileges, he offered to grant phirmans, whenever the petition for them should be presented in form. The intention was distinctly formed at Calcutta, to afford assistance for placing and confirming him on his paternal throne; but the want of money, and the disinclination of the Nabob, proved decisive obstructions.

Meer Casim, who had supplied his first necessities by squeezing out of those persons, who were suspected of having made riches in the public service, all that terror or cruelty, under pretence of making them account for their balances, was calculated to extort, regarded the supposed treasures of Ramnarain, as well as the revenues of his government, with a craving appetite; and resolved to omit no effort or contrivance to get both in his power. As Ramnarain, however, had been assured of protection by the English, it was necessary to proceed with caution and art. The pretence of calling upon him to account for the receipts of his government was the instrument employed. It was the purpose of the Nabob to accede to no accom-

BOOK IV. modulation which should not leave Ramnarain at his mercy
 CHAP. V. It was the purpose of Ramnarain to avoid, by every effort
 ————— of chicanery, the rendering of a fair account. These en-
 1761. deavours, truly Oriental, of the Nabob on the one side,
 and Ramnarain on the other, operated to the ruin of
 both.

Mr. Vansittart, and the party who supported him, desirous of finding the conduct of Meer Casim, whom they had raised, of a nature to justify their choice, were disposed to interpret all appearances in his favour. The opposite party, who condemned the elevation of Meer Casim, were not less disposed to interpret all appearances to his disadvantage. Unfortunately for Ramnarain, and, in the end, not less unfortunately for the Nabob, the persons at Patna, in whose hands the military power of the English at this time was placed, belonged to the party by whom the Governor was opposed. Major Carnac was indeed superseded in the chief command by the arrival of Colonel Coote, soon after the Emperor was received at Patna: but Coote fell so entirely into the views of his predecessor, that Carnac, though in a subordinate station, remained at Patna, to lend his countenance and aid to measures, the line of which he had contributed to draw.

So far was Mr. Vansittart from intending to permit any injustice towards Ramnarain, that Major Carnac, in his first instructions, was particularly informed of the engagements subsisting between the English government and Ramnarain; and of the necessity of supporting his life, fortune, and government against the Nabob, should any hostile design appear to be entertained. Mr. Vansittart, however, listened to the representations which the Nabob artfully sent him, of the artifices by which Ramnarain evaded the settlement of his accounts. The exigencies of the Calcutta government urgently required the payments due from the Nabob: the Nabob declared that the recovery of the balances from Ramnarain was the only fund from which those payments could be made: and Vansittart with the usual credulity, believed the vulgar reports of the great treasures, as well as the vast balances, in the hands of Ramnarain; though the accounts of only three years of his government were unexamined, and though in each of those years his country had been regularly overrun by

hostile armies, and he had been obliged for defence to keep on foot an army greater than he was able to pay.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1761.

Major Carnac and Colonel Coote, on the other hand, allowed their minds to be entirely engrossed by the evidence which appeared of the resolution of the Nabob to destroy Ramnarain. The proof which they possessed was indeed but too conclusive, since they have both left their declarations upon record, that the Nabob tempted them with enormous bribes to leave Ramnarain in his power.² Their opposition to the Nabob, which was often offensive and exceptionable in the mode, appeared to Vansittart to have no better aim than vexation to himself; it lessened the care of Ramnarain to save appearances in evading the extortion with which he was threatened; and it enabled the Nabob at last to persuade Vansittart, that it was a man requiring nothing but justice, which Ramnarain was labouring to defeat; and that his government was hastening to ruin from the obstinate dishonesty of one man, supported by two English commanders.

So far did these altercations and animosities proceed, that on the 25th of June, Vansittart, who had a majority in the council, came to the unhappy resolution of recalling both Coote and Carnac from Patna, and of leaving Ramnarain at the mercy of the Nabob. He made that use of his power, which it was the height of weakness in Vansittart not to foresee. Ramnarain was immediately seized and thrown into prison; his very house was robbed; his

¹ Major Carnac (see his Evidence in the Third Report of the Committee of 1772) believed that he owed nothing at all.

² Both insisted upon the fact, that Ramnarain was ready to account fairly. In a letter of Major Carnac's to the Select Committee, dated 13th April, 1761, he says, "I have long had reason to suspect the Nabob had ill designs against Ramnarain, and have now found my suspicions to be too true. His Excellency (the Nabob) made a heavy complaint to me yesterday, in the presence of Mr. McGuire, Major Yorke, Messrs. Lushington and Swinton, that there was a considerable balance due on the revenues of this province. Ramnarain has declared to me, that he was ready to lay the accounts before him; however, as the two parties differ widely in their statements, Mr. McGuire and I proposed, that they should each make out their accounts, and refer them to your board, who would fairly decide between them. This, which I thought was a reasonable proposal, was so far from being satisfactory to the Nabob, that he plainly declared, nothing less could satisfy him than the Mahrage's being removed from the Naibut of this province before he returned to Moorsshedabad." First Report of the Committee in 1772, App. No. 13. In his evidence before the Committee, Carnac says, "The plea of his being in arrear was the pretext always made use of for oppressing him, but without foundation; for in the frequent conversations I had with Ramnarain on the subject, he always seemed ready to come to a fair and equitable account."

BOOK IV. friends were tortured to make confession of hidden treasures; his life was only for the moment spared, lest the indignation of the English should be too violently roused and after all, the quantity of treasure which he was found to possess was insignificant, a sum barely sufficient for the daily expenses of his government.¹

CHAP. V.

1761.

This was the fatal error of Mr. Vansittart's administration: because it extinguished among the natives of rank all confidence in the English protection; and because the enormity to which, in this instance, he had lent his support, created an opinion of a weak or a corrupt partiality and diminished the weight of his interference when the Nabob was really the party aggrieved. For now began the memorable disputes between the Nabob and the Company's service about the internal trade; and, at the same time, such changes were produced in the Council at Calcutta, as impaired considerably the Governor's power. These changes constitute an incident in the history of the Company, the memory of which is of peculiar importance.

Just before Colonel Clive resigned the government in Bengal, the 147th paragraph of one of the last of the despatches, to which he affixed his name, addressed the Court of Directors in the following terms:—"Having fully spoken to every branch of your affairs at this Presidency under their established heads, we cannot, consistent with the real anxiety we feel for the future welfare of that respectable body from whom you and we are in trust, close this address without expostulating with freedom on the unprovoked and general asperity of your letter *per Prince Henry packet*. Our sentiments on this head, will, we doubt not, acquire additional weight, from the consideration of their being subscribed by a majority of your Council, who are, at this very period, quitting your service, and consequently, independent and disinterested. Permit us to say, that the diction of your letter is most unworthy yourselves and us, in whatever relation considered, either as masters to servants, or gentlemen to gentlemen. Mere inadvertencies, and casual neglects, arising from an un-

¹ Vansittart's Narrative, i. 141—271; The evidence of Carnac and Coote in the First Report, and that of Clive, M'Gulre, and Carnac, in the Third Report of the Committee, 1772; Scott's Hist. of Bengal, p. 404—409, Secr. Mutakhareen, ii. 160—181; Verelst's View of the English Government in Bengal, p. 47.

avoidable and most complicated confusion in the state of your affairs, have been treated in such language and sentiments, as nothing but the most glaring and premeditated faults could warrant. Groundless informations have, without further scrutiny, borne with you the stamp of truth, though proceeding from those who had therein obviously their own purpose to serve, no matter at whose expense. These have received from you such countenance and encouragement, as must most assuredly tend to cool the warmest zeal of your servants here and every where else; as they will appear to have been only the source of general reflections, thrown out at random against your faithful servants of this Presidency, in various parts of your letter now before us,—faithful to little purpose,—if the breath of scandal, joined to private pique or private or personal attachments, have power to blow away in one hour the merits of many years' services, and deprive them of that rank, and those rising benefits, which are justly a spur to their integrity and application. The little attention shown to these considerations in the indiscriminate favours heaped on some individuals, and undeserved censures on others, will, we apprehend, lessen that spirit of zeal so very essential to the well-being of your affairs, and, consequently, in the end, if continued, prove the destruction of them. Private views may, it is much to be feared, take the lead here, from examples at home; and no gentlemen hold your service longer, nor exert themselves further in it, than their own exigencies require. This being the real present state of your service, it becomes strictly our duty to represent it in the strongest light, or we should, with little truth, and less propriety, subscribe ourselves,

“May it please your Honours,

“Your most faithful servants,

“ROBERT CLIVE,

“J. Z. HOLWELL,

“WM. B. SUMNER,

“W. M'GUIRE.”

The Company were even then no strangers to what they have become better acquainted with the longer they have acted; to that which, from the very nature of their authority, and from their local circumstances, it was evident

BOOK IV. they must experience; a disregard of their orders, when
 CHAP. V. contrary to the interests or passions of their servants:

1761.

but as they never before had a servant of such high pretensions, and so audacious a character as Clive, they had never before been treated with so much contumely in words. They were moved accordingly to resent it highly. In the very first paragraph of their general letter to Bengal, dated the 21st of January, 1761, they said, "We have taken under our most serious consideration the general letter from our late President and council of Fort William, dated the 29th December, 1759, and many paragraphs therein containing gross insults upon and indignities offered to the Court of Directors; tending to the subversion of our authority over our servants, and a dissolution of all order and good government in the Company's affairs: to put an immediate stop therefore to this evil, we do positively order and direct, that, immediately upon receipt of this letter, all those persons still remaining in the Company's service, who signed the said letter, viz. Messieurs John Zephaniah Holwell, Charles Stafford Playdell, William Brightwell Sumner, and William M'Guire, be dismissed from the Company's service; and you are to take care that they be not permitted, on any consideration, to continue in India, but that they are to be sent to England by the first ships which return home the same season you receive this letter."

The dismissal of which this letter was the signal, not only gave a majority in the Council to the party by whom Vansittart was opposed; but sent Mr. Ellis, the most intemperate and arbitrary of all his opponents, to the chiefship of the factory at Patna. He treated the Nabob with the most insulting airs of authority; and broke through all respect for his government. So early^a as the month of January he gave his orders to the commander of the troops to seize and keep prisoner one of the Nabob's collectors, who had raised some difficulties in permitting a quantity of opium, the private property of one of the Company's servants to pass duty free as the property of the Company. This outrage the discretion of the officer avoided, by suspending obedience to the order^f, and sending a letter to the Nabob, to redress by his own authority whatever might appear to be wrong. About the same time another servant of the Nabob, a man of high connexions and influence,

BOOK IV.

CHAP. V.

1761.

purchased for the Nabob's use a quantity of nitre. But the monopoly of the saltpetre trade had been conveyed to the Company. Though an exception in favour of the Nabob to the extent of his own consumption was, from standing usage, so much understood, that to express it had appeared altogether useless and vain, this purchase was converted by Mr. Ellis into such an invasion of the English rights, that the Nabob was not to be consulted in the punishment of his own servant. The unfortunate man was seized, put in irons, and sent down a prisoner to Calcutta, to receive whatever chastisement the Council might direct. It required the utmost address and power of the President to get him sent back to be punished by his master. As to sending him back for the purpose of ascertaining whether he was guilty or innocent, that was a preliminary which it would have been absurd to propose. Some of the Council insisted that he should be publicly whipped at Calcutta; others, that he should have his ears cut off. Not many days after these violent proceedings, Mr. Ellis, having heard, by vague report, that two English deserters were concealed in the fort of Mongeer, despatched a company of Sepoys, with orders to receive the deserters, or to search the fort. The Governor declared that no Europeans were there; and for ampler satisfaction carried two officers of the Company round the fort. From apprehension, however, of some evil design, or from a very plain principle of military duty, he refused without orders to admit a body of armed men; shut the gates; and threatened to fire upon them if they approached the walls. This Mr. Ellis treated as the highest excess of insolence; and obstinately refused to withdraw the Sepoys till they had searched the fort. By these repeated invasions of his government, the pride of the Nabob was deeply wounded. He complained to the President in bitter terms; and with reason declared that the example, which was set by the servants of the Company, of trampling upon his authority deprived him of all dignity in the eyes of his subjects, and rendered it vain to hope for their obedience. After a dispute of three months, during which Ellis was supported by the Council, the difference was compromised, by the Nabob's consenting to admit any person to search the fort whom Mr. Vansittart should name; when Lieutenant Ironside, after the strictest investigation, was convinced that no

BOOK IV. European whatsoever, except an old French invalid, whose
 CHAP. V. freedom Mr. Hastings procured, had been in the fort.

1762.

Hitherto Meer Casim had conducted his government with no ordinary success. He had reduced to obedience all the rebellious Zemindars. What was of still greater importance, he had, as was declared by the President, in his minute of the 22nd of March, 1762, discharged the whole of his pecuniary obligations to the English; and satisfied both his own and his predecessor's troops.¹ He had extorted money with unsparing hands from the Zemindars and other functionaries. In the financial department of his government, he was clear-sighted, vigilant, and severe. He had introduced a strict economy, without appearance of avarice, in his whole expenditure: and he had made considerable progress in new-modelling and improving his army; when the whole internal economy of his government became involved in disorder by the pretensions of the Company's servants.

In India, as under most uncivilized governments, the transit of goods within the country was made subject to duties; and upon all the roads and navigable rivers, toll-houses, or custom-houses, (in the language of the country *chokeys*) were erected, which had power of stopping the goods, till the duties were levied. By the rude and oppressive nature of the government these custom-houses were exceedingly multiplied; and in long carriages the inconvenience of numerous stoppages and payments was very severe. As in all other departments of the government, so in this, there was nothing regular and fixed; the duties varied at different times and different places; and a wide avenue was always open for the extortion of the collectors. The internal trade of the country was by these causes subject to ruinous obstructions.

The English Company had at an early period availed themselves of a favourable opportunity to solicit exemption from such oppressive interruptions and expense; and the rulers of the country, who felt in their revenues the benefits of foreign commerce, granted a *phirman* by which the export and import trade of the Company was completely relieved, as both the goods which they imported

¹ His payments to the Company consisted of twenty-six lacs of sicca rupees, of 2s. 8½d., together with fifty-three lacs of current rupees, of 2s. 4d., derived from the ceded districts. See Vansittart's Minute, Narrative, ii 33.

were allowed to pass into the interior, and those which they purchased in the interior for exportation were allowed to pass to the sea without either stoppage or duties. A certificate, signed by the English President, or chiefs of factories, (in the language of the country a *dustuck*), shown at the toll-houses or chokeys, protected the property. The Company, however, engrossed to themselves the import and export trade between India and Europe, and limited the private trade of their servants to the business of the country. The benefit of this exemption therefore accrued to the Company alone; and though attempts had been sometimes made to extend the protection of the Company's *dustuck* to the trade carried on by their servants in the interior, this had been always vigorously opposed by the Subahdars, both as defrauding the public revenue, and injuring the native merchants.

No sooner had the English acquired an ascendancy in the government by the dethronement of Suraj-ad-dowla, and the elevation of Meer Jaffier, than the servants of the Company broke through the restraints which had been imposed upon them by former Subahdars, and engaged largely in the interior trade of the country. At first, however, they carried not their pretensions beyond certain bounds; and they paid the same duties which were levied on the subjects of the Nabob. It appears not that during the administration of Clive, any of the Company's servants, unless clandestinely, attempted to trade on any other terms. According, however, as they acquired experience of their power over the government of the country; and especially after the fresh and signal instance of it, the elevation of a new sovereign in the person of Meer Casim, the Company's *dustuck* or passport, which was only entitled to protect the goods of actual exportation and importation, was employed by the Company's agents of all descriptions to protect their private trade in every part of the country. So great was now the ascendancy of the English name, that the collectors or officers at the chokeys or toll-houses, who were fully aware of the dependence of their own government on the power and pleasure of the English, dared not in general to scrutinize the use which was made of the Company's *dustuck*, or to stop the goods which it fraudulently screened. The Company's servants, whose goods were thus conveyed entirely free from duty, while

BOOK IV.

CHAP. V.

1762.

BOOK IV. those of all other merchants were heavily burdened, were
 CHAP. V. rapidly getting into their own hands the whole trade of
 1762. the country, and thus drying up one of the sources of the public revenue. When the collectors of these tolls, or transit duties, questioned the power of the dustuck, and stopped the goods, it was customary to send a party of Sepoys to seize the offender and carry him prisoner to the nearest factory. Meer Casim was hardly seated on the musnud, when grievous complaints of these enormities came up to him from all quarters, and he presented the strongest remonstrances to the President of the Council. In his letter to the Governor, dated March 26th, 1762, he says, "From the factory of Calcutta to Cossimbuzar, Patna, and Dacca, all the English chiefs, with their gomastahs, officers and agents in every district of the government, act as collectors, renters, and magistrates, and setting up the Company's colours, allow no power to my officers. And besides this, the gomastahs and other servants in every district, in every market and village, carry on a trade in oil, fish, straw, bamboo, rice, paddy, betel-nut, and other things; and every man with a Company's dustuck in his hand regards himself as not less than the Company." It is abundantly proved that the picture drawn by the Nabob was not overcharged. Mr. Hastings, in a letter to the President, dated Baugulpore, 25th April, 1752, said, "I beg to lay before you a grievance, which loudly calls for redress, and will, unless duly attended to, render ineffectual any endeavours to create a firm and lasting harmony between the Nabob and the Company;—I mean, the oppressions committed under the sanction of the English name, and through the want of spirit to oppose them. This evil I am well assured, is not confined to our dependants alone, but is practised all over the country, by people falsely assuming the habit of our Sepoys, or calling themselves our gomastahs. As on such occasions the great power of the English intimidates the people from making any resistance; so, on the other hand, the indolence of the Bengalees, or the difficulty of gaining access to those who might do them justice, prevents our having knowledge of the oppressions. I have been surprised to meet with several English flags flying in places which I have passed; and on the river I do not believe that I passed a boat without one. By whatever title they have been assumed,

I am sure their frequency can bode no good to the Nabob's revenues, the quiet of the country, or the honour of our nation.—A party of Sepoys, who were on the march before us, afforded sufficient proofs of the rapacious and insolent spirit of those people, where they are left to their own discretion. Many complaints against them were made me on the road; and most of the petty towns and serais were deserted at our approach, and the shops shut up from the apprehensions of the same treatment from us,"¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1762.

At first the Governor attempted to redress these evils by gentle means; by cautioning the servants of the Company; by soothing the irritation of the Nabob, and lending his own authority to enable the native toll-gatherers to check the illegitimate traffic of the English. The mischief, however, increased. The efforts of the collectors were not only resisted, and the collectors themselves punished as heinous offenders on the spot; but these attempts of theirs excited the loudest complaints; they were represented as daring violations of the Company's rights; and undoubted evidence of a design on the part of the Nabob to expel the English from the country. As usual, one species of enormity introduced another. When the officers of government submitted to oppression, it necessarily followed that the people must submit. At the present time it is difficult to believe, even after the most undeniable proof, that it became a common practice to force the unhappy natives, both to buy the goods of the Company's servants, and of all those who procured the use of their name, at a greater; and to sell to the Company's servants the goods which they desired to purchase, at a less than the market price. The native judges and magistrates

¹ Mr. Verelst says, (View of Bengal, p. 8 and 46) "The reader must here be informed, that a trade, free from duties, had been claimed by the Company's servants, supported by their forces, and established by the last treaty with Meer Jaffer; and that this article, though condemned by the Directors, was afterwards transcribed into the treaty with his son Nudjum al Dowlah. The contention during two years with Meer Cossim, in support of this trade, greatly weakened the country government, which his subsequent overthrow quite annihilated. At this time many black merchants found it expedient to purchase the name of any young writer in the Company's service, by loans of money, and under this sanction harassed and oppressed the natives. So plentiful a supply was derived from this source, that many young writers were enabled to spend 1500*l.* and 2000*l.* per annum, were clothed in fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day."—"A trade was carried on without payment of duties, in the prosecution of which infinite oppressions were committed. English agents or gomastahs, not contented with injuring the people, trampled on the authority of government, binding and punishing the Nabob's officers, whenever they presumed to interfere. This was the immediate cause of the war with Meer Cossim."

BOOK IV. were resisted in the discharge of their duties; and ever
 CHAP. V. their functions were usurped. The whole frame of the
 1762. government was relaxed: and in many places the Zemindars
 and other collectors refused to be answerable for the
 revenues.¹

The President, aware of the prejudices which were fostered, by a majority of the board, against both the Nabob and himself, submitted not to their deliberation these disorders and disputes, till he found his own authority inadequate to redress them. The representations, presented to them, of the enormities to which the private trade of the Company's servants gave birth in the country were treated, by the majority of the Council, as the effect of a weak or interested subservience to the views of the Nabob; while they received the complaints of the servants and their agents against the native officers, more often in fault, according to Hastings and Vansittart, from laxity than tyranny, as proofs of injustice demanding immediate punishment, and of hostile designs against which effect

¹ The following letter to the Nabob from one of his officers, affords a specimen of the complaints; it is dated Backergunge, May 25, 1762. "The situation of affairs at this place obliges me to apply to your honour for instructions for my further proceedings.—My instructions which I brought her were, that in case any Europeans or their servants committed any disorders they were to be sent to Calcutta, notwithstanding any pretence they shall make for so doing.—Notwithstanding the rigour of these orders, I have ever made it my business (when anything trifling happened) to endeavour, by gentle means, to persuade the gentlemen's gomastahs here to act in a peaceable manner; which, although repeated several times, has had no effect but, on the contrary, has occasioned their writing complaints of me to their respective masters, that I obstructed them in their business, and ill-used them and in return I have received menacing letters from several gentlemen threatening, if I interfere with their servants, to use such measures as I may, repent; nor have the gentlemen only done this, their very gomastahs have made it public here, that in case I stop them in any proceeding, they will use the same methods; of the truth of which I have good proofs. Now, Sir, I am to inform you what I have obstructed them in. This place was of great trade formerly, but is now brought to nothing by the following practices. A gentleman sends a gomastah here to buy or sell. He immediately looks upon himself as sufficient to force every inhabitant, either to buy his goods or sell his: and on refusal, (in case of non-capacity) a flogging or confinement immediately ensues. This is not sufficient even when willing, but a second force is made use of, which is to engross the different branches of trade to themselves, and not to suffer any persons to buy or sell the articles they trade in and if the country people do it, then a repetition of their authority is put in practice; and again, what things they purchase, they think the least they can do is, to take them for a considerable deal less than another merchant, and oftentimes refuse paying that, and my interfering occasions an immediate complaint.—These, and many other oppressions which are daily practised, is the reason that this place is growing destitute of inhabitants, &c.—Before justice was given in the public cutcherie, but now every gomastah is become a judge: they even pass sentences on the Zemindars themselves, and draw money from them by pretended injuries." Vansittart's Narrative ii. 112.

tual securities could not be too speedily taken. Of the BOOK IV.
 Council a great proportion were deriving vast emoluments CHAP. V.
 from the abuses, the existence of which they denied ; and
 the President obtained support from Mr. Hastings alone, 1762.
 in his endeavours to check enormities, which, a few years
 afterwards, the Court of Directors, the President, the
 servants of the Company themselves, and the whole
 world, joined in reprobating, with every term of condem-
 nation and abhorrence.

Observing the progress of these provocations and re-
 sentments, Vansittart anticipated nothing but the calamity
 of war, unless some effectual measures could be adopted
 to prevent them. Dependence upon the English, though
 it had been light, was a yoke which the Nabob would
 doubtless have been very willing to throw off. This pre-
 sumed inclination the majority of the Council treated as
 a determined purpose ; and every measure of his admi-
 nistration was, according to them, a proof of his hostile
 designs. The Nabob, aware of the strength of the party
 to whom his elevation was an object of aversion, naturally
 considered the friendship of the English as a tenure far
 from secure. The report was spread, that the views of
 his enemies would be adopted in England ; and it is no
 wonder if, against a contingency so very probable, he was
 anxious to be prepared. Vansittart, however, who was not
 mistaken as to the interest which the Nabob had in main-
 taining his connexion with the English, and his want of
 power to contend with them, remained assured of his dis-
 position to peace, unless urged by provocations too great
 for his temper to endure. He formed the plan, therefore,
 of a meeting with Meer Casim, in hopes that, by mutual
 explanations and concessions, there might be drawn, be-
 tween the rights of the government on the one hand, and
 the pretensions of the Company's servants on the other,
 such a line of demarcation as would preclude all future
 injuries and complaints. With Mr. Hastings, as a coad-
 jutor, he arrived at Mongeer on the 30th of November,
 and was received with all the marks of cordiality and
 friendship. After some bitter complaints, the Nabob
 agreed that all preceding animosities should be consigned
 to oblivion, and that the present interview should be
 wholly employed in preventing the recurrence of such

BOOK IV. dangerous evils. For this purpose, he insisted that the
 CHAP. V. interior trade, or that from place to place within the
 1762. country, should be entirely renounced, as a trade to which
 the Company had no claim, and in which their servants
 had never been allowed to engage by any Subahdar pre-
 ceding Meer Jaffier ; a trade which introduced innumerable
 disorders into his government, and was not carried on for
 the benefit of the Company, but of individuals, who reaped
 the profit of their own offences. Mr. Vansittart, though
 fully aware, as he himself declares, that the interior
 trade, which had been grasped by the Company's servants,
 was purely usurpation, was yet, he says, "unwilling to
 give up an advantage which had been enjoyed by them, in
 a greater or less degree, for five or six years." A still
 stronger reason probably was, that he knew himself un-
 able to make them "give it up ;" and, therefore, limited
 his endeavours to place it upon such a foundation as ap-
 peared the best calculated for the exclusion of abuse. He
 proposed that the interior trade should be open to the
 servants of the Company, but that they should pay the
 same duties as other merchants ; and that, for the preven-
 tion of all disputes, a fixed and accurate rate of duties
 should be established. To this arrangement, the Nabob,
 who saw but little security against a repetition of the pre-
 ceding evils in the assignment of duties which, as before,
 the servants of the Company might refuse to pay, mani-
 fested extreme aversion. At last, with great difficulty, he
 was induced to comply ; but declared his resolution, if
 this experiment should fail, to abolish all duties on inter-
 ior commerce, and in this way at least place his own
 subjects on a level with the strangers. To prevent the
 inconvenience of repeated stoppages, it was agreed that
 nine per cent., immensely below the rate exacted of other
 traders,¹ should be paid upon the prime cost of the
 goods, at the place of purchase, and that no further
 duties should be imposed. Mr. Vansittart returned to
 Calcutta on the 16th of January.

¹ Clive, in his speech, March 30, 1772, afterwards published by himself, said, "The natives paid infinitely more—and that this was no remedy to the grievance of which the Nabob complained." See Almon's Debates, from April 1772 to July 1773, where the speech is reprinted, p. 9. The Company afterwards rated the duties at forty per cent., and called this "a treaty exacted by force to obtain to their servants a sanction for a trade to enrich themselves."

The President believed that he had left Calcutta fully BOOK IV.
authorized, by the Council, to settle with the Nabob the CHAP. V.
terms of an amicable arrangement ; and he expected to
find the Members of the Council pleased that the servants
of the Company were now vested with a right to that
plentiful source of gain, in which they had hitherto par-
ticipated only by usurpation. He was not as yet suffici-
ently acquainted with the boundless desires of his col-
leagues. Before his arrival, unlimited condemnation had
passed on the whole of his proceedings ; and the precipi-
tation of the Nabob added to the disorder and combustion.
The regulations which the President had formed were
couched in a letter addressed to the Nabob. It was the
plan of Vansittart, that, as soon as they were confirmed
by the Council, instructions should be sent to the English
factories and agents ; and that corresponding instructions
should at the same time be transmitted by the Nabob to
his officers, informing them of the powers which they were
authorized to exert. The Nabob, who was not sufficiently
warned or sufficiently patient to observe this order of pro-
ceeding, immediately transmitted copies of Vansittart's
letter to his different officers, as the code of laws by which
their conduct was to be guided. The officers, of course,
began to act upon those laws immediately ; and as the
English had no commands to obey, they resisted. The
native officers, who imagined they had now authority for
retaliating some of the indignities to which they had been
subject, were in various instances guilty of severity and
oppression. It followed of course, that the dissatisfaction
which the Members of the Council were prepared to dis-
play, was rendered more confident and loud by these trans-
actions, and by the complaints which they failed not to
produce. It was speedily resolved, that the President had
no authority for forming those regulations to which he
had assented ; and instructions were sent to the factories
and agents to trade upon the previous terms, and to seize
and imprison any of the Nabob's officers who should dare
to offer any obstructions. In a solemn consultation, which
was held on the 1st of March, it was determined, with only
two dissenting voices, those of the President and Mr. Has-
tings, that by the imperial phirman, under which the
Company had traded so long, their servants had a right

1763.

BOOK IV. (which, however, all preceding Nabobs had disallowed) to
 CHAP. V. the internal trade, and that it was out of compliment, not
 1763. by obligation, that they had in any case consented to the
 payment of duties. It was decided, after many words, that, as an acknowledgement to the Nabob, and out of their own liberality and free choice, they would pay a duty of two and a half per cent. upon the article of salt alone, and no other ; instead of the nine per cent. upon all articles for which Vansittart had agreed. It was, however, at the same time decreed, that all disputes between the gomastahs of the English, and the subjects of the native government, should be referred, not to the native tribunals, but to the heads of factories and residents : that is, should be referred to men, not only, in the great majority of cases far too distant to receive the complaints ; but, what was still more shameful, men reaping exorbitant profits from the abuses over which they were thus exclusively vested with the judicial power.

When Vansittart took leave of the Nabob, he was setting out upon an expedition against the kingdom of Nepaul, a small country, completely surrounded, after the manner of Cashmere, by the northern mountains. It was a country which the Mohammedan arms had never reached ; and on the subject of its riches, oriental credulity, influenced by the report of its yielding gold, had room for unlimited expansion. The conquest of a country, abounding with gold, held out irresistible temptations to the Nabob. He ascended the ridge of mountains by which it is separated from Bengal ; but he was met by the Nepaulese in a dangerous pass ; and, after a contest, which appalled him, abandoned the enterprise. He was met, upon his return, by accounts of the reception which the regulations of Vansittart had experienced in the Council ; of the resistance which had been opposed to his officers in their attempts to execute his orders ; and of the seizure and imprisonment which in various instances they had undergone. He wrote, in terms of the highest indignation ; and called upon the English to relieve him from the burden of the Subahdarry, since they deprived him of the powers without which the government of the country could not be carried on. His patience was nearly exhausted : he now, therefore, executed his resolution of abandoning all duties

on the transit of goods, and laid the interior trade of his country perfectly open. BOOK IV.

CHAP. V.

1763.

The conduct of the Company's servants, upon this occasion, furnishes one of the most remarkable instances upon record, of the power of interest to extinguish all sense of justice, and even of shame. They had hitherto insisted, contrary to all right and all precedent, that the government of the country should exempt their goods from duty. They now insisted that it should impose duties upon the goods of all other traders ; and accused it as guilty of a breach of peace toward the English nation, because it proposed to remit them.¹

To enforce these conditions, and yet to maintain the appearance of omitting no effort to obtain the consent of the Nabob, it was proposed in the Council to send to him a deputation. For this purpose, Mr. Amyatt and Mr. Hay volunteered their services. They departed with their instructions on the 4th of April. In the meantime, in all parts of the country, the disputes between the officers of the government and the Company's servants, were carried to the greatest height. Many complaints arrived at Calcutta of the resistance which the gomastahs of the English experienced in the conduct of their business, and even of the outrages to which they were sometimes exposed. On the other hand, a multitude of instances were produced, in which the English Sepoys had been employed to seize and bind, and beat the officers of the government, and to protect the agents of the Company's servants in all the enormities and oppressions which they exercised upon the

¹ In the Council, the President and Mr. Hastings were, as before, the only dissentients, and said (see their minute, Consultation, March 24), "We cannot think the Nabob to blame (in abolishing the duties); nor do we see how he could do otherwise. For although it may be for our interest to determine, that we will have all the trade in our hands, take every article of the produce of the country off the ground at the first hand, and afterwards send it where we please free of customs, yet it is not to be expected that the Nabob will join with us in endeavouring to deprive all the merchants of the country of the means of carrying on their business, which must undoubtedly soon be the case, if they are obliged to pay heavy duties, and we trade in every article on the footing before-mentioned.—Neither in our opinion could the Nabob, in such circumstances, collect enough to pay the expense of the chokeys, collectors, &c. As to the Nabob's rights to lay trade open, it is our opinion, that the Nizam of every province has a right to anything for the relief of the merchants trading under his protection." Vansittart, iii. 74.—M. There can be no difference of opinion on these proceedings. The narrow-sighted selfishness of commercial cupidity, had rendered all the members of the Council, with the two honourable exceptions of Vansittart and Hastings, obstinately inaccessible to the plainest dictates of reason, justice, and policy.—W

BOOK IV. people. At Patna, from the animosities and violence of
 CHAP. V. Mr. Ellis, the flames of discord were the most vehemently
 1763. fanned ; the Sepoys were employed under his directions in
 opposing the government in bodies of 500 at a time ; and
 blood had been shed in the disputes which ensued. Before
 the 14th of April, the position of the Nabob and the Com-
 pany had become so threatening, that in the consultation
 of that day measures of war were eventually planned. The
 Nabob, on his part, though well acquainted with his own
 weakness, (for the short duration and the difficulties of his
 government had rendered the collection of more than a
 very small army impossible,) yet fully persuaded of the
 resolution of the Council to depose him, now applied for
 assistance to the Emperor and the Nabob of Oude ; and
 prepared himself for a conclusion which he deemed in-
 evitable.

On the 25th of May some boats, laden with arms for
 the troops at Patna, arrived at Mongeer. This circum-
 stance tended to confirm the Nabob in his opinion that
 the English were arming for war. He had the resolution
 to order the arms to be stopped. The deputation from
 the Council had already arrived ; but he treated their new
 propositions as unreasonable ; and enumerating the out-
 rages committed upon his servants, and the disorders in-
 troduced into his government, insisted, that the resolution
 of the Council to protect such proceedings imported
 nothing less than a design to deprive him of his authority.
 Though he offered to let the arms proceed to Patna, if
 either Mr. Amyatt, Mr. McGuire, or Mr. Hastings, were
 placed over the factory, he refused to send them to Ellis,
 as a man determined to employ them against him. He
 even insisted that the troops which were stationed at
 Patna, and for whom he paid, under the pretence of their
 being employed for the protection of his government,
 should not remain at the disposal of his enemy, but should
 be sent either to Calcutta or Mongheer.

The Council were unanimous in treating the detention
 of the arms as a very serious offence ; and the deputa-
 tion were instructed to take their departure, unless the
 boats were allowed to proceed. The Nabob wavered ;
 and on the 19th of June, the gentlemen of the deputation
 wrote to the Council, that he had consented to release

the boats of arms immediately ; to enter upon negotiation BOOK IV.
 without persisting, as before, in his preliminary demand of CHAP. V.
 removing the troops from Patna ; and that they had ac-
 cordingly agreed to wait upon him the following day. 1763.
 The hopes, which were drawn from this communication,
 by those Members of the Council to whom peace was
 really dear, were speedily destroyed. Mr. Ellis, at an early
 period of the disputes, had presented urgent expostulations
 to the Council upon the necessity of being entrusted with
 discretionary powers, not only to act upon the defensive if
 attacked by the Nabob, but even to anticipate any hostile
 attempt by the seizure of Patna. This demand the Pre-
 sident had very earnestly opposed, from a strong convic-
 tion that the precipitation of Mr. Ellis would force the
 Company into war. By alarming representations, how-
 ever, of the imminent dangers to which the factory was
 exposed, and of the impossibility of receiving instructions
 from Calcutta in time for the adoption of measures indis-
 pensable for its safety, the permission which Mr. Ellis
 solicited was at last conferred. After a variety of reports
 received by the Nabob of operations, openly carried on by
 this gentleman, which could have nothing in view but a
 state of war, a letter was brought to him from the Go-
 vernor of Patna, on the 20th or 21st, informing him that
 Mr. Ellis had made preparations, and even constructed
 ladders, for attacking the fort. This seems to have put
 an end to the inclination, if any, which he had still re-
 tained for avoiding, by accommodation, the hazard of war.
 Commands were sent to stop the arms, which had already
 proceeded up the river : Mr. Amyatt was allowed to return
 to Calcutta : but Mr. Hay was detained, as a hostage for
 the Nabob's annals, imprisoned by the English. Intelli-
 gence of the departure of Amyatt reached Mr. Ellis on the
 24th. On that very night, he surprised and took the city
 of Patna. The news of this attack carried the resentment
 of the Nabob to that degree of violence, to which a long
 course of provocation, terminated by a deadly injury, was
 calculated to raise that passion in a half-civilized mind.
 He dispatched his orders to seize and make prisoners of
 the English wherever they were to be found ; among the
 rest to stop Mr. Amyatt, and send him with his retinue
 to Mongheer. As Mr. Amyatt refused to stop his boats,

BOOK IV. and answered the command which he received for that
CHAP. V. purpose by firing upon the Nabob's people, the boats were
immediately boarded, and in the struggle he himself, with
1763. several others, was slain.

Both parties now hastened to take the field. The Nabob was speedily encouraged by tidings from Patna. After Captain Carstairs, the officer commanding the English troops, which were sent a little before day-break on the morning of the 25th to surprise Patna, had, without much difficulty, finding the guards for the most part off their duty, scaled the walls; and after the Governor of Patna, who suddenly collected a portion of the garrison, and made a very short resistance, had left the city and fled towards Mongheer; the English, masters of the whole place, except the citadel, and a strong palace, into which an officer had thrown himself, broke through the rules of prudence as much in the prosecution, as they had broken through those of caution in the commencement of their operations. The troops were allowed to disperse, and were plundering the houses of the inhabitants; when the Governor, who had only marched a few miles before he met a detachment which had been sent to reinforce him from Mongheer, receiving at the same time intelligence of the resistance made by the citadel and palace, returned. The English were ill prepared to receive him. After a slight resistance they spiked their cannon, and retired to their factory. It was soon surrounded; when, fear taking place of their recent temerity, they evacuated the place during the night, and taking to their boats which were stationed at their cantonments at Bankipore they fled up the river to Chopperah, and towards the frontiers of Oude, where being attacked by the Fojedar of Sirkaur Sarun, they laid down their arms. The factory at Cossimbuzar was plundered about the same time; and all the English who belonged to it, as well as those who had fled from Patna, were sent prisoners to Mongheer.

It had, some time before, been determined in the Council, the President and Mr. Hastings refusing to concur, that in case of a war with Meer Casim, the door should be closed against accommodation, by divesting him of the government, and elevating another person to his throne. When the melancholy death, therefore, of Mr.

Amyatt became known, a negotiation was immediately commenced with Meer Jaffier, whose puerile passion to reign made him eager to promise compliance with any conditions which were proposed. Besides confirming the grant which had been obtained from Meer Casim of the revenues of the provinces of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, for defraying the expense of the English troops employed in the defence of the country, the new Subahdar granted exemption to the trade of the Company's servants from all duties, except the two and a half per cent. which these servants themselves, out of their own liberality, agreed to pay upon the single article of salt. He consented also to rescind the ordinance of Meer Casim for the general remission of commercial imposts, and to levy the ancient duties upon all except the English dealers. He engaged to maintain 12,000 horse, and 12,000 foot; to pay to the Company thirty lacks of rupees, on account of their losses and the expense of the war; to reimburse the personal losses of individuals, and to permit no Europeans but English to erect fortifications in the country.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.
1763.

On the 2d of July the English army was ordered to march from Gherettee. It consisted of 650 Europeans, and 1200 Sepoys, exclusive of the black cavalry, commanded by Major Adams, of the King's Eighty-fourth regiment; and was afterwards joined by 100 Europeans and a battalion of Sepoys from Midnapore. After concluding the treaty on the 11th, the new Nabob proceeded to the army, which he joined at Agurdeep on the 17th.

The first defensive movement of Meer Casim was to send three of his generals, with their respective troops, to post themselves, for the protection of Moorshedabad, between that city and the English army. That army encountered them on the 19th; and gave them a total defeat. They retreated from the battle towards Geriah, where they received command to post themselves, and where they were reinforced by the principal part of Meer Casim's army, among the rest by the German Sumroo,¹ who commanded the Sepoys, or the troops disciplined in the European manner, in the service of that Nabob. On

¹ This adventurer came to India as a serjeant in the French army.

BOOK IV. the 23d, the English army advanced to Chuna Cullee, and
 CHAP. V. on the 24th in the morning stormed the lines at Mootejil,
 which gave them possession of Moorshedabad. On the 2d
 1763. of August they reached the plain of Geriah, near Sootee,
 where the enemy waited and gave them battle. It was
 the severest conflict which the English had yet sustained
 with an Indian army. Meer Casim had been very ambi-
 tious to introduce the European order among his troops ;
 and he was now defended by a body of men better ap-
 pointed and better disciplined than those which any native
 commander had ever brought into the field. The battle
 lasted four hours, during which the enemy once broke a
 part of the English line, took possession of two guns, and
 attacked the Eighty-fourth regiment in front and rear.
 The steadiness, however, of the English exhausted the im-
 petuosity of their assailants, and in the end bestowed upon
 them a complete and brilliant victory. The enemy aban-
 doned all their cannon, with 150 boats laden with provi-
 sions, and fled to a strong post on a small stream, called
 the Oodwa, where Meer Casim had formed a very strong
 entrenchment. On every reverse of fortune, the fears and
 the rage of that unhappy man appear to have inflamed
 him to a renewed act of cruelty ; and Ramnarain, who
 hitherto had been retained a prisoner, with several chiefs
 and persons of distinction, was, upon the present disaster,
 ordered for execution. It was at this time only that Meer
 Casim, among whose qualities contempt of personal dan-
 ger had no share, having first conveyed his family and
 treasures to the strong hold of Rotas, left Mongheer. He
 marched towards Oodwa, but halting at a distance, con-
 tented himself with forwarding some bodies of troops. The
 English approached the entrenchment on the 11th. It
 occupied the whole of a narrow space which extended be-
 tween the river and the foot of the hills. The ditch, which
 was deep, was fifty or sixty feet broad, and full of water.
 The ground in front was swampy, and admitted no
 approach, except for a space of about 100 yards on the
 bank of the river. At this place the English, harassed
 daily by numerous bodies of cavalry both in front and
 rear, were detained for nearly a month. On the 5th of
 September, while a feigned attack at the bank of the river
 engaged the attention of the enemy, a grand effort was

made at the foot of the hills, and, in spite of an obstinate resistance, was crowned with success. Meer Casim, upon intelligence of this new misfortune, left his camp privately the succeeding night, and hastened to Mongheer, whither he was followed by the army in great disorder. He remained, however, only a few days, to secure some of his effects, and refresh his troops ; and then proceeded towards Patna. He carried with him the English prisoners ; and killed by the way the two celebrated Sets, the great Hindu bankers, whom, in the progress of his disputes with the English, he had seized and brought from Moorshedabad.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1764.

Mean time the English army advanced towards Mongheer, which they were obliged to attack regularly ; but early in October they made a practicable breach, when the garrison, consisting of 2000 Sepoys, capitulated. The loss of this place, which he had made his capital, threw Meer Casim into a paroxysm of rage ; during which he ordered the English prisoners to be massacred ; and Sumroo, the German, executed with alacrity the horrid command. Mr. Fullerton, the Surgeon, who, in the exercise of his profession, had gained a place in the affections of Meer Casim, was the only individual whom he spared. As the English were advancing towards Patna, Meer Casim departed to some distance from the city. The garrison defended it with spirit ; even took one of the English batteries, and blew up their magazine. But the ruinous fortifications were not calculated for a prolonged resistance, and Patna was taken by storm on the 6th of November. After the loss of this place, Meer Casim made no further resistance. He formed his resolution to throw himself upon the protection of the Nabob of Oude the Vizir, and made haste to take refuge in his dominions. The English army followed him to the banks of the Carumnassa, which they reached early in December.

A treaty, in which the Vizir had bound himself by his oath on the Coran to support the ejected Nabob, had been concluded, before that unfortunate chief crossed the boundary of his own dominions. At that time the Emperor and Suja-ad-dowla were encamped at Allahabad, preparing an expedition against Bundelcund, the predatory inhabitants of which had refused to pay their revenues.

BOOK IV. Meer Casim was received by them with all the distinction
 CHAP. V. due to the greatest viceroy of the Mogul empire. As the
 1764. enterprise against the Bundelas threatened to retard the
 assistance which he was impatient to receive against the
 English, he offered to reduce them with his own battalions,
 crossed the Jumna, took one of their fortresses, and so
 alarmed them, by his artillery, and his Sepoys, dressed and
 disciplined in the European manner, that they hastened
 to make their submission; and Suja-ad-dowla who, under
 pretence of assisting Meer Casim, already grasped in his
 expectation the three provinces of the East, marched with
 his allies to Benares, to make preparations for his selfish
 enterprise.

In the mean time the English, who were ignorant of his
 designs, and not without hopes that he would either de-
 liver Meer Cassim into their hands, or at least deprive him
 of his treasures and troops, directed that the army should
 be cantoned on the frontiers for the purpose of watching
 his motions. In this situation an alarming disaffection
 broke out among the troops. The importance and diffi-
 culties of the service which they had rendered in reco-
 vering the provinces from Meer Casim, had raised a high
 expectation of some proportional reward. Nor had the op-
 portunity of acting upon them been neglected by the
 emissaries of the enemy. On the 11th of February, the Eu-
 ropean battalion stood to their arms, and, after loading
 their pieces and fixing their bayonets, took possession of
 the artillery parks, and marched towards the Caruninassa.
 The Sepoys were also in motion; but, of them, by the
 exertions of their officers, a great proportion were induced
 to return. Of the Europeans, the English, with few excep-
 tions, desisted and came back; the rest, in number about
 300, of whom some were Germans, and the greater
 part were French, proceeded towards Benares. At the
 beginning of the month of March, when Major Carnac
 arrived to take the command, a mutinous disposition still
 prevailed among the troops; provisions were in great scar-
 city, and the preparations making for the invasion of the
 province by the Nabob of Oude were no longer a secret.
 Though urged by the Governor and Council to act upon
 the offensive, and to push the war into Suja-ad-dowla's
 dominions, he agreed with all his officers in opinion, that

without a greater certainty of provisions, especially in the present temper of the troops, the hazard ought not to be incurred. At the beginning of April, when the enemy crossed the Ganges, and began to advance, the English, straitened for provisions, and afraid lest by a circuitous route a detachment of the hostile army should get between them and Patna, retreated to that city and encamped under the walls. Early in the morning of the 3rd of May, the enemy approached in order of battle, and began a cannonade, which before noon was converted into a general and vigorous attack. Sumroo, with the choice of the infantry, supported by a large body of cavalry, assailed the English in front; while the main body of the army made an onset in the rear. The English army, and particularly the Sepoys, who bore the principal weight of the attack, behaved with great steadiness and gallantry. It was sunset before the enemy was completely repulsed. At that time, the English were too much worn-out with fatigue to be able to pursue. Their loss, at least in Europeans, was inconsiderable: the slaughter of the assailants great. From this day till the 30th, the enemy hovered about Patna, continually shifting their position, and keeping the English in perpetual expectation of a renewed attack, without allowing them an opportunity, such at least as Carnac thought it prudent to seize, of acting on the offensive. During this time Suja-ad-dowla opened a correspondence with Meer Jaffier, the new Nabob. But as the English would listen to no proposal without the preliminary condition of surrendering Meer Casim, Sumroo, and the deserters; and as the pretensions of Suja-ad-dowla extended to nothing less than the province of Bahar, it led to no agreement. The rains being now at hand, and the treasury of the Vizir severely feeling the burden of so great an army in the field, he marched away on the 30th, with great expedition. At this time, the Emperor, uneasy under the treatment which he received from the greedy and unprincipled Vizir, sent a private message, offering to form a separate connexion with the English; but Major Carnac refused to open a correspondence. Without venturing to pursue the enemy, he sent a strong detachment across the Ganges, to threaten Suja-ad-dowla's frontier; which had the effect of making him hasten to his own dominions.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. V.

1764.

BOOK IV. In the month of May, Major, afterwards Sir Hector
 CHAP. V. Munro, arrived from Bombay with a body of troops, partly
 ——— King's and partly Company's; and hastened with them to
 1764. Patna, to take the command of the army. He found the
 troops, Europeans as well as Sepoys, extremely mutinous,
 deserting to the enemy, threatening to carry off their offi-
 ciers, demanding higher pay, and a large donation, pro-
 mised, as they affirmed, by the Nabob.¹ The Major
 resolved to subdue this spirit by the severest measures.
 He had hardly arrived when a whole battalion of Sepoys,
 with their arms and accoutrements, went off to join the
 enemy. He immediately detached a body of troops on
 whom he thought he could depend, to pursue them and
 bring them back. They overtook them in the night, when
 asleep, and made them prisoners. The Major ready to
 receive them with the troops under arms, ordered their
 officers to select fifty, whom they deemed the most de-
 praved and mischievous, and of this fifty to select again
 twenty-four of the worst. He then ordered a field court-
 martial, composed of their own black officers, to be im-
 mediately held; and addressed the court, impressing them
 with a sense of the destruction which impended over an
 army in which crimes like these were not effectually re-
 pressed. The prisoners were found guilty of mutiny and
 desertion, and sentenced to suffer death in any manner
 which the commander should direct. He ordered four of
 them to be immediately tied to the guns, and blown away;
 when four grenadiers presented themselves, and begged, as
 they had always had the post of honour, that they should
 first be allowed to suffer. After the death of these four
 men, the European officers of the battalions of Sepoys
 who were then in the field came to inform the Major that
 the Sepoys would not suffer the execution of any more.
 He ordered the artillery officers to load the field pieces
 with grape; and drew up the Europeans,¹ with the guns in
 their intervals. He then desired the officers to return to
 the head of their battalions; after which he commanded
 the battalions to ground their arms, and assured them if a
 man attempted to move that he would give orders to fire.
 Sixteen more of the twenty-four men were then blown }

¹ It appears by Munro's evidence (First Report, Committee, 1772) that such a promise was made to them, and through Major Adams.

away; the remaining four were sent to another place of BOOK IV.
cantonment, and executed in the same manner. Nothing
is more singular, than that the same men, in whom it is
endeavoured to raise to the highest pitch the contempt of
death, and who may be depended upon for meeting it,
without hesitation at the hand of the enemy, should yet
tremble, and be subdued, when threatened with it by their
own officers.

1764.

The rains drawing to a close, Munro appointed the 15th of September as the day of rendezvous from the several places of cantonment. He then advanced toward the Soane, to which the enemy had forwarded several bodies of horse; and where they had thrown up some breastworks, to impede the passage of their assailants. Having sent a detachment to cross the river at some distance below, for the purpose of attacking the enemy at a concerted moment and covering the passage of the troops, he gained the opposite side without molestation; and advanced toward Buxar, where the hostile armies were encamped. For the last two or three days the line of march was harassed by the enemy's cavalry; and the Major encamped on the 22nd of October within gun shot of the enemy's camp, entrenched with the Ganges on its left, and the village and fort of Buxar in the rear. An attack was intended the same night; but the spies not coming in till towards morning, it could not take place. About eight o'clock in the morning the enemy were seen advancing; and as the troops were encamped in order of battle, they were in a few minutes ready for action. The battle began about nine, and lasted till twelve; when the enemy gave way, and retired slowly, blowing up some tumbrils and magazines of powder as they withdrew. The Major ordered the line to break into columns and follow: but the enemy, by destroying a bridge of boats upon a stream of water two miles from the field of battle, effectually impeded the pursuit. This was one of the most critical and important victories in the history of the British wars in that part of the globe. It broke completely the force of Suja-ad-dowla, the only Mogul chief who retained till this period any considerable strength; it placed the Emperor himself under the protection of the English; and left them without dispute the greatest power in India.

BOOK IV. The very day after the battle, the Emperor sent his
CHAP. V. application to the English commander; who immediately
 1764. wrote to the Presidency for directions; and received
 authority to conclude an agreement. The Emperor complained that he had been the state prisoner of Suja-ad-dowla; and before the answer from Calcutta arrived, marched along with the English, and encamped with his guards close to them every night. When the army arrived at Benares, Suja-ad-dowla sent his minister with overtures of peace; promising twenty-five lacks of rupees to reimburse the Company for the expenses of the war; twenty-five lacks to the army: and eight lacks to the Commander himself. The preliminary surrender of Meer Casim and Sunroo was still however demanded. The perfidious Vizir had already violated the laws of hospitality and honour towards his wretched guest. A quarrel was picked, on account of the non-payment of the monthly subsidy which the Ex-Nabob had promised for the troops employed in attempting his restoration; the unhappy fugitive was arrested in his tent; and his treasures were seized. Still the Nabob dreaded the infamy of delivering him up; but, if that would satisfy the English, he offered to let him escape. With regard to Sunroo, his proposal was to invite him to an entertainment, and have him despatched in presence of any English gentleman who might be sent to witness the scene. As this mode of their enemies was not agreeable to English morality, the negociation ceased: but Meer Casim, who dreaded the conclusion to which it might lead, contrived to escape with his family and a few friends into the Rohilla country, whither he had providently, before the plunder of his treasures, despatched a dependant with some of his jewels.

The negotiation with the Emperor proceeded with less obstruction. It was proposed, as far as mutual approbation extended, agreed and contracted; that the English by virtue of the imperial grant, should obtain possession of Gauzeepore, and the rest of the territory of Bulwar Sing, the Zemindar of Benares; that on the other hand they should establish the Emperor in the possession of Allahabad, and the rest of the dominions of Suja-ad-dowla; and the Emperor engaged to reimburse them after

wards, out of the royal revenues, for the whole of the expense which this service might oblige them to incur. BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

In the mean time, affairs of no trivial importance were transacting in the Council. They had been extremely urgent with Meer Jaffier to leave the army, and come down to Calcutta, before Major Carnac quitted the command. The treasury of the Company was in a most exhausted state; and every effort was to be used to make Jaffier yield it a more abundant supply. In addition to the sums for which he had contracted in the recent treaty, a promise was drawn from him to pay five lacks per month toward the expense of the war so long as it should last. But his former engagements to the Company were not yet discharged. The payments also to individuals, stipulated under the title of compensation for losses, were swelled to an oppressive amount. When this article was first inserted in the treaty, the Nabob was informed that the demand at the utmost would extend to a sum of about ten lacks. That demand, however, was soon after stated at twenty, then at thirty, afterwards at forty, and at last was fixed at fifty-three lacks of rupees. We are assured, by a Director of the Company, "That all delicacy was laid aside in the manner in which payment was obtained for this sum, of which seven-eighths was for losses sustained, or said to be sustained, in an illicit monopoly of the necessaries of life, carried on against the orders of the Company, and to the utter ruin of many thousands of the Indian merchants; that of the whole one half was soon extorted from him, though part of the payments to the Company was still undischarged, and though the Company was sinking under the burden of war, and obliged to borrow great sums of money of their servants at eight per cent. interest, and even with that assistance unable to carry on the war and their investment, but obliged to send their ships half loaded to Europe."¹ By the revenues of the three ceded districts, added to the monthly payment for the war, "the Company," we are informed by Clive, "became possessed of one half of the Nabob's revenues. He was allowed," says that great informant, "to collect the other half for himself; but in fact he was no more than a banker for the Company's servants, who could draw

1764.

¹ Scrafton's Observations on Vansittart's Narrative, p. 48, 49.

BOOK IV. upon him" (meaning for presents) "as often, and to as great an amount as they pleased."¹ "To all other causes of embarrassment in the finances of Jaffier were added the abuses perpetrated in conducting the private trade of the Company's servants, which not only disturbed the collection of the taxes, but impeded the industry of the whole country.² In such circumstances it was to no purpose to harass the Nabob for larger payments. The importunities to which he was subjected³ only conspired, with the infirmities of age and of a body worn out with pleasure, to hurry him to his grave. After languishing several weeks at Calcutta, he returned to Moorshedabad, loaded with disease, and died in January, 1765.

The making of a new Nabob, the most distinguished of all occasions for presents, was never disagreeable to the Company's servants. The choice lay between the next surviving son of Jaffier, Nujum-ad-dowla, a youth of about twenty years of age; and the son of Meeran, his eldest, a child of about six. According to the laws and customs of the country, the title of both might be regarded as equal. In point of right, the office of Subahdar was not only not hereditary, it was, like any other office under the Mogul government, held at the will of the Emperor; and, during the vigorous days of the Mogul dynasty, no Subahdar had ever been permitted to enjoy it long. In the decline of that power, the Subahdars became frequently, during their

¹ Clive's Speech, March 30th, 1772, in Almon's Debates, x. 14.

² Mr. Gray, resident at Maulda, of date January, 1764, wrote to the President, "Since my arrival here, I have had an opportunity of seeing the villainous practices used by the Calcutta gomastahs in carrying on their business. The government have certainly too much reason to complain of their want of influence in their country, which is torn to pieces by a set of rascals, who in Calcutta walk in rags, but when they are set out on gomastahships, lord it over the country, imprisoning the ryots and merchants, and writing and talking in the most insolent, domineering manner, to the fouzدارs and officers." In like manner, Mr. Senior, Chief at Cossimbuzar, wrote, in March, 1764, "It would amaze you, the number of complaints that daily come before me of the extravagancies committed by our agents and gomastahs all over the country." See Verelst, p. 49.

³ Your Committee then examined Archibald Swinton, Esq., who was Captain in the army in Bengal in 1765, and also Persian interpreter, and Aide-de-Camp to General Carnac. And he informed your Committee, that he had frequent conversations with Meer Jaffier about the five lacks of rupees per month, stipulated to be paid by Meer Jaffier in October, 1764, and the other demands made on him by the Board; of which he frequently heard Meer Jaffier complain bitterly; and of all the demands made upon him at that time, which had not been stipulated in the treaty with the Company on his restoration—*particularly the increased demand for restitution of losses*, and the donation to the navy." Third Report, Committee, 1772.

lives, too formidable to be removed; and the Emperors contented themselves with resuming their power when the provincial chief expired. But it sometimes also happened, that a son, brother, or other relative, succeeded too rapidly and too completely to the power of the deceased, to render it convenient to attempt his removal. The Emperor contented himself with a nominal, when an efficient choice was out of his power; and on these terms had the Subahdaree of the eastern provinces been held for some generations. The right of choice belonged unquestionably to the Emperor; but to this right the servants of the Company never for a moment thought of paying any regard.¹ That unhappy, dependent sovereign, now stript of all his dominions, while great kingdoms were still governed in his name, might have recovered the immediate sovereignty of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, at the word of the English; or, despairing of so generous and self-denying a policy, would gladly have bestowed the Subahdaree upon them. The dewanee or collection, receipt and disbursement of the revenue, which in the present state of the country implied all the powers of government, he had repeatedly offered to them; and very recently, through Major Munro. But the modesty of the English, still alarmed at the thought of declaring themselves sovereigns of Bengal, grasped powerfully at the reality, though it desired to shun the appearance of power. The long minority, which would have followed the choice of the infant son of Meeran, would have placed the government, even to the minutest details, in the hands of the Company; and the present rulers were blamed by their successors for not securing so great an advantage. But they looked for some assistance in the drudgery of governing, from a Nabob of mature age, and had no difficulty in believing that the shadow of power with which he was to be invested would little interfere with either the pleasure or the profits of English domination. Another motive had doubtless some weight: Nujum-ud-dowla could give presents; the infant son of Meeran, whose revenues must be accounted for to the Company, could not.

¹ On this Sir J. Malcolm observes, "However politic it might have been to have gained the sanction of the Emperor and the Nawab Vizir, after the measure was adopted, a previous application would have been the height of folly and of weakness." *Life of Clive*, ii. 293.—W.

BOOK IV. In the treaty with the new Nabob, dated in February, 1765, it was resolved by the English, to take the military defence of the country entirely into their own hands; and to allow the Nabob to keep only so many troops as should be necessary for the parade of government, the distribution of justice, and the business of the collections. They had two motives; one was to preclude the possibility of inconvenience from the power of the Nabob; the second was to make provision for the defence of the country, which they found, by experience under Meer Jaffier, would depend almost entirely upon themselves. And we may suppose that another consideration was not without its influence; that a still greater share of the revenues might pass through their hands. The civil government of the country was no less effectually transferred from the Nabob to his faithful allies. He bound himself to choose, by the advice of the Governor and Council, a Deputy, who, under the appellation of Naib Subah, should have the entire management of all the affairs of government, and not be removable without their consent. The Nabob suffered more in submitting to this condition than to all the rest; and showed extreme solicitude about the choice of the person who was to fill that important office. Mohammed Reza Khan was appointed by the Governor and Council; and appears to have been one of the best men, whom, under Indian morality, it was easy to find. The Nabob was eager for the nomination of Nuncomar, who, beyond dispute, was one of the worst. This man, who was governor of Hoogley, at the time when Suraj-ad-dowla took Calcutta, had rendered himself conspicuous by a restless ambition, and unbounded avarice, which he sought to gratify by the vilest arts of intrigue, by dissimulation and perfidy. He had, at an early period, become odious to the English, as a deceitful and dangerous character, and was a prisoner in Calcutta for having corresponded with their enemies, while Meer Jaffier resided there, during the Nabobship of Meer Casim. During this time, he paid his court so very successfully to the dethroned Nabob, that upon his restoration, he solicited, as an object of the first importance to be allowed to employ Nuncomar as his minister. Though Vansittart, and even some of those who in general

concurred not in his views, objected to this arrangement, on account of the exceptionable character of the man, the Council, as the last triumph, according to Vansittart, of a factious party, decided, that the Nabob might enjoy his choice. Nuncomar redeemed not his character with the English, while he governed the Nabob. The want of corn, under which the operations of the army were impeded at Patna, the disappointments in the receipt of monies from the Nabob, were all principally laid to the charge of Nuncomar ; who was also vehemently suspected of having carried on a traitorous correspondence with the Nabob of Oude. Mr. Vansittart had, a little before this time, returned to Europe, and was succeeded in the chair by Mr. Spencer, as the oldest member of the Board. As opposition to the Governor, therefore, no longer actuated the Council, the general opinion of the character of Nuncomar produced its proper effect ; and he was peremptorily excluded from the government of the country. The other conditions of the treaty were nearly the same as those of the treaty with the old Nabob. Beside the revenues of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, the five lacks per month were to be continued during the war, and as much of them after the war as the state of the country might, to the English, seem to require. And the grand privilege to the Company's servants of trading free from the duties which other merchants paid within the country, and of paying only two and a half per cent. upon the single article of salt, was carefully preserved. The government of the country was now so completely in the hands of the English, that the accountants of the revenue were not to be appointed except with their approbation.

During the military and political transactions which so intensely engaged their servants in India, the Courts of Directors and Proprietors remained for several years rather quiet spectators and warm expectants, than keen and troublesome controllers. When they had been agitated for a while, however, by the reports of mismanagement which were mutually transmitted to them by Vansittart and his opponents ; and, at last, when they were alarmed by the news of a war actually kindled with the Nabob, of the massacre of so many of their servants, and the extensive spirit of mutiny among the troops, their sense of

BOOK IV.

CHAP. V.

1765.

BOOK IV. danger roused them to some acts of authority. Though
 CHAP. V. Clive had quitted India with an act of insult towards his
 1765. employers, which they had highly resented; though the
 Directors had disputed and withheld payment of the proceeds of his jaghire, for which he had commenced a suit against them in the Court of Chancery; he was now proposed for Governor, as the only man capable of retrieving their disordered and desperate affairs. Only thirteen Directors, however, were found, after a violent contest, to vote for his appointment; while it was still opposed by eleven.¹ Yet the high powers which he demanded, as

¹ Clive's reappointment was the act of the Proprietors, and was forced by them upon the Court of Directors, after a series of angry discussions. A general court was called on Monday the 27th February, 1764, upon the requisition of the usual number of Proprietors, "having," as they declared, "just reason to be alarmed at the present dangerous and critical state of the Company's affairs in Bengal, and other parts of India;" and desiring that the affairs might be taken into consideration. The meeting was occupied with the communication of such of the correspondence with Bengal, as related to the recent transactions there, and a second meeting having been principally engaged with similar matters, the main question was adjourned to a third, on the following day. When a motion was made that the nomination of Mr. Spencer, as Governor of Bengal, should be referred back to the Court of Directors for their reconsideration, a warm debate ensued which ended in a resolution that the question should not be put, which was carried by a majority of 184 to 141. The friends of Lord Clive were however not to be thus baffled—a number of new shareholders was immediately created, and a second requisition was addressed to the Directors, in consequence of which a fourth general court took place on the 12th of March, when, after a violent discussion, a motion was made and carried, "that it was the desire of the General Court, that Lord Clive be requested to take upon him the station of President of Bengal, and the command of the Company's military forces upon his arrival at that Presidency."

The business was not yet terminated, for Lord Clive, on thanking the Court for their nomination, suspended his acquiescence until he should be satisfied that the Court of Directors was as well disposed towards him as he was towards them; no further discussion then took place, but on the 21st March, on the occasion of a Quarterly General Court, an inquiry was made whether Lord Clive would signify his immediate acceptance of the station he had been requested to take upon him. To this, Clive, who was in Court, replied, he would give his answer as soon as the next election of Directors should be determined. On which a motion was made by a member of the opposite party, that as Lord Clive declined to accept immediately the service proposed to him, the Court of Directors should be desired to make other arrangements. This was followed by a long debate, in which Clive explained his objection to be directed especially against the influence of the Deputy Chairman, Mr. Sullivan, who in return pledged his faith and honour to the Court, that he was ready to co-operate with the proposed Governor in a friendly spirit, and many persons joining in urging "with great energy and very pathetically," a mutual oblivion of all differences, Clive so far relented, as to promise, that he would declare his determination in a few days if indulged with the delay: with this compromise, the motion, which does not seem to have been seconded, was dropped, and the Court adjourned.

Clive carried his point, for before another General Court could be assembled, the annual election of Directors took place, and his antagonist Sullivan, although returned, resumed his seat by a majority of only one vote, whilst the Chairs were filled by Messrs. Rous and Bolton, both friends of Lord Clive. His answer was now promptly given, and on the 2nd of May, 1764, it was announced to the Proprietors that he had been sworn in President and Governor of Bengal, and Commander of the Forces. MSS. Records.—W.

indispensable for the arduous services necessary to be performed, though strongly opposed, were also finally conferred. He was invested with the powers of Commander-in-Chief, President, and Governor in Bengal; and, together with four gentlemen, named by the Directors, was to form a Select Committee, empowered to act by their own authority, as often as they deemed it expedient, without consulting the Council, or being subject to its control.

The Directors, at the same time, condemned, in the severest terms, the rapacious and unwarranted proceedings of their servants. In their letter to the Governor and Council of Bengal, dated the 8th of February, 1764, "One grand source," they said, "of the disputes, misunderstandings, and difficulties, which have occurred with the country government, appears evidently to have taken its rise from the unwarrantable and licentious manner of carrying on the private trade by the Company's servants, their gomastahs, agents, and others, to the prejudice of the Subah, both with respect to his authority and the revenues justly due to him; the diverting and taking from his natural subjects the trade in the inland parts of the country, to which neither we, or any persons whatsoever dependent upon us, or under our protection, have any manner of right. In order, therefore, to remedy all these disorders, we do hereby positively order and direct, --That from the receipt of this letter, a final and effectual end be forthwith put to the inland trade in salt, betelnut, tobacco, and all other articles whatsoever, produced and consumed in the country."¹ In his correspondence

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1765.

¹ See the Extract at length in the Second Report, Select Committee, 1772. In another letter to the Governor and Council of Bengal, dated 24th December, 1765, the Directors say, "Your deliberations on the inland trade have laid open to us a scene of most cruel oppression, which is indeed exhibited at one view of the 13th article of the Nabob's complaints, mentioned thus in your Consultation of the 17th October, 1764: 'The poor of the country, who used always to deal in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, are now deprived of their daily bread by the trade of the Europeans, whereby no kind of advantage accrues to the Company, and the Government's revenues are greatly injured.' We shall for the present observe to you, that every one of our servants concerned in this trade has been guilty of a breach of his covenants, and a disobedience to our orders. In your consultations of the 3rd of May, we find among the various extortionate practices, the most extraordinary one of burjaut, or forcing the natives to buy goods beyond the market price, which you there acknowledged to have been frequently practised. In your resolution to prevent this practice you determine to forbid it, 'but with such care and discretion as not to affect the Company's investment, as you do not mean to invalidate the right derived to the Company from the phirmaund, which they have always held over the weavers.' As the Company are known to

BOOK IV. with the Court of Directors, on the subject of his return to
 CHAP. V. Bengal, Clive expressed himself in the following manner :

1765.

"The trading in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, having been one cause of the present disputes, I hope these articles will be restored to the Nabob, and your servants absolutely forbidden to trade in them. This will be striking at the root of the evil."¹ At a general meeting, however, of proprietors, held on the 18th of May, 1764, it was urged by several active members, and urged to the conviction of the majority, that the servants of the Company in India ought not to be deprived of such precious advantages ; which enabled them to revisit their native countries with such independent fortunes as they were entitled to expect. The Court therefore RESOLVED, "That it be recommended to the Court of Directors to reconsider the orders sent to Bengal relative to the trade of the Company's servants in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, and to regulate this important point, either by restrictions framed at home, or by referring it to the Governor and Council of Fort William."² In consequence of this recommendation, the Court of Directors by letter dated 1st of June, 1764, and sent by the same ship which carried out Lord Clive, instruct the Governor and Council, after, "consulting the Nabob, to form a proper and equitable plan for carrying on the inland trade."

The presents which, since their acquiring an ascendancy in the government, their servants had been in the habit of

purchase their investment by ready money only, we require a full explanation how this can affect them, or how it ever could have been practised in the purchase of their investment, (which the latter part of Mr. Johnstone's minute, entered on Consultation the 21st July, 1764, insinuates); for it would almost justify a suspicion, that the goods of our servants have been put off to the weavers, in part payment of the Company's investment."

¹ Letter to Directors, dated 27th April, 1764. Fourth Report, App. No. 2.

² In quoting this resolution, some important omissions have been made; as no reference is given, it is not possible to say with whom they originate. The entire resolution runs, "that it be recommended to the Court of Directors to reconsider the orders sent to Bengal relative to the Trade of the Company's servants in the articles of Salt, Betel, and Tobacco, and that they do give such directions for regulating the same, *agreeably to the interests of the Company and the Subah*, as to them may appear prudent, either by settling here at home the restrictions under which this trade ought to be carried on, or by referring it to the Governor and Council of Fort William, to regulate this important point in such a manner *as may prevent all future disputes* between the Subah and the Company." The professed object of the resolution, therefore, was not the advantage of the Company's servants, although it is possible that it had in prospect the arrangement afterwards adopted by Clive in Bengal. MSS. Records.—W.

receiving, sometimes to a very large amount, from the Nabobs and other chiefs of the country, were another subject which now engaged the serious attention of the Company. The practice which prevails in all rude governments of accompanying any application to a man in power with a gratification to some of his ruling passions, most frequently to the steadiest of all his passions, his avarice or rapacity, has always remarkably distinguished the governments in the East, and hardly any to so extraordinary a degree as the governments of the very rude people of India. When the English suddenly acquired their extraordinary power in Bengal, the current of presents, so well accustomed to take its course in the channel drawn by hope and fear, flowed very naturally, and very copiously, into the lap of the strangers. A person in India, who had favours to ask, or evil to deprecate, could not easily believe, till acceptance of his present, that the great man to whom he addressed himself was not his foe. Besides the sums, which we may suppose it to have been in the power of the receivers to conceal, and of the amount of which it is not easy to form a conjecture, the following were detected and disclosed by the Committee of the House of Commons, in 1773.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.

1765.

“Account of such Sums as have been proved or acknowledged before the Committee to have been distributed by the Princes and other Natives of Bengal, from the Year 1757 to the Year 1766, both inclusive; distinguishing the principal Times of the said Distributions, and specifying the Sums received by each Person respectively.”

Revolution in favour of Meer Jaffier in 1757.

Mr. Drake (Governor)	Rupees.	280,000	£31,500
Colonel Clive as second in the Select Committee		280,000	
Ditto as Commander in Chief		200,000	
Ditto as a private donation		1600,000 ¹	
		—————	2,080,000 234,000

¹ It appears, by the Extract in the Appendix, No. 102, from the evidence given on the trial of Raim Churn before the Governor and Council in 1761, by Roy Dulip, who had the principal management in the distribution of the treasures of the deceased Nabob Surajah Dowla, upon the accession of Jaffier Ally Cawn—that Roy Dulip then received, as a present from Colonel Clive, one lack, 25,000 rupees, being five per cent. on 25 lacks. It does not appear that this evidence was taken on oath.”

BOOK IV. Mr. Watts as a Member of the		Rupees.	Rupees.
CHAP. V.	Committee	240,000	
	Ditto as a private donation	800,000	
1765.		1,040,000	117,000
	Major Kilpatrick	240,000	27,000
	Ditto as a private donation	300,000	33,750
	Mr. Maningham	240,000	27,000
	Mr. Becher	240,000	27,000
	Six Members of Council one lack each	600,000	68,200
	Mr. Walsh	500,000	56,250
	Mr. Scrafton	200,000	22,500
	Mr. Lushington	50,000	5,625
	Stipulation to the navy and army		600,000
			1,261,075
	Memorandum, the sum of two lacks to Lord Clive, as Commander in Chief, must be deducted from this account, it being included in the donation to the army		22,500
	Lord Clive's jaghire was likewise obtained at this period ¹		1,238,575

Revolution in favour of Cossim, 1760.

Mr. Sumner		28,000
Mr. Holwell	270,000	30,937
Mr. McGuire	180,000	20,625
Mr. Smyth	134,000	15,354
Major Yorke	134,000	15,354
General Caillaud	200,000	22,916
Mr. Vansittart, 1762, received seven lacks; but the two lacks to General Caillaud are included; so that only five lacks must be counted for here	500,000	58,333
Mr. McGuire 5000 gold mohrs	75,000	8,750
		200,269

¹ This, as noticed by Sir J. Malcolm, *Life of Clive*, ii. 187, is incorrect. The Jaghire was not granted till the end of 1769, two years after Mir Jaffer had been seated on the throne.—W.

Revolution in favour of Jaffier, 1763.			BOOK IV.
	Rupees.	£	CHAP. V.
Stipulation to the army	2,500,000	291,666	<hr/> 1765. <hr/>
Ditto to the navy	1,250,000	145,833	
		437,499	
Major Munro ¹ in 1764 received from			
Bulwan Singh		10,000	}
Ditto from the Nabob		3,000	
The officers belonging to Major Munro's			
family from ditto		3,000	
The army received from the merchants			
at Banaras	400,000	46,666	
		62,666	
Nudjum ul Dowla's Accession, 1765.			
Mr. Spencer	200,000	23,333	
Messieurs Pleydell, Burdett, and Gray,			
one lack each	300,000	35,000	
Mr. Johnstone	237,000	27,650	
Mr. Leycester	112,500	13,125	
Mr. Senior	172,500	20,125	
Mr. Middleton	122,500	14,291	
Mr. Gideon Johnstone	50,000	5,833	
		139,257 ²	
General Carnac received from Bulwan-			
sing in 1765	80,000	9,333	
Ditto from the King	200,000	23,333	
Lord Clive received from the Begum			
in 1766	500,000	58,333	
		90,999	

¹ It appears Colonel Munro accepted a jaghire from the King, of £12,500 a-year, which he delivered to the Nabob Meer Jaffier, the circumstances of which are stated in the Journals of last year, 1825."

² These sums appear by evidence to have been received by the parties; but the Committee think proper to state, that Mohammed Reza Cawn intended a present of one lack of rupees to each of the four deputies sent to treat with Nudjum al Dowla upon his father's death; viz. Messieurs Johnstone, Leycester, Senior, and Middleton; but Mr. Middleton and Mr. Leycester affirm that they never accepted theirs, and Mr. Johnstone appears to have tendered his back to Mohammed Reza Cawn, who would not accept them. These bills (except Mr. Senior's, for 50,000 rupees) appear to have been afterwards laid before the Select Committee, and no further evidence has been produced to your Committee concerning them. Mr. Senior received 50,000 rupees of his, and it is stated against him in this account."

BOOK IV.

Restitution—Jaffier, 1757.

CHAP. V.		£
1765.	East India Company	1,200,000
	Europeans	600,000
	Natives	250,000
	Armenians	100,000
		2,150,000

Cossim, 1760.

East India Company	62,500
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Jaffier, 1763.

East India Company	375,000
Europeans, Natives, &c.	600,000
	975,000

Peace with Suja-ad-dowla.

East India Company	5,000,000	583,333
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Total of Presents, 2,169,665*l*.

Restitution, &c. 3,770,833*l*.

Total Amount, exclusive of Lord

Clive's jaghire £5,940,498

Memorandum. The rupees are valued according to the rate of exchange of the Company's bills at the different periods."¹

That this was a practice presenting the strongest demand for effectual regulation, its obvious consequences render manifest and indisputable. In the first place, it laid the nabobs, rulers, and other leading men of the country, under endless and unlimited oppression; because, so long as they on whom their whole power and influence depended were pleased to desire presents, nothing could be withheld which they either possessed or had it in their power to ravage and extort. That the temptations under which the servants of the Company were placed carried them to those heights of exaction which were within their reach, is far from true. They showed, on the contrary, a reserve and forbearance, which the education received in no other country, probably in the world, except their own, could have enabled men, in their extraordinary circum-

¹ Third Report on the Nature, State, and Condition of E. I. Company, 1772, p. 20—23.

stances, to maintain. Besides the oppression upon the people of the country, to which the receiving of presents prepared the way, this dangerous practice laid the foundation of perpetual perfidy in the servants of the Company to the interests of their employers. Not those plans of policy which were calculated to produce the happiest results to the Company, but those which were calculated to multiply the occasions for presents, and render them most effectual, were the plans recommended by the strongest motives of interest to the agents and representatives of the Company in India. It is still less true, in the case of perfidy to the Company, than in the case of oppression to the natives, that the interests of the Company's servants were to the greatest practicable extent pursued. There seems not upon the most jealous scrutiny, any reason to believe that any one of the greatest transactions or revolutions, in which the English, up to this period were instrumental, was not sincerely regarded at the time, by the men on whom the decision depended, as required by the interests of their employers and country; nor has it yet been certainly made appear, that in any of the instances in question, the circumstances of the moment admitted of a better decision.

The Company now resolved that the benefit of presents should at any rate change masters: and they ordained and commanded, that new covenants, dated May, 1764, should be executed by all their servants, both civil and military, binding them to pay to the Company the amount of all presents and gratuities in whatsoever shape, received from the natives, in case the amount exceeded four thousand rupees; and not to accept any present or gratuity, though not exceeding four thousand rupees, if amounting to so much as one thousand, without the consent of the President and Council. An unbounded power was still reserved by the Honourable Company for receiving or extorting presents in benefit to themselves. But as their servants were in no danger of being so rapacious for their masters' emolument as their own, any effects which this regulation was calculated to produce were all naturally good.

With these powers and regulations, Lord Clive (such was now the rank and title of this Anglo-Indian chief) sailed from England on the 4th of June, 1764, and arrived

BOOK IV.
CHAP. V.
1765.

BOOK IV. at Madras on the 10th of April, 1765 ; where he received
 CHAP. V. intelligence that the dangers of which the alarm had sent
 1765. him to India were entirely removed ; that the troops were
 obedient ; that not only Meer Casim was expelled, but all
 his supporters subdued ; that the Emperor had cast him-
 self upon the protection of the English ; and that the
 Nabob, Meer Jaffier, was dead. His sentiments upon this
 intelligence were communicated in a private letter to Mr.
 Rous, dated seven days exactly after his arrival :¹ " We
 have at last," said he, " arrived at that critical period
which I have long foreseen ; I mean that period which
 renders it necessary for us to determine, whether we can
 or shall take the whole to ourselves. Jaffier Ally Khan
 is dead, and his natural son is a minor ; but I know not
 whether he is yet declared successor. Suja-ad-dowla is
 beaten from his dominion ; we are in possession of it, and it
 is scarcely hyperbole to say, to-morrow the whole Mogul
 empire is in our power. The inhabitants of the country,
 we know by long experience, have no attachment to any
 obligation. Their forces are neither disciplined, com-
 manded, nor paid as ours are. Can it then be doubted
 that a large army of Europeans will effectually preserve us
 as sovereigns : not only holding in awe the attempts of any
 country Prince, but by rendering us so truly formidable
 that no French, Dutch, or other enemy will presume to
 molest us.—You will, I am sure, imagine with me, that
 after the length we have run, the Princes of Indostan
 must conclude our views to be boundless ; they have such
 instances of our ambition, that they cannot suppose us
 capable of moderation. The very Nabobs whom we might
 support, would be either covetous of our possessions, or
 jealous of our power. Ambition, fear, avarice, would be
 daily watching to destroy us : a victory would be but a
 temporary relief to us ; for the dethroning the first Nabob
 would be followed by setting up another, who, from the
 same principles, would, when his treasure admitted of his
 keeping up an army, pursue the very path of his prede-
 cessor. We must indeed become Nabobs ourselves, in
 fact, if not in name ;—perhaps totally so without disguise ;
 but on this subject I cannot be certain until my arrival in

¹ See other letters on his arrival in Bengal, from Clive to General Carnac and Mr. Palk. Life, ii, 318.—W.

Bengal." With these views of the bold and splendid measures which it was now the time to pursue; and anticipating the important effects which those dazzling transactions would have on the price of the Company's Stock, this great man forgot not to deliberate how they might be directed to bear upon his own pecuniary interests. He wrote on the very same day to his private agent in London, as follows: "I have desired Mr. Rous to furnish you with a copy of my letter to him of this day's date, likewise with the cipher, that you may be enabled to understand what follows: 'The contents are of such great importance, that I would not have them transpire. Whatever money I may have in the public Funds, or any where else, and *as much as can be borrowed in my name*, I desire may be, without loss of a minute, invested in East India Stock. You will speak to my Attorneys on this point. Let them know I am anxious to have my money so disposed of; and press them to hasten the affair as much as possible.'" ¹ The letter to Mr. Rous, and the shortness of the period which intervened between the arrival of Lord Clive in Bengal and his assuming the dewanee or revenues, would leave no doubt that he commanded all the money which he possessed, or which he could borrow, to be invested in India Stock, in contemplation of the rise of price which that measure was calculated to produce; had he not, when examined on the subject of this letter by the Committee of the House of Commons, declared absolutely, "that he had not while at Madras formed the resolution to seize the dewanee."

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VI.

1763.

CHAPTER VI.

Political state of the Carnatic.—Views of the Nabob on Governor of Velore, King of Tanjore, and Maravars.—Treaty with Tanjore—Company's Jaghire.—War on Mohammed Issoof.—Mound of the Cavery.

BY the final overthrow of the French in the Carnatic, the British in that part of India had accomplished an object far greater than any to which, at the beginning of

¹ Extracts of both Letters are given in the Appendix, No. lxxxii. and lxxxiii. of the Third Report of the Committee, 1772.

BOOK IV. the contest, they had ever elevated their hopes. To see
 CHAP. VI. the Carnatic under the Government of a chief, who should
 1763. have obligations to them for his elevation, and from whose
 gratitude they might expect privileges and favour, was the
 alluring prospect which had carried them into action.
 They not only now beheld the man, whose interest they
 had espoused, in possession of the government of the coun-
 try, but they beheld him dependent upon themselves, and
 the whole kingdom of the Carnatic subject to their abso-
 lute will.

It was the grand object of deliberation, and the grand
 practical difficulty, to settle in what proportion the powers
 and advantages should be divided between the nominal
 sovereign and the real one. Clear, complete, well-defined
 and unambiguous regulations, are naturally employed for
 the prevention of discordance, when the parties have wis-
 dom, and are free from clandestine views.¹ On the pre-
 sent occasion, according to the slovenly mode in which the
 business of government is usually transacted, few things
 were regulated by professed agreement; the final distri-
 bution was left to come out among the practical, that
 is, the fortuitous results of government; and of the two
 parties each inwardly resolved to appropriate as great a
 share of the good things as power and cunning would
 allow.

The English were not disposed to forget that upon them
 the whole burden of the war had devolved; that they
 alone had conquered and gained the country; that the
 assistance of Mohammed Ali had been of little or rather
 of no importance; and that even now he possessed not
 resources and talents sufficient to hold the government in
 his hands, unless they continued to support him.

On the other hand, Mohammed Ali looked upon himself
 as invested with all the dignity and power of Nabob; and
 the absolute ruler of the country. During the whole pro-
 gress of the dispute, the English had represented them-
 selves as contending only for him; had proclaimed that
 his rights were indisputable; and that their zeal for jus-
 tice was the great motive which had engaged them so

¹ It is scarcely just, however, to expect complete regulations affecting untried circumstances and novel relations; to legislate before experience, is to invert the order of things, and except in some lucky hits, to ensure failure.—W.

deeply in the war. The Nabob, therefore, hesitated not to consider himself the master ; though a master owing great obligations to a servant who had meritoriously exerted himself in his cause.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VI.

1768.

The seeds of dissatisfaction between the rulers of the Carnatic, abundantly sown in a fruitful soil, were multiplied by the penury of the country. The avidity, which made the English so long believe that every part of India abounded with riches, had filled them with hopes of a great stream of wealth, from the resources of the Carnatic. And although they had already experienced how little was to be drawn, and with how great difficulty, from the districts which had come into their power ; though they were also aware how the country had been desolated by the ravages of war, they still expected it to yield a large supply to their treasury, and accused and complained of the Nabob when their expectations were not fulfilled.

The Nabob, who was the weakest party, and as such had the greatest occasion for the protection of well-defined regulations, had, before the surrender of the French in Pondicherry, presented a draught of the conditions to which it appeared to him expedient that the two parties should bind themselves. He offered to pay to the Company, in liquidation of the sums for which in the course of the war he had become responsible, twenty-eight lacs of rupees annually till the debts should be discharged ; and three lacs of rupees annually to defray the expense of the garrison at Trichinopoly. Should Pondicherry be reduced, and the Company afford him an adequate force to extract from the renters and other tributaries of the country, the contributions which they owed, he would discharge his debt to the Company in one year : should any of the districts between Nelore and Tinivelly, be taken or plundered by an enemy, a proportional deduction must take place, from the twenty-eight lacs which were assigned to the Company : on the other side, the Nabob desired, that the Company would not countenance the disobedience of the local governors and administrators ; that the English officers in the forts or garrisons should not interfere in the affairs of the country, or the disputes of the inhabitants ; that the Nabob's flag, instead of the Com-

BOOK IV. pany's, should be hoisted in the different forts ; and that
 CHAP. VI. the Company should, when required, assist his officers in
 the collection of the revenue.

1763.

The President, whether he decided without reflection, or thought a promise which would keep the Nabob in good humour, and might be broken at any time, was an obligation of no importance, expressed by letter his assent to these conditions.¹ In a short time, however, the President and Council presented to the Nabob a demand for fifty lacs of rupees. The Nabob, as this was a sum which he did not possess, endeavoured by all the means in his power to evade the contribution. Unable to resist the importunities of his allies, he was driven to his credit, which was very low ; and under disadvantageous terms, which heaped upon him a load of debt, he raised by loan the money they exacted.

The expense of the war, the exhaustion of their own treasury, and their exaggerated conception of the riches of the country of which they had made him sovereign, rendered the President and Council by no means sparing in their requisitions upon the Nabob. It was stipulated that he should repay the whole expenses of the siege of Pondicherry. Even to this he agreed, upon condition of receiving all the stores which should be taken in the place. The servants of the Company, however, appropriated the stores to themselves ; and they met the complaints of the Nabob, by promising to allow for them a certain sum in his account : in other words, they took for their own benefit what by their own contract belonged to the Nabob, and promised to make their masters² pay him something, more or less, by way of compensation. Their masters, however, were on this occasion not less alive to their own interests than their servants had been to theirs ; and no sooner heard of the sum which had been allowed to the Nabob in their books than they ordered it to be recharged to his account ; while their servants were left in undisturbed possession of the stores.²

From the mode in which the country was governed ; by sub-division into local commands, with a military force

¹ Mr. Pigot's letter to the Nabob, June 23, 1760. Nabob's Papers, iii. 24.

² Sir John Lindsay's Narrative, Oct. 13, 1770, Secretary of State's Office. Quoted by the author of the History and Management of the East India Company, p. 116.

and places of strength in the hands of every local commander, who withheld the revenue of his district, as often as he beheld a prospect of escaping punishment for his faults; it has frequently been seen what difficulties attended the realizing of revenue, whenever the government became disordered or weak. For a series of years, the Carnatic had been subject to no regular government; the different antagonists had collected the revenues, and raised contributions, in those districts which had at any time fallen into their hands; and the commanders of districts and forts had eluded payment as often as it was in their power. From this wasted and disordered country, with an insignificant army, and no resources for its augmentation, was Mohammed Ali required to find means for the support of his own government, for the gratification of his own taste and passions, and to satisfy the unbounded expectations of the English.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VI.
1763.

The hopes of the Nabob, who knew the poverty of the country, and with what severity everything had been stripped from those among the district Governors who enjoyed not extraordinary means of defence, were chiefly fixed upon the supposed treasures of Mortiz Ali, Governor of Velore, the riches of Tanjore, and the two Marawars. The fort and district of Velore was an acknowledged portion of the Carnatic territory. Tanjore and the Marawars were separate principalities, which, as often as they were pressed by the strength of their neighbours, had, according to Indian practice, occasionally paid them tribute; as Bengal and the Carnatic themselves had paid to the Marhattas; but which had never been incorporated with the Mogul empire, nor regarded their dependence as more than casual, temporary, and unjust.

The strength, however, of the Nabob was altogether inadequate to the coercion of such powerful chiefs; and for the accomplishment of so important an object, he importuned the Presidency to join their forces to his. The state of the treasury at Madras, exhausted by the efforts of so tedious and expensive a war, rendered the English by no means desirous of engaging immediately in fresh adventures. And it was not without difficulty that in the summer of 1761 they were induced to lend their aid for the reduction of Velore. It resisted the exertions of the

BOOK IV. army for three months, and but ill repaid the conquerors
 CHAP. VI. by the treasure which it contained.

1763. The conquest of Tanjore was an object of still greater promise. As it had not yet been ravaged by foreign armies, the ideas of Indian wealth, which so long had sparkled in the imaginations of men, were not altogether extinct. The country, though small, was undoubtedly fertile ; the incompatibility between the existence of a rude government and people, and the production and accumulation of wealth, was not understood ; and the expectations which had misled both the French and the English still maintained their sway in the mind of Mohammed Ali. Besides, as ruler of the Carnatic, it was his interest to add a principality of some importance to his dominions, and to remove a neighbour who might on every emergency become a dangerous foe.

The English, however, either because they had descended in their estimate of the riches of the country, or because they had ascended in their estimate of the difficulty of its subjugation, discovered an aversion, which the Nabob was unable to overcome, to embark in the conquest of Tanjore. The Governor recommended negotiation ; and offered himself as mediator. To settle with the subordinate agents of his own government belonged, he said, to the Nabob himself : but the King of Tanjore was a sovereign Prince ; and a tribunal, distinct from that of either party, namely, that of an independent mediator, was necessary to adjust the differences between them.¹

The Nabob resisted this mode of adjustment, with great eagerness ; and, rather than adopt it, would have postponed the enforcement of his claims, trusting to the chapter of accidents, and a time to come, at which the Raja might yield at discretion. The Presidency, however, knew their power ; they sent, therefore, an agent to Tanjore, to hear the allegations of both parties, and suggest the conditions of an agreement. The following were the terms which they resolved to confirm : That twenty-two lacs of rupees, at five instalments, should be paid by the Raja to the Nabob, as arrears ; four lacs as a present ; and

¹ This is evidently the meaning of Mr. Pigot's letter to the Nabob, of May 31, 1762; from which, by a misinterpretation, the author of the *Hist. and Management of the E. I. C.* draws an accusation, p. 124.

BOOK IV. the relative strength of the two parties made them willing to engage not to molest one another, was in the following words: "That Great Britain shall restore to France, in the condition they now are, the different factories¹ which that crown possessed, as well on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa, as on that of Malabar, as also in Bengal, at the beginning of the year 1749. And France renounces all pretensions to the acquisitions which she has made on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa.² And his most Christian Majesty shall restore, on his part, all that he may have conquered from Great Britain in the East Indies during the present war, and will expressly cause Natal and Tapanouly,³ in the island of Sumatra, to be restored. And he further engages not to erect fortifications, or to keep troops, in any part of the dominions of the Subahdar of Bengal; and in order to preserve future peace on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa, the English and French shall acknowledge Mohammed Ali Khan, for lawful Nabob of the Carnatic, and Salabut Jung for lawful Subahdar of the Deccan, and both parties shall renounce all demands and pretensions of satisfaction, with which they might charge each other, or their Indian allies, for the depredation or pillage committed on either side during the war."

In the distribution of the advantages of the Carnatic sovereignty, for such it now might truly be deemed, as scarcely even a nominal subjection was acknowledged either to the Subahdar of the Deccan, or the Emperor himself, the English imagined they had as yet not appropriated to themselves the requisite share. They began accordingly to represent to the Nabob, the necessity of bestowing upon the Company a jaghire: or a grant of lands, the rents and revenues of which, free from any deduction to the Nabob's treasury, should accrue to themselves. The Nabob urged the narrowness of his own resources, the load of debt under which he laboured, the great proportion of his revenue already allowed to the Company, and the cession which he had made, not only of lands, but of the tribute which the Company owed for Madras itself.

The Company, in truth, had now placed themselves in

¹ Comptoirs.

² Fort St. David and its dependencies.

³ Bencoolen.

a situation of considerable difficulty. The Presidency could not help observing, that under the weakness of both the mind and the resources of the Nabob, the defence of the Carnatic must rest upon them; and that they must, therefore, maintain at all times an army sufficient to oppose its enemies. This, without the revenue of the country, was a burden which they knew they could not sustain. And yet to strip of all his revenue a sovereign Prince, of whose rights they had so often proclaimed themselves the champions, was a procedure which bore a most unfavourable appearance, and from which formidable accusations against them could hardly fail to be drawn.

The Company took the course which power, though less supported by reasons, will most commonly pursue. They adopted the alternative which was most agreeable to themselves; and the revenues of the Carnatic gradually passed into their hands. The President, however, was anxious that, at this time, the donation should wear the appearance of a voluntary act on the part of the Nabob; and amid his efforts of persuasion assured him, if we can believe the Nabob himself, "that if four districts were given, the Company would be extremely pleased and obliged to him, and would ever assist him and his children with a proper force of Europeans, without desiring any thing further; that till he had cleared off his debts to the Company, the revenues of those districts, after defraying the expenses of the soldiers, should be placed to the credit of his account."¹ When the President began to pass from the tone of suggestion to that of requisition, and the Nabob perceived that compliance could not be escaped, he endeavoured to obtain the security of at least a written promise for those terms which had been offered in order to gain his consent. But when he transmitted the draft of an agreement, in which those terms were specified, and which he requested the Governor and Council to sign, the temper of the President broke through his policy; and he pulled off the mask with which he had hitherto endeavoured, though it must be confessed but awkwardly, to cover from the Nabob and the world the view of his real

¹ Rous's Appendix, p. 161. This declaration is made in a subsequent correspondence between the Nabob and the Governor and Council, and not denied by the Governor and Council, though such a bargain, they say, was a bad one for the Company.

BOOK IV. situation. He sent back the agreement unsigned, with
 CHAP. VI. strong marks of his displeasure; and told the Nabob by
 1763. letter, that it ill became the situation in which he stood,
 to make conditions with the Company; since "they," said
 he, "do not take any thing from you; but they are the
 givers, and you are a receiver."¹

It was not till the summer of 1763, that the Nabob and Presidency were enabled to turn their attention to Madura and Tinivelly. Though Mohammed Issoof had been vigorously employed, from the raising of the siege of Madras, till the fall of Pondicherry, in reducing the refractory Polygars and other local commanders, obedience and tranquillity were by no means established. And when that active and useful partisan proposed to take the country as renter, and to become responsible, though for a small revenue, from a region which hitherto had cost much and yielded nothing, the offer was not unwillingly embraced. Mohammed Issoof, like other renters of India, had no doubt an inclination to withhold if possible the sum which he engaged to pay out of the taxes which he was empowered to collect: and, like other Governors, contemplated, it is probable, from the very beginning, the chance of independence. It cannot, however, be denied, that the enemies with whom he had as yet been obliged to struggle, and who had heretofore rendered the country not only unproductive, but burdensome, left him no revenue to pay. It appears, accordingly, that none had ever been received. For this failure, the Nabob and the Company now proceeded to inflict chastisement, and in the month of August, 1763, a combined army of natives and English marched to Madura. Mohammed Issoof endeavoured by negotiation, and the influence of those among the English whom he had rendered his friends, to ward off the blow. But when he found these efforts unavailing, he resolved to give himself the chance of a struggle in his own defence. He was not a man of whom the subjugation was to be expected at an easy price. He baffled all the efforts of the Nabob and the Company, till the month of October, 1764; when he had already forced them to expend a million sterling, and no ordinary quantity of English blood; and without a deed of treachery which placed his person in their hands,

¹ Mr. Pigot's Letter to the Nabob, August 13, 1763.

it is uncertain how far he might have prolonged his re-
sistance. Among a body of French troops whom he had
received from the Raja of Tanjore, was a person of the
name of Marchand, by whom he was seized and delivered
to his enemies.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VI.

1764.

The occasions on which the interests of the Nabob and of the Raja of Tanjore were liable to clash or to interfere, became, through their jealousy and mutual hatred, a perpetual source of contention. The treaty which had been formed under the coercive authority of the English, had defined the terms of their pecuniary relation: with the usual want of foresight, every thing else was left vague and disputable. The river Cavery, about six miles to the north-west of Trichinopoly, is divided into two streams, of which the northern takes the name of Coleroon, and, by a course not far from direct, joins the sea at Devicotah. The southern branch, which retains the name of Cavery, passes through the flat alluvial territory of Tanjore; and dividing itself into a great number of smaller streams, overflows, and fructifies the country. But it so happens that the two branches of this great river, after flowing at some distance from one another, for a space of about twenty miles, again approach, forming what is called the island of Seringham, and are only prevented by a narrow neck of land, which requires continual repairs, from reuniting their streams, and falling down the channel of the Coleroon to the ocean. The kingdom of Tanjore was thus in the highest degree interested in the preservation of the mound of the Cavery, upon the waters of which its vegetative powers so greatly depended; and it must have anciently been a powerful instrument of coercion in the hands of the neighbouring kingdom of Trichinopoly, within the territories of which it appears to have been always included.

The Nabob, as sovereign of Trichinopoly, now assumed authority over the mound of the Cavery; and the dispute between him and the Raja grew to importance. The Raja endeavoured to make the reparation of the mound the condition of paying the money which he owed by the treaty; and the President, after writing several letters to the Nabob, appointed a deputy to inquire into the subject and to make his reports. The rights in question were

BOOK IV. actually two. The first was the right of sovereignty in
 CHAP. VII. the mound; the second was the right of having the mound
 1765. preserved and repaired. The first, as no one disputed,
 belonged to the Nabob. The second, if prescription and
 equity constituted any title, as undeniably belonged to the
 Raja. Ignorantly and awkwardly, and not without English
 co-operation, they blended them together in one question;
 and the dispute became interminable. Who had the right
 of repairing the mound, was the subject about which they
 contended; the Nabob claiming it, as inherent in the
 sovereignty; and the Raja as inherent in the title which
 he possessed to the waters of the Cavery. Unhappily, in
 the right which, as sovereign, the Nabob claimed, of per-
 mitting no one but himself to repair the mound, he
 tacitly included the right of omitting all repairs whenever
 he pleased. The Raja, who dreaded the consequences,
 solicited an interview; and by making ample submission
 and protestations, effected a temporary compromise. It
 was not long, however, before he had again occasion to
 complain; and wrote the most pressing letters to Madras,
 beseeching the Presidency to lay their commands upon
 the Nabob for the repair of the mound. The Nabob
 hardly disguised his intention of allowing it to be washed
 away; alleging the wishes of his own people, who, on
 account of the overflowing of the low grounds to the
 eastward of Trichinopoly, desired the waters of the Cavery
 to be turned into the channel of the Coleroon. The English
 at last interfered, with a determination to prevail; and
 the Nabob, but not before the month of January, 1765,
 and with great reluctance, gave his consent, that the
 mound of the Cavery should be repaired by the King of
 Tanjore.¹

CHAPTER VII.

*Second Administration of Clive.—Company's Orders res-
 pecting the Private Trade disregarded.—Arrangements
 with the Vizir.—With the Emperor.—Acquisition of the
 Dewannee.—Private Trade created a Monopoly for the*

¹ Official Papers in Rous's Appendix, Nos. vi. x. xii. xiii.

Benefit of the superior Servants.—Reduction of the Military Allowances.—Its effects.—Clive resigns, and Verelst succeeds.—Proceedings in England relative to the Rate of Dividend on Company's Stock.—Financial Difficulties.—Verelst resigns, and Cartier succeeds.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. VII.

1765.

LORD CLIVE, together with Mr. Sumner and Mr. Sykes, who had accompanied him from England, and were two of the persons empowered to form the Select Committee, arrived at Calcutta, on the 3d of May, 1765. The two other persons of whom that extraordinary machine of government was to be composed, were absent; General Carnac, beyond the confines of the province of Bahar, with the army; and Mr. Verelst, at the distant settlement of Chittagong. For as much as the disturbances, which guided the resolves of the Company, when they decreed that such a new organ of government should exist, were now removed; and for as much as the Select Committee were empowered to exercise their extraordinary powers for so long a time only as those disturbances should remain; it was a question, whether they were entitled to form themselves into a governing body; but a question of which they speedily disposed.¹ On the 7th of May, exactly four days after their arrival, Lord Clive, and the two gentlemen who accompanied him, assembled: and without waiting for communication with the rest of the destined members declared the Select Committee formed;² assumed the whole powers of government civil and military; and administered to themselves and their secretaries an oath of secrecy.

The great corruption which they represented as prevailing in the government, and tainting to a prodigious degree the conduct of the Company's servants, was the foundation on which they placed the necessity for the establishment of the Committee. The picture which they drew of these corruptions exhibited, it is true, the most

¹ "Upon my arrival in Bengal," said Clive (in his speech in the House of Commons, *ut supra*. p. 3), "I found the powers given were so loosely and jesuitically worded, that they were immediately contested by the Council. I was determined, however, to put the most extensive construction upon them, because I was determined to do my duty to my country."

² The rest were "two," and to one of these at least, General Carnac, Lord Clive wrote the moment of his arrival. There was no occasion to wait for his presence or that of Verelst. *Life of Clive*, ii. 318.—W.

BOOK IV. hideous and the most disgusting features. But the impartial judge will probably find, that the interest of the Committee to make out the appearance of a strong necessity

CHAP. VII.

1765.

for investing themselves with extraordinary powers, after the original cause for them had ceased to exist, had *some* influence on their delineations. In the letter, addressed to the Committee, with which Lord Clive opened their proceedings, on the 7th of May, "A very few days," he says, "are elapsed since our arrival; and yet, if we consider what has already come to our knowledge, we cannot hesitate a moment upon the necessity of assuming the power that is in us of conducting, as a Select Committee, the affairs both civil and military of this settlement. What do we hear of, what do we see, but anarchy, confusion, and, what is worse, an almost general corruption. Happy, I am sure, you would have been, as well as myself, had the late conduct of affairs been so irreproachable as to have permitted them still to continue in the hands of the Governor and Council." Yet one would imagine that four days afforded not a very ample space for collecting a satisfactory body of evidence on so extensive a field,¹ especially if we must believe the noble declarer, that the determination to which it led was a disagreeable one.

"Three paths," observed his Lordship, when afterwards defending himself, "were before me. 1. One was strewed with abundance of fair advantages. I might have put myself at the head of the government as I found it. I might have encouraged the resolution which the gentlemen had taken not to execute the new covenants which prohibited the receipt of presents: and, although I had executed the covenants myself, I might have contrived to return to England with an immense fortune, infamously added to the one before honourably obtained. 2. Finding my powers disputed, I might in despair have given up the commonwealth, and have left Bengal without making an effort to save it. Such a conduct would have been deemed the effect of folly and cowardice. 3. The third path was intricate. Dangers and difficulties were on every side. But I resolved to pursue it. In short, I was determined

¹ Most of the Evidence was supplied in the minutes and proceedings of the Committee; much was furnished by the avowal of the parties themselves. Life, ii. 222.—W.

to do my duty to the public, although I should incur the odium of the whole settlement. The welfare of the Company required a vigorous exertion, and I took the resolution of cleansing the Augean Stable.”¹

BOOK IV.

CHAP. VII.

1765.

Another circumstance deserves to be mentioned, of which Lord Clive takes no notice in his speech, though on other occasions it is not forgotten ; that without the formation of the Select Committee, he would, as Governor, have enjoyed only a shadow, or at best a small fragment of power. In his letter to the Directors, dated the 20th of February, in which he describes the transactions of the first five months of his new administration, he says, “The gentlemen in Council of late years at Bengal, seem to have been actuated, in every consultation, by a very obstinate and mischievous spirit. The office of Governor has been in a manner hunted down, stripped of its dignity, and then divided into sixteen shares,”—the number of persons of whom the board consisted. “Two paths,” he observes, in nearly the same language as was afterwards used in his speech, “were evidently open to me : the one smooth, and strewed with abundance of rich advantages that might easily be picked up ; the other untrodden, and every step opposed with obstacles. I might have taken charge of the government upon the same footing on which I found it ; that is, I might have enjoyed the name of Governor, and have suffered the honour, importance, and dignity of the post to continue in their state of annihilation. I might have contented myself as others had before me, with being a cipher, or, what is little better, the first among sixteen equals : and I might have allowed this passive conduct to be attended with the usual *douceur* of sharing largely with the rest of the gentlemen in all donations, perquisites, &c., arising from the absolute government and disposal of all places in the revenues of this opulent kingdom ; by which means I might soon have acquired an immense addition to my fortune, notwithstanding the obligations in the new covenants ; for the man who can so easily get over the bar of conscience as to receive presents after the execution of them, will not scruple to make use of any evasions that may protect him from the consequences. The settlement, in general, would thus have been my friends, and only the

¹ Speech, *ut supra*, p. 4.

BOOK IV. natives of the country my enemies." It deserves to be
 CHAP. VII. remarked, as twice declared by this celebrated Governor

1765.

that the covenants against the receipt of presents afforded no effectual security, and might be violated, by the connivance and participation of the presiding individuals, to any amount. It follows, as a pretty necessary consequence that independent of that connivance they might in many instances be violated to a considerable amount.¹

The language in which Clive describes the corruption of the Company's government and the conduct of their servants, at this era, ought to be received with caution and, doubtless, with considerable deductions; though it is an historical document, or rather a matter of fact, singularly curious and important. "Upon my arrival," he tells the Directors, "I am sorry to say, I found your affairs in a condition so nearly desperate, as would have alarmed any set of men, whose sense of honour and duty to their employers had not been estranged by the too-eager pursuit of their own immediate advantages. The sudden, and among many, the unwarrantable acquisition of riches, had introduced luxury in every shape, and in its most pernicious excess. These two enormous evils went hand in hand together through the whole presidency, infecting almost every member of each department. Every inferior seemed to have grasped at wealth, that he might be enabled to assume that spirit of profusion, which was now the only distinction between him and his superior. Thus all distinction ceased; and every rank became, in a manner, upon an equality. Nor was this the end of the mischief: for a contest of such a nature among our servants necessarily destroyed all proportion between their wants and the honest means of satisfying them. In a country where money is plenty, where fear is the principle of government, and where your arms are ever victorious, it is no wonder that the lust of riches should readily embrace the proffered means of its gratification, or that the instruments of your power should avail themselves of their authority

¹ This conclusion is scarcely justified by the premises. Clive, in the first instance, intimates that he might have done what had been already done by the Committee, delay the execution of the covenants until his own fortune had been made, and in the second case he asserts that an individual who violated the covenants would be ready to urge any plea whatever in mitigation of the consequences. He gives no reason to infer that in either case a breach of the covenants could be attempted with impunity.—W.

and proceed even to extortion in those cases where simple BOOK IV.
corruption could not keep pace with their rapacity. CHAP. VII.
Examples of this sort, set by superiors, could not fail
of being followed in a proportionable degree by inferiors. 1765.
The evil was contagious, and spread among the civil and
military, down to the writer, the ensign, and the free mer-
chant."¹ The language of the Directors held pace with
that of the Governor. In their answer to the letter from
which this extract is taken, they say, "We have the
strongest sense of the deplorable state to which our affairs
were on the point of being reduced, from the corruption
and rapacity of our servants, and the universal depravity
of manners throughout the settlement. The general re-
laxation of all discipline and obedience, both military and
civil, was hastily tending to a dissolution of all government.
Our letter to the Select Committee expresses our sen-
timents of what has been obtained by way of donation;
and to that we must add, that we think the vast fortunes
acquired in the inland trade have been obtained by a series
of the most tyrannic and oppressive conduct that ever was
known in any age or country."²

The letters from the Court of Directors, commanding
the immediate and total abandonment of the inland trade,
and the execution of the new covenants against the receipt
of presents, had arrived on the 24th of January, 1765, pre-
vious to the formation of the treaty with Nujum-ad-dowla.
Yet so far was the inland trade from being abandoned, that
the unlimited exercise of it, free from all duties except two
and a half per cent. upon the article of salt, and along with
that unlimited exercise, the prohibition, or what amounted

¹ Letter, dated Calcutta, 30th September, 1765, from Lord Clive to the
Court of Directors, Third Report of Committee, 1772, Appendix, No. 73. In
the letter of the same date from the Select Committee, which was merely
another letter from Clive, by whose nod the other Members of the Committee
were governed, they express themselves bound "to lay open to the view of
the Directors a series of transactions too notoriously known to be suppressed,
and too affecting to their interest, to the national character, and to the ex-
istence of the Company in Bengal, to escape unnoticed and uncensured;—
transactions which seem to demonstrate that every spring of this government
was smeared with corruption; that principles of rapacity and oppression
universally prevailed, and that every spark of sentiment and public spirit
was lost and extinguished in the unbounded lust of unmerited wealth."
Ib. App. No. 86.—M.

That many of their charges were not ill-founded, is manifest from the
Minutes of Council quoted in Vansittart's Narrative, and from Johnstone's
vindication of himself in his Letter to the Proprietors. London, 1766.—W.

² Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 74.

BOOK IV. to the prohibition, of all other traders, the exaction of oppressive duties, from which the English were exempt, had been inserted, as leading articles, in the treaty. Again, as to what regarded the covenants, not only had presents, upon the accession of Nujum-ad-dowla been received, with unabated alacrity, in defiance of them ; but they remained unexecuted to that very hour. The Committee of the House of Commons could not discover from the records that the Governor had so much as brought them under the consultation of the Council Board ;¹ and it is certain that no notice whatsoever had been communicated to the other servants of the Company, that any such engagements were required.

CHAP. VII.
1765.

The execution of the covenants, as a very easy and simple transaction, was one of the earliest of the measures of the Committee. They were signed, first by the Members of the Council, and the servants on the spot ; and afterwards transmitted to the armies and factories, where they were immediately executed by everybody ; with one remarkable exception. General Carnac, when they arrived, distributed them to his officers, among whom the signature met with no evasion. But General Carnac himself, on the pretence that they were dated several months previous to the time at which intimation of them was conveyed to him, forbore privately to execute his own. A few weeks afterwards, upon his return to Calcutta, he signed it, indeed, without any scruple ; but, in the interval, he had received a present of two lacks of rupees from the reduced and impoverished Emperor.²

¹ In a letter of Clive to General Carnac, of the 6th May, he says the Council had "left to the Committee the getting the covenants signed, which they say is of such consequence, that they cannot think of settling anything final about them until Lord Clive's arrival." *Life of Clive.* Johnstone, one of the Council, and an active agent in the whole business of the presents, gives a rather different account. "It is true," he says, "the covenants had arrived before the death of Meer Jaffer, who was not at that time thought to be in any danger of dying ; I was not at the Council when they arrived, nor at any time after, till I was called down to assist their deliberation upon the event of the Nabob's death. The covenants never were offered to me, and I certainly could not be bound by covenants which I not only did not sign, but never was even required to sign. I have heard from the gentlemen of the Council, that their reason for not signing the covenants was, that the regulation appeared to them so new and extraordinary, and seemed liable to so many objections, that they did propose to send home a remonstrance against it, setting forth the reasons for judging the regulation unexpedient and improper." *Johnstone's Letter to the Proprietors*, 63.—W.

² "This transaction is not accurately stated. General Carnac's objection to sign the covenant was perfectly reasonable. As it would have bound him to

The Nabob, Nujum-ad-dowla, hastened to Calcutta, upon the arrival of Clive; and being exceedingly displeased with restraints imposed upon him, presented a letter of complaints. Mohammed Reza Khan, whose appointment to office of Naib Subah was the most offensive to the Nabob of all the hard conditions to which he had been compelled to submit, had given presents on account of his elevation to the amount of nearly twenty lacks of rupees. There was nothing, in this, unusual or surprising; but the Nabob, who was eager to obtain the ground of an accusation against a man whose person and office were alike odious to him, complained of it as a dilapidation of his treasury. The servants of the Company, among whom the principal part of the money was distributed, were those who had the most strongly contested the authority of Clive's Committee; and they seem to have excited, by that opposition, a very warm resentment. The accusation was treated as a matter of great and serious importance. Some of the native officers engaged in the negotiation of the presents, though required only for the purpose of evidence, were put under arrest. A formal investigation was instituted. It was alleged that threats had been used to extort the gifts. And the Committee pronounced certain facts to be proved; but in their great forbearance reserved the decision to the Court of Directors. The servants, whose conduct was arraigned, solemnly denied the charge of using terror or force; and it is true that their declaration was opposed by only the testimony of a few natives, whose veracity is always questionable when they have the smallest interest to depart from the truth:¹ who in the

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.

1765.

the observance of a law of which he did not know the existence, and which he would have violated unwittingly, having between the date of the covenant and its reaching him, avowedly received a present of 70,000 rupees from the Bulwant Singh. There was no intention of evading its prospective operation, as the interval was short before he did sign it, and the General declared in his evidence before the Committee of the House, that from the moment he was publicly apprised of the Company's pleasure on the subject, he considered himself equally bound by the covenant, whether he signed it or not. With regard to the two lacks of rupees, said to have been received by him from the King, after he knew of the covenants, the charge is untrue. General Carnac declined accepting it without the permission of the Governor and Council, to whom, therefore, the King wrote to request that their permission might be granted. The Council referred it to the Court of Directors, and it finally received, therefore, it was with their approbation. Appen. 3rd Report, 1773, p. 390.—W.

¹ There is little reason to question the veracity of such men as Mohammed Reza, Jaggat Set, and other natives of respectability, who gave evidence in

BOOK IV. present case were not examined upon oath; were deeply
 CHAP. VII. interested in finding an apology for their own conduct, and
 1765. had an exquisite feeling of the sentiments which prevailed
 towards the persons whom they accused in the breasts of
 those who now wielded the sceptre. There seems not, in
 reality, to have been any difference in the applications for
 presents on this and on former occasions, except perhaps
 in some little ceremoniousness of manner. A significant
 expression escapes from Verelst, who was an actor in the
 scene; "Mohammed Reza Khan," he says, "affirms that
 these sums were not voluntarily given. This the English
 gentlemen deny. Perhaps the reader, who considers the
 increased power of the English, may regard this as a *verbal*
dispute."¹

On the 25th of June Lord Clive departed from Calcutta, on a progress up the country, for the purpose of forming a new arrangement with the Nabob for the government of the provinces, and of concluding a treaty of peace with Suja-ad-dowla the Vizir.

The first negotiation was of easy management. Whatever the Committee were pleased to command, Nujum-ad-dowla was constrained to obey. The whole of the power reserved to the Nabob, and lodged with the Naib Subah, was too great, they said, to be deposited in a single hand; they resolved, therefore, to associate the Raja Dooloob Ram, and Juggut Seet, the Hindu banker, with Mohammed Reza Khan, in the superintendence of the Nabob's affairs. To preserve concord among these colleagues, it was determined to employ the vigilant control of a servant of the Company, resident upon the spot. The Nabob was also now required to resign the whole of the revenues, and to make over the management of the Subahdaree, with every advantage arising from it, to the Company; by whom an annual pension of fifty lacks of rupees, subject to the

the present transaction, and who had less inducement to depart from the truth than the Europeans, who were personally interested. The same inference is presently admitted in the significancy attached to the words quoted from Verelst. The conflicting assertions were a mere verbal dispute. The Europeans, it is true, did not employ force to compel the donations which they received; but there can be no doubt that they did intimate their expectations, and that the young Nabob, and his advisers, dared not disappoint them.—W.

¹ Verelst's View of the English Government in Bengal, p. 50. For the sums received, and the rate they bore to the sums received by the managers of the preceding revolutions, see the preceding table, p. 369.

management of their three nominees, were to be allowed to himself. The final arrangement of these terms was notified to the Committee on the 28th of July, by a letter despatched from Moorshedabad, whence, a few days before, Clive had proceeded on his journey.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.

1765.

The army had prosecuted the advantages gained over the Vizir; and at this time had penetrated far into the territories of Oude. The arrangement, however, which had been concluded with the Emperor, and in conformity with which the English were to receive the Gauzeepore country for themselves, and to bestow the dominions of Suja-ad-dowla on the Emperor, had been severely condemned by the Court of Directors. They denounced it, not only as a violation of their repeated instructions and commands not to extend the dominions of the Company; but as in itself an impolitic engagement; full of burden, but destitute of profit.¹ Lord Clive, and, what is the same thing, Lord Clive's Committee, professed a deep conviction of the wisdom of that policy (the limitation of dominion) which the Directors prescribed;² declaring, "that an influence maintained by force of arms was destructive of that commercial spirit which the servants of the Company ought to promote; oppressive to the country, and ruinous to the Company; whose military expenses had hitherto rendered fruitless their extraordinary success, and even the cession of rich provinces."³

After the battle of Buxar, the Vizir, who no longer considered his own dominions secure, had sent his women and treasures to Bareilly, the strong fort of a Rohilla chief; and, having gained as much time as possible by negotiations with the English, endeavoured to obtain assistance from Ghazi-ad-din Khan, from the Rohilla chiefs, and a body of Mahrattas, who were at that time under Mulhar Row, in the vicinity of Gualior. The Mahrattas, and Ghazi-ad-din Khan, with a handful of followers, the miserable re-

¹ See the Letters to Bengal, dated 24th Dec. 1765, and 19th Feb. 1766, in the Appendix to the Third Report.

² Clive, in his letter to the Directors, dated 30th Sept. 1765, says, "My resolution was, and my hopes will always be, to confine our assistance, our conquest, and our possessions, to Bengal, Bahar, and Orix: to go further is, in my opinion, a scheme so extravagantly ambitious and absurd, that no governor and council in their senses can ever adopt it, unless the whole scheme of the Company's interest be first entirely new modelled."

³ Instructions from the Select Committee to the President, dated 21st June, 1765; and their Letter to General Carnac, dated 1st July.

BOOK IV. mains of his former power, had, in reality, joined him.
 CHAP. VII. But the Rohillas had amused him with only deceitful pro-

1765.

promises : and he had been abandoned even by Sunroo ; who, with a body of about 300 Europeans of various nations, and a few thousand Sepoys, was negotiating for service with the Jaats.

The English had detached two battalions of Sepoys, which took possession of Lucknow, the capital of Oude, and made an attempt upon the fortress of Chunar, the strength of which enabled the garrison to make a successful resistance ; when the preparations of Suja-ad-dowla induced Sir Robert Fletcher, on whom, till the arrival of Carnac, after the departure of Sir Hector Munro, the command of the troops had devolved, to endeavour to anticipate that Nabob by taking the important fortress of Allahabad. Nujuf Khan, as a partisan of the Emperor, had joined the English with his followers from Bundelcund, and being well acquainted with the fortress, pointed out the weakest part. It was speedily breached ; and the garrison, too irresolute to brave a storm, immediately surrendered. Soon after this event General Carnac arrived, and took the command of the army. The situation of the enemy which rendered their designs uncertain, puzzled, for a time, the General ; who over-estimated their strength, and was afraid of leaving the frontiers exposed. Having received undoubted intelligence that the enemy had begun to march on the Corah road ; and suspecting that an attack was designed upon Sir Robert Fletcher, who commanded a separate corps in the same direction he made some forced marches to effect a junction with that commander ; and, having joined him, advanced with united forces towards the enemy. On the 3d of May a battle was fought in the neighbourhood of Corah ; or rather a skirmish, for, by the absence of the Rohillas, and the weakness of Ghazi-ad-din Khan, the force of the Vizir was inconsiderable, and he was still intimidated by remembrance of Buxar. The Mahrattas, on whom he chiefly depended, were soon dispersed by the English artillery. The Vizir separated from them ; and they retired with precipitation towards the Jumna. Observing the English to remit the pursuit in order to watch the Vizir, who made no attempt to join his allies, they ventured a second effort to enter Corah.

To stop their incursions the General resolved to drive them beyond the Jumma ; crossed that river on the 22d ; dislodged them from their post on the opposite side ; and obliged them to retire to the hills.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.

1765.

The Vizir impelled, on the one side by the desperate state of his affairs, on the other by hopes of moderate treatment from the English, resolved to throw himself entirely upon their generosity, by placing his person in their hands. On the 19th of May, General Carnac received, written by the Nabob with his own hand, a letter, in which he informed that officer that he was on his way to meet him. The General received him with the highest marks of distinction ; and all parties recommended a delicate and liberal treatment. The final settlement of the terms of pacification was reserved for the presence of Clive. As it was unanimously agreed, that it would cost the Company more to defend the Country of the Vizir, than it would yield in revenue ; that Suja-ad-dowla was more capable of defending it than the Emperor, to whom it had been formerly promised, or than any other chief who could be set up ; and that in the hands of the Vizir it might form a barrier against the Mahrattas and Afghans ; it was determined to restore to him the whole of his dominions, with the exception of Allahabad and Corah, which were to be reserved to the Emperor.

When the first conference was held with the Vizir on the 2nd of August, he strongly expressed his gratitude for the extent of dominion which his conquerors were willing to restore ; and readily agreed to the payment of fifty lacks of rupees demanded in compensation for the expenses of the war : but, when it was proposed to him to permit the English to trade, free from duties, and erect factories in his dominions, he represented so earnestly the abuses which, under the name of trade, the Company's servants and their agents had perpetrated in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa ; and expressed with so much vehemence his apprehension of disputes, and the impossibility they would create of long preserving the blessings of peace, that Clive agreed, in the terms of the treaty, to omit the very names of trade and factories.

The Raja Bulwant Sing, who held, as dependencies of the Subah of Oude, the Zemindarees of Banares and Gau-

BOOK IV. zeepore, had joined the English and rendered important service, in the late wars against the Vizir. It was, therefore, incumbent upon them to yield him protection against the resentment of a chief whose power he could not resist.

CHAP. VII.
1765.

The Vizir bound himself not to molest the Raja in the possession of his former dominions; and the Raja was held bound to pay him the same tribute as before. The Vizir and the English engaged to afford assistance, each to the other, in case the territory of the other was invaded; and the Vizir engaged never to harbour or employ Meer Casim or Sumroo.

The business with the Emperor was the next subject of negociation which claimed the exertions of Clive. Of the annual tribute to the Emperor, contracted for in the names of Meer Jaffier, Meer Casim, and Nujum-ad-dowla, as the imperial revenue from Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, thirty lacks were unpaid. Of this debt, the indigent sovereign was frankly and definitively told, that not a single rupee would ever be given him. The sum which had, under the English authority, been assigned as the share due to him of the revenue of these provinces, was twenty-six lacks of rupees in money, and jaghires or land to the annual amount of five lacks and a half. The jaghires, it was now made known to him, he must henceforth renounce. He expressed warmth, and even resentment, upon the hardness of these arbitrary conditions; but the necessities of the humbled monarch left him without means of relief. The twenty-six lacks of rupees were continued as his portion of the revenues; and he was put in possession of the countries of Corah and Allahabad. On his part was required the imperial grant of the dewannee, or collection and receipt of the revenues, in Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. The phirmaun of the dewannee, which marks one of the most conspicuous eras in the history of the Company, constituting them masters of so great an empire, in name and in responsibility, as well as in power,¹ was dated the 12th day of August, 1765. Along with the dewannee was required of the Emperor his imperial confirmation of all the territory which the Company possessed throughout to nominal

¹ The Select Committee express strongly their sense of the ostensible change; in their Consultation, 18th Sept. 1765, describing the Company as having "come into the place of the country government, by his Majesty's royal grant of the dewannee." See Fourth Report, Committee of Secrecy of House of Commons, 1773. Appendix, No. 38.

extent of the Mogul empire. Among these confirmations was not forgotten the jaghire of Lord Clive ; a possession, the dispute about which that powerful servant had compromised before his departure from England, by yielding the reversion to the Company, after ten years' payment, if so long he should live.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.
1765.

It was in the course of this summer that, in pursuance of the terms of the treaty concluded in Europe between the English and the French, the settlements of that nation at Chandernagor and other places in Bengal, were restored.

On the 7th of September, Lord Clive resumed his seat in the Select Committee ; in which the urgent questions respecting the inland trade now constituted the grand subject of consultation. The Company's letter of the 8th of February, 1764, completely prohibiting the inland trade of their servants, was taken into consideration by the board, on the 17th of October, in the same year. And it was resolved that all the branches of that trade, which it was worth while to carry on, should still be steadfastly retained ; but that proper respect should be shown to the commands of their masters ; and what was of no value to keep should be immediately and completely resigned. The grand articles of the interior trade of Bengal were salt, betel-nut, and tobacco ; of which salt was out of all proportion the most important. Tobacco in particular, was so inconsiderable, that few, if any, of the Company's servants had engaged in it. The determination was, to give up the tobacco, preserving and securing the betel-nut and the salt. It must not, however, be forgotten that an order was now issued, prohibiting the practice of forcing the natives to buy and sell at any price which the Company's servants thought proper to command.

On the 1st of June, 1764, a letter was written by the Court of Directors, in consequence of the resolution of the Court of Proprietors, that the letter of the 8th of February should be reconsidered. In this, the Directors declared, that the terms imposed upon Meer Casim for the regulation of the private trade in the interior, " appeared to them so injurious to the Nabob and the natives, that they could not, in the very nature of them, tend to any thing but the producing general heart-burning and dissatisfaction : that the orders, therefore, in their letter of

BOOK IV. the 8th of February should remain in force until a more
CHAP. VII. equitable and satisfactory plan could be formed and

1765.

adopted; and, as it was impossible for them to frame such a plan at home, destitute as they were of the informations and lights necessary to guide them in settling such an important affair—the Committee were therefore ordered, as soon after the receipt of this letter as might be convenient, to consult the Nabob as to the manner of carrying on the inland trade, and thereupon to form a proper and equitable plan for that purpose, and transmit the same to the Directors, accompanied by such explanations, observations, and remarks, as might enable them to give their sentiments and directions thereupon in a full and explicit manner:—And in doing this, as before observed, they were to have a particular regard to the interest and entire satisfaction of the Nabob.” It was agreed, in general consultation at Fort William, on the 26th of January, 1765, to defer all proceedings on this order, till the arrival of Lord Clive; and in the mean time, in defiance of both letters, the course of the inland trade remained undisturbed.

One important circumstance in the letter of the 1st of June, the Directors themselves interpreted one way; their servants in India chose to interpret another. The servants inferred that the letter empowered them not only to contrive a plan, but also to put it in practice. It was maintained on the other hand, that the letter only authorized them to devise a plan, and transmit the account of it to the Directors. The letter, as usual, was vague and ambiguous; and those who had to act upon it, at so vast a distance, preferred, as might have been expected, the interpretation which best suited their own interests.

It is worthy of particular remark, that Lord Clive, as he declares to the Directors themselves,¹ framed the plan which was afterwards adopted, during his voyage to India. But, as he could not then have any lights which he had not in England, he might, unless he had determined not to be governed by the Directors, have opened to them his project before he departed; and have allowed to his masters the privilege of deciding.

It is not less worthy of remark, that Clive and the other Members of the Select Committee—Carnac ex-

¹ In his Letter, dated Calcutta, 1st February, 1766.

cepted, who had not left the army—formed a partnership before the beginning of June, for buying up large quantities of salt; that all the purchases were made during the month of June, and that in nine months the parties realized a profit, including interest, of about forty-five per cent. In apology for Clive, it was stated, that he brought out with him three gentlemen from England, Mr. Strachey, his secretary; Mr. Maskelyne, an old friend and fellow-servant of the Company; and Mr. Ingham, his surgeon; and that for the sake of making a fortune to them he engaged in that suspicious transaction. If a proceeding, however, is in its own nature shameful, there is but little saved, when the emolument is only made to go into the pocket of a connexion.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.

1765.

On the 10th of August, after these purchases had for some time been completed, and after certain inquiries had been made respecting the usual prices of salt in different places; it was resolved, in a Select Committee composed of only Mr. Sumner and Mr. Verelst, That a monopoly should be formed of the trade in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, to be carried on exclusively for the benefit of the superior servants of the Company. After several consultations, the following rules were adopted: That, deducting a duty to the Company, computed to produce 100,000*l.* per annum, the profits should be divided among three classes of proprietors: That, in the first class, should be allowed—to the governor, five shares; to the second in council, three shares; to the general, three shares; ten gentlemen of council, each two shares: two colonels, each two shares—in all thirty-five: That, in the second class, consisting of one chaplain, fourteen senior merchants, and three lieutenant-colonels, in all eighteen persons, two-thirds of one share should be granted to each, or twelve shares to the whole: In the third class, consisting of thirteen factors, four majors, four first surgeons at the presidency, two first surgeons at the army, one secretary to the council, one sub-accountant, one Persian translator, and

¹ There was nothing "shameful" in the nature of the transaction. The wisdom of the scheme may be questioned, but it was adopted deliberately and openly, as the only practicable expedient of providing for the indisputable necessity of giving liberal pay to responsible officers, whilst depriving them of the opportunity of remunerating themselves, and whilst the only legitimate source of public recompense, the public treasury was yet unopened.

—W.

BOOK IV. one sub-export-warehouse-keeper, in all twenty-seven persons, one-third of a share should be distributed to each, or nine shares to the whole : That a committee of four, **CHAP. VII.** empowered to make by-laws, borrow money, and determine the amount of capital, should be appointed for the entire management of the concern : that the purchases should be made by contract : That the goods should be conveyed by the agents of the association to certain fixed places, and there sold to the native merchants and retailers at established and invariable prices : That the exclusive power of making those purchases should be ensured to the association for one year : And that European agents should be allowed to conduct the business of the society in different parts of the country.

1765.

In defence of this scheme, it was urged, that by the prohibition of presents, and the growing share of the export and import trade engrossed by the Company's investment, the pay of their servants was reduced to the means of a bare subsistence ;¹ that besides the hardship of this policy, the wisdom was very defective, since it was absurd to suppose that men deprived of the means of enriching themselves by legitimate, would abstain from illegitimate means, when placed to a boundless extent in their power ; that a too rapid enriching of their servants, by enabling them to hurry to England, and leaving none but inexperienced youths to conduct their affairs, was ruinous to their interests ; and that, by the admirable arrangements of the trade society, a proper fortune was secured to those who had attained a certain station in the service, without incurring the danger of sending them home enriched at too early a period.

Upon these arguments, one reflection cannot be withheld, because the occasions for its application are exceed-

¹ It was wholly inadequate as a means of subsistence. Johnstone, in vindication of the unwillingness of the Council to sign the covenants, very fairly urges the insufficiency of the salaries of the Company's servants ; the allowance of a councillor, he writes, is not more than 250*l.*, of a factor, 140*l.*, of a writer, as lately increased 130*l.* ; but the rent of a very indifferent house in Calcutta, is 200*l.*, nearly the whole of even a councillor's salary. Letter to the Proprietors. So Clive, in his Speech to the House of Commons, observes, "the salary of a councillor is I think scarcely 300*l.* per annum, and it is well known that he cannot live in that country for less than 3,000*l.*" Life, iii. 100. As long as the salaries of the civil and military services left the Company's servants to starve, it was monstrous to expect that they would not use the power they possessed of providing for their own necessities, and for something more.—W.

ingly numerous, and because it appears, unhappily, to be not unfrequently made. It is contrary to experience, that by deriving large emoluments from an office, the person who holds it will be less eager to grasp at any unlawful gains which are within his reach. The avidity for more is not in general diminished by the amount of what is possessed. A trifling sum will doubtless lose something of its apparent magnitude in the eye of a man of wealth ; but the vast sums are those alone which are of much importance ; and they, we find, are as resistless a temptation to the rich as to the poor. The prevalence of the idea that satiating the servants of the public with wealth is a secret for rendering them honest, only proves how little the art of government has borrowed as yet from the science of human nature. If, with immense emoluments, a door is left open to misconduct, the misconduct is but the more ensured ; because the power of the offender affords him a shield against both popular contempt and legal chastisement. If the servants of the Company, as Clive and his Committee so positively affirmed, had it in their power, and in their inclination, to pillage and embezzle, when their incomes were small, the mere enlargement of their incomes would add to the power, and could not much detract from the inclination.¹

At the time of these proceedings, the Select Committee were deprived of the shelter even of an ambiguous expression ; and knew that they were acting in express defiance of the wishes and commands of their superiors. Under date the 15th of February, 1765, the Directors had written in the following terms : " In our letters of the 8th February, and 1st June last, we gave our sentiments and directions very fully in respect to the inland trade of

¹ This reflection is not founded upon so careful a consideration of human nature as might have been expected from our author. Although cases of insatiable cupidity may from time to time occur, yet in general a man who has in his hands the means of securing, at no very remote period, a moderate fortune for himself and his family, is removed from the temptation of accelerating that period by illicit gains. He is also likely to be deterred from yielding to the temptation by the amount of loss which he hazards. To him who has nothing, the consequences of exposure offer little terror, to him who has much, disgrace, and eventually diminished wealth, will be very reluctantly risked. All consideration of moral principle is omitted in the text, but in the instance of insufficient means, integrity is manifestly powerfully assailed, whilst in that of competent means it is strengthened and confirmed. That these views are sound is established by events, and the generally unimpeached integrity of the Company's servants in India has

BOOK IV. Bengal ;—we now enforce the same in the strongest manner, and positively insist that you take no steps whatever towards renewing this trade, without our express leave ;
 CHAP. VII. 1765. for which reason you must not fail to give us the fullest information upon the subject, agreeably to our above-mentioned directions.

Having thus established the Private-trade Society, the Committee proceeded to introduce other regulations which the state of affairs appeared to require. It had been a common practice with members of the Council, instead of remaining at the Board for the business of the Presidency, to receive nomination to the chiefship of factories, as often as additional means of accumulating money were there placed in their hands. To this practice the Committee, on very good grounds, resolved to put an end. "We are convinced," they said, "by very late experience, that the most flagrant oppressions may be wantonly committed in those employments, by members of the Board, which would not be tolerated in junior servants ; and that the dread and awe annexed to their station, as councillors, has too frequently screened them from complaints which would be lodged without fear or scruple against inferior servants." Yet, with this experience before them, they recommend great emoluments as a security against corruption.¹ The Committee further remarked, that not only the business, which was thus engrossed by Members of the Board, could be as well transacted by a junior servant, at much less expense ; but that other inconveniences, still more pernicious, were incurred ; that by the absence of so many members of the board, it had been necessary to increase their numbers from twelve to sixteen ; that by the regular departure to the out-settlements of those Members of the Council who had the greatest influence to procure their own appointment, there was so rapid a change of councillors at the board, where only the youngest and most inexperienced remained, that the business of the Presidency was obliged to be conducted by men deficient,

followed the elevation of their pay in proportion to the responsibility of their stations, and their reasonable prospects of returning with a sufficiency to their native country.—W.

¹ The emoluments in this case, it is to be remembered, were in their very nature fertile sources of oppression ; they were indefinite, limited by no bounds except the power and cupidity of the individual.—W.

in the knowledge and experience necessary for carrying BOOK IV.
it on.

CHAP. VII.

1765.

Another measure, productive of considerable irritation and disturbance, was promoted by Clive. The rapid acquisition of riches in Bengal had recently sent so many of the superior servants, along with their fortunes, to Europe, that few remained to fill up the vacancies in the Council except either men very young and inexperienced, or those whom Clive described as tainted with the corruptions which had vitiated the administration. The Committee say, "It is with the utmost regret we think it incumbent on us to declare, that in the whole list of your junior merchants, there are not more than three or four gentlemen whom we could possibly recommend to higher stations at present." They accordingly forbore to supply the vacancies which occurred in the Council, and resolved upon calling a certain number of servants at the other presidencies, to supersede those in Bengal. They paid to their employers the compliment of recommending the measure to their consideration; but waited not for their decision, for, in two months from the date of their letter, four gentlemen arrived from Madras, and soon after took their seats at the Board.¹

Among the circumstances most strongly recommended to Lord Clive by the Company, was the reduction of the military expenses, which absorbed all their revenues, and

¹ The effects of this measure are thus described by the Committee themselves: "As soon as this measure became known by reports from Madras, the young gentlemen of the settlement had set themselves up for judges of the propriety of our conduct, and the degree of their own merit." It is to be observed that by "young gentlemen," here is to be understood all those, without exception, who were not of the council, that is, all those whose interests were affected by this unusual proceeding; and they were even joined by several Members of the Council. That Clive should treat it as unendurable in such persons to express an unfavourable opinion upon his conduct, or upon a treatment which they naturally regarded as highly injurious to themselves, is in the genuine strain of power, both in India and Europe. The Committee continue: "They have not only set their hands to the memorial of complaint, but entered into associations unbecoming at their years, and destructive of that subordination, without which no government can stand; all visits to the President are forbidden; all invitations from him and the Members of the Committee are to be slighted; the gentlemen called down by our authority from Madras are to be treated with neglect and contempt." Even the Secretary to the Council, distinguishing himself in this association, was dismissed from his office, and suspended the service. The Committee adds, "You will be astonished to observe at the head of this list, two members of your Council who subscribe their names in testimony of their sense of the injustice done to the younger servants." Letter from the Select Committee to the Directors, dated 1st January, 1766.

BOOK IV. rendered their ascendancy in the country a burden rather
 CHAP. VII. than an advantage. As service in the field is, in India,
 1766. attended with peculiar charges to the officers, the Company had, at an early period of their wars, found it necessary to allow their officers, during the time of campaign, a certain addition to their daily pay, which, in the language of the country, was styled *batta*, or indemnity for field expenses.

When the English forces took the field with Meer Jaffer after the battle of Plassy, to cherish their good-will, on which he was so dependent, that Nabob afforded to the officers twice the ordinary sum, and this allowance was distinguished by the name of *double batta*. As long as the troops continued to be paid by Meer Casim, the Company felt no prevailing motive to lessen an expense, which pleased the officers, and oppressed only the Nabob. When they perceived, upon the assignment of territorial revenues for the expense of the army, that what could be withheld from the army would accrue to themselves, they issued repeated orders for the reduction of the *batta*. But the dangers of the country had rendered the exertions of the army so necessary; and they to whom the powers of government were intrusted had so little dared to venture their authority in a contest with the military, that double *batta* had hitherto been allowed to remain.

Upon the conclusion of the war with Suja-ad-dowla, the troops were regimented, according to a plan proposed by Clive, and sanctioned by the Company before his departure from England; divided into three brigades, each consisting of one regiment of European infantry, one company of artillery, six battalions of Sepoys, and one troop of black cavalry; and were stationed, one brigade at Mongheer, 300 miles from Calcutta; another at Bankipore, near Patna, 100 miles beyond Mongheer; and the third at Allahabad, 200 miles beyond Patna, whither it had been sent as a security against the Mahrattas, whom the Emperor and Vizir were far too reduced to be able to oppose.

In this situation, the Select Committee issued an order, that on the 1st January, 1766, the double *batta* should cease; and that the officers in Bengal, with some exceptions in favour of the troops in the most distant and expensive stations, should be placed on the same footing

with those on the coast of Coromandel ; that is, receive BOOK IV.
single batta when in the field ; and in garrison or canton- CHAP. VII.
ments, no batta at all.

The officers, who, along with the rest of their countrymen, had formed unbounded notions of the wealth of India, and whose imaginations naturally exaggerated the fortunes which were making in the civil branch of the service, had received every previous intimation of this reduction with the loudest complaints and remonstrances ; and treated the peremptory decree which was now issued, as an act of the highest injustice ; and as a most unworthy attempt to deprive them of a share of those rich advantages for which they had fought and bled, only that a larger stream of emolument might flow into the laps of those very men who were the instruments of their oppression.

1766.

At all times, and especially in situations in any degree resembling that of the British in India, it has been found a hazardous act to reduce the advantages of any army ; and Clive appears to have greatly miscalculated either the weight of his own authority, or the delicacy of the operation. Without any endeavour to prepare the minds of the men, the order was issued and enforced ; and without any care to watch its effects, the Governor remained in perfect security and ignorance, till the end of April, when he received a letter informing him, that a most alarming conspiracy, embracing almost every officer in the army, was ripe for execution.

As early as the month of December, a combination began. Private meetings and consultations were held, secret committees were formed, and correspondence carried on. The combustion first began in the brigade of Mongheer ; but was soon, by letter, communicated to the rest, whose bosoms were perfectly prepared for inflammation. The plan concerted was, that the officers should resign their commissions in a body, and, by leaving the army totally ungoverned, make the constituted authorities submit to their terms. Nearly two hundred commissions of captains and subalterns were in a short time collected. Besides a solemn oath of secrecy, they bound themselves by a similar obligation, to preserve at the hazard of their own lives, the life of any officer, whom a Court Martial might

BOOK IV. condemn to death. Each officer executed a penalty bond
 CHAP. VII. of 500*l.*, not to accept his commission till double batta
 1766. was restored. A subscription was raised among them to
 establish a fund for the indemnification of those who might
 suffer in the prosecution of the enterprise; and to this, it
 was understood, that the gentlemen in the civil service,
 and even those at the Presidency, largely contributed.

When the army was in this situation, a body of between fifty and sixty thousand Mahrattas appeared on the frontiers of Corah, about one hundred and fifty miles from Allahabad. To watch their motions, the brigade remaining in garrison at that city was ordered to encamp at Suragepore. Early in April, Lord Clive, accompanied by General Carnac, had repaired to Moorsshedabad, in order to regulate the collections of the revenue for the succeeding year, to receive from Suja-ad-dowla the balance of his payments, and to hold a congress of the native chiefs or princes, who were disposed to form an alliance for mutual defence against the Mahrattas. On the 19th, was transmitted to him, from the Select Committee, a remonstrance received from the officers of the third brigade,¹ expressed in very high language, which he directed to be answered with little respect. It was not till late in the evening of the 28th; when he received a letter from Sir Robert Fletcher, the commanding officer at Mongheer; that Clive had the slightest knowledge or suspicion of a conspiracy so extensive, and of which the complicated operations had been going on for several months.

At Bankipore, a considerable part of the cantonments had been burnt down; and a Court Martial was held upon one of the officers, accused of having been the voluntary cause. The act proceeded from a quarrel between him and another officer who attempted to take away his commission by force: and, upon exploring the reason of this extraordinary operation, the existence of the combination was disclosed. The commanding officer immediately despatched an account of the discovery to Sir Robert Fletcher at Mongheer; who was by no means unacquainted with the proceedings in his own brigade, but was only now induced

¹ That is of the Brigade stationed at Bankypore, not, as might be supposed, from the previous specification of the Brigades, that which was quartered at Allahabad, which was the second, not the third Brigade.—W.

to give intimation of them to his superiors. It was the plan of the officers to resign their commissions on the 1st of June; but this discovery determined them, with the exception of the brigade at Allahabad, to whom information could not be forwarded in time, to execute their purpose a month earlier.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.
1766.

Clive at first could not allow himself to believe that the combination was extensive; or that any considerable number of men, the whole of whose prospects in life were founded upon the service, would have resolution to persevere in a scheme, by which the danger of exclusion from it, not to speak of other consequences, was unavoidably incurred. It was one of those scenes, however, in which he was admirably calculated to act with success. Resolute and daring, fear never turned him aside from his purposes; or deprived him of the most collected exertion of his mind in the greatest emergencies. To submit to the violent demands of a body of armed men, was to resign the government. He had a few officers in his suite upon whom he could depend; a few more, he concluded might yet be found at Calcutta, and the factories; and some of the free merchants might accept of commissions. The grand object was to preserve the common soldiers in order and obedience, till a fresh supply of officers from the other Presidencies could be obtained.

He remained not long without sufficient evidence that almost all the officers of all the three brigades were involved in the combination, and that their resignations were tendered. Directions were immediately sent to the commanding officers, to find, if possible, the leaders in the conspiracy; to arrest those officers whose conduct appeared the most dangerous, and detain them prisoners; above all things to secure the obedience of the Sepoys and black commanders, if the European troops should appear to be infected with the disobedience of their officers. Letters were despatched to the Council at Calcutta, and the Presidency at Fort St. George, to make the greatest exertions for a supply of officers; and Clive himself hastened towards Mongheer. On the road he received a letter from Colonel Smith, who commanded at Allahabad, informing him that the Mahrattas were in motion, and that Ballajee Row was at Calpee with 60,000 men

BOOK IV. collecting boats. If reduced to extremity, but not before,
 CHAP. VII. Smith was instructed to promise the officers compliance
 with their demands.

1766.

Expecting their resignation to produce all the effects which they desired, the officers had concerted no ulterior measures. Their desperation had not led them to make any attempts to debauch the common soldiers. The Sepoys everywhere exhibited a steady obedience; and the commanding officers of all the brigades remained in perfect confidence of being able, in case of mutiny, to put every European soldier to death. Except, however, at Mongheer, where symptoms of mutiny among the Europeans were quickly dispelled by the steady countenance of the Sepoys drawn out to attack them, no disturbance occurred. The officers at Mongheer submitted quietly to be sent down to Calcutta; the greater part of those belonging to the other brigades retracted: and this extraordinary combination, which, with a somewhat longer sight on the part of the officers, or less of vigour and of the awe of a high reputation on the part of the Governor, would have effected a revolution in India, produced, as ineffectual resistance generally does, a subjection more complete than what would have existed, if the disturbance had never been raised. Some of the officers, upon profession of repentance, were allowed to resume the service; others were tried and cashiered. The case of Sir Robert Fletcher was the most remarkable. He had been active in subduing the confederacy; but was found to have encouraged its formation. He apologized for himself on two grounds; that he wished, through the guilt of the conspiracy, to be able to dismiss a number of officers, whose bad conduct rendered them an injury to the service; and that he wished, through the appearance of favouring the views of the officers in some things, to have the advantage of a complete knowledge of their proceedings: a Court Martial, notwithstanding, found him guilty of mutiny, of sedition, and concealment of mutiny; and he was punished by ejection from the service.

Upon the termination of this dangerous disaffection, Lord Clive proceeded to Chupprah, where he was met by Suja-ad-dowla, by the Minister of the Emperor, and by deputies from the Mahratta Chiefs. Suja-ad-dowla con-

tinued to express the highest satisfaction with the treaty which he had lately concluded with the Company; and cheerfully advanced the remainder of the sum which he had promised as the price of peace. The grand desire of the Emperor was to regain possession of the capital of his ancestors, and to mount the throne at Delhi. He had exhausted all his arts of negotiation and intrigue to obtain the assistance of the English; and had, without their concurrence, formed engagements with the Mahrattas, who, at his persuasion, it now appeared, and under assurances that the English would join them in escorting him to his capital, were assembled on the confines of Corah. This ambition of the Emperor was offensive to the English; who, as they had no intention to second his views, dreaded violently his connexion with the Mahrattas. The formation of a treaty for mutual defence, including the Emperor, the Company, the Jaat and Rohilla chiefs, was left to be conducted by Suja-ud-dowla.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. VII.

1766.

During these transactions died the Nabob of Bengal, Nujum ud Dowla. He expired on the 8th of May, a few days after Clive had left him at Moorshedabad. He was an intemperate youth, of a gross habit of body; and his death had in it nothing surprising. Its suddenness, however, failed not, in a country habituated to deeds of darkness around a throne, to cover it with odious suspicions. His brother, Syeff ud Dowla, a youth of sixteen, was elevated to his nominal office; a change of less importance now than that of the chief of a factory.

Upon the return of Clive to the Presidency, the private trade, so dear to individuals, demanded the attention of the Committee. The native merchants, to whom the salt had been disposed of, at the places of the society's sales, had re-sold or retailed it at a profit which the Committee deemed extravagant. Instead of inquiring whether, if the trade, as alleged by the Committee, was monopolized and engrossed by a combination, the means could not be devised of yielding it the benefit of free competition; they contented themselves with the easy and despotical expedient of ordering the commodity to be retailed at an established price: and by an *ex-post-facto* law fined the native merchants to the amount of their additional gains.¹

¹ Select Consultation, 15th August, 1766.—M.

It should be stated, however, that the merchants had purchased, under an

BOOK IV. On the 3d of September the Select Committee proceeded
 CHAP. VII. to arrange the business of the inland trade society for another year. The Company in their letter of the 19th of February, already received, had declared that they considered the continuance of this trade "as an express breach and violation of their orders, and as a determined resolution to sacrifice the interests of the Company, and the peace of the country, to lucrative and selfish views." Pronouncing, "that every servant concerned in that trade stood guilty of a breach of his covenants, and of their orders," they added, "Whatever government may be established, or whatever unforeseen circumstances may arise, it is our resolution to prohibit, and we do absolutely forbid, this trade of salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, and of all articles that are not for export and import, according to the spirit of the phirmaund, which does not in the least give any latitude whatsoever for carrying on such an inland trade; and moreover, we shall deem every European concerned therein, directly or indirectly, guilty of a breach of his covenants; and direct that he be forthwith sent to England, that we may proceed against him accordingly."

1766.

Notwithstanding these clear and forcible prohibitions, the Committee proceeded to a renewal of the monopoly, as if the orders of the Directors deserved not a moment's regard. Clive, in his Minute, turned them carelessly aside, observing that when the Company sent them, "they could not have the least idea of that favourable change in the affairs of these provinces, whereby the interest of the Nabob, with regard to salt, is no longer immediately concerned." As a reason against lodging the government of India in hands at the distance of half the circumference of the globe, the remark would merit attention: for the disobedience of servants to those who employed them, it is no justification at all; because, extended as far as it is applicable, it rendered the servants of the Company independent; and constituted them masters of India.¹

agreement with the Committee of Trade, to sell at a fixed rate of profit, and it was the excess upon the agreed rate, which they were, somewhat arbitrarily, but not unjustly, compelled to refund.—W.

¹ A discretionary power to suspend the execution of the orders of the home authorities, so as to afford them the opportunity of considering circumstances of which they may not have been apprized, is a very different thing from positive disobedience, and is indispensable to the due administration of government in India. It still rests with the authorities in England to countermand or enforce the instructions they have sent out.—W.

One change alone, of any importance, was introduced upon the regulations of the preceding year: the salt, instead of being conveyed to the interior, was to be sold at Calcutta, and the several places of manufacture. The transportation of the commodity to distant places, by the agents of the society, was attended with great trouble and expense: by selling it immediately at the places of manufacture, so much was saved: and by reserving the distribution to the merchants of the country, a pretended boon was granted to the natives. A maximum price was fixed; and, on the 8th of September, a Committee of Trade was formed, with directions for carrying the plan into execution.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.

1766.

No sooner was this arrangement formed, than Clive brought forward a proposition for prohibiting all future Governors and Presidents from any concern whatsoever in trade. On the 19th of the very same month, in a Minute presented to the Select Committee, he represented, that, "Where such immense revenues are concerned, where power and authority are so enlarged, and where the eye of justice and equity should be ever watchful, a Governor ought not to be embarrassed with private business. He ought to be free from every occupation in which his judgment can possibly be biassed by his interest." He, therefore, proposed, that the Governor should receive a commission of one and one-eighth per cent. upon the revenues; and in return should take a solemn and public oath, and bind himself in a penalty of 150,000*l.* to derive no emolument or advantage from his situation as Governor of Bengal, beyond this commission, with the usual salary and perquisites: and a covenant to this effect was formally executed by him. That good reasons existed for precluding the Governor from such oblique channels of gain, both as giving him sinister interests, and engrossing his time, it is not difficult to perceive: that the same reasons should not have been seen to be good, for precluding, also, the members of the Select Committee and the Council, might, though it need not, excite our surprise.

On the 8th of December, letters arrived from England, dated the 17th of May, addressed both to Clive and the Committee. In these documents, the Directors pronounced the inland trade society to be a violation of their repeated

BOOK IV. orders; declared that all those servants who had been
 CHAP. VII. engaged in that society should be held responsible for a
 1766. breach of their covenants; and commanded that the trade
 should be abandoned, and should be reserved, free from
 European competition, to the natives. There was no
 longer any room for direct disobedience. The dissolution
 of the society was pronounced. But on the score of the
 contracts which had been formed and the advances made,
 the whole of the existing year was reserved; and the
 society was not abolished, in fact, till the 14th of Sep-
 tember, 1768.¹

Upon the 16th of January, 1767, Lord Clive declared his
 intention of returning immediately to Europe, on account
 of his health; and directed the attention of the Select
 Committee to the regulations which, previous to his de-
 parture, it might appear expedient to adopt. By recent
 instructions the Directors had empowered him either to
 abolish, or continue the Select Committee, upon his de-
 parture, according as the state of affairs might to him
 appear to require. He felt no hesitation in deciding for
 its continuance; and named as members Mr. Verelst, who
 was to succeed him in the chair, Mr. Cartier, Colonel
 Smith, Mr. Sykes, and Mr. Beecher. He departed in the
 Britannia; and, on the 17th of February, Mr. Verelst took
 his oath as successor in the chair.²

It was the interest of the servants in India, diligently
 cultivated, perpetually to feast the Company with the
 most flattering accounts of the state of their affairs. The
 magnitude of the transactions, which had recently taken
 place; the vast riches with which the new acquisitions
 were said to abound; the general credulity on the subject

¹ Governor Vansittart is very severe in his condemnation of this society. "As I am of opinion," he says, "that an universal equality of trade in these articles (salt, betel-nut, and tobacco,) would be the most beneficial footing it could stand upon; so I think that a monopoly of it in the hands of a few men of power is the most cruel and oppressive. The poor people of the country have not now a hope of redress.—It is a monopoly, in my opinion, of the most injurious nature.—I could set forth the unhappy condition of the people under this grievous monopoly, in the words of a letter, which I have received from one of the country merchants; but I think it needless, because it must occur sufficiently to every reader who has any feeling." A Letter to the Proprietors of India Stock, from Mr. Henry Vansittart, 1767, p. 88, 89, 93.

² For the preceding train of events, the principal sources of information were the Reports of the Two Committees of the House of Commons in 1772 and 1773; Vansittart's Narrative; Verelst's View of Bengal; Scott's History of Bengal; Seer Mutakhareen; Clive's Speech.

of Indian opulence ; and the great fortunes with which a few individuals had returned to Europe ; inflamed the avarice of the proprietors of East India Stock ; and rendered them impatient for a share of treasures, which the imaginations of their countrymen, as well as their own, represented as not only vast, but unlimited. This impulse carried them, in 1766, to raise their dividend from six to ten per cent. The inflated conceptions of the nation at large multiplied the purchasers of India stock ; and it rose so high as 263 per cent. The proprietors called with importunity for a higher return. It was in vain that the Directors represented the heavy debts of the Company ; and pointed out the imprudence of taking an augmented dividend, when money at a heavy interest must be taken up to discharge it. In a General Court held on the 6th of May, 1767, a dividend of twelve and a half per cent. was voted for the year.¹ The public attention was vehemently roused. Even the interference of the minister was commanded. He had condemned the rapacity of the proprietors in augmenting the dividend ; and recommended a Committee of the House of Commons, which was actually formed in November 1766, for the purpose of inquiring into the state of their affairs. The relation between the public, and the territory now held by the Company in India, called for definition. It was maintained on the one hand, as an indisputable maxim of law, supported by the strongest considerations of utility, that no subjects of the

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.

1767.

¹ The opposition of the Directors to this increase of the dividend, founded on a knowledge of the state of the Company's affairs, rendered them unpopular with the body of the proprietors ; and advantage was taken of the circumstance to baffle them in a measure which was the natural consequence of the proceedings in Bengal upon Clive's resumption of the government, but of which no notice is taken in the text. As the presents received by the members of the Council upon Nujum-ud-dowla's accession were subsequent to the arrival of the covenants, legal opinions had pronounced that although not formally executed, they were binding in equity, and that the parties were liable to a prosecution for their violation. The Directors had accordingly instituted a suit against those of their servants who had accepted the presents in question. As these persons were now at home, with wealth and friends, great efforts were made to induce the court to drop the proceedings, and the question was mixed up with that of the increase of the dividends ; accordingly, on the day when the Directors were overruled on the latter point, and resentment as violent as unmerited, had been excited against them, it was moved and carried that the prosecutions which had been instituted should be dismissed. Life of Clive, iii. 135. The party animosities and angry feelings called into opposition by these discussions, were the motives of the Parliamentary Debates and Investigations that ensued, much more than any sober and statesman-like desire to provide for India the best form of government of which its condition was susceptible.—W.

BOOK IV. Crown could acquire the sovereignty of any territory for themselves, but only for the nation. On the side of the

CHAP. VII. Company, the abstract rights of property, and the endless
 1767. train of evils which arise from their infringement, were vehemently enforced; while it was affirmed that the Company held not their territories in sovereignty, but only as a farm granted by the Mogul, to whom they actually paid an annual rent. An Act was passed, which directed that, after the 24th of June, 1767, dividends should be voted only by ballot, in General Courts summoned expressly for that purpose; and that no dividend above ten per cent. for the year should be made before the next Session of Parliament. The resolution of the Court of Proprietors respecting a dividend of twelve and a half per cent. was thus rescinded; and the right of Parliament to control and command the Company in the distribution of their own money asserted and established. The question of the sovereignty was not pushed at that time to a direct and express decision; though a decision was virtually involved in another Act, by which the Company, in consideration of holding the territorial revenues for two years, were obliged to pay annually 400,000*l.* into the public exchequer.

The opinion which Lord Clive had artfully¹ raised of the high prosperity of the Company's affairs, and of his own extraordinary share in producing it, directed the overflowings of their gratitude towards himself; and a proposition was brought forward and carried, to grant him, for ten years certain, the produce of his jaghire.

Other acquisitions of Clive come subsequently to view. Notwithstanding the covenants executed by the servants of the Company, not to receive any presents from the natives, that Governor had accepted five lacks of rupees during his late residence in Bengal from the Nabob Nujumud-dowla. It was represented, indeed, as a legacy left to him by Meer Jaffier, though all indications pointed out a present, to which the name of legacy was artfully attached.

¹ There does not seem to be any just cause for this epithet. The extension of the Company's territory and power was notorious, and was unquestionably attributable in the main to Clive's genius. The general opinion was the natural result of events, and was not stimulated in any degree by designing or false representations on the part of Clive. He may have overrated the value of the acquisition; but the exaggeration was the honest expression of his own belief, not an artful misrepresentation.—W.

At any rate, if any sums might be acquired under the name of legacies, the covenants against receiving presents were useless forms. Lord Clive represented, that upon the first intimation of this gift, his resolution was to refuse it; that he changed his mind, upon reflecting of what importance it would prove as a fund for the benefit of invalided officers and soldiers in the Company's service; and that he afterwards prevailed upon Syeff-ud-dowla, the successor of Nujum-ud-dowla, to bestow three lacks more for this excellent end. The Company sanctioned the appropriation; and to this ambiguous transaction the Institution at Poplar owes its foundation.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.
1767.

Upon this, as upon his former departure, the regulations which Clive left behind, calculated for present applause rather than permanent advantage, produced a brilliant appearance of immediate prosperity, but were fraught with the elements of future difficulty and distress. A double government, or an administration carried on in name by the Nabob, in reality by the Company, was the favourite policy of Clive;² to whose mind a certain degree of crooked artifice seems to have presented itself pretty congenially in the light of profound and skilful politics. The collection of the revenues was still made as for the exchequer of the Nabob; justice was still administered by

¹ The fact is unambiguous. Clive did not benefit by the donation.—W.

² The following is an extract of Clive's Letter to the Select Committee of 16th of January, 1767, upon his leaving India: "The first point in politics which I offer to your consideration is the form of government. We are sensible that since the acquisition of the dewanny, the power formerly belonging to the Subah of these provinces is totally, in fact, vested in the East India Company. Nothing remains to him but the name and shadow of authority. This name, however, this shadow, it is indispensably necessary we should seem to venerate.—Under the sanction of a Subah (Subahdar), every encroachment that may be attempted by foreign powers can effectually be crushed, without any apparent interposition of our own authority; and all real grievances complained of by them can, through the same channel, be examined into and redressed. Be it, therefore, always remembered, that there is a Subah; and that though the revenues belong to the Company, the territorial Jurisdiction must still rest in the chiefs of the country, acting under him and this Presidency in conjunction. To appoint the Company's servants to the offices of collectors, or indeed to do any act by any exertion of the English power, which can easily be done by the Nabob at our instance, would be throwing off the mask, would be declaring the Company Subah of the provinces. Foreign nations would immediately take umbrage; and complaints preferred to the British court might be attended with very embarrassing consequences. Nor can it be supposed, that either the French, Dutch, or Danes, would readily acknowledge the Company's Subahship, and pay into the hands of their servants the duties upon trade, or the quit-rents of those districts which they may have long been possessed of by virtue of the royal privileges, or grants from former Nabobs."

BOOK IV. his officers and in his name ; and all transactions with
 CHAP. VII. foreign powers were covered with the mask of his authority. For the benefit of certain false pretexts which imposed upon nobody, the government of the country, as far as regarded the protection of the people, was dissolved. Neither the Nabob nor his officers dared to exert any authority against the English, of whatsoever injustice and oppression they might be guilty. The gomastahs, or Indian agents employed by the Company's servants, not only practised unbounded tyranny, but, overawing the Nabob and his highest officer, converted the tribunals of justice themselves into instruments of cruelty, making them inflict punishment upon the very wretches whom they oppressed, and whose only crime was their not submitting with sufficient willingness to the insolent rapacity of those subordinate tyrants. While the ancient administration of the country was rendered inefficient, this suspension of the powers of government was supplied by nothing in the regulations of the English. Beyond the ancient limits of the Presidency, the Company had no legal power over the natives : beyond these limits, the English themselves were not amenable to the British laws ; and the Company had no power of coercion except by sending persons out of the country ; a remedy always inconvenient, and, except for very heinous offences, operating too severely upon the individual to be willingly applied. The natural consequence was, that the crimes of the English and their agents were in a great measure secured from punishment, and the unhappy natives lay prostrate at their feet. As the revenue of the government depended upon the productive operations of the people ; and as a people are productive only in proportion to the share of their own produce which they are permitted to enjoy ; this wretched administration could not fail, in time, to make itself felt in the Company's exchequer.¹ Other sources were not

1767.

¹ Governor Verelst, in his letter to the Directors, immediately before his resignation, dated 16th December, 1769, says, " We insensibly broke down the barrier betwixt us and government, and the native grew uncertain where his obedience was due. Such a divided and complicated authority gave rise to oppressions and intrigues, unknown at any other period ; the officers of government caught the infection, and, being removed from any immediate control, proceeded with still greater audacity. In the meantime, we were repeatedly and peremptorily forbid to avow any public authority over the officers of government in our own names," &c.

wanting, whence a copious stream of evils was derived. BOOK IV.
 Though the Governor and Council placed the powers of CHAP. VII.
 the Nabob in a sort of commission, by compelling him to
 resign the entire management of business to one or more
 persons of their own choosing ; and though they placed a
 confidential servant of the Company to watch them at the
 Nabob's durbar ; yet they possessed not over these depo-
 sitaries of power, whom they could only punish by dis-
 missal, sufficient means of control. Before detection, or
 much of suspicion, it was always possible for each of them
 to appropriate a treasure, and be gone ; leaving his place
 to be filled by another who had both temptation and op-
 portunity to repeat his crimes. With men whose interests
 were so little united with those of their employers, and
 whose situation was so very precarious, the Zemindars,
 Rajas, and other agents of the revenue, might easily settle
 their own terms, and place the fallacy of their accounts
 beyond the reach of detection. The mischief was less in
 practice than reason would have anticipated ; because in
 the choice of these native functionaries, the English were
 both judicious and happy. Another, and that the most
 pernicious perhaps of all the errors into which Clive
 exerted himself to mislead the Company, was, the belief
 which he created, that India overflowed with riches, the
 expectations he raised, and on which the credulous Com-
 pany so fondly relied, that a torrent of treasure was about
 to flow into their laps. As such expectations were adverse
 to the best use and improvement of their resources, they
 only hastened that disappointment and distress which
 their inconsistency with the matters of fact rendered a
 necessary consequence. In political affairs, it is long before
 even experience teaches wisdom. Till the present moment,
 incessant promises of treasure have never failed to deceive
 without ceasing to delude. As often as the pain of dis-
 appointment has become exceedingly severe, we have con-
 demned a Governor, in whose conduct we believed that we
 had found the cause of our misery ; and have begun imme-
 diately to pamper our fancy anew, with endless hopes and
 delusions.

Under the feebleness of Suja-ad-dowla, and the quar-
 rels which occupied the Mahrattas at home, the Company
 enjoyed profound tranquillity in Bengal for a considerable

BOOK IV. number of years ; and during the administrations of Mr.
 CHAP. VII. Verelst and Mr. Cartier, who occupied the chair till the

1767.

elevation of Mr. Hastings, and were calm, unambitious men, few events of historical importance occurred. It was during a period like this, if ever, that the Company ought to have replenished their exchequer, and to have attained financial prosperity. During this period, on the other hand, financial difficulties were continually increasing ; and rose at last to a height which threatened them with immediate destruction. Doubtless, the anarchical state, in which, by the double government, the provinces were placed, contributed powerfully to impoverishment ; but the surplus revenue, with which the people of England were taught to delude themselves, was hindered by more permanent causes. Though no body should believe it, India, like other countries, in which the industrious arts are in their infancy, and in which law is too imperfect to render property secure, has always been poor. It is only the last perfection of government which enables a government to keep its own expense from absorbing every thing which it is possible to extract from the people : and the government of India, under the East India Company, by a delegation of servants at the distance of half the circumference of the globe from control, was most unhappily circumstanced for economy. On a subject like this, authority is useful. "With regard to the increase of the expenses," says Clive, "I take the case to stand thus : Before the Company became possessed of the dewanee, their agents had other ways of making fortunes. Presents were open to them. They are now at an end. It was expedient for them to find some other channel—the channel of the civil and military charges. Every man now who is permitted to make a bill, makes a fortune."¹

During the year 1767, a march of the Abdallee Shah towards Delhi, excited the attention, though not much the alarm, of the Presidency. After some contests with the Seiks, and overrunning a few of the provinces, that powerful Chief returned to his own country. An expedition was undertaken for the restoration of the Raja of Nepaul, who had been dispossessed by his neighbour the

¹ Clive's Speech, as published by himself, reprinted in *Almon's Debates* for 1772, p. 44.

Ghurka. The motives were: that Nepaul had carried on BOOK IV.
a considerable traffic with the province of Berar; that its CHAP. VII.
vicinity to the district of Bettea afforded great opportuni-
ties for the improvement of trade; that all intercourse
was now destroyed; and that the accomplishment of the
object was easy. On the last point, at least, the authors
of the war were not very correctly informed; and found
they had miscalculated the difficulties of subduing a
country, surrounded by mountains, and accessible only by
a few narrow and nearly impenetrable defiles. The officer
sent to command the expedition was unable to proceed, and
wrote for reinforcements. The Presidency were violently
disappointed; and felt a strong inclination to wreak their
vengeance upon the Commander. Being obliged to send
assistance to Madras, they were unable to afford reinforce-
ments, and recalled the detachment.¹ The war with Hyder
Ali had now broken out in the Carnatic; and considerable
supplies, both in men and money, were demanded from
Bengal. This year financial distress began to be experi-
enced. Complaints were first emitted of the scarcity of
money, ascribed, not to impoverishment of the country,
but to a drain of specie, occasioned by the annual expor-
tation of the precious metals, chiefly to China, on account
of the Company's investment, and also in other directions;
while the usual supplies of bullion from Europe (the
Company providing their investment from the revenues,
the Dutch and French from the fortunes of the English
consigned to them for transmission) were almost wholly
cut off.²

¹ Letters from the Presidency, to the Directors, Verelst's Appendix.

² In the letter of the Select Committee to the Directors, dated Fort William, September 26th, 1767, they say, "We have frequently expressed to you our apprehensions lest the annual exportation of treasure to China would produce a scarcity of money in the country. This subject becomes every day more serious, as we already feel in a very sensible manner the effects of the considerable drain made from the silver currency." And in their letter of the 16th of December, they add, "We foresee the difficulties before us in making provision agreeably to your orders for supplying China with silver bullion even for this season. We have before repeatedly requested your attention to the consequences of this exportation of bullion; and we now beg leave to recommend the subject to your most serious consideration—assuring you, that, should we find it at all practicable to make the usual remittances next year to China, the measure will prove fatal to your investment, and ruinous to the commerce of Bengal."—The absurdity of the theory which they invented to account for the want of money, that is, of resources, (to wit, the drain of specie,) is shown by this fact; that the price of commodities all the while, instead of falling, had immensely risen. See the testimonies of Hastings and Francis, in their minutes on the revenue plans. Sixth Report of the Select Committee in 1781, Appendix xiv. and xv.

BOOK IV. Early in the year 1768, arrived the Company's peremp-
CHAP. VII. tory order for abolishing entirely the trade of their ser-
 1768. vants in salt, and other articles of interior traffic; for
 laying it open, and confining it to the natives; and for
 restricting their servants entirely to the maritime branches
 of commerce.¹

The commission of one and one-eighth per cent. upon the dewanee revenues, which by the Select Committee had been settled upon the Governor as a compensation for relinquishing his share in the salt trade, was also commanded to cease. For as much, however, as the income of their servants, if thus cut off from irregular sources of gain, was represented as not sufficiently opulent, the Company granted a commission of two and a half per cent. upon the net produce of the dewanee revenues, to be divided into 100 equal shares, and distributed in the following proportions: to the Governor, thirty-one shares; to the second in Council, four and a half; to the rest of the Select Committee, not having a chiefship, each three and a half shares; to the Members of the Council not having a chiefship, each one and a half; to the Commander-in-Chief, seven and a half shares; to Colonels each, two and a half; Lieutenant-Colonels, each, one and a half; and to Majors, three fourths. An additional pay was allotted to Captains, of three shillings, Lieutenants two shillings, and Ensigns one shilling per day.

Some uneasiness still continued with respect to the designs of Suja-ad-dowla, between whom and the Emperor considerable discordance prevailed. The directors had forwarded the most positive orders for recalling the brigade from Allahabad; and for confining the operations of the Company's army entirely within the limits of the Company's territory. The Council thought it necessary to disobey; and in their letter went so far as to say that they "must express their great astonishment at such an absolute restriction, without permitting them upon the

¹ "Past experience," they say, "has so impressed us with the idea of the necessity of confining our servants, and Europeans residing under our protection, within the ancient limits of our export and import trade, that we look on every innovation in the inland trade as an intrusion on the natural right of the natives of the country, who now more particularly claim our protection; and we esteem it as much our duty to maintain this barrier between the two commercial rights, as to defend the provinces from foreign invasion." Letter from the Directors, dated 20th November, 1767.

spot to judge how far, from time and circumstances, it might be detrimental to their affairs.”

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.

The most important particular in the situation of the Company in Bengal was the growing scarcity of pecuniary means. In the letter from the Select Committee to the Court of Directors, dated 21st November, 1768, “You will perceive,” they say, “by the state of your treasury, a total inability to discharge many sums which you are indebted to individuals for deposits in your cash, as well as to issue any part of the considerable advances required for the service of every public department. And you will no longer deem us reprehensible, if a decrease in the amount of your future investments, and a debasement of their quality, should prove the consequence.”

1768.

By a correspondence between the Presidencies of Fort William and Fort St. George, in the beginning of March, 1769, the dangerous consequences to be apprehended from the exhausted state of their treasuries, and the necessity of establishing a fund against future emergencies, were mutually explained and acknowledged. In two separate consultations, held by the President and Council at Fort William, in the months of May and August, the utility, or rather the indispensable necessity, of such a fund, underwent a solemn discussion, and was pronounced to be without dispute. But as the expences of the government left no resource for the creation of it, except the diminution of the investment, or quantity of goods transmitted to the Company in England, they resolved upon that reduction, and limited to forty-five lacks the investment of the year.

Even this resource was in a very short time perceived to be insufficient. On the 23rd of October, a deficiency of 6,63,055 rupees appeared on the balance of receipts and disbursements; and the President and Council in their Minute declared, “That however the public might have been flattered, they could not flatter themselves, with any expectations from their revenue; and that the only expedient within their reach was to open their treasury doors for remittances.”¹

¹ The President and Council of Fort William, in their letter (dated the 21st of March, 1769) to the President and Council of Fort St. George, speak in pathetic terms of “the incontestible evidence they had transmitted to their

BOOK IV. These remittances consisted chiefly of the money or
 CHAP. VII. fortunes of the individuals who had grown rich in the

1768.

Company's service, and who were desirous of transmitting their acquisitions to Europe. Such persons were eager to pay their money to the Company's government in India, upon receiving an obligation for repayment from the Company in England; in the language of commerce, for a bill upon the Company payable in England. The money thus received, in other words borrowed, was applied to the exigences of the service; and by augmenting their resources, was always highly agreeable to the servants in India. The payment, however, of these loans or bills in England was apt to become exceedingly inconvenient to the Directors. The sole fund out of which the payment could be made was the sale of the investment, or the goods transmitted to them from India and China. If the quantity of these goods was less in value than afforded a surplus equal to the amount of the bills which were drawn upon them, they remained so far deficient in the ability to pay. And if the goods were sent in too exorbitant a quantity, the market was insufficient to carry them off.

An opposition of interests was thus created between the governing part of the servants abroad, and the Court of Directors and Proprietors at home. For the facility of their operations, and the success of their government, it was of great importance for the servants to preserve a full treasury in India, secured by a small investment, and the receipt of money for bills. It was the interest of the Directors to have an ample supply of money at home, which on the other hand could only be produced by a large investment and a moderate transmission of bills. The Directors, accordingly, had given very explicit instructions on this subject; and in their letter of the 11th of November, 1768, after acknowledging the growing deficiency of the funds in India, had said: "Nevertheless, we cannot suffer ourselves to be drawn upon to an unlimited amount, the state of the Company's affairs here not yet admitting us to answer large drafts upon us from India; but should the exigency of your affairs require

honourable masters of the exaggerated light in which their new acquired advantages had been placed," and the change of views which they expected them in consequence to adopt.

your receiving money into your treasury, we prefer the mode of borrowing at interest to that of granting bills upon us. We therefore permit you to take up such sums on interest, for one year certain, as will answer your various demands, which are to be paid off at the expiration of that period, or as soon after as the state of your treasury will admit of. You are, therefore, to confine your drafts upon us, by the ships to be despatched from your Presidency in the season of 1769, to the same amount as we allowed last year, viz., 70,000*l*.”¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VII.

1769.

When the amount of the sums which it was the desire of individuals to send home exceeded the amount which it was permitted to the government in India to receive, in other words to draw bills for upon the Company at home, the parties who were deprived of this channel of remittance betook themselves to the French and Dutch factories, and paid the money into their treasuries for bills upon their respective companies, payable in Europe. This, from an early period of Mr. Verelst's administration, had constituted a heavy subject of complaint; as making these subordinate settlers to abound with money, while the English were oppressed with want. As he ascribed the financial difficulties of the Company's government merely to a defect of currency not of revenue, as he ascribed the defect of currency to the remittances which were forced into the Dutch and French channels; though neither of these nations carried any specie out of India, and were only saved to a certain extent the necessity of importing bullion; to him it appeared surprising that the Dutch and French Companies should find it easy to pay the bills which were drawn upon them for money received in India, but that the English Company should find it im-

¹ Eighth Report from the Committee of Secrecy, 1773, Appendix, No. i. In their letter, 17th March, 1769, they so far modify their former directions as to say, "Upon reconsidering the subject of remittances, we find it so connected with that of the investment, that the increase of the former must always depend on that of the latter. The produce of our sales here is the only channel of our receipts; and our flourishing situation in India would not avail us, if we were to suffer ourselves to be drawn upon to the amount of the cost of our homeward cargoes. In order therefore to unite the advantages of the Company and their servants, we do permit you to increase your remittances, by the ships despatched from Bengal in the season of 1769, beyond the limitation in our letter of the 11th November last, so far as one half of the sum which your investment sent home in that season shall exceed the amount of sixty lacs. But if you do not send home an investment exceeding that sum, you must then confine your drafts upon us agreeably to our said letter of the 11th November last."

BOOK IV. possible; and he ascribed the restrictions which they
 CHAP. VII. imposed to a timid and narrow spirit.¹ One circumstance,
 1769. however, which constituted a most important difference,
 he was ill situated to perceive. The French and Dutch
 Companies were chiefly commercial; and whatever money
 was received in India was laid out in the purchase of
 goods; these goods were carried to Europe, and sold before
 the bills became due; the bills were paid out of the pro-
 ceeds; and a great trade was thus carried on upon English
 capital. The English Company, on the other hand, was
 become a regal, as well as a commercial body; the money
 which was paid for remittance into their treasury in India
 was absorbed in the expence of the government;² and so

¹ In his letter to the Directors, dated 26th September, 1768, he says, "The extent of the Dutch and French credit exceeds all conception, and their bills are even solicited as favours. The precise sums received by them for some years I have endeavoured to ascertain, though hitherto without success: but if we only form our idea from the bills drawn this year from Europe on individuals here and Madras, the amount will appear prodigious and alarming. Advices of drafts and letters of credit have been already received to the amount of twenty-eight lacs on Bengal, and ten on Madras; and I have the most certain information that their treasuries at Pondicherry and Chandernagore, are amply furnished with all provision for both their investments and expenses for three years to come. You have often complained of the increase and superiority of the French and Dutch investments; but your orders and regulations have furnished them with the most extensive means of both. It is in vain to threaten dismission from your service, or forfeiture of your protection, for sending home money by foreign cash, while you open no doors for remittances yourselves. Such menaces may render the practice more secret and cautious; but will never diminish, much less remove the evil." Verelst's Appendix, p. 113. So much did Mr. Verelst's imagination deceive him, in regard to the prosperity of the English rivals, that the exclusive privileges of the French Company, after they had struggled for some time on the verge of bankruptcy, were suspended by the King, and the trade laid open to all the nation. They were found unable to extricate themselves from their difficulties; and resigning their effects into the hands of government, for certain government annuities to the proprietors of stock, the Company were in reality dissolved. Raynal, viii. sect. 26, 27.

² This is not warranted by the facts: a slight examination of the general accounts of receipts and disbursements exhibited in the accounts of the Bengal Presidency published by the Select Committee shows, that the financial difficulties experienced there arose not from the political, but the commercial transactions of the Company. From 1761 to 1772, there was a surplus on the territorial account of about 5,475,000*l.* (the smaller figures are purposely omitted). The whole produce of the import cargoes was 1,437,000*l.*, the cost value of the goods remitted to England, 5,291,000*l.*, of which, therefore, 3,854,000*l.* had been provided out of the revenue. Besides this, large remittances for commercial purposes had been made to other settlements, and to China, exceeding those received by 2,358,000*l.*, and consequently, exceeding the whole territorial receipt by 737,000*l.* It is not matter of surprise, therefore, that the territorial treasury was embarrassed, nor is it to be wondered at that the resources of the country were in progress of diminution, the constant abstraction of capital, whether in bullion or goods could not fail in time to impoverish any country however rich, and was very soon felt in India, in which no accumulation of capital had ever taken place from the unsettled state of the Government, and the insecurity of property, and the constant tendency of the population to press upon the means of subsistence.—W.

much only as could be spared was employed in the purchase of investment. This was the cause undoubtedly of the comparative inability of the English Directors to pay the bills which were drawn upon them.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VIII.
1769.

In the Consultation of the 23d of October, in consideration of great exigency, it was resolved, that the board would receive all moneys tendered to the Company's treasury from that day to the 1st of November, 1770; and at the option of the lenders, grant, either interest notes payable in one year; or receipts bearing interest at eight per cent. for bills to be granted at the sailing of the first ship after the 22nd of November, 1770, payable with three per cent. interest, in equal proportions on each tender, at one, two, and three years' sight. And as a resource to the Directors, it was resolved to enlarge the investment by purchasing, not with ready money, but with bonds at eight per cent. and one year's credit. This was the last considerable act in which the Governor was engaged. He resigned his office on the 24th of December, and was succeeded by Mr. Cartier. A new treaty had been concluded with Suja-ad-Dowla, which allayed whatever suspicions the ambiguous conduct of that Governor had raised, and Mr. Verelst left the three provinces in profound tranquillity.¹

CHAPTER VIII.

Subahdar of the Deccan dethroned by his Brother.—The English take possession of the Northern Circars.—Make a Treaty with the Subahdar of the Deccan.—Which embroils them with Hyder Ali.—Hyder's first War with the English.—New Treaty with the Subahdar.—Peace with Hyder.

THE Carnatic remained but a short time free from the pressure of the neighbouring powers. In the superior government of the Deccan, Nizam Ali, who had resumed, upon the departure of Bussy, the commanding station which he formerly occupied, made no delay in

¹ The principal materials, before the public, for the history of Verelst's administration, are found in the Reports of the Two Committees of 1772, and in the Appendix to his own View of Bengal. Information, but needing to be cautiously gleaned, is obtained from the numerous Tracts of the day.

BOOK IV. employing all his advantages to effect the dethronement
 CHAP. VIII. of his feeble-minded brother. On the 18th of July, 1761,
 1765. he committed the Subahdar to a prison; and invested
 himself with the full powers and insignia of the govern-
 ment.

The treaty, by the provisions of which the pretensions of England and France were at this time adjusted, affords a singular illustration of the obvious and neglected truth that the knowledge requisite for good government in India cannot be possessed by rulers sitting and deliberating in Europe. By the treaty of Paris, concluded on the 10th of February, 1763, Salabut Jung was acknowledged as lawful Subahdar of the Deccan, after he had been nearly two years dethroned, and another reigning in his stead. This instrument, indeed, which recognised Salabut Jung as a great sovereign, was the immediate cause of his death; for Nizam Ali, who had been withheld by dread of the restoration of the French power in India, no sooner received intelligence of the treaty of Paris, by which the French resigned the Carnatic, and appeared to abandon the contest, than he felt himself delivered from all restraint, and ordered his brother to be murdered in September, 1763.

With little concern about Bassalut Jung, who nevertheless was elder brother of Nizam Ali, that usurper, at once a regicide and fratricide, now grasped, without a rival, the power of Subahdar of the Deccan. The personal title or name of himself and his father have by the English been converted into the appellative of his sovereignty and it is under the title of the Nizam, that the Subahdar of the Deccan is commonly known.

In the beginning of the year 1765, the English and Mohammed Ali their Nabob were summoned to action, by the irruption of Nizam Ali into the Carnatic. With a great army, which seemed to have no object in view but plunder and destruction, he laid waste the open country with a ferocity, even greater than the usual barbarity of Indian warfare. The troops of the English and Nabob were put in motion from Arcot, under the command of Colonel Campbell, and came in sight of the enemy at the Pagoda of Tripeti. The Nizam felt no desire to fight. His army was reduced to great distress for provisions and

water. He decamped accordingly on a sudden, and march- BOOK IV.
ing forty miles in one day, evacuated the Carnatic by way CHAP. VIII.
of Colastri and Nelore.

It was at this time that Lord Clive, on his passage from Europe to Bengal, arrived at Madras. The ascendancy of the English over the Mogul, the unfortunate and nominal Emperor Shah Aulum, rendered it extremely easy to procure from him those imperial grants which, however little respected by the sword, still gave the appearance of legal right to territorial possession within the ancient limits of the Mogul empire. A firmaun was solicited and obtained for the maritime districts, known by the title of the Northern Circars. Like the rest of India, this tract was held by renters responsible for a certain portion of revenue. Of these some were of recent appointment; others were the ancient Rajas and Polygars of the country; a set of men who were often found to be the most convenient renters, and who, on the regular payment of the expected revenue, were seldom displaced. The country fell within the government of the Subahdar of the Deccan, and was managed by a deputy or commissioner of his appointment. After the English, however, had expelled from it the French, the authority of the Subahdar had been rather nominal than real. The English held possession of their factories and forts; the Rajas and Polygars assumed a species of independence; Salabut Jung had offered it to Mohammed Ali at the time of his quarrel with Bussy at Hyderabad; and Nizam Ali himself had proposed to surrender it to the English, on the condition of military assistance against Hyder Ali and the Mahrattas. The advantage of possessing the whole line of coast which joined the English territories in the Carnatic to those in Bengal, suggested to Clive the importance of obtaining it on permanent terms.¹ A firmaun was accordingly received from the Emperor, by which, as far as the formality of his sanction could extend, the Northern Circars were freed from their dependence upon the Subahdar of the Deccan, and bestowed upon the English. Nor was this the only diminution which the nominal empire of the Nizam

1765.

¹ The acquisition of the Northern Circars did not give the English the whole of the sea-coast: the province of Orissa held by the Mahrattas separated them from Bengal.—W.

BOOK IV. sustained; for another firmaun was procured from the
 CHAP. VIII. Emperor, by which the Carnatic itself was rendered inde-
 1765. pendent of his authority; and bestowed, holding immediately of the Emperor, upon the Nabob Mohammed Ali, together with the new titles of Walla Jah, Ummir ul Hind, which he ever afterwards used.¹

To take possession of the Circars, on its new and independent footing, General Calliaud marched with the troops of the Carnatic, and on the part of the Rajas and Polygars found little opposition to subdue. The Nizam, or Subahdar, was at that time engaged in the country of Barad, making head against the Mahrattas. But he no sooner heard of the operations of the English, than he proceeded with great expedition to Hyderabad; and to avenge himself for the usurpation, as it appeared to him, of an important part of his dominions, made preparations for the invasion of the Carnatic. The Presidency, whom their pecuniary weakness rendered timid, were alarmed at the prospect of a war with the Subahdar; and sent orders to Calliaud to hasten to Hyderabad with full powers to negotiate a peace. A treaty was concluded on the 12th of November, 1766, by which the Company agreed to pay to the Nizam an annual tribute of five lacks of rupees for the three Circars of Rajamundry, Ellore, and Mustephanagur; and for those of Siccacole (Chicacole) and Murtezanagur, two lacks each, as soon as they were definitively placed in their hands. Murtezanagur, commonly called Guntoor, had been assigned as a jaghire to Bassahut Jung; and the Company

¹ It is stated that Clive even entertained the project of obtaining for Mohammed Ali the firmaun of Subahdar of the Deccan; but that the Nabob who it is true was worn out with the struggle which he had already sustained who now parted for ease and enjoyment, and whose qualities Clive estimated at more than their actual value (in his correspondence with the Directors he represents his word as more trustworthy than that of any Mohammedan whom he had ever known. Reports of Committee, 1772), shrunk from the prospect of the arduous enterprise, and declared that "the Deccan was too great for him to desire to have the charge of its government." Letter from the Nabob to Clive in 1765, 3 S. quoted (p. 150) by the author of the History and Management of the East India Company.—It is also affirmed, perhaps on better grounds (Observations by the President and Council, on Sir John Lindsay's Letter of the 22nd of June, 1771: Papers in Rous's Appendix p. 371) that the Nabob used his endeavours to obtain the exertion of the English power to procure him this high elevation; but met not with a corresponding disposition in the servants of the Company. The point is not of sufficient importance to require that we should spend any time in endeavouring to ascertain whether the one allegation or the other is the truth.—M.

It is wholly incredible that Mohammed Ali would have refused the Subahdari of the Deccan, if he had had a reasonable prospect of obtaining it.—W.

were pleased to suspend their occupation of it, so long as Bassalut Jung should live, or so long as he should remain a faithful subject to Nizam Ali. They further engaged to hold a body of troops in readiness, "to settle in every thing right and proper, the affairs of his Highness's government." And they give him a present of five lacks of rupees, which the Nabob was ordered to find money to pay.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VIII.
1767.

This treaty has been severely condemned. But the Presidency were not mistaken in regard to their own pecuniary difficulties, though they probably over-estimated the power of the Nizam, whose unpaid and mutinous troops the money which he received by the treaty scarcely enabled him for a short time to appease. The most imprudent article of the agreement was that which stipulated for the Nizam the assistance of English troops; because this had an evident tendency to embroil, and in the event did actually embroil them, with other powers. The exploit in which they were first to be employed, the reduction of the fort of Bangalore, was not, it is probable, disliked by the Presidency; because they were already upon hostile terms with Hyder Ali, to whom it belonged. The Nizam, however, after availing himself of the assistance of the British troops in collecting the tribute of the Polygars, on his march, listened to the overtures of Hyder, who was too eminent a master in the arts of intrigue to let slip an opportunity of dividing his enemies. The Nizam concluded with him a treaty of alliance, in consequence of which they united their forces at Bangalore: and in August 1767, they began to make incursions into the Carnatic.

Hyder Ali, who began to occupy the attention of the English, and who proved the most formidable enemy whom they had ever encountered in India, had now rendered himself entire master of the kingdom of Mysore. The principality of Mysore, a region of considerable magnitude, had formed one of the dependencies of the great Hindu Government of Bijanuggur, which was broken up by the formation of the Mohammedan kingdoms in the Deccan. When the declining power of the sovereigns of Bijanuggur

¹ Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy in 1761, p. 22; Hist. and Management, p. 161; Collection of Treaties, p. 364.

BOOK IV. enabled Mysore to throw off its dependence upon that ancient monarchy, its distance and other local circumstances saved it from subjection to any of the Mohammedan powers. It continued, therefore, till the period of Hyder's usurpation, under a pure Hindu government, and afforded a satisfactory specimen of the political institutions of the native Hindus. The arts of government were less understood in that, than in the Mohammedan districts of India. Hardly ever have mankind been united in considerable societies under a form of polity more rude, than that which has every where been found in those parts of India which remained purely Hindu.¹ At a period considerably prior to the rise of Hyder, the government of Mysore had assumed that state, which, if we may judge by its own example, and that of the Mahrattas, Hindu governments had a general tendency to assume. The Raja, or Monarch, was stripped of all power, while a minister kept him a prisoner, and governed absolutely in his name. At the time when the wars of the English in the Carnatic commenced, the powers of the Raja of Mysore were usurped by two brothers, named Deoraj, and Nunjeraj. It was this same Nunjeraj, whom the French were enabled to bring to their assistance at Trichinopoly; and who there exhibited so many specimens of the rudeness of his people, and of his own ignorance and incapacity. And it was in the station of a subordinate officer in the service of this commander, that Hyder Ali began his career.

Mohammed Beloli, the great grandfather of Hyder, was a native of the Punjab, who came into the Deccan in the character of a fakir, and, settling in the district of Calburga, about 110 miles in a north-west direction from Hyderabad, acquired considerable property by the exercise of his religious talents. Mohammed Beloli had two sons, Mohammed Ali, and Mohammed Wullee. They left their father's house, and travelling southward, became at Sera, revenue peons, or armed men, employed, according to Indian practice, in the forced collection of the taxes. Mohammed Ali died at Colar, and Mohammed Wullee, for the sake of his property, expelled his widow and son, and drove them from his doors. The name of the son was

¹ See the illustrations of the Mysore Government, in the instructive volume of Col. Wilks.

Futtuh Mohammed, the father of Hyder. He obtained along with his mother, protection from a petty officer, called a Naik of peons, by whom he was brought up, and employed as a peon, or common foot soldier, in the party under his command. Futtuh Mohammed found means to distinguish himself, and, in the service of the Nabob of Sera, became, first a Naik of peons, and afterwards the Fojedar, or military superintendent of a district. But misfortune overtook his master. The Nabob was dethroned, his family plundered; and Futtuh Mohammed lost his life in their defence. He left two sons, the elder Shabas, the youngest Hyder, and a widow, who had a brother, the Naik of a few peons, in the service of a Killedar of Bangalore. With this man, the mother of Hyder sought, and, together with her sons, obtained protection. When Shabas, the elder of the brothers, grew towards manhood, he was recommended by his uncle to an officer in the service of the Raja of Mysore. The youth quickly rose to distinction, and obtained the command of 200 horse and 1000 peons. Hyder, till the age of twenty-seven, could be confined to no serious pursuit, but spent his life between the labours of the chase, and the pleasures of voluptuous indolence and riot. He joined, however, the troops of Mysore, as a volunteer at the siege of Deonhully, the castle of a Polygar, about twenty-four miles north-east from Bangalore, which, in 1749, Nunjeraj undertook to reduce. On this occasion the ardour, the courage, and the mental resources of Hyder, drew upon him the attention of the general; and, at the termination of the siege, he was not only raised to the command of fifty horse, and 200 peons, or foot, but was intrusted with the charge of one of the gates of the fortress.

He continued to recommend himself with so much success to Nunjeraj, that, when the efforts of the English to establish their authority in Madura and Tinivelly, in 1755, rendered precarious the possession of the fort of Dindegul, Hyder was chosen as the man on whom its defence could, with greatest security, repose. It was situated on a high rock in the middle of a plain, at nearly an equal distance, of about fifty miles from Madura and Trichinopoly; and amid the confusions of the Carnatic had fallen into the hands of the Mysoreans about ten years before. This ele-

BOOK IV. vation added fuel to the ambition of Hyder ; and from this
 CHAP. VIII. period his exertions in its gratification became conspicuous
 and incessant.

1767.

The depredations upon which all Indian, and other barbarous warriors, are so much accustomed to subsist, he reduced to a system. There are in India, and in particular in that part of it to which he belonged, a species of troops, or of men bearing the title of soldiers, who are particularly skilled in all the arts of plunder and of theft ; who receive, indeed, no pay in the armies of most of the Indian states, but are understood to provide for themselves by the devastations which they commit. A body of these men Hyder engaged in his service ; and employed in the business of depredation. Hyder had never learned either to write or to read ; but he valued himself upon the faculty of performing exactly by memory arithmetical calculations, with greater velocity than the most expert accountants. He agreed with his depredators to receive from them one half of the spoil ; and so skilfully, we are told, were his checks contrived, that it was nearly impossible for any part of it to be concealed. It was of little importance to Hyder, or to his gang, when the convenience and safety were equal, whether the property which they acquired was taken from friends or from foes. Valuables of every description were their prey ; “from convoys of grain,” says Mr. Wilks, “cattle and sheep, which were among the most profitable heads of plunder, down to the clothes, turbans, and earrings of travellers and villagers, men, women, and children.” Thus it was, that Hyder acquired the sinews of war ; and before he left Trichinopoly, to which he had repaired in the army of Nunjeraj, he was a commander of 1500 horse, 3000 regular infantry, 2000 peons, and four guns. Having enlisted the most select of the men discharged by Nunjeraj, he departed for Dindegul at the head of 2500 horse, 5000 regular infantry, and 2000 peons, with six guns. He employed against the polygars of his district and its neighbourhood the arts of fraud and of force, with equal success. His vigilant eye discovered, and his activity drained, every source of revenue. He excelled in deceiving the government with false musters and accounts ; and the treasures of Hyder were daily augmented. The distracted state of Madura, in 1757, encour-

raged him to make an effort to gain possession of that country ; but Mohammed Issoof marched against him at the head of the English Sepoys, and gave him a severe defeat at the mouth of the narrow pass of Natam.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VIII.

1767.

The weak and distracted state of the government of Mysore afforded opportunity to Hyder of ascending gradually to higher and higher situations and power. The Raja, who was uneasy at the state of insignificance in which he was held, harassed the ministers with perpetual intrigues ; and the brothers themselves were so little united, that Deoraj, who had most of years and of prudence, retired from the scene in disgust, and left Nunjeraj alone to sustain the weight of affairs. The treasury had been exhausted by repeated exactions of the Mahrattas ; and 1758 the troops of Nunjeraj mutinied for payment of arrears.

This was an occasion on which Hyder conceived that he might interpose his authority with advantage. He marched from Dindegul with the whole of his disposable troops ; exerted himself with success in effecting a reconciliation between the brothers, and between the brothers and the Raja ; with his strict and experienced eye he examined and reduced the false accounts of the army ; and, by effecting a partial payment of arrears, restored the troops to obedience. In this transaction he had sustained the character of a friend to all ; and took care to be rewarded in proportion. An assignment was made to him of the revenues of a tract of country for sums due by the government ; and the fort and district of Bangalore were bestowed upon him in personal jaghire. The moment looked favourable for securing what he probably deemed a greater advantage. Herri Sing was one of the most powerful chiefs in the service of Mysore, and the declared enemy of Hyder. Under pretence of forwarding part of his troops to Dindegul, Hyder sent a large detachment to attack the camp of Herri Sing, who, reposing in careless security, was surprised, with a large portion of his troops, and massacred in the middle of the night.

An invasion of the Mahrattas, which immediately followed, in the beginning of 1759, contributed more remarkably to the elevation of Hyder. Though several of the principal commanders disdained to serve under a man

BOOK IV. whom they had so lately seen in a very subordinate station, he was appointed to the chief command against this formidable enemy ; and acquitted himself with so much vigour and success, that before the end of the campaign he reduced them to an inclination for peace ; and concluded a treaty on what were deemed favourable terms.

CHAP. VIII.
1767.

Hyder was now advanced to the rank and power of commander-in-chief, and had only his friend and patron Nunjeraj, for Deoraj was dead, between him and the entire control of the resources of the state. Hyder's impatience admitted little delay. To secure the countenance of the Raja against a man who was at once his robber and his gaoler, was an easy intrigue ; and the troops, whose arrears had not been fully paid, and had again increased, were artfully incited to mutiny against Nunjeraj, and to place Hyder, by compulsion, at their head. The Raja now imposed, and offered to procure pay for the troops, as soon as Hyder should take an oath to be obedient, and to renounce his connexion with the usurping minister. Hyder failed not to exhibit reluctance ; but at last allowed himself to be constrained ; and Nunjeraj, who could not any longer misunderstand the game, and whose courage was not remarkable, consented to retire, upon the condition of receiving an honourable provision. The Raja was complimented with the show of greater liberty ; but Hyder, to be enabled to provide for the arrears, and the regular pay of the troops, took care to procure the assignment of the revenues of so many districts, that what was now in his direct possession exceeded half the territory of the state.

In March, 1751, Hyder received overtures from Lally, inviting him to his assistance against the English ; and, amid the contentions of the rival strangers, looked forward to acquisitions in the Carnatic. To pave the way for the share which he proposed to take in determining the fate of that important region, he resolved to obtain possession of the territory which separated Mysore from the confines of the Carnatic, and which consisted first of the territory of Anicul, situated on the eastern verge of the tract of woody hills, between Savendy Droog and the Cavery, and next of the Baramahal, a province situated on the intermediate level between the first and second ranges of

hills. Immediately after the termination of the stratagem BOOK IV.
 against Nunjeraj, a part of the troops, with a confidential CHAP. VIII.
 general, were detached to occupy this intermediate territory, which opened a safe communication into the very
 centre of the province of Arcot. Anicul and Baramahal
 were secured ; and the General proceeded to Pondicherry,
 under orders from Hyder, to settle the terms of co-operation with the French. These were speedily adjusted ; and,
 on the 4th of June, 1760, a detachment of the Mysorean
 army arrived at Thiagar, which was surrendered to them
 by the treaty. The defeat which was sustained by a
 detachment of the English army, sent to intercept the
 Mysoreans on their march to Pondicherry, greatly elevated
 the spirits of Hyder ; and inspired him with a resolution
 to exert his strength in the war of the Carnatic. Several
 divisions of his troops were ordered to assemble in
 Baramahal ; and the affairs of the Carnatic might have undergone a revolution, had not a storm arisen in another
 quarter which it required all the address and power of
 Hyder to elude.

1767.

The distant employment of the troops of Hyder, and his own position, with a small detachment, under command of the guns of the palace, and surrounded by the river, which, being now full, it was impossible to pass, suggested to the queen-mother the possibility of cutting him off, and delivering her son from the thralldom in which it was the evident intention of Hyder to retain him. The assistance was secured of a Mahratta chief, who was at the head of an army in a neighbouring territory ; and a cannonade began. Hyder soon discovered that his situation was desperate : but the main attack being deferred till the arrival of the Mahrattas, night came on, when Hyder, with the assistance of a few boats, crossed the river unperceived, with a small body of horse, leaving his family behind him ; and having travelled ninety-eight miles in twenty hours, the first seventy-five on the same horse, he arrived at Bangalore. He was just in time to precede the orders of the Raja, by which the gates of the fort would have been shut against him ; and he now hastened to collect his forces, of which those serving with Lally constituted a principal part.

The fortunes of Hyder tottered on the verge of a pre-

BOOK IV. cipice. The troops, which were hastening towards him
 CHAP. VIII. from the Carnatic and Baramahal, were intercepted by the
 1767. Mahrattas, who had joined the Raja, and besieged in their
 camp. The utmost efforts of Hyder were ineffectual to
 relieve them; and his power was ready to drop from his
 hands; when the Mahrattas agreed to march off, upon
 receiving the cession of Baramahal, and the payment of
 three lacks of rupees. They had engaged their services
 to Lally, now besieged in Pondicherry; but had after-
 wards accepted the promise of a large sum from the
 English Nabob, on condition of returning immediately to
 Poonah. It was in consequence of this stipulation, so
 fortunate for Hyder, that they accepted his additional
 bribe; and the man, who was destined to bring the English
 interests to the brink of ruin, was saved by a stroke of
 English politics.

Hyder took the field against the forces of the Raja, but
 still perceiving himself to be inferior to his enemies, he
 took a resolution, which it required Oriental hypocrisy
 and impudence to form, and of which nothing less than
 Oriental credulity could have been the dupe. Unexpected,
 unarmed, and alone, he presented himself as a suppliant
 at the door of Nunjeraj, and, being admitted, prostrated
 himself at his feet. He acknowledged, in terms of bitter
 anguish, the wrongs of which he was guilty toward the
 first and greatest of his friends; vowed to devote his fu-
 ture life to their reparation; and entreated a firm and
 sincere union, that he might establish Nunjeraj in the
 station of honour and power in which he had formerly
 beheld him. It requires a high degree of improbability to
 prevent the greater part of mankind from believing what
 they vehemently wish. Nunjeraj was gained; and lent his
 troops, his exertions, his name, and his influence, to give
 ascendancy to the cause of Hyder. Fraud was an opera-
 tive instrument in the hands of this aspiring general.
 Finding himself intercepted with a small detachment
 which had accompanied him on his sudden journey to the
 retreat of Nunjeraj, and his junction with the main body
 of his army which he had left to hang during his absence
 upon the rear of the enemy, rendered difficult, and his
 situation dangerous, he forged letters, in the name of
 Nunjeraj, to the principal commanders in the hostile army,

letters purporting to be the result of a conspiracy into BOOK IV.
which these commanders had already entered to betray CHAP. VIII.
their General to Nunjeraj. The bearer was seized of
course; and the letters delivered into the hands of the 1767.
General, who fulfilled the fondest wishes of Hyder, by
taking the panic, and running away from the army.
During its confusion it was assailed by the main body of
Hyder's forces in the rear, by the detachment with him-
self in front: and yielded an easy and decisive victory.
The triumph of Hyder was now secured. He delayed,
only till he augmented his army, and took possession of
the lower country; when he ascended the Ghauts, and
early in the month of May, 1761, arrived at the capital.
He sent to the Raja a message: "That large sums were
due to Hyder by the State, and ought to be liquidated:
after the payment of these arrears, if the Raja should be
pleased to continue him in his service, it was well; if not,
Hyder would depart, and seek his fortune elsewhere." The
meaning of this humble communication no one misunder-
stood. It was arranged, that districts should be reserved
to the amount of three lacks of rupees for the personal
expenses of the Raja, and one lack for those of Nunjeraj;
and that of the remainder of the whole country the
management should be taken by Hyder, with the charge
of providing for the expenses, civil and military, of the
government. From this period Hyder was undisputed
master of the kingdom of Mysore.

Hyder was fortunately cast at one of those recurring
periods in the history of Oriental nations; when, the
springs of the ancient governments being worn out, and
political dissolution impending, a proper union of audacity
and intrigue has usually elevated some adventurer to the
throne. The degraded situation of the Raja, and the feeble
and unskilful administration of the two brothers, opened
an avenue to power, of which Hyder was well qualified to
avail himself. The debilitated and distracted government
of the Subahdar of the Deccan; the dreadful blow which
the Mahrattas had just received at the battle of Paniput;
and the fierce and exhaustive contentions which the rival
strangers in the Carnatic were waging against one another,
left all around a wide expanse, in which, without much
resistance, he might expect to reap an opulent harvest:

BOOK IV. and had it not happened, by a singular train of circumstances, that he was opposed by the arms of a people,

CHAP. VIII. whose progress in knowledge and in the arts was far superior to his own, he, and his son, would probably have extended their sway over the greater part of India.

1767.

In prosecution of the design which Bassalut Jung had formed to render himself independent of Nizam Ali, he proceeded, about the month of June in 1761, to the reduction of Sera. This was a province, formerly governed by a Nabob, or deputy, of the Subahder of the Deccan. It was now possessed by the Mahrattas. But the shock which the Mahratta power had sustained by the disaster of Paniput, inspired Bassalut Jung with the hope of making a conquest of Sera. By his approach to the territories of Hyder, that vigilant chief was quickly brought near to watch his operations. Bassalut Jung was, by a short experience, convinced that his resources were unequal to his enterprise; and as his elder brother was imprisoned by Nizam Ali, on the 18th of July, his presence at the seat of his own government was urgently required. That the expedition might not appear to have been undertaken in vain, he made an offer to Hyder of the Nabobship of Sera, though yet unconquered, for three lacks of rupees; and formally invested him with the office and title, under the name of Hyder Ali Khan Behauder, which he afterwards bore. The allied chiefs united their armies, and, having speedily reduced the country to the obedience of Hyder, took leave of each other about the beginning of the year 1762.

Hyder continued to extend his conquests over the two Balipooas; over Gooti, the territory of the Mahratta chieftain Morari Row; received the submission of the Polygars of Raidroog, Harponelly, and Chittledroog; and early in 1763 he marched under the invitation of an impostor, who pretended to be the young Raja of Bednore, to the conquest of that kingdom. The territory of Bednore includes the summit of that part of the range of western hills, which, at a height of from four to five thousand feet above the level of the sea, and for nine months of the year involved in rain and moisture, which clothe them with the most enormous trees, and the most profuse vegetation, overlook the provinces of Canara and Malabar.

The capital and fort of Bednore situated in a basin sur-
 rounded by hills, extended its sway over the maritime
 region of Canara, and on the eastern side of the moun-
 tains, as far as Santa Bednore and Hoolalkera, within
 twenty miles of Chittledroog. This country had suffered
 little from the calamities of recent war; and the riches of
 the capital, which was eight miles in circumference, are
 represented as having been immense. Hyder made the
 conquest with great ease, and confessed that the treasure
 which he acquired in Bednore was the grand instrument of
 his future greatness.¹

BOOK IV.

CHAP. VIII.

Hyder devoted his mind with great intensity to the es-
 tablishment of a vigorous and efficient administration in
 this country; which opened to him a new scene of con-
 quest. He took possession of Soonda, a district on the
 northern frontier of Bednore: he reduced to submission
 and dependance the Nabob of Savanoor, a territory which
 formed a deep indentation between his recent acquisitions
 of Sera and Soonda: and he rapidly extended his northern
 frontier across the rivers Werda, Malpurba, and Gutpurba,
 almost to the banks of the Kistna.

This daring progress, however, again brought the Mah-
 rattas upon his hands. Since the battle of Paniput, they
 had, in this quarter of India, been pushed with some
 vigour by Nizam Ali, the new Subahdar, who, at the com-
 mencement of his reign, gave some signs of military
 ardour and talent. He had constrained them to restore
 the celebrated fortress of Dowlatabad, in 1762; and, in
 1763, carried his arms to Poona, the capital; which he
 reduced to ashes. The accommodation which succeeded
 this event, and the occupation which the Nizam was now
 receiving by the war for the reduction of his brother Bas-
 salut Jung, seemed to present an opportunity to the Mah-
 rattas of chastising the encroachments of a neighbour,

¹ Col. Wilks thinks he estimates the amount of it very low at 12,000,000*l.* sterling. More likely it was not a third of the sum. "The immense property," he calls it, "of the most opulent commercial town of the East, and full of rich dwellings." The sound judgment of Col. Wilks generally preserves him, much better than Oriental gentlemen in general, from the strain of Eastern hyperbole. The richest commercial town of the East, neither a sea-port, nor on any great line of communication, in a situation almost inaccessible, on the top of unwholesome mountains! Besides, there is little opulence in any house in India, or in any shop. The chief articles of splendour is jewels, which almost always are carried away, or hid, upon the appearance of danger.

BOOK IV. whom as yet they despised. Madoo Row, who, third in
CHAP. VIII. order of time, had, under the title of Peshwa, or Prime

1767. Minister, succeeded to the supreme authority among the
Mahratta states, crossed the Kistna in May, 1764, with an
army which greatly outnumbered that which Hyder was
able to bring into the field.¹ He sustained a tedious, un-
equal conflict, which greatly reduced and disheartened his
army, till 1765; when the Mahrattas agreed to retire, upon
condition that he should restore the districts wrested from
Morari Row, relinquish all claims upon the territory of
Savanoor, and pay thirty-two lacks of rupees.

He hastened to give order to his recent conquests in
the east, which the late interruption of his prosperity had
animated into rebellion. As his forts and garrisons had
remained firm, these disturbances were speedily reduced,
and he immediately turned his eye to new acquisitions.
Having employed the greater part of the year 1765 in
regulating the affairs of his government, and repairing his
losses, he descended into Canara in the beginning of 1766,
with the declared intention of making the conquest of
Malabar. After an irregular war of some duration with
the Nairs, the whole country submitted; and a few sub-
sequent struggles only afforded an opportunity for cutting
off the most refractory subjects, and establishing a more
complete subjection. He had accomplished this important
enterprise before the end of the year 1766, when he was
recalled to Seringapatam, by intelligence of the utmost
importance. Madoo Row had issued from Poona; Nizam
Ali, with an English corps, was advancing from Hyderabad;
the English had already sent to attack some of his dis-
tricts which interfered with the Carnatic; and all these
powers were joined, according to report, in one grand con-
federacy, for the conquest of Mysore. Nizam Ali, however,
and the English, were the only enemies whom it was im-

¹ Col. Wilks makes, on this occasion, a judicious remark, the spirit of
which should have saved him from the pecuniary exaggerations mentioned
above. "I have found it proper," he says, "to distrust my manuscripts in
statements of numbers, more than in any other case. In no country, and
in no circumstance, is it safe to trust to any statement of numbers that is not
derived from actual returns. Even Sir Eyre Coote, whose keen and expe-
rienced eye might be considered as a safe guide, and whose pure mind never
harboured a thought of exaggeration, states the force of Hyder, in the
battle of Porto Novo, 1st of July, 1781, to have been from 140,000 to 150,000
horse and irregular cavalry, besides twenty-five battalions of regulars;
when it is certain that the whole did not exceed 80,000." *Hist. Sketches*,
p. 461.

mediately necessary to oppose ; and the Nizam, as we have BOOK IV.
already seen, he easily converted into an ally. In this CHAP. VIII.
state of his kingdom and fortunes, he began his first war
with the English, in 1767.¹ 1767.

He was exasperated, not only by the readiness with which, in the late treaty with the Nizam, the English had agreed to join in hostilities against him, but by an actual invasion of his dominions. Under the pretence that it formerly belonged to the Carnatic, but chiefly induced, we may suppose, by the consideration of the passage which it afforded an enemy into the heart of that country, the English had sent a Major, with some Europeans, and two battalions of Sepoys, into Baramahl, who, unhappily were just strong enough to overrun the open territory, and enrage its master ; but were unable to make any impression upon the strong forts, much less to secure possession of the country.

It was by the means of Maphuz Khan, the brother of the English Nabob, who had acted as an enemy of the English from the period of his recall as renter of Madura and Tinivelly, that Hyder effected his alliance with the Nizam. The English corps, under Colonel Smith, which had followed the Nizam into Hyder's dominions, had separated from his army, upon intimation of the design which that faithless usurper was supposed to entertain. The Nabob Mohammed Ali, who had early intelligence of the views of the Nizam, urged the Presidency to attack his camp before the junction of the Mysorean. The advice, however, was neglected, and in the month of September, Colonel Smith was attacked on his march, near Changama by the united forces of the new allies. He sustained the attack, which, for the space of an hour² was vigorously maintained ; and for that time repelled the enemy. He found himself, however, under the necessity of flight ; and marching thirty-six hours, without refreshment, he arrived at Trinomalee. He here enclosed himself within the walls of the fort, from which he soon beheld the sur-

¹ For the Life of Hyder, the Researches of Col. Wilks, p. 240—278, are the best source of intelligence.

² This action commenced at two, and continued till dark. With regard to the subsequent retreat Colonel Wilks states that the men had been twenty-seven hours without refreshment or repose when they arrived at Trinomalee on the 4th.—W.

BOOK IV. rounding country covered by the troops of the enemy, and
 CHAP VIII. desolated with fire and sword.

1767.

He remained not long an idle spectator, though his weakness compelled him to act with caution. He encamped for a few days under the walls of Trinomalee, and afterwards near a place called Calishy-Wâcum, about ten miles farther to the north. While the army lay in this situation, Hyder planned an expedition, from which important consequences might have ensued. He detached into the Carnatic 5000 horse, who marched without opposition to the very precincts of Madras. The place was completely taken by surprise. The President and Council were at their garden houses, without the town; and had not the Mysoreans been more eager to plunder than to improve the advantages which their unexpected arrival had procured, the seizure of the English chiefs might have enabled them to dictate the terms of peace.

Before the rains compelled the English army to retire into cantonments at Wandewash, Colonel Smith attacked the enemy, with some advantage,¹ before Trinomalee. In the mean time Nizam Ali, whose resources could ill endure a protracted contest, or the disordered state of his government a tedious absence, grew heartily sick of the war; and during the period of inactivity signified to the English his desire of negotiation. As a security against deception Colonel Smith insisted that he should first separate his troops from those of Hyder. But in the mean time the period of operations returned; and the English commander, now respectably reinforced, marched towards the enemy, who in the month of December had taken the field on the further side of Velore. The two armies met, and came to action, between Amboor and Wanumbaddy, when Hyder and his ally were defeated, and fled to Caverypatnam. This disaster quickened the decision of the Nizam, who now lost not any time in separating his troops from the Mysoreans, and commencing his negotiation with the English. A treaty was concluded between the Subahdar, the Nabob, and the English, in February, 1768; by which the titles of the Nabob, and the grants which he had re-

¹ "With some advantage" means the entire defeat of the allies, with a loss of about 4000 men, 64 guns, and a large quantity of military stores. The Nizam, immediately after the battle, withdrew from the scene of action, and Hyder fell back within his own frontier. Wilks ii. 41.—W.

ceived, were confirmed; the former conditions respecting the Northern Circars were renewed; the dewanee, or revenues, in other words the government of the Carnatic Balagaut, a country possessed by Hyder, was in name assigned to the English, subject to a payment of seven lacks per annum to the Nizam, and the tribute or chout to the Mahrattas; the English agreed to assist the Nizam with two battalions of Sepoys, and six pieces of cannon, as often as required; and the tribute due to the Nizam for the Circars was reduced from nine lacks perpetual, to seven lacks per annum, for the space of six years.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VIII.

1767.

The victory gained over the united forces of the allies, and their final separation by treaty, elevated the Madras government to a high tone of ambition. They resolved not only to carry their arms into Mysore, but to make the conquest and acquisition of the country. They pressed Mohammed Ali to join the army, that the war might as far as possible appear to be his. "They pompously" (as the Directors afterwards reproached them) "appointed him Phousdar of Mysore," and afterwards accused him, for accepting that very title, "of an insatiable desire of extending his dominions."² To bring the conduct of the

¹ Collection of Treaties (printed 1812), p. 364, 372. The Presidency held up to the Directors the necessity of supporting the Nizam, as a barrier against the Mahrattas—a policy of which the Directors entirely disapproved. Bengal Letter, 16th March, 1768; Fifth Report, Secret Committee, 1781, Appendix No. 6. See too a letter, 13th May, 1768, Rous's Appendix, p. 517, in which the connexion with the Nizam is strongly reprobated. "It is not," they say, "for the Company to take the part of umpires of Indostan. If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance of power among themselves. We wish to see the Indian Princes remain as a check upon one another, without our interfering."—They declare expressly, "With respect to the Nizam and Hyder Ali, it is our interest that neither of them should be totally crushed." To the same purpose, see p. 529. In another letter, dated 17th March, 1769, after telling the Madras Presidency that they had paid no regard to the above injunctions, and to the whole tenor, which was to the same effect, of all the instructions of their employers, they say, "It is with the utmost anxiety and displeasure that we see the tenth article of the treaty with the Subah, by which he cedes to the Company the Dewannee of the Carnatic Balaghaut; a measure so totally repugnant to our most positive and repeated orders, not to extend our possessions beyond the Carnatic. . . . Our displeasure hereat is aggravated, by the disingenuous manner in which these affairs are represented to us in your advices." They express a strong opinion on the passion of their servants for interfering extensively with the native powers. "We cannot take a view of your conduct, from the commencement of your negotiation for the Circars, without the strongest disapprobation; and when we see the opulent fortunes, suddenly acquired by our servants, who are returned since that period, it gives but too much weight, to the public opinion, that the rage for negotiations, treaties, and alliances, has private advantage for its object more than the public good." Ibid. p. 520, 521.

² Letters from the Directors to Governor and Council of Madras, 17th March, 1769.

BOOK IV. war still more under the control of the Presidency, they
CHAP. VIII. sent to the army two members of council, as field deputies, without whose concurrence no operations should be carried on. These members compelled the commander of the troops to renounce his own scheme of operations, that he might act offensively against Mysore. The English army, however, too feeble for the enterprise, acted without energy; and the summer of 1768 passed in unavailing movements and diminutive attempts. Hyder, the newness of whose government could not long dispense with his presence, was well inclined to postpone his struggle with the English, and made in September an overture towards peace. It was received, however, with great haughtiness by the Presidency, whose persuasion of the weakness of their enemy, and hopes of a speedy conquest of his realm, it only tended to increase and inflame. In the mean time Hyder was by no means inattentive to the war. He took the considerable fort of Mulwaggle; and gained some advantages over Colonel Wood, who attempted in vain to recover the place. The Presidency, dissatisfied with the progress of the war under Colonel Smith, who was highly exasperated by the control of the field deputies, recalled that respectable officer; and Mohammed Ali, whom they had in some measure forced to join the army, but who was now unwilling to leave it, they commanded, under pain of deprivation, to return. The army became weak and despondent through sickness and desertion. Hyder displayed increasing vigour. He attacked Colonel Wood, who was unable to save his baggage. Before the end of the year he had recovered all the conquered districts; and in January, 1769, carried his usual ravages into the Carnatic. He penetrated into the district of Trichinopoly; and detached one of his Generals into the provinces of Madura and Tinivelly, which he plundered and laid waste. The English army were unprovided with horse, and could neither overtake the march of Hyder, nor interrupt his devastations. No part of the southern division of the Carnatic escaped his destructive ravages, except the dominions of the Raja of Tanjore, who saved himself by a timely accommodation, and whose alliance Hyder was solicitous to gain. Colonel Smith was again placed at the head of the English forces, and by judicious movements

straitened the operations of Hyder. He even interposed with dexterity a detachment between Hyder and his own country, which was of the less importance, however, to that warrior, as he drew his resources from the country in which he fought.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. VIII.
1769.

Hyder now meditated a stroke, which he executed with great felicity and address. Sending all his heavy baggage and collected plunder home from Pondicherry, which during this incursion he had twice visited to confer with the French, he drew the English army, by a series of artful movements, to a considerable distance from Madras, when, putting himself at the head of 6000 cavalry, and performing a march of 120 miles in a space of three days, he appeared suddenly on the mount of San Thomé, in the immediate vicinity of the English capital. From this he dispatched a message to the Governor, requiring that a negotiation for peace should be immediately opened; and that in the mean time the approach of the army in the field should be forbidden. The Presidency were struck with consternation. The fort might undoubtedly have held out till the arrival of Smith; but the open town, with its riches, the adjacent country, and the garden houses of the President and Council, would have been ravaged and destroyed. The Presidency were now seriously inclined to peace; and notwithstanding the unfavourableness of their situation, they agreed to negotiate upon Hyder's terms. A treaty was concluded on the 4th of April, 1769, consisting of two grand conditions: first, a mutual restitution of conquests, including the cession to Hyder of a small district, which had formerly been cut off from the Mysorean dominions; and secondly, mutual aid, and alliance in defensive wars.

The disasters of the war in the Carnatic, with the disorders which pervaded the government of Bengal, excited the most violent apprehensions in the Company, and reduced sixty per cent. the price of East India Stock. The treaty with Hyder was the bed on which the resentments of the Directors sought to repose. It is very observable, however, that their letters on this subject abound much more with terms of vague and general reproach, than with any clear designation of mischief to which the conditions of the treaty were calculated to give birth.

BOOK IV. They accuse the Presidency of irresolution and incapacity;
 CHAP. IX. and tell them that by the feebleness with which they had
 1769. carried on the war, and the pusillanimity with which they had made peace at the dictation of an enemy, "they had laid a foundation for the natives of Hindustan to think they may insult the Company at pleasure with impunity." Yet they pretended not, that a mutual renunciation of conquests was not better than a continuation of the war; or that the vain boast of driving Hyder's light cavalry from the walls of Madras would not have been dearly purchased with the ravage of the city of Madras and the surrounding country. The Presidency affirm that they "were compelled to make peace for want of money to wage war."¹ And the only imprudent article of the treaty, in which, however, there was nothing of humiliation or inconsistency with the train of the Company's policy, was the reciprocation of military assistance; because of this the evident tendency (a circumstance, however, which seemed not ever to be greatly deprecated,) was, to embroil them with other powers.²

CHAPTER IX.

Public opinion in England.—Proceedings in the India House and in Parliament.—Plan of Supervisors.—Plan of a King's Commissioner.—Increase of pecuniary Difficulties.—Dividend raised.—Company unable to meet their Obligations.—Parliamentary Inquiry.—Ministerial relief.—An Act, which changes the Constitution of the Company.—Tendency of the Change.—Financial and Commercial State.

THE affairs of the Company excited various and conflicting passions in England, and gave rise to measures of more than ordinary importance. The act of parliament having expired which limited the amount of dividend in

¹ Letters to the Court of Directors, 23rd March, 1770; Rous's App. p. 1416.

² For these transactions, besides the printed official documents, the well-informed, but not impartial author, of the History and Management of the East India Company, has been, with caution, followed, together with Robson's Life of Hyder Ali, corrected from authentic MSS. by Mr. Grant.—M.

A more authentic and accurate account is to be found in Col. Wilks's Historical Sketches of the South of India.—W.

1767, the Directors exclaimed against a renewal of the restriction, as transferring the powers of the Company to parliament, subverting the privileges of their charter, and rendering insecure the property of every commercial and corporate body in the kingdom. They even presented to parliament a petition, in which these arguments were vehemently enforced; and so well by this time were they represented in that assembly, that a sufficiency of orators was not wanting, who in both Houses supported their claims. Opposite views, notwithstanding, prevailed; and an act was passed to prevent the increase of the dividend beyond ten per cent. till the 1st day of February, 1769.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IX.

1769.

Before the expiration of this term, the Company, who were anxious to evade the question respecting the public claim to the sovereignty of the Indian territory, very assiduously negotiated with the minister a temporary arrangement. After a great deal of conference and correspondence, an act was passed, in April, 1769, to the following effect: That the territorial revenues in India should be held by the Company for five years to come; that in consideration of this benefit they should pay into the exchequer 400,000*l.* every year; that, if the revenues allowed, they might increase the dividend, by augmentations not exceeding one per cent. in one year, to twelve and a half per cent.; that if, on the other hand, the dividend should fall below ten per cent., the payment into the exchequer should obtain a proportional reduction, and entirely cease if the dividend should decline to six per cent.; that the Company should, during each year of the term, export British merchandise, exclusive of naval and military stores, to the amount of 380,837*l.*; and that when they should have paid their simple contract debts bearing interest, and reduced their bonded debt to an equality with their loans to government, they should add to these loans the surplus of their receipts at an interest of two per cent.¹ This agreement between the public and the Company was made, it is obvious, upon the same supposition, that of a great surplus revenue, upon which succeeding agreements have been made, and with the same result.

In the meantime, the grievous failure in the annual trea-

¹ Act 9, Geo. III. c. 24.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. IX.

1769.

asures, which they had been so confidently promised ; and which, with all the credulity of violent wishes, they had so fondly and confidently promised themselves : excited, both in the Company, and in the nation, the most vehement complaints against the managers in India, to whose misconduct was ascribed the disappointment of hopes which no conduct could have realized.¹ A grand investigation and reform were decreed. And for the performance, after great consultation, it was resolved : That three persons should be chosen, whose acquaintance with Indian affairs, and whose character for talents, diligence, and probity, should afford the best security for the right discharge of so important a trust ; and that they should be sent out, in the name and with the character of Supervisors, and with powers adapted to the exigence of the case. Mr. Vansittart, the late Governor of Bengal, Mr. Scrafton, and Colonel Ford, were recommended as the three commissioners ; and it was proposed to invest them with almost all the powers which the Company themselves, if present in India, would possess ; a power of superseding the operations and suspending the authority of the Presidents and Councils, of investigating every department of the service, and establishing such regulations as the interests of the Company might seem to require. The scheme was indeed opposed with great vehemence by all those who favoured the persons now invested with the governing powers in India ; by all those who had any pique against the individuals proposed ; and by all those who disliked the accumulation of exorbitant authority in a small number of hands. But though they formed no inconsiderable party, the disappointment of the golden dreams of the Proprietors prevailed in the General Court ; and supervisors with extraordinary powers, it was resolved, were the very remedy which the maladies of the Indian government required.

But the pretensions of the ministry again interfered. Not only was the legality disputed of the commission by

¹ The manner in which Clive, to enhance the merit of his own services, had puffed the importance of the Indian territory, and inflamed the hopes of treasure which it was to produce, misled the Company. The perpetually recurring interests of their servants to delude them with these hopes, and their perpetual readiness to believe flattering accounts, has been a perennial fountain of misgovernment.

which the supervisors were appointed ; but a share was claimed in the government of India, which the Directors regarded with alarm and abhorrence. As an accession to their power and influence in India, which they imagined would be of the utmost importance, they had applied to government for two ships of the line, and some frigates. No aversion to this proposition was betrayed by the ministry ; but when the Company were elated with the hopes which a compliance was calculated to inspire, they were suddenly informed that the naval officer whom the Crown should appoint to command in India, must be vested with full powers to adjust all maritime affairs ; to transact with the native princes ; and, in short, to act the principal part in the offensive and defensive policy of the country. The Directors represented this proposal as affecting the honour, and the very existence of the Company. The General Court was adjourned from time to time to afford sufficient space for the consideration of so important a subject ; and the Proprietors were entreated to consider the present moment as the very crisis of their fate ; and to devote to the question a proportional share of their attention. To vest the officers of the Crown in India with powers independent of the Company, was in reality, they said, to extrude the Company from the government ; to lay the foundation of endless contests between the servants of the King and those of the Company ; and to prepare the ruin of the national interest in that part of the world ; if the Company were incapable of maintaining their territorial acquisitions, to surrender them to the powers of the country, upon terms advantageous to their commerce, was better, it was averred, than to lie at the mercy of a minister : and the fatal effects of the interference of the servants of the Crown in the affairs of a Company, formed for upholding a beneficial intercourse with India, were illustrated by contrasting the ruin of the French East India Company, the affairs of which the ministers of the French King had so officiously controlled, with the prosperity of the Dutch East India Company, the affairs of which had been left entirely to themselves. The grand argument, on the other side, was furnished by Clive and the Directors themselves ; who had used so many and such emphatical terms to impress a belief that the unprosperous state of their govern-

BOOK IV.

CHAP. IX.

1769.

BOOK IV. ment was wholly produced by the rapacity and misconduct
 CHAP. IX. of those who conducted it in India. In the first place, the
 1769. authority of a King's officer was held up as an indispensable
 security against the vices of the Company's servants; and
 in the next place the dignity of the master whom he served
 was represented as necessary to give majesty to the nego-
 tiations which a company of merchants might be required
 to conduct with the potentates of India.¹ After long and
 acrimonious debates, the powers demanded for an officer of
 the Crown were condemned in a Court of Proprietors; and
 the ministers were not disposed to enforce, by any violent
 procedure, the acceptance of their terms. The Company
 would agree to sanction the interference of the officer com-
 manding the ships of the King only within the Gulf of
 Persia, where they were embroiled with some of the neigh-
 bouring chiefs; the demand of two ships of the line for the
 Bay of Bengal was suspended; and the legal objection to
 the commission of the supervisors was withdrawn. In
 this manner, at the present conjuncture, was the dispute
 between the Government and the Company compromised.
 Two frigates, beside the squadron for the Gulf of Persia,
 were ordered upon Indian service. In one of them the
 supervisors took their passage. Their fate was remarkable.
 The vessel which carried them never reached her port;
 nor was any intelligence of her or her passengers ever
 received.

Mr. Cartier assumed the government of Bengal at the
 beginning of the year 1770.

¹ These debates are reported in various periodical publications of the time. A good abstract of them is presented in the Annual Register for 1769. A variety of pamphlets was produced by the dispute; of those which have come under the author's inspection, the following are the titles of the more remarkable: "An Address to the Proprietors of India Stock, showing, from the political State of Indostan, the Necessity of sending Commissioners to regulate and direct their Affairs abroad; and likewise the Expediency of joining a Servant of Government in the Commission. Printed for S. Bladon in Paternoster Row, 1769;" "A Letter to the Proprietors of East India Stock, containing a brief Relation of the Negotiations with Government, from the Year 1767 to the present Time, respecting the Company's Acquisitions in India, together with some Considerations on the principal Plans for Adjusting the Matters in dispute, which have been discussed in the General Court of Proprietors. Printed for B. White, at Horace's Head, in Fleet Street, 1769;" "A Letter to the Proprietors of India Stock, containing a Reply to some Insinuations in an OLD PROPRIETOR'S LETTER to the PROPRIETORS on the 13th Inst. relative to the Ballot of that Day. Printed for W. Nicholl, No. 51, St. Paul's Church Yard, 1769;" "A Letter to the Proprietors of E. I. Stock, by Governor Johnstone. Printed for W. Nicholl, 1769;" "A Letter to the Proprietors of East India Stock, relative to some Propositions intended to be moved at the next General Court, on Wednesday the 12th of July." Printed as above, 1769.

The first year of his administration was distinguished by one of those dreadful famines which so often afflict the provinces of India ; a calamity by which more than a third of the inhabitants of Bengal were computed to have been destroyed.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IX.

1770.

On the 10th of March, 1770, the Nabob Syef ad Dowla died of the small-pox ; and his brother Mubarek ad Dowla, a minor, was appointed to occupy his station. The President and Council made with him the same arrangements, and afforded the same allowance for the support of his family and dignity, as had been established in the time of his predecessor. But this agreement was condemned in very unceremonious terms by the Directors. "When we advert," say they, "to the encomiums you have passed on your own abilities and prudence, and on your attention to the Company's interest (in the expostulations you have thought proper to make on our appointment of commissioners to superintend our general affairs in India), we cannot but observe with astonishment, that an event of so much importance as the death of the Nabob Syef al Dowla, and the establishment of a successor in so great a degree of non-age, should not have been attended with those advantages for the Company, which such a circumstance offered to your view. Convinced, as we are, that an allowance of sixteen lacks per annum will be sufficient for the support of the Nabob's state and rank, while a minor, we must consider every addition thereto as so much to be wasted on a herd of parasites and sycophants, who will continually surround him ; or at least be hoarded up, a consequence still more pernicious to the Company. You are, therefore, during the non-age of the Nabob, to reduce his annual stipend to sixteen lacks of rupees."²

By the last regulations of the Directors, the inland trade in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, was reserved to the natives, and Europeans were excluded from it. By a letter of theirs, however, dated the 23d of March, 1770, it was commanded to be laid open to all persons, Europeans as well as natives, but without any privileges to their countrymen or servants beyond what were enjoyed by natives and other subjects.

¹ Letter of the Governor and Council to the Directors, 3rd Nov. 1772.

² General Letter to Bengal, 10th April, 1771.

BOOK IV. —These regulations were promulgated on the 12th of December.

1771. In the meantime financial difficulties were every day becoming more heavy and oppressive. On the 1st of January, 1771, when the President and Council at Fort William had received into their treasury 95,43,855 current rupees, for which they had granted bills on the Court of Directors, the cash remaining in it was only 35,42,761 rupees. At the same period the amount of bond debts in Bengal was 612,628*l*. And at the beginning of the following year it had swelled to 1,039,478*l*.

Notwithstanding the intelligence which the Directors had received of the inadequacy of their revenues, and the accumulation of their debts in all parts of India ; and notwithstanding their knowledge of the great amount of bills drawn upon them, for which they were altogether unable to provide, they signalized their rapacity on the 26th of September, 1770, by coming to a resolution for recommending it to the General Court, to avail themselves of the permission accorded in the late Act, by making a dividend at the rate of twelve per cent. per annum. The approbation of the General Court was unanimous. On the 14th of March and 25th of September, 1771, it was resolved, by the Court of Directors, to recommend to the General Court an augmentation of the dividend to six and a quarter per cent. for the six months respectively ensuing : approved in the General Court, by ninety-four voices against five in the first instance, and three hundred and seventy-four against thirty in the second. On the 17th of March, 1772, the Directors again resolved to recommend a dividend of six and a quarter per cent. for the current half year, which the Court of Proprietors in a similar manner confirmed.

These desperate proceedings hurried the affairs of the Company to a crisis. On the 8th of July, on an estimate of cash for the next three months, that is, of the payments falling due, and the cash and receipts which were applicable to meet them, there appeared a deficiency of no less than 1,293,000*l*. On the 15th of July the Directors were reduced to the necessity of applying to the Bank for a loan of 400,000*l*. On the 29th of July they applied to it for an additional loan of 300,000*l*, of which the Bank was prevailed upon to advance only 200,000*l*. And, on the 10th

of August, the Chairman and Deputy waited upon the Minister, to represent to him the deplorable state of the Company, and the necessity of being supported by a loan of at least one million from the public.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IX.

1772.

The glorious promises which had been so confidently made of unbounded riches from India, their total failure, the violent imputations of corrupt and erroneous conduct which the Directors and the agents of their government mutually cast upon one another, had, previous to this disclosure raised a great ferment in the nation, the most violent suspicions of extreme misconduct on the part of the Company and their servants, and a desire for some effectual interference on the part of the Legislature. In the King's speech, on the 21st of January, at the opening of the preceding session, it had been intimated that one branch of the national concerns which, "as well from remoteness of place, as from other circumstances, was peculiarly liable to abuses, and exposed to danger, might stand in need of the interposition of the Legislature, and require new laws, either for supplying defects or remedying disorders." On the 30th of March a motion was made by the Deputy-Chairman for leave to bring in a Bill for the better regulation of the Company's servants, and for improving the administration of justice in India. The grand evil of which the Directors complained was the want of powers to inflict upon their servants adequate punishment either for disobedience of orders, or any other species of misconduct. The Charter of Justices, granted in 1753, empowered the Mayor's Court of Calcutta, which it converted into a Court of Record, to try all civil suits arising between Europeans, within the town or factory of Calcutta, or the factories dependent upon it: it also constituted the President and Council a Court of Record, to receive and determine appeals from the Mayors; it further erected them into Justices of the Peace, with power to hold quarter sessions; and into Commissioners of oyer and terminer, and general gaol-delivery, for the trying and punishing of all offences, high treason excepted, committed within the limits of Calcutta and its dependent factories. This extent of jurisdiction, measured by the sphere of the Company's possessions at

¹ For the details and documents relative to this curious part of the history of the Company, see the Eighth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1773.

BOOK IV. the time when it was assigned, deprived them of all powers
 CHAP. IX. of juridical coercion with regard to Europeans over the
 1772. wide extent of territory of which they now acted as the
 sovereigns. They possessed, indeed, the power of suing or
 prosecuting Englishmen in the Courts of Westminster ;
 but under the necessity of bringing evidence from India,
 this was a privilege more nominal than real.

One object, therefore, of the present bill was to obtain
 authority for sending a chief justice with some puisne
 judges, and an attorney-general, according to the model of
 the Courts of England, for the administration of justice
 throughout the territory of the Company.

The next object was, the regulation of the trade. The
 author of the motion, the Deputy Chairman of the Com-
 pany, represented it as a solecism in politics, and mon-
 strous in reason, "that the governors of any country
 should be merchants ; and thus have a great temptation
 to become the only merchants, especially in those articles
 which were of most extensive and necessary consumption,
 and on which, with the powers of government, unlimited
 profits might be made." It was, therefore, proposed that
 the Governors and Councils, and the rest of the Company's
 servants, should be debarred from all concern in trade.
 But it neither occurred to the Deputy Chairman, nor was
 it pressed upon his notice by any other member of the
 legislative body, that the argument against the union of
 trade and government was equally conclusive, applied to
 the Company, as applied to their servants ; to those who
 held the powers of government in the first instance, as to
 those who held them by delegation and at will.

It was in the debate upon this motion that Lord Clive
 made the celebrated speech, in which he vindicated his
 own conduct against the charges to which, as well from
 authority as from individuals, it had been severely exposed.
 He spared not the character either of his fellow-servants,
 or of the Directors. "I attribute the present situation of
 our affairs," he said, "to four causes ; a relaxation of
 government in my successors ; great neglect on the part of
 administration ; notorious misconduct on the part of the
 Directors ; and the violent and outrageous proceedings of
 general courts." To hear his account, no one would be-
 lieve that any creature who had ever had any thing to do

with the government had ever behaved well but himself. BOOK IV.
 It was much easier for him, however, to prove that his CHAP. IX.
 conduct was liable to no peculiar blame, than that it was
 entitled to extraordinary applause. With great audacity,
 both military and political, fortunately adapted to the
 scene in which he acted, and with considerable skill in the
 adaptation of temporary expedients to temporary exigen-
 cies, he had no capacity for a comprehensive scheme, in-
 cluding any moderate anticipation of the future ; and it
 was the effect of his shortsighted regulations, and of the
 unfounded and extravagant hopes he had raised, with
 which the Company were now struggling on the verge of
 ruin, and on account of which the conduct both of them
 and of their servants was exposed to far more than its due
 share of obloquy and condemnation. 1772.

The suspicions of the nation were now sufficiently roused
 to produce a general demand for investigation ; and on the
 13th of April a motion was made and carried in the House
 of Commons for a select Committee to gratify the public
 desire. The bill which had been introduced by the De-
 puty Chairman was thrown out on the second reading, to
 afford time for the operations of the Committee, and par-
 liament was prorogued on the 10 of June.

During the recess, took place the extraordinary disclo-
 sure of the deficiency of the Company's funds, their solici-
 tation of loans from the Bank, and their application for
 support to the Minister. He received their proposals with
 coldness ; and referred them to parliament. That assem-
 bly was convened on the 26th of November, much earlier,
 as the King from the throne informed them, than had been
 otherwise intended, to afford them an opportunity of tak-
 ing cognizance of the present condition of the East India
 Company. The Minister had already come to the resolu-
 tion of acceding to the request of the Directors ; it there-
 fore suited his purpose to affirm that how great soever the
 existing embarrassment, it was only temporary ; and a
 Committee of Secrecy was appointed, as the most effectual
 and expeditious method for gaining that knowledge of
 the subject from which it was proper that the measures
 of parliament should originate.

Among the expedients which the urgency of their affairs
 had dictated to the Company, a new commission of super-

BOOK IV. vision had been resolved upon during the recess ; and six gentlemen were selected for that important service. The measure, however, was not approved by the ministry ; and on the 7th of December, the Committee of Secrecy presented a report, stating, that notwithstanding the financial difficulties of the Company, they were preparing to send out a commission of supervisors at a great expense, and that, in the opinion of the Committee, a bill ought to be passed to restrain them from the execution of that purpose for a limited time. The introduction of this bill excited the most vehement remonstrances on the part of the Company, and of those by whom their cause was supported in the two houses of parliament. It was asserted to be a violation of property, by curtailing the powers which the Company possessed by charter of managing their own affairs ; and all the evils which can arise from shaking the security of property were held up in their most alarming colours to deter men from approbation of the threatened restraint. The Company's claims of property, however, so frequently, during the whole course of their history, brought to oppose the interposition of parliament in their affairs, proved of as little force upon this as upon other occasions ; and their privileges, they were told, to which the term property, in its unlimited sense, could not without sophistry be applied, were insufficient to set aside that for which all property is created—the good of the community ; now in one important article so formidably threatened in their mismanaging hands.

After this decisive act of control, the next ostensible proceeding was the petition for a loan, presented by the Company to parliament on the 9th day of March. The propositions urged by the Directors were : that they should receive a loan of 1,500,000*l.* for four years, at four per cent. interest ; that they should make no dividend of more than six per cent. per annum until the loan should be reduced to 750,000*l.* ; that the dividend in that event should rise to eight per cent. ; that the surplus of receipts above disbursements in England should be applied to the reduction of the Company's bond debts to 1,500,000*l.* ; that after such reduction, the surplus should be divided equally between the public and the Company ; and that the Com-

pany should be released from payment of the annual 400,000*l.* to the public, for the remainder of the five years specified in the former agreement, and from the payments to which they were bound in consequence of the late acts for the indemnity on teas. In lieu of these, the following ing were the propositions offered by the Minister : to lend the Company 1,400,000*l.* at an interest of four per cent. ; to forego the claim of 400,000*l.* a-year from the territorial revenue till that debt is discharged ; to restrict them from making any dividend above six per cent. till that discharge is accomplished, and from making any dividend above seven per cent. till their bond debt is reduced to 1,500,000*l.* ; after that reduction to receive from them, in behalf of the public, three-fourths of the surplus receipts at home, the remaining fourth being appropriated either for the further reduction of the bond debt, or the formation of a fund to meet contingent exigencies ; and, under these conditions, to permit the territorial acquisitions to remain in their possession for six years, the unexpired term of their charter.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IX.

1778.

The Company treated these conditions as harsh, arbitrary, and illegal ; petitioned against them in the strongest terms ; and were supported with great vehemence of language by their own friends, and the enemies of the Minister, in both houses of parliament. The restriction of the dividend after payment of the debt, the exaction of so great a proportion of the surplus receipts, and in particular the appropriation even of that part which it was proposed to leave as their own, they arraigned as a violent disposal of their property without their own consent, equalling the most arbitrary acts of the most despotical governments, and setting a precedent which lessened the security of every right of a British subject. These considerations, however vehemently urged, produced but little effect : the ministerial influence was predominating ; the Company were odious ; and it was felt, perhaps, rather than distinctly seen, that the rules of individual property were not applicable, without great restrictions, to an artificial body, whose proceedings were of such magnitude as deeply to affect the interests of the nation at large. Of all these pretensions, however, that which seemed most to alarm the Company was the claim now distinctly asserted by

BOOK IV. the government to the territorial acquisitions; and though
 CHAP. IX. a definitive discussion was still waved by the Minister, the
 1773. Company expostulated against the limitation of their possession to six years, as involving in it a decision of the question at issue.

A more important exercise of power over their affairs was still meditated by the Minister; an entire change in the constitution of the Company. On the 3rd of May, he introduced a series of propositions, as the foundation for a law, which should raise the qualification to vote in the Court of Proprietors from 500*l.* to 1000*l.*, and give to every proprietor possessed of 3000*l.* two votes, possessed of 6000*l.* three votes, and of 10,000*l.* four votes; which should change the annual election of the whole number of Directors to that of six new ones, or one-fourth of the whole number each year; vest the government of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, in a governor-general, with a salary of 25,000*l.*, and four councillors of 8000*l.* each; render the other Presidencies subordinate to that of Bengal: establish at Calcutta a supreme court of judicature, consisting of a chief justice with 8000*l.* a-year, and three other judges each with 6000*l.* a-year, appointed by the Crown.

As subsidiary articles, it was proposed: that the first governor-general and councillors should be nominated by parliament in the act, and hold their office for five years, after which the patronage of those great offices should revert to the Directors, but still subject to the approbation of the Crown; that every thing in the Company's correspondence from India, which related to the civil or military affairs, to the government of the country, or the administration of the revenues, should be laid before the ministry; that no person in the service, either of the King or of the Company, should be allowed to receive presents; and that the governor-general, the councillors, and judges, should be excluded from all commercial profits and pursuits.

If the alarm and indignation of the Company, Directors, and Proprietors, were excited before, that body were now struck with the highest terror and resentment. They exclaimed, that the very constitution was threatened with subversion, and the rights conferred by charter treated as dust. They tendered a direct application to the city of

London, to join them with its influence in resisting a measure which destroyed the principle on which its own privileges and those of every chartered body in the nation depended; and threatened the very freedom of the people, both by setting a conspicuous and prolific example of the arbitrary violation of law, and by adding the whole of the revenue and government of India to the power and influence of the Crown. They represented, that by the clause which raised the qualification of the voters, about twelve hundred Proprietors were disfranchised; violently; and without compensation, robbed of an important right, and excluded from all share, direct or indirect, in the management of their own immediate property: that by destroying the annual election of Directors, those Trustees for the Company were placed above the control of their constituents, and vested with new powers to gratify their own ease or corruption, at the expense of those whose interests were lodged in their hands: that by reducing to a small number the votes of the Proprietors, the ministerial management of that body became more easy; that, by rendering the situation of Director permanent for so great a number of years, under the incapacitation of the Proprietors either to punish or reward, and under the great power of the Minister to do both, the subserviency of the Court of Directors to all ministerial purposes was perfectly secured; and that, from these sources combined, the power of the Minister over the Company was rendered hardly any thing inferior to absolute: that the whole government of the settlements in India was taken from the Company, and, in effect, transferred to the Crown, by establishing a general presidency over all their affairs, of which the agents were in the first instance named by parliament, and ever after, in reality, under the condition of its approbation, named by the Crown: and that, "notwithstanding the Company were thus deprived of their franchise in the choice of their servants, by an unparalleled strain of injustice and oppression, they were compelled to pay such salaries as ministers might think fit to direct, to persons in whose appointment, approbation, or removal, the Company were to have no share."¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IX.
1773.

¹ Message from the East India Company to the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the city of London, in Common Council assembled, dated 27th May, 1773.

BOOK IV. These considerations were frequently urged, with the utmost vehemence and asperity, in both assemblies of Parliament. Every question, every clause, was warmly debated, and pressed to a division. The city of London, the Company themselves, and those stockholders who were deprived of their votes, presented strong and earnest petitions. In behalf of the Company and the disfranchised Proprietors, counsel, at their prayer, were heard. And two protests, couched in censorial language of extraordinary strength, obtained a numerous signature in the upper house.

CHAP. IX.
1773.

All this opposition, however, and all this ferment were of little avail. The propositions of the ministry were all carried by great and decisive majorities, and being reduced into two acts, the one relating to the financial relief of the Company, the other to the establishment of their new constitution, received the royal assent on the 21st of June and the 1st of July. The arrangements which concerned the business at home were appointed to commence from the 1st of October, 1773 ; those which concerned the foreign administration not till the 1st of August, 1774.¹

Practical statesmen, so apt to assume to themselves the monopoly of political wisdom, are commonly short-sighted legislators.

In one respect, the present experiment fulfilled the purpose very completely for which it was intended. It followed the current of that policy, which for many reasons has run with perfect regularity and considerable strength, diminishing the influence of numbers in affairs of government, and reducing things as much as possible to the oligarchical state.

For the rest ; it had not so much as a tendency to remove the principal evils to which it pretended to find a remedy ; and it created some of the greatest magnitude which previously had no existence.

The evils in question were—I. Such as had their operation in India ; and—II. Such as had their operation in England.

I. Those which had their operation in India might all be ranked under two heads ; 1. The absorption of more than

¹ See 13 Geo. III. c. 63, and 13 Geo. III. c. 64.

the revenues by expense ; and 2. The plunder and oppression of the people. BOOK IV.

CHAP. IX.

1773.

The only parts of the new constitution which had a direct influence upon the government in India were—

1. The new appointment and powers of the Governor-general and Council ; and 2. The Supreme Court of Judicature.

1. The mode of appointing public functionaries, and the extent of their power, distinct from the motives to good or evil conduct which operate upon them in the discharge of their functions, are evidently of no avail. Upon the Governor and Council in India the motives to evil conduct, and the scope for its exercise, were, if not augmented by the new regulations, at any rate not impaired.¹ As ingenuity may be challenged to refute this proposition, it follows, that from this branch of the arrangement no good was derived.²

2. The Supreme Court of Judicature was intended to supply the limited powers of criminal jurisdiction, which in their ancient commercial capacity, had been committed to the Company. The terrors of law, brought nearer home to the inferior servants of the Company, and those who enjoyed their protection, might have restrained in some degree their subordinate oppressions. But it was easy to see that the operations of the supreme functionaries in India must remain exempt from the control of the Supreme Court ; otherwise, that court became itself the government. This consequence was not sufficiently foreseen ; and the vague and indefinite powers assigned to the judicatory, introduced immediately, between the Governor-general and

¹ They were previously debarred from the acceptance of presents, and the Governor from trade. Reliance for probity was placed, as it is so commonly placed, on the greatness of the salaries ; as if there was a point of saturation in cupidity ; as if the great power which great salaries confer was not the most effectual of all instruments for the undue acquisition of more, and the most effectual of all instruments for covering such acquisition from inquiry or punishment. In as far, then, as the prospect of impunity is a motive, and it is one of the strongest, so far great salaries do not take from, they add to the temptations of corruption. Even Burke, upon this particular, remarked, that “ ample salaries removed the necessity indeed, but by no means the inducements, to corruption and oppression.” See Ninth Report of the Select Committee, 1781.

² That part of the regulations which subjected to the Bengal Council the other Presidencies in matters of peace and war with foreign states, had some effect, though not without drawbacks, in giving unity to the international proceedings of the Company. With the goodness or badness of the internal government, it had no connexion.

BOOK IV. the Judges, those struggles which threatened the existence
 CHAP. IX. of English authority.

1773.

So long, on the other hand, as the Governor-general and Council remained exempt from the control of law, the great oppressors were safe; and, from the community of interests, and the necessity of mutual compliance and mutual concealment, between the high offenders and the low, impunity was pretty well secured to the class.

The grand source, however, of mischief to the natives, in the jurisprudential plan, was the unfortunate inattention of its authors to the general principles of law, detached from its accidental and national forms. As the vulgar of every nation think their language the natural one, and all others arbitrary and artificial; so, a large mass of Englishmen consider English law as the pure extract of reason, adapted to the exigencies of human nature itself; and are wholly ignorant that, for the greater part, it is arbitrary, technical, and ill-adapted to the general ends which it is intended to serve; that it has more of singularity, and less capacity of adaptation to the state of other nations, than any scheme of law to be found in any other civilized country. The English law, which in general has neither definition nor words, to guide the discretion or circumscribe the license of the Judge, presented neither rule nor analogy in cases totally altered by diversity of ideas, manners, and pre-existing rights; and the violent efforts which were made to bend the rights of the natives to a conformity with the English laws, for the purpose of extending jurisdiction, and gratifying a pedantic and mechanical attachment to the arbitrary forms of the Westminster courts, produced more injustice and oppression and excited more alarm, than probably was experienced, through the whole of its duration, from the previous imperfection of law and judicature.¹

¹ Mr. Burke, in the Ninth Report of the Select Committee, in 1783, says, "The defect in the institution seemed to be this; that no rule was laid down, either in the act or the charter, by which the Court was to judge. No descriptions of offenders, or species of delinquency, were properly ascertained, according to the nature of the place, or to the prevalent mode of abuse. Provision was made for the administration of justice in the remotest part of Hindostan, as if it were a province in Great Britain. Your Committee have long had the constitution and conduct of this Court before them, and they have as yet been able to discover very few instances (not one that appears to them of leading importance) of relief given to the natives against the corruptions or oppressions of British subjects in power.—So far as your Com-

II. If, towards the amelioration of *the government in India*, the new effort in legislation performed no more than this, it injured, rather than improved, the condition of both the Company and the natives. Against *the government at home*, the only objection, of any real moment, was its inefficiency as the ruling power to produce, by means of its servants a good government in India, or, what in this case was meant by good government, a large surplus of revenue or treasure to England, without oppression to the natives. The total change which was effected in the Constitution of the Company pretended to have for its *End* the improvement and perfection of the Company in that respect. and it employed as its whole and only *Means*, dependence upon the Minister.

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IX.
1778.

If the Minister had more knowledge of the affairs in India; more leisure to devote to their management, and more interest in their being well managed, this was an improvement. If he had less knowledge, less leisure, and, far above all, if his interest was likely to be most promoted by that system of patronage which creates dependence, and which is at irreconcilable enmity with the very principle of good government, the change was wholly the reverse. How dependence upon the Minister was to render the agents of government more faithful and economical stewards of the revenues in India, or less disposed to accumulate wealth at the expense of the prostrate natives, it is not easy to make appear: in regard to responsibility, or eventual punishment, the only caution was, to act in concert with the minister; and then they were out of all comparison more assured of impunity than before.

From dependence upon the Court of Proprietors, by annual elections, to render the Directors in a great degree independent of their constituents by elections in four years, gave them greater powers, and hence motives, to pursue their own interests at the expense of the Proprietors; but that it should increase their interest in the good government of India, and hence their motives for exertion to procure it, is impossible.

mittee have been able to discover, the Court has been generally terrible to the natives, and has distracted the government of the Company, without substantially reforming any one of its abuses."

BOOK IV. To diminish the number of votes in the court of Proprietors, and confine the power to the rich, was contrived, CHAP. IX. it was said, to render that assembly less tumultuous. But tumultuousness, in itself, is not an evil. It is evil only 1773. when it has a tendency to produce evil effects. What is more tumultuous than a public market, a theatre, or a church? To know the merit then of a reform of tumultuousness, we ought to know the specific evils which the tumultuousness in question produced. In the case of the East India Company the authors of the measure failed in exhibiting any mischievous effects; though by their reform they unquestionably created a field for other effects of a pernicious description. "If tumult and disorder," as was well remarked by an illustrious Committee of the Commons House, "were lessened by reducing the number of Proprietors, private cabal and intrigue were facilitated at least in an equal degree; and it is cabal and corruption, rather than disorder and confusion, that are most to be dreaded in transacting the affairs of India;"¹ that are most to be dreaded in transacting the affairs of every country under the sun.

The virtues of a Court of Proprietors, as of every political body, are intelligence and probity. The owner of £500 stock was just as likely to be intelligent as the owner of £1000. But a small number of men are much more easily corrupted than a large; and, where the matter of corruption operates, much more sure of being corrupt.²

To the grand complaint against the Court of Proprietors, that, being filled by the servants of the Company who had returned loaded to Europe with ill-gotten wealth, it proved a barrier against exposure and punishment, the amount of the qualification provided no sort of remedy, but rather facilitated and confirmed the abuse.

As soon as the management of the East India Company's affairs became a source of great patronage and power, it necessarily followed that stock was generally held for the promotion of interests of much greater value than the dividend. It was distributed mostly among three great

¹ Ninth Report of the Select Committee, in 1783.

² "The whole of the regulations concerning the Court of Proprietors, relied upon two principles, which have often proved fallacious; namely, that small numbers were a security against faction and disorder; and that integrity of conduct would follow the greater property." Ninth Report, *ut supra*.

classes of Proprietors ; 1. Those who aspired to a share in the Direction, and who were careful to possess themselves of whatever share of stock was calculated to strengthen their influence ; 2. The large class of those who were competitors for the Company's favours and employment, all those concerned in the immense supply of their shipping and goods, constituting a considerable proportion of the ship-owners and tradesmen in London, who strengthened their influence with the great customer, by the number of votes which they could assure to the Directors in the General Court ; 3. Those who aspired to contracts with the Treasury, Admiralty, and Ordnance, and clerks in public offices, who discovered that one ground of influence with the Minister was, to have votes at his disposal in the East India Proprietary Court.¹

BOOK IV.

CHAP. IX.

1773.

By every thing which tended to lessen the number of voting Proprietors, the force of all these sinister interests was increased. The only expedient which had a tendency to counteract them was, to render such Proprietors as numerous as possible. This would have promoted the interests of the public, but not those of the minister ; the interests of the many, but not those of the few.²

One part of the ancient constitution, for the preservation of which the authors of the present reform were condemned by the Select Committee of 1783, was the ballot ; "by means of which, acts," they said, "of the highest concern to the Company and to the state, might be done by individuals with perfect impunity." There are occasions on which the use of the ballot is advantageous. There are occasions on which it is hurtful. If we look steadily

¹ This is pretty nearly the description of the East India Proprietary which is given by the Committee of the House of Commons. See Ninth Report of the Select Committee in 1783.

² It was urged by the Minister, that by raising the qualification from 500*l.* to 1000*l.*, the value of the dividend would govern the Proprietor more than that of the vote ; with what sincerity, or what discernment, it is easy to see. Burke, however, very justly remarked, that this pecuniary interest might be most effectually : seduced by some signal misdemeanour, which should produce a great immediate advantage, though productive of ultimate ruin. "Accordingly," he adds, "the Company's servants have ever since covered over the worst oppressions of the people under their government, and the most cruel and wanton ravages of all the neighbouring countries, by holding out, and for a time actually realizing, additions of revenue to the territorial funds of the Company, and great quantities of valuable goods to their investment." He added, with obvious truth, "The Indian Proprietor will always be, in the first instance, a politician : and the bolder his enterprise, and the more corrupt his views, the less will be his consideration of the price to be paid for compassing them." Ninth Report, *ut supra*.

BOOK IV. to the end, to which all institutions profess to be directed,
 CHAP. IX. we shall not find it very difficult to draw the line of demarcation.

1773.

A voter may be considered as subject to the operation of two sets of interests : the one, interests rising out of the good or evil for which he is dependent upon the will of other men : the other, interests in respect to which he cannot be considered as dependent upon any determinate man or men.

There are cases in which the interests for which he is not dependent upon other men impel him in the right direction. If not acted upon by other interests, he will, in such cases, vote in that direction. If, however, he is acted upon by interests dependent upon other men, interests more powerful than the former, and impelling in the opposite direction, he will vote in the opposite direction. What is necessary, therefore, is, to save him from the operation of those interests. This is accomplished by enabling him to vote in secret ; for in that case, the man who could otherwise compel his vote, is ignorant in what direction it has been given. In all cases, therefore, in which the independent interests of the voter, those which in propriety of language may be called his *own* interests, would dictate the good and useful vote ; but in which cases, at the same time, he is liable to be acted upon in the way either of good or of evil, by men whose interests would dictate a base and mischievous vote, the ballot is a great and invaluable security. In this set of cases is included, the important instance of the votes of the people for representatives in the legislative assembly of a nation. Those interests of each of the individuals composing the great mass of the people, for which he is not dependent upon other men, compose the interests of the nation. But it is very possible for a majority out of any number of voters to be acted upon by the will of other men, whose interests are opposite to those of the nation. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that they should be protected from that influence.

There is, however, another set of cases, in which those interests of the voter, which have their origin primarily in himself, and not in other men, draw in the hurtful direction ; and in which he is not liable to be operated

upon by any other interests of other men than those which each possesses in common with the rest of the community. If allowed, in this set of cases, to vote in secret, he will be sure to vote as the sinister interest impels. If forced to vote in public, he will be subject to all the restraint which the eye of the community, fixed upon his virtue or knavery, is calculated to produce: and in such cases, the ballot is only an encouragement to evil. If it cannot be affirmed that the interests of the individuals, composing the Court of Proprietors of the East India Company, are incapable of being promoted at the cost of the British and Indian communities, it cannot be denied that the case of these Proprietors belongs to this latter description.¹

At the very time when the discussions upon the new regulations were taking place, the Chairman of the Select Committee of the House of Commons came forward with a motion for inquiry into the circumstances of the deposition and death of Suraj-ad-dowla; into the imposture, by a fictitious treaty, practised upon Onichund; the elevation of Meer Jaffier; and the sums of money, in the shape of presents, obtained at the time of that revolution. Crimes of the blackest dye, rapacity, treachery, cruelty, were charged upon the principal actors in that suspicious scene; and the punishment, even of Clive, as the first and principal delinquent, was represented as a necessary act of justice and policy. On the 10th of May, the following resolutions were moved: 1. "That all acquisitions, made under the influence of a military force, or by treaty with foreign Princes, do of right belong to the state; 2. That to appropriate acquisitions so made, to the private emolument of persons intrusted with any civil or military

¹ No inconvenience has been found to attend the alterations made in the constitution of the general courts. They are still sufficiently numerous to present both the merits and defects of popular assemblies, in which vehemence of feeling commonly overbears an appeal to calm and rational argument. The ballot is a commodious method of receiving the votes, the purport of which, there is rarely, if ever, any desire to conceal. By making it imperative on proprietors to have been possessed of their stock a reasonable period before they could exercise a vote, and by limiting the number of votes, which any single proprietor enjoyed, a real improvement was effected, as it put an end to the splitting of votes, by which, upon any emergency, a number of nominal shareholders was created to carry a particular question, of the merits of which they knew and cared nothing, and it prevented any individual from possessing an undue influence, which he might exercise, as was often done, for his own advantage, to the detriment of the Company.—W.

BOOK IV. power of the state, is illegal ; 3. That very great sums of
 CHAP I. money, and other valuable property, have been acquired
 1773. in Bengal, from Princes and others of that country, by
 persons intrusted with the military and civil powers of the
 state, by means of such powers ; which sums of money
 and valuable property have been appropriated to the pri-
 vate use of such persons." These resolutions were warmly
 adopted by the house. But when the application of them
 came to be made to individuals—and especially when the
 ruin was contemplated which that application would draw
 down upon Clive—compassion for the man, and the con-
 sideration of his services, blotted by offences, yet splendid
 and great, operated with effect in the breasts of the
 assembly, and put an end to the inquiry.¹ According to
 the style, which the spirit of English laws renders predo-
 minant in English councils, inquiry was rejected ostensibly
 upon a subterfuge, of the nature of a legal shuffle ; incom-
 petence, to wit, in the reports of the Select Committee to
 be received as evidence. As if that were true ! As if no
 other evidence had been to be found ! On the other hand
 the considerations which fairly recommended the rejection,
 or at least a very great modification of the penal proceed-
 ing, were not so much as mentioned ; that the punish-
 ment threatened was more grievous than the offence
 that it was punishment by an *ex-post-facto* law, because
 however contrary to the principles of right government
 the presents received from Meer Jaffier, and however
 odious to the moral sense the deception practised upon
 Omichund, there was no law¹ at the time which forbade
 them ; that the presents, how contrary soever to European
 morals and ideas, were perfectly correspondent to those of
 the country in which they were received, and to the ex-
 pectations of the parties by whom they were bestowed
 that the treachery to Omichund was countenanced and
 palliated by some of the principles and many of the ad-

¹ The concluding debate did not take place until the 31st of May. After a long discussion, a declaratory motion, to the effect that Lord Clive did receive certain presents upon the enthronement of Meer Jaffier was carried. It was then moved that " in so doing he abused the powers with which he was intrusted to the evil example of the servants of the public." The motion was rejected without a division : a motion was finally made about " five in the morning," that Robert Lord Clive, did at the same time render great and meritorious services to his country, which passed unanimously. Life of Clive, iii. 360.—W.

mired incidents of European diplomacy; that Clive, though never inattentive to his own interests, was actuated by a sincere desire to promote the prosperity of the Company, and appears not in any instance to have sacrificed what he regarded as their interests to his own; and that it would have required an extraordinary man, which no one ought to be punished for not being, to have acted, in that most trying situation in which he was placed, with greater disinterestedness than he displayed.¹

BOOK IV.
CHAP. IX.

1773.

The inquiry into the financial and commercial state of the Company exhibited the following results: The whole of their effects and credits in England, estimated on the 1st day of March, 1773, amounted to 7,784,689*l.* 12*s.* 10*d.*; and the whole of their debts to 9,219,114*l.* 12*s.* 6*d.*; leaving a balance against the Company of 1,434,424*l.* 19*s.* 8*d.* The whole of their effects and credits in India, China, and St. Helena, and afloat on the sea, amounted to 6,397,299*l.* 10*s.* 6*d.* The whole of their debts abroad amounted to 2,032,306*l.*; producing a balance in their favour of 4,364,993*l.* 10*s.* 6*d.* Deducting from this sum the balance against the Company in England, we find the whole amount of their available property no more than 2,930,568*l.* 10*s.* 10*d.*; so that of their capital stock of 4,200,000*l.*, 1,269,431*l.* 9*s.* 2*d.* was expended and gone.²

¹ This vindication of Clive is unanswerable, and should have protected him against some of the remarks and insinuations to his discredit, which have previously occurred. Whatever errors he may be charged with they were those of his time, and his situation; his merits were his own. The whole of the parliamentary proceedings against him originated in a spirit of vindictive retaliation, which his private and public measures had provoked:—the vehemence with which he had opposed an influential party in the Direction, and the unmitigated sternness with which he had repressed all opposition to his will in the government of Bengal. He was himself a good hater, and had, therefore, little reason to complain of having incurred the like animosity from others, but when his enemies assailed him through the pretext of public justice, they converted the great council of the nation into an instrument of personal revenge, and disgraced parliament more than they dishonoured Clive.—W.

² Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy in 1773. The Committee say, "They have not included in the above account any valuation of the fortifications and buildings of the Company abroad. They can by no means agree in opinion with the Court of Directors, 'That the amount of the fortifications, &c., should be added to the annual statement.'"—Undoubtedly no assets of any party can be compared with his debts, further than they can be disposed of for the payment of those debts; the manure which a farmer has spread upon his fields, or the hedges and ditches with which he has surrounded them, are nothing to him, the moment his lease is expired. The money expended in fortifications and buildings, from May 1757, was stated at nearly four millions.—M.

The illustration is not wholly applicable, nor as far as it is applicable is it true. The connexion between the country and the Company is not exactly

BOOK IV. From the year 1744, the period to which in a former
 CHAP. IX. passage¹ is brought down the account of the dividend
 1773. paid annually to the Proprietors on the capital stock, that
 payment continued at eight per cent. to the year 1756, in
 which it was reduced to six per cent. It continued at that
 low rate till Christmas, 1766, when it was raised by the
 General Court, repugnant to the sense of the Court of
 Directors, to five per cent. for the next half-year. On the
 7th of May, 1767, it was resolved in the General Court,
 that for the following half-year the dividend should be six
 and a quarter per cent. But this resolution was rescinded
 by act of parliament, and the dividend limited, till further
 permission, to ten per cent. per annum. It was continued
 at ten per cent. till the year commencing at Christmas,
 1769, when, in pursuance of the new regulations, it was
 advanced to eleven per cent. The next year it rose to
 twelve per cent. The following year it was carried to its
 prescribed limits, twelve and a-half per cent.; at which it
 continued for eighteen months, when the funds of the
 Company being totally exhausted, it was suddenly reduced
 to six per cent. per annum, by a resolution passed on the
 3d of December, 1772.²

In the interval between 1774 and 1772, the sales at the
 India House had increased from about 2,000,000*l.* to
 3,000,000*l.* annually; their annual exports, including both
 goods and stores, had fully doubled. In the year 1751,
 the total amount of shipping in the service of the Com-
 pany was 38,441 tons; in the year 1772 it was 61,860.³

that of a tenant on lease, and the occupant of an estate in which he has more
 than a passing interest, may equitably expect an equivalent for permanent
 improvements. - - W.

¹ *Supra*, vol. iii. p. 36.

² See the Third and Eighth Reports of the Committee of Secrecy in 1773.

³ Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy.

BOOK V.

FROM THE FIRST GREAT CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND IN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, IN 1773, TILL THE SECOND GREAT CHANGE BY THE ACT COMMONLY CALLED MR. PITT'S ACT, IN 1784.

CHAPTER I.

Administration of Hastings till the Time when the Parliamentary Members of the Council arrived and the Operations of the New Constitution commenced, including—Arrangements for collecting the Revenue and administering Justice ostensibly as Dewan.—Treatment of Mohammed Reza Khan and the Raja Shitab Roy.—Elevation of Munny Begum.—Destruction of the Rohillas.—Sale of Corah and Allahabad to the Vizir.—Payment refused of the Emperor's Revenue.—Financial Results.

BY the new parliamentary authority, Mr. Hastings was appointed Governor-General, and General Clavering, Colonel Monson, Mr. Barwell, and Mr. Francis, the members of Council; not removable, except by the King, upon representation made by the Court of Directors, during the period assigned in the act. Mr. Hastings had ascended with reputation through the several stages of the Company's service; possessed the rank of a member of Council at the time of Mr. Vansittart's administration, and generally concurred in the measures which the party opposed to that Governor so vehemently condemned. After a visit to his native country, to which he proceeded at the same time with Vansittart, he returned to India in 1769, to fill the station of second in council at Madras; and in the beginning of 1772 was raised to the highest situation in the service of the Company, being appointed to succeed Mr. Cartier in the government of Bengal.

BOOK V.
CHAP. I.
1760.

BOOK V. The sense which the Directors entertained of the vices
 CHAP. I. which up to this time had stained their administration in
 1773. India, is recorded thus: "We wish" (the words of their
 letter to the President and Council at Fort William, dated
 the 7th of April, 1773,) "we could refute the observation,
 that almost every attempt made by us and our adminis-
 trations at your Presidency, for the reforming of abuses,
 has rather increased them, and added to the miseries of
 the country we are anxious to protect and cherish. The
 truth of this observation appears fully in the late appoint-
 ment of supervisors and chiefs—instituted, as they were,
 to give relief to the industrious tenants, to improve and
 enlarge our investments, to destroy monopolies, and re-
 trench expenses, the end has by no means been answer-
 able to the institution. Are not the tenants, more than
 ever, oppressed and wretched? Are our investments im-
 proved? Have not the raw silk and cocoons been raised
 upon us fifty per cent. in price! We can hardly say what
 has not been made a monopoly. And as to the expenses
 of your Presidency, they are at length settled to a degree
 we are no longer able to support. These facts (for such
 they are) should have been stated to us as capital reasons,
 why neither our orders of 1771, nor indeed any regulations
 whatever, could be carried into execution. But, perhaps,
 as this would have proved too much, it was not suggested
 to us; for nothing could more plainly indicate a state of
 anarchy, and that there was no government existing, in
 our servants in Bengal. . . . When oppression pervades the
 whole country; when youths have been suffered with im-
 puny to exercise sovereign jurisdiction over the natives,
 and to acquire rapid fortunes by monopolizing of com-
 merce, it cannot be a wonder to us, or yourselves, that
 native merchants do not come forward to contract with
 the Company; that the manufactures find their way
 through foreign channels; or that our investments are at
 once enormously dear, and of a debased quality.—It is
 evident, then, that the evils which have been so destruc-
 tive to us, lie too deep for any partial plans to reach to
 correct. It is, therefore, our resolution to aim at the root
 of those evils." Their expectation of assistance from Mr.
 Hastings in these reforms, was expressed in the following
 terms: "Our President, Mr. Hastings, we trust will set the

example of temperance, economy, and application ; and upon this we are sensible, much will depend. And here we take occasion to indulge the pleasure we have in acknowledging Mr. Hastings' services upon the coast of Coromandel, in constructing with equal labour and ability, the plan which has so much improved our investments there ; and as we are persuaded he will persevere, in the same laudable pursuit, through every branch of our affairs in Bengal, he, in return, may depend on the steady support and favour of his employers." ¹

BOOK V.
CHAP. I.
1769.

The double, or ambiguous administration, in name and in ostent by the Nabob, in reality by the Company, which had been recommended as ingenious policy by Clive, and admired as such by his employers and successors, had contributed greatly to enhance the difficulties in which, by the assumption of the government, the English were involved. All the vices of the ancient polity were saved from reform ; and all the evils of a divided authority were superinduced. The revenues were under a complicated, wasteful, and oppressive economy ; the lands being partly managed by the native agents of the collectors, partly farmed from year to year, partly held by Zemindars, and Talookdars, responsible for a certain revenue. The administration of justice, of which, under the military and fiscal Governors of the Mogul provinces, the criminal part belonged to the Nazim, or military Governor, the civil to the Dewan, or fiscal Governor, was, as a heavy and unproductive burden, left in the hands of the Nabob, who, being totally without power, was totally unable to maintain the authority of his tribunals against the masters of the country ; and the people were given up to oppression.²

The Company and their servants were little satisfied, from the beginning, with the produce of the dewanee : and soon began to be as little satisfied with the expedients adopted by Clive for ensuring a faithful collection. In the month of August, 1769, before the close of Mr. Verelst's administration, a supplementary security was

¹ Minutes of Evidence on Mr. Hastings' trial, p. 966.

² This is expressly stated by Hastings, and the Committee of Revenue, in their letter of the 3rd of Nov., 1772, in the Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, in 1773.

BOOK V. devised. It was held expedient, that servants of the
 CHAP. I. Company should be stationed in appropriate districts,
 1769. throughout the whole country, for the purpose of super-
 intending the native officers, both in the collection of the
 revenue, and, what was very much blended with it, the
 administration of justice. These functionaries received
 the title of Supervisors. And, in the next year was added
 a second supplementary security ; two councils, with
 authority over the supervisors, one at Moorshedabad, and
 another at Patna.

Among the duties recommended to the supervisors, one
 was to collect a body of information with respect to the
 amount of the revenues ; with respect to the state, pro-
 duce, and capabilities of the great source of the revenue,
 the lands ; with respect to the cesses or arbitrary taxes ;
 the whole catalogue of imposts laid upon the cultivator ;
 the manner of collecting them, and the origin and progress
 of all the modern exactions ; with respect to the regula-
 tions of commerce, and the administration of justice.
 The reports of the supervisors, intended to convey the
 information which they collected under those heads, repre-
 sent the government as having attained the last stage of
 oppressiveness and barbarism. "The Nazims exacted
 what they could from the Zemindars and great farmers of
 the revenue, whom they left at liberty to plunder all be-
 low ; reserving to themselves the prerogative of plundering
 them in their turn, when they were supposed to have en-
 riched themselves with the spoils of the country." The
 Select Committee of the House of Commons, in 1810,
 quoting this passage, remark, "The whole system thus
 resolved itself, on the part of the public officers, into
 habitual extortion and injustice ; which produced on that
 of the cultivator the natural consequences—concealment
 and evasion, by which government was defrauded of a con-
 siderable part of its just demands." With respect to the
 administration of justice, the supervisors reported, "That
 the regular course was every where suspended : but every
 man exercised it, who had the power of compelling others
 to submit to his decisions." The Committee of the House
 of Commons, whose remark on the state of the fiscal col-
 lections has just been adduced, subjoin to this quotation
 that which fills up the picture : "Seven years had elapsed,

from the acquisition of the dewannee, without the government deeming itself competent to remedy these defects." ¹

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

1771.

Grievously disappointed in their expectations of treasure, the Directors resolved to break through the scheme of ambiguity ; so far at least as to take into their own hands the collection as well as the disbursement of the revenues. In their letter to the President and Council of Fort William, dated the 28th of August, 1771, they declared their resolution, "To stand forth as Dewan," (so they were pleased to express it), "and by the agency of the Company's servants to take upon themselves the entire care and management of the revenues." The change was enormous, which it was the nature of this decree to produce. It was a revolution, much greater, probably, than any previous conjuncture—than even the change from Hindu to Mohammedan masters, had been able to create. The transition from Hindu to Mohammedan masters had only changed the hands by which the sword was wielded, and favours were dispensed ; the machine of government, still more the texture of society, underwent feeble alterations ; and the civil part of the administration was, from convenience, left almost wholly in the hands of Hindus. A total change in the management of the revenues more deeply affected the condition, individually and collectively, of the people of India, than it is easy for the European reader to conceive. It was an innovation by which the whole property of the country, and along with it the administration of justice, were placed upon a new foundation.

Of the nature of this change, the Directors appear to have had no adequate conception. As if the measure which they proposed had been without consequences, they satisfied themselves with enjoining its execution ; and consigned to their servants the task (of which, however, they did not much complain) of carrying into effect a change of government so momentous without one word of instruction.² Those servants, though more acquainted with the

¹ Fifth Report of the Select Committee, 1810, p. 5.

² The Committee of Circuit, in entering upon their task, remark a still more extraordinary failure in the sagacity of the Directors, who did not even foresee, that while their new resolution was totally inconsistent with their former regulations they gave no authority for abolishing them. "They have

BOOK V. practical difficulties which would be met in establishing
 CHAP. I. the new system of finance, appear to have thought as little
 1772. nearly as their honourable masters, of the great changes,
 with regard to the people, which it was calculated to produce. With great alacrity they betook themselves to the undertaking. Mr. Hastings succeeded to the chair on the 13th of April, 1772; and on the 16th the Council deemed themselves ripe for the following important resolution: that they would let the lands in farm, and for long leases; because it is the most simple mode, and best adapted to a government like that of the Company, which cannot enter into the minute details of the collections; because every mode of agency by which the rents could be received would be attended with perplexed and intricate accounts, with embezzlement of the revenue, and oppression of the people; and because any mode of collecting the revenues which would trench upon the time of the Governor and Council, would deprive them of a portion of what was already too little for the laborious duties which they had to perform.¹

On the 14th of May the operations were planned. It was decreed, that the lands should be let for a period of five years: that a Committee of the Board, consisting of the President and four members, should perform the local operations, by circuit through the country; that the servants of the Company who superintended the business of the collection in the several districts, and who had hitherto been distinguished by the title of supervisors, should henceforth be denominated collectors;² that a native,

been pleased," say the Committee, "to direct a total change of system, and have left the *plan* and *execution* of it to the discretion of the Board, without any formal repeal of the regulations which they had before framed and adapted to another system—the abolition of which necessarily includes that of its subsidiary institutions, unless they shall be found to coincide with the new." Extract, Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit, dated Cossimbuzar, 28th July, 1772, inserted in the Sixth Report, Committee of Secresy, 1773, p. 21.

¹ These reasons are assigned in the Consultation 14th May, Report, ut supra.

² The reasons they assign for this change of title is worth transcribing. "The term 'Supervisor' was properly suited to the original commission, which was to examine, inspect, and report. This office has been long since annulled; but we apprehend that the continuance of the name, and of many of the residents, in the same stations which they now fill as collectors, may have misled even our Honourable Masters, who were never regularly advised of the change, into the opinion that the first commission still subsisted." So much for the care of instructing, and the accurate information of the Honourable Directors.

under the title of *dewan*, should in each district be joined with the collector, both to inform and to check; that no banyan, or servant of a collector, should be permitted to farm any portion of the revenue: because with the servant of a collector no man would dare to become a competitor: and, as presents to the collectors from the *Zemindars* and other middlemen had been abolished, so all acceptance of presents, by such middlemen from the ryots, and all other modes of extortion, should be carefully prevented. Some precautions were taken against the accumulation of debt, which swelled at exorbitant interest, rarely less than three, often as much as fifteen per cent. per month, upon the ryots, as well as the different orders of middlemen. The collectors were forbidden to lend, or to permit their banyans or servants to lend, to the middlemen; and the middlemen or agents to lend to the ryots: but the Governor and Council express their regret, that loans and exorbitant interest were an evil which it was not in their power wholly to repress.¹

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

1772.

The objects which in these regulations the servants of the Company professed to have in view, were, to simplify accounts; to render uniform the mode of exaction; and to establish fixed and accurate rules. The Committee of Circuit, with whom, though a Member, Mr. Hastings did not proceed, first began to receive proposals at Kishenagur. But the terms which were offered were in general so unsatisfactory both in form and amount, that the Committee deemed them inadmissible; and came speedily to the resolution of putting up the lands to public auction. It was necessary to ascertain with as much exactness as possible, the nature and amount of the different taxes which were to be offered to sale. For this purpose a new *hustabood*, or schedule of the taxes, was formed. The exactions consisted of two great parts; of which the first and principal was called *assal*, or the ground rents; the second *abwabs*, which consisted of a variety of additional, often arbitrary, and uncertain imposts, established at different times, by the government, the *Zemindars*, the farmers, and even the inferior collectors. Some of the most oppressive of these were abolished, and excluded from the present schedule. And new leases or titles were

¹ Consultation, 14th, May, at *supra*.

BOOK V. granted to the ryots ; which enumerated all the claims to
 CHAP. I. which they were to be subject ; and forbade, under penal-
 ties, every additional exaction. When the Zemindars, and
 1772. other middlemen of ancient standing, offered for the lands
 which they had been accustomed to govern, terms which
 were deemed reasonable, they were preferred ; when their
 offers were considered as inadequate, they were allowed a
 pension for their subsistence, and the lands were put up
 to sale.

While the settlement, in other words the taxation of
 the country, was carrying into execution upon this plan,
 the principal office of revenue, or *Khalsa*, underwent a
 total revolution. So long as the veil of the native go-
 vernment had been held up, this office had been stationed
 at Moorshedabad, and was ostensibly under the direction
 of the sort of minister of revenue, whom, with the title
 of *Naib Dewan*, the President and Council had set up. It
 was now resolved to transfer this great office from Moor-
 shedabad to Calcutta ; and to place it under the immediate
 superintendence of the government. The whole Council
 were constituted a Board of Revenue, to sit two days in
 the week, or if necessary, more. The Members of the
 Council were appointed to act as auditors of accounts,
 each for a week in rotation. The office of *Naib Dewa*
 which had been held by Mohammed Reza Khan at Moor-
 shedabad, and by Shitab Roy at Patna, was abolished ;
 but a native functionary, or assistant dewan, under the
 title of *Roy royan*, was appointed to act in the *Khalsa*, as
 superintendent of the district dewans, to receive the ac-
 counts in the Bengal language, to answer interrogatories,
 and to make reports.¹

The fundamental change in that great and leading
 branch of Indian administration which concerned the re-
 venue, rendered indispensable a new provision for the ad-
 ministration of justice. The Zemindar, who was formerly
 the great fiscal officer of a district, commonly exercised
 both civil and criminal jurisdiction within the territory
 over which he was appointed to preside. In his Phouj-
 dary, or criminal court, he inflicted all sorts of penalties ;

¹ Extract of Proceedings, Sixth Report, ut supra. See also Sixth Report of
 the Select Committee of 1782, Appendix, No. 1.; Colebrook's Supplement to
 Digest of Bengal Regulations, p. 174—190; and the Fifth Report from the
 Select Committee of the House of Commons, in 1810, p. 4, 5.

chiefly fines for his own benefit: even capital punishments, under no further restraint than that of reporting the case at Moorshedabad before execution. In his Adaulut, or civil court, he decided all questions relating to property; being entitled to a chout, or twenty-five per cent., upon the subject of litigation. His discretion was guided or restrained by no law, except the Koran, its commentaries, and the customs of the country, all in the highest degree loose and indeterminate. Though there was no formal and regular course of appeal from the Zemindary decisions, the government interfered in an arbitrary manner, as often as complaints were preferred, to which, from their own importance, or from the importance of those who advanced them, it conceived it proper to attend. To the mass of the people these courts afforded but little protection. The expense created by distance, excluded the greater number from so much as applying for justice; and every powerful oppressor treated a feeble tribunal with contempt. The judges were finally swayed by their hopes and their fears; by the inclinations of the men who could hurt or reward them. Their proceedings were not controlled by any written memorial or record. In cases relating to religion, the Cauzee and Brahmen were called to expound, the one the Moslem, the other the Brahmenical law; and their opinion was the standard of decision. Originally, questions of revenue as well as others belonged to the courts of the Zemindars; but a few years previous to the transfer of the revenues to the English, the decision of fiscal questions had been taken from the Zemindar, and given to an officer styled the Naib Dewan, or fiscal Deputy, in each province.

Beside the tribunals of the districts, the capital was provided with two criminal courts; in one of which, called Roy adaulut, the Nazim, as supreme magistrate, tried capital offences; in another, a magistrate called the houzdar tried offences of a less penal description, and reported his proceedings to the Nazim. At the capital was also found the principal dewancee or fiscal court; in which the Dewan tried causes relating to the revenue, including all questions of title to land. All other civil causes were tried at the capital in the court of the barogah-i-adaulut-al-alea; except those of inheritance and

BOOK V. succession, which were decided by the Cauzee and Muftee.
 CHAP. I. An officer, with the title of Mohtesib, superintended the
 weights and measures, and other matters of police.

1772.

Generally speaking, the courts of justice in India were instruments by which the powerful performed oppression, at their pleasure, on the weak.

Under the ancient government, the English, as well as other European settlers, instead of demanding payment from a reluctant debtor through the courts of law, seized his person and confined it, till satisfaction was obtained. Nor was this so inconsistent with the spirit of the government, as often to excite its displeasure. It was indeed a remedy to which they were not often obliged to recur; because the profit of dealing with them generally constituted a sufficient motive to punctuality. After the power of the English became predominant, the native courts ceased to exert any authority over Englishmen and their agents.¹

The first attempt which had been made by the English to remedy, in their new dominions, any of the defects in the administration of justice, was the appointment in 1769 of superintending commissioners to the several districts, with directions to inquire into the proceedings of the courts of justice, to restrain iniquitous proceedings, to abolish the chout, and, where a total change should appear desirable, to apply to government for the requisite powers. In 1770, the Naib Dewan, and such of the servants of the Company as had their station of service at Moorshedabad, were formed into a Council of Control over the administration of justice. Its administration was still to conform to the ancient and established plan; but the Council of Control should interpose as they perceived occasion; every judicial proceeding which concerned the government should come under their review; the trials should be transmitted to them in all criminal cases, and execution suspended till their opinion was known; all causes relative to the revenue and to property in land should, in the first instance, be tried in the native courts, but the Council should revise the proceedings of these courts, and have the power of final determination.

¹ For this sketch of the state of the administration of justice in Bengal, see the Seventh Report of the Committee of Secresy in 1773.

For supplying the place of the native courts, in a great measure superseded by the new system of revenue, and for providing a more perfect judicial establishment, the following scheme was invented and pursued. Two courts, a civil and a penal, were appointed for each district. The criminal court, styled Phoujdary Adaulut, consisted of the collector, as superintendent, with the Cauzee and Muftee of the district, and two Moulavies, as interpreters of the law. The civil court, styled Mofussul Dewanee Adaulut, consisted of the collector, as President, assisted by the provincial dewan and the other officers of the native court. From the jurisdiction of this tribunal, no cases were excepted, beside those of succession to Zemindaries and Talookdaries, reserved to the President and Council.

At the seat of government were also established two supreme courts of appeal. That to which the civil branch of this appellate jurisdiction was consigned, received the name of Sudder Dewanee Adaulut; and was composed of the President with two Members of the Council, attended by the dewan of the Khalsa, and certain officers of the Cutchery, or native court of the city. That on which the penal branch was conferred, obtained the title of Nizamut Suddur Adaulut. It consisted of a chief judge, entitled Darogah-i-Adaulut, assisted by the chief Cauzee, the chief Muftee, and three Moulavies. This judge was nominated by the President and Council, who in this case acted in the capacity of Nazim. All capital cases were reported to his tribunal; and, after review, were ultimately referred to the Governor-general and Council. After a short experience, however, the superintendence of this court appeared to impose a labour, and to involve a responsibility, which the Governor and Council found it inconvenient to sustain; it was one of the first transactions, therefore, of the new government which succeeded in 1774, to restore this part of the Nizamut to the nominal Nabob, and to carry back the tribunal to Moorshedabad.¹

¹ Fifth Report, Committee 1810, p. 6. It would appear, however, from Hastings' Minute, 21st November, 1775 (Fifth Report of Committee of Secresy in 1782, Appendix, No. civii.) that Hastings was averse to the intrusting of a native with the uncontrolled administration of criminal justice, and that it was the act of the hostile majority of the council, by whom Mohammed Reza Khan was in 1775 raised to the office of Naib Nazim. It is necessary at the same time to state, that the gentlemen of the majority (see their letter of the same date, *Ibid.*) declare that previous to this measure of theirs, "the ad-

BOOK V. For the district of Calcutta, two courts were established, on the plan of the other district courts; in each of which a Member of Council presided in rotation. In 1772. all these courts, it was ordained that records of proceedings should be made and preserved. The chout, or exaction of a fourth part of all litigated property, for the benefit of the judge, was abolished. A prohibition was issued against exorbitant fines. The discretionary power, exercised by a creditor over the person of his debtor, was no longer tolerated. And all disputes of property, not exceeding ten rupees, were referred to the head farmer of the pergunna or village precinct, to which the parties belonged.¹

In the introduction of these measures, a specimen is exhibited of the regard which was paid to the feelings or honour of the natives, how great soever their rank or deservings. Under the anxious search of the Directors for the cause of their intense disappointment in the receipt of treasure from the revenues of Bengal, they, after venting the first portion of their chagrin upon their European, seem to have turned, with still greater want of consideration, upon their native agents. In a letter from the Secret Committee to Mr. Hastings, their President, dated 28th of August, 1771, they say, "By our general address you will be informed of the reasons we have to be dissatisfied with the administration of Mahomet Reza Cawn, and will perceive the expediency of our divesting him of the rank and influence he holds as Naib Dewan of the kingdom of Bengal."² Mr. Hastings is then directed "to

ministration of criminal justice throughout the country was at a stand."—It was at a stand, while under the superintendence of the English rulers: What was it likely to be, under a creature, without one atom of power, having the name of a Nabob?

¹ Seventh Report, *ut supra*, General Regulations, dated 15th August, 1772; Colebrooke's Supplement, p. 1; Fifth Report from the Select Committee on Indian affairs, 1810, p. 6.

² By the manner in which the transaction is narrated, it would seem that Mohammed Reza Khan was put under arrest, because the Court of Directors were disappointed in their financial expectations. The letter of the court, however, specifies as the grounds of inquiry, charges of fraud and embezzlement, and principal instrumentality in the aggravation of the recent famine by a monopoly of rice and other necessities of life. The charges were unfounded, and might have been somewhat hastily entertained, but as they had made an impression on the minds of the Directors, it was only their duty to direct investigation to be instituted. Hastings throughout acted under their positive orders, and as well stated by some of his contemporaries, inhabitants of Calcutta, petitioning against the Supreme Court, was excusably anxious

issue his private orders for the securing the person of Mahomet Reza Cawn, together with his whole family, and his known partisans and adherents," and for bringing them prisoners to Calcutta. For this secrecy, precipitation, and severity, (arrest and imprisonment to a man of that rank in India is one of the most cruel of all punishments,) the reason assigned was, that otherwise he might "render all inquiry into his conduct ineffectual, and ill-consequences might result from his resentment and revenge." In the endeavour to discover delinquency, they say, "Your own judgment will direct you to all such means of information as may be likely to bring to light the most secret of his transactions. We cannot, however, forbear recommending to you, to avail yourself of the intelligence which Nundcomar may be able to give respecting the Naib's administration; and while the envy which Nundcomar is supposed to bear this minister may prompt him to a ready communication of all proceedings which have come to his knowledge, we are persuaded that no scrutable part of the Naib's conduct can have escaped the watchful eye of his jealous and penetrating rival."¹

The opinion which the Directors entertained of the man of whom they desired to make such an instrument, had, on a former occasion, been thus expressed: "From the whole of your proceedings with respect to Nundcomar, there seems to be no doubt of his endeavouring, by forgery and false accusations, to ruin Ram Churn; that he has been guilty of carrying on correspondence with the country powers, hurtful to the Company's interests; and instrumental in conveying letters between the Shazada and the French Governor-general of Pondicherry. In short, it appears he is of that wicked and turbulent disposition, that no harmony can subsist in society where he has the opportunity of interfering. We therefore most readily concur with you, that Nundcomar is a person improper to be trusted with his liberty in our settlements;

to obey the orders of the Directors by whom he had been recently appointed to the high station he occupied in Bengal. See Instructions of the Court, &c., quoted in a letter to E. Burke, Esq., Lond., 1782. Accusations similar to those urged against Mohammed Reza Khan were preferred against Shitab Roy. Nuncomar, according to his own account, was the principal instigator of the proceedings against both. Min. of Evidence, p. 1000.—W.

¹ See the Letter, Minutes of Evidence on the Trial of Warren Hastings, Esq., p. 993.

BOOK V. and capable of doing mischief, if he is permitted to go
 CHAP. I. out of the province, either to the northward, or to the
 1772. Deccan. We shall therefore depend upon your keeping
 such a watch over all his actions, as may be means of
 preventing his disturbing the quiet of the public, or in-
 juring individuals for the future.”¹

In a letter dated 1st September, 1772, Mr. Hastings gave the Directors a history of the operations already performed, and of the views from which they had sprung. “As your commands were peremptory, and addressed to myself alone, I carefully concealed them from every person except Mr. Middleton, whose assistance was necessary for their execution, until I was informed by him that Mahmud Rizza Cawn was actually in arrest, and on his way to Calcutta.” Beside these alleged commands of the Directors, “I will confess,” he says, “that there were other cogent reasons for this reserve;” and giving these reasons, he describes the importance of the office which was filled by Mohammed Reza Khan, and the susceptibility of corruption which marked the situation of his fellow-servants in India. “I was yet but a stranger to the character and disposition of the Members of your administration. I knew, that Mahmud Rizza Cawn had enjoyed the *sovereignty* of this province for seven years past, had possessed an annual stipend of nine lacks of rupees, the uncontrolled disposal of thirty-two lacks intrusted to him for the use of the Nabob, the absolute command of every branch of the Nizamut, and the chief authority in the Dewanee. To speak more plainly; he was, in everything but the name, the Nazim of the province, and in real authority more than the Nazim. I could not suppose him so inattentive to his own security, nor so ill-versed in the maxims of Eastern policy, as to have neglected the due means of establishing an interest with such of the Company’s agents, as, by actual authority, or by representation to the Honourable Company, might be able to promote or obstruct his views.”²

The office of Mohammed Reza Khan consisted of two parts; the one was the office of Naib Dewan, in which he represented the Company, as Dewan or Master of the Re-

¹ Company’s Letter to their President and Council, dated 22nd February, 1764; Minutes, *ut supra*, p. 996.

² Committee of Secresy, 1781, Fifth Report, Appendix, No. iv.

venues ; the other was the office of Naib Subah, as it was called by the President and Council, more properly the Naib Nazim, in which he represented the Nabob in his office of Nazim, that department of the Subahdaree, the name and ministerial functions of which were still reserved to the native Prince. The functions of the Naib Dewan were indeed supplied by the new scheme for levying the revenue. But for those of the Naib Subah, as they called him, no provision as yet was made. The duties and importance of that office, are thus described by Mr. Hastings and committee ; "The office of Naib Subah, according to its original constitution, comprehends the superintendence of the Nabob's education, the management of his household, the regulation of his expenses, the representation of his person, the chief administration of justice ; the issuing of all orders, and direction of all measures which respect the government and police of the provinces ; the conduct of all public negotiations, and execution of treaties ; in a word, *every branch of executive government*."¹

Nothing can afford a more vivid conception of what I may perhaps be allowed to call the *style* of government which then existed in Bengal, the temper with which the difference between some performance and no performance of the duties of government was regarded, than this ; that the officer on whom "*every branch of the executive government*" depended, was arrested some days before the 28th of April ; and that it was not till the 11th of July, that a proposition was brought forward to determine what should be done with the office he had filled.² A letter signed by the Company's principal servants at Moorshedabad, and received at Fort William on the 21st of May, declared ; "We must also observe to you the necessity there is for speedily appointing a Naib to the Nizamut, as the business of that department, particularly the courts of justice, is suspended for want of a person properly authorized to confirm the decrees of the several courts of justice, and to pass sentence on criminals, besides various other matters of business, wherein the interposition of the Subah [*Subahdar*] is immediately necessary."³ Why was not some

¹ Consultation, 11th July, 1772, Minutes of Evidence, ut supra, p. 972.

² Comp. Consultation, 28th April, 1772, Minutes, ut supra, p. 972 ; and Consultation, 11th July, 1772, Ibid, p. 978, 994.

³ See the Letter, Minutes, ut supra, p. 974.

BOOK V. arrangement taken ; or rather, is it necessary to *ask*, why
 CHAP. I. some arrangement was not taken to prevent the suspension of the judicial and every branch of the executive government, before the officer was arrested on whom all these great operations depended !¹

1772.

The Raja Shitab Roy held the same office at Patna, for the province of Bahar, as was held by Mohammed Reza Khan at Moorshedabad, for that of Bengal. Because Mohammed Reza Khan was arrested, and sent to Calcutta for his trial, and because, as holding the same office, it seemed proper that they should both share the same fate, Shitab Roy was in like fashion arrested, and sent to his trial.

Ahteram-al-dowlah was a surviving brother of Jaffier Ali Khan, the deceased Subahdar, the uncle of the young Nabob, the eldest existing male, and hence the natural guardian, of the family : on this ground he presented a petition to "the Gentlemen," praying that he might be appointed to the vacant office of Naibut Nizamut ; in other words, be chosen Naib under the Nazim.

The Directors, though resolved not to be any longer Dewan under a cloak ; were yet eager to preserve the supposed benefit of clandestinity, in the other department of the Subahdaree, the Nizamut.² The servants in India declared their full concurrence in the wisdom of that policy.³ But they conceived that for this purpose such an officer as

¹ It is here forgotten that a plan for the collection of the revenue, and the administration of civil justice, and of criminal justice, in the first instance, had been devised, which rendered the interposition of the Naib no longer necessary ; the Committee speak of the office as originally constituted, not as now, in a great degree superseded by the English regulations.—W.

² "Though we have not a doubt but that by the exertion of your abilities, and the care and assiduity of our servants, in the superintendency of the revenues, the collections will be conducted with more advantage to the Company, and ease to the natives, than by means of a Naib Dewan ; we are fully sensible of the expediency of supporting some ostensible minister in the Company's interest at the Nabob's court, to transact the political affairs of the Circar, and interpose between the Company and the subjects of any European power, in all cases wherein they may thwart our interest, or encroach on our authority." Letter from the Court of Directors to the President and Council at Fort William, 28th August, 1771 : Minutes, ut supra, p. 973.

³ "The Committee are fully sensible of the expediency remarked by the Honourable Court of Directors, of holding out the authority of the country government to the European powers, in all cases wherein their interests may interfere with those of the Company." Consultation, 11th July, 1772, Minutes, ut supra, p. 978. Mr. Hastings, in his letter, 24th March, 1774, seems to have questioned altogether the wisdom of clandestinity : "There can be but one government, and one power in this province. Even the pretensions of the Nabob may prove a source of great embarrassment, when he is of age to claim his release from the present state of pupillage which prevents his asserting them." Ibid. p. 999.

the Naib Subah (so they styled the Naib of the Nazim) was neither necessary nor desirable ; first, on account of the expense, next, the delegation of power, which could never be without a portion of danger. They resolved, therefore, that the office of Naib Subah should be abolished.¹ That is to say, they resolved, that the main instrument of government, that on which the administration of justice, the whole business of police, and every branch of the executive government depended, should be taken away ; and what did they substitute, for answering the same ends ? The Courts of Review established at Calcutta might be expected to supply the place of the Naib of the Nazim, in respect to the administration of justice : with respect to all the other branches of government, answerable for the happiness of between twenty and thirty millions of human beings, no substitution whatsoever was made : so profound, for I acquit them on the score of intention, was the ignorance which then distinguished the English rulers of India, of what they owed to the people, over whom they ruled, and the fruit of whose labour, under the pretence of rendering to them the services of government, they took from them, and disposed of as they pleased ! No doubt the duties of government, thus left without an organ, were in part, and irregularly, when they pressed upon them and could not be avoided, performed both by the President and Council, and by the servants distributed in the different parts of the country. But how imperfectly those services of government must have been rendered, for which no provision was made and which, as often as they were rendered, were rendered as works of supererogation by those who had other obligations to fulfil, it is unnecessary to observe.

Though so little was done for rendering to the people the services of government, there was another branch of the duties of the Naib Nazim, which met with a very different sort and style of attention. That was, in name, the superintendence of the education and household of the Nabob ; in reality, the disbursement of the money, allotted for his state and support. This was a matter of prime importance ; and was met with a proportional intensity of consideration and care. It would be unjust, however, to

¹ Ibid. p. 978.

BOOK V. impute to the individuals the defect in point of virtue
 CHAP. I. which this contrast seems to hold forth. The blame is due
 1772. to their *education*, the sort of education which their country
 bestows. They had been taught to consider the disbursement of a very large sum of money, as a matter of prodigious importance; they had never been taught to consider the rendering of the services of government to the people, provided the people would be quiet, as a matter of any importance at all. They must, therefore, have been superior to ordinary men; they must have belonged to that small number who rise above the mental level which their country and its institutions are calculated to form, had they displayed a higher measure, than they did, of wisdom and virtue.

This high-prized department of the functions of the Naib Nazim was even divided into two portions: the latter subject to the control of the former. One portion was made to consist, in "the guardianship of the Nabob, and the care and rule of his family;" the other "in regulating and paying the salaries of the Nabob's servants, and keeping the account of his expenses, to be monthly transmitted to the Board, according to the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors."¹

To execute the first of these portions (the pretensions of Ahteram-ul-Dowla, and if a woman was to be chosen, those of the mother of the Nabob the wife of Meer Jaffier being set aside) Munny Begum, a second wife, or rather concubine of Meer Jaffier, a person who had been originally a dancing girl, was preferred and appointed. The reasons are thus assigned by the majority of the Council, in their minute of the 11th of July, 1772: "We know no person so fit for the trust of guardian to the Nabob, as the widow of the late Nabob Jaffier Ally Cawn, Munnee Begum; her rank may give her a claim to this pre-eminence, without hazard to our own policy: nor will it be found incompatible with the rules prescribed to her sex by the laws and manners of her country, as her authority will be confined to the walls of the Nabob's palace, and the Dewan" (meaning the person who should hold the secondary office, the paymaster, and accountant) "will act, of course, in all cases in which she cannot personally appear. Great abilities are not to be

¹ Consultation, 11th July, 1772, Minutes, ut supra, p. 978.

expected in a Zennana, but in these she is very far from BOOK V.
being deficient, nor is any extraordinary reach of under- CHAP. I.
standing requisite for so limited an employ. She is said
to have acquired a great ascendant over the spirit of the 1772.
Nabob, being the only person of whom he stands in any
kind of awe; a circumstance highly necessary for fulfilling
the chief part of her duty, in directing his education
and conduct, which appear to have been hitherto much
neglected.”¹

With regard to the second of the above-described por-
tions, a minute, in the Consultation, 11th July, 1772, signed
Warren Hastings, says, “The President proposes Raja Goor-
dass, the son of Maha Rajah Nundcomar, for the office of
Dewan to the Nabob’s household. The inveterate and
rooted enmity which has long subsisted between Mahomet
Reza Cawn and Nundcomar, and the necessity of employ-
ing the vigilance and activity of so penetrating a rival
to counteract the designs of Mahomet Reza Cawn, and
to eradicate that influence which he still retains in the
government of this province, and more especially in the

¹ Minutes, ut supra, p. 979. It is curious enough that Hastings, in his
letter to the Nabob, calls her “The Rightful Head of his Family;” and tells
him, that “She stands in the place of his deceased Father.” Ib. 980. In a
private account to the Secret Committee of Directors, Mr. Hastings states
other reasons: the first was, that she was “the declared enemy of Mohammed
Reza Khan,” and that it was necessary, in order to obtain evidence of his
guilt, to fill every department with the enemies of that prisoner, who was
arrested without warning, and whose papers were secured.” He adds, “the
only man,” he says nothing of a woman, “who could pretend to such a trust
was the Nabob Yeteran O’Dowla, the brother of Meer Jaffer; a man indeed
of no dangerous abilities, nor apparent ambition, but the father of a numerous
family; who, by his being brought so nigh to the Musnud, would have ac-
quired a right of inheritance to the Subahship; and if only one of his sons,
who are all in the prime of life, should have raised his hopes to the succession,
it would have been in his power at any time to remove the single obstacle
which the Nabob’s life opposed to advancement of the family. The guardian,
at least, would have been the Nizam while the minority lasted; and all the
advantages which the Company may hope to derive from it, in the confirma-
tion of their power, would have been lost, or could only have been maintained,
by a contention hurtful to their rights, or by a violence yet more excep-
tionable. The case would be the same were any other man placed in that
station. The truth is, that the affairs of the Company stand at present on a
footing which can neither last as it is, nor be maintained on the rigid prin-
ciples of private justice. You must establish your own power, or you must
hold it dependent on a superior, which I deem to be impossible.

“The Begum, as a woman, is incapable of passing the bounds assigned
her. Her ambition cannot aspire to higher dignity. She has no children
to provide for, or mislead her fidelity. Her actual authority rests on the
Nabob’s life, and therefore cannot endanger it; it must cease with his
minority, when she must depend absolutely on the Company for support
against her ward and pupil, who will then become her master.” Fifth Re-
port, Committee of Secrecy, 1781, Appendix, No. iv.

BOOK V. family of the Nabob, are the sole motives for his recommendation." ¹

CHAP. I.

1772.

The revenue allowed to the use of the Nabob had hitherto been so great a sum as thirty-two lacks of rupees. Of this the Directors had already complained: and, agreeably to their directions, in January, 1772, on the allegation of the non-age of the Nabob, it was reduced to one half.

Mohammed Reza Khan and Shitab Roy were brought prisoners to Calcutta in the month of April. In his letter of the 1st of September, to the Court of Directors, Mr. Hastings says: "It may at first sight appear extraordinary, that Mahmud Rizza Cawn and Raja Shitab Roy have been so long detained in confinement without any proofs having been obtained of their guilt, or measures taken to bring them to a trial." Among the causes of this, he first specifies the great load of business with which the time of the counsel had been consumed. He then says, "Neither Mahmud Rizza Cawn nor Raja Shitab Roy complain of the delay as a hardship. Perhaps all parties, as is usual in most cases of a public concern, had their secret views, which, on this occasion, though opposite in their direction, fortunately concurred in the same points. These had conceived hopes of a relaxation of the Company's orders; Mahmud Rizza Cawn had even buoyed himself up with

¹ Minutes, ut supra, p. 994. The President goes on, "These reasons will justify the nomination of a man to supply the place of the late Nabh Soobah, who is known to be his most violent opponent, and most capable of opposing him. It is not pretended that these ends are to be obtained merely from the abilities of Raja Goundass; his youth and inexperience render him, although unexceptionable in other respects, inadequate to the real purposes of his appointment; but his father hath all the abilities, perseverance, and temper, requisite for such ends, in a degree, perhaps, exceeding any man in Bengal. These talents, heretofore, made him obnoxious to government itself, and therefore it might be thought unsafe to trust him with an authority so near the Nabob; . . . it is therefore proposed to confer it upon his son, who is of himself incapable of making a very bad use of it, and to allow of his acting under the influence and instruction of his father, who, holding no office under the Nabob, and being a subject of our government, may be removed without éclat, or the least appearance of violence, whenever he shall be proved, or even suspected, to abuse his trust." Messrs. Dawes, Lawrel, and Graham, dissented from the President and the majority, and objected to the appointment of Raja Goordass, "Because," say they, "we esteem it, in effect, the appointment of Nundcomar, who, with respect to the various accusations against his political conduct, and the orders which have been in consequence received, stands in such a predicament as to preclude, in our opinion, an acquiescence in the President's proposition." Ib. 996. In his answer, the President vindicates the political conduct of Nundcomar, which he affirms to be without blemish, though he says he will "not take upon him to vindicate his moral character." Ib. 996, 997.

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

1772.

the hopes of a restoration to his former authority, by the interest of his friends and a change in the Direction. I pretend not to enter into the views of others ; my own were these : Mahmud Rizza Cawn's influence still prevailed generally throughout the country ; in the Nabob's household, and at the capital, it was scarce affected by his present disgrace ; his favour was still courted, and his anger dreaded. Who, under such discouragements, would give information or evidence against him ? His agents and creatures filled every office of the Nizamut and Dewannee ; how was the truth of his conduct to be investigated by these ? It would be superfluous to add other arguments to show the necessity of pressing the inquiry by breaking his influence, removing his dependants, and putting the direction of all the affairs which had been committed to his care, into the hands of the most powerful or active of his enemies. With this view, too, the institution of the new Dewannee obviously coincided. These were my real motives for postponing the inquiry."¹

With respect to the further progress of that inquiry, for facilitating which such extraordinary proceedings had been described as necessary, proceedings sufficient to procure the destruction, when required, of the most innocent of men ; it was, nevertheless, after two years' confinement,² degradation, and anxiety, judicially declared, that in Mohammed Reza Khan, and Raja Shitab Roy, no guilt had been proved. There is no proof that their destruction was at any time an object with Mr. Hastings ; and their acquittal proves that certainly it was not so to the end. Of Mohammed Reza Khan, as connected with subsequent facts of great importance, we shall afterwards have to speak. But the mind of Shitab Roy, who was a man of a high spirit, was too deeply wounded for his health to escape ; and he died of a broken heart, a short time after his return to Patna. As some compensation for the ill-usage of Shitab Roy, Mr. Hastings, on his visit to Patna, when travelling to meet the Vizir at Benares, in 1773, appointed his son Roy-royan, or chief native agent of finance, in the province

¹ There was no confinement nor personal restraint beyond an enforced residence in Calcutta, and this was no doubt considered by the parties themselves as an advantage, as it afforded them opportunities of personally defending both their character and their interests.—W.

² Committee of Secrecy, 1781, Fifth Report, Appendix, No. iv.

BOOK V. of Bahar ; "from an entire conviction," as he declared, "of the merits and faithful services, and in consideration of the late sufferings of his deceased father."¹

1772. During the time in which this great revolution was effecting in the Government of Bengal, the situation of the neighbouring powers was preparing another field of action for the ambition and enterprise of the Company's servants. The loss which the Mahrattas had sustained in their late contest with the Abdallees, and the dissensions which prevailed among their chiefs, had for several years preserved the northern provinces from their alarming incursions. Nujub-ad-dowla, the Rohilla, in whom, as imperial deputy, the chief power, at Delhi, had been vested, upon the departure of the Abdallee Shah, had, by his wisdom and vigour, preserved order and tranquillity in that part of Hindustan. The Emperor, Shah Aulum, who resided at Allahabad, in the enjoyment of the districts of Allahabad and Corah, allotted as his dominion in the treaty lately concluded with him by the English and Vizir, where his state was in some measure supported by the payment or expectation of the share which was due to him, and which the English rulers had bound themselves to pay, of the revenues of Bengal ; had manifested great impatience, even before the conclusion of Mr. Verelst's government, to march to Delhi, and to mount the throne of his ancestors. Respect for the English, who laboured to repress this fond desire, and for the power of Nujub-ad-dowla, who might not willingly retire from his command, delayed the execution of the Emperor's designs. Nujub-ad-dowla died in the year 1770, about the very time when the ambition of Shah Aulum had stimulated him to the hazardous project of courting the Mahrattas to assist him in returning to Delhi.

¹ For the above scenes, besides the documents already quoted, see Scott's *Hist. of Bengal*, p. 453; and *Seer Mutakhareen*, ii. 418.—M.

The transactions regarding Shitab Roy are inaccurately detailed, and the cause of his death is a gratuitous supposition. In the first place, the term of his detention is exaggerated ; it was little more than one year. He was sent to Calcutta in May 1772, and acquitted in July 1773. As noticed in the text, he made no complaint of the delay, and at the close of the investigation he was appointed Roy Royan of Behar, with the addition of the office of Naib Nazim : he quitted Calcutta in August, in a bad state of health, and died at Patna, in September. His son, Ku'lian Sing, was at once nominated his successor in both his fiscal and judicial functions. Letter from Bengal, 10th November, 1773.—W.

With or without the concert of the Emperor, three powerful chiefs, Tookagee, Sindia, and Besajee, had taken a position to the northward of the river Chumbul, and hovered over the adjoining provinces with 300,000 horse.¹ The Emperor, in the beginning of the year 1771, had despatched his minister to Calcutta to obtain, if not the assistance, at least the approbation of the English, to his projected expedition; and was not restrained by their dissuasions. By the exertions of the Mogul nobles, and the assistance of the Vizir, who is said to have acted with more than his usual liberality,² he was enabled, in the month of May, 1771, to march from Allahabad at the head of an army of 16,000 men. At the town of Nubbee Gunge, about thirty miles beyond the city of Furuckabad, on the high road to Delhi, where he was constrained, by the commencement of the rains, to canton his army, a Mahratta vakeel, or ambassador, waited his arrival, and presented the demands of his masters. Whatever balance of chout was due from the time of Mohammed Shah, must be discharged; whatever plunder should be taken, must be divided equally between the Mogul and Mahratta troops; the Mahratta leaders must be confirmed in their jaghires; and five lacks of rupees,³ toward the expense of the war, must be immediately advanced to the Mahrattas from the imperial treasury. With whatever indignation these imperious terms might be heard, no reluctance was to be shown. When the season for marching returned, the Mahratta chiefs and the nobles of Delhi joined the retinue of the Emperor; and on the 25th of December he made his entrance into the capital, with all the display which his circumstances placed within the compass of his power.

The Mahrattas afforded the Emperor but a few days to

¹ The Emperor had nothing to do with their position. Tukajee Holkar, Madhaje Sindhia, and Kishn Visajee, were officers of the Peishwa, by whom, in 1799, an army had been sent into Hindustan, to recover the influence lost at Paniput, and to exact revenge upon the Rohillas, for the aid they had given to the Abdali. It was for the easier accomplishment of these objects, that they undertook to replace Shah Alam on the throne of Delhi. Duff's Mahrattas, ii. 222.

² Franklin's Shah Anlum, p. 36. In the *Scer Mutakhareen*, the Vizir is said to have exerted himself to deter the Emperor. The truth is, he acted insidiously; in appearance dissuading the Emperor from the projected expedition, to keep faith with the English; secretly encouraging him to it, from the hopes of profiting, as he did, by this improvident adventure.

³ Scott (Aurangzeb's Successors, p. 249) mentions ten lacks of rupees, without any other conditions or exactions.

BOOK V. enjoy the dignity and pleasures of his capital; when they
 CHAP. I. hurried him into the field. The country of the Rohillas
 1772. was the object of cupidity to both; to the Emperor, as an
 increase of his limited territory; to the Mahrattas, as a
 field of plunder, if not a permanent possession. Seharun-
 pore, the jaghire of the late minister Nujub-ad-dowla, the
 Rohilla chief, who had served the royal family with so
 much fidelity and talent, and, in the absence of the Em-
 peror, had governed the city and province of Delhi for a
 number of years, lay most accessible. It was not, as the
 other possessions of the Rohillas, on the further side of
 the Gauges, but commenced under the Sewalic hills, at a
 distance of seventy miles from Delhi, and was terminated
 by the strong fortress of Ghose Ghur on the north, and by
 Sakertal on the east. The resumption of the government
 of Delhi, which had been possessed by Nujub-ad-dowla,
 transmitted to his son Zabita Khan, and the idea of the
 resentment which that chief must have conceived upon
 this retrenchment of his power, rendered him an object of
 apprehension to the Emperor, and recommended to his
 approbation the project of commencing operations with the
 reductions of Seharunpore. The Mogul forces, which the
 Emperor accompanied in person, were commanded by
 Mirza Nujuf Khan, a native of Persia, who accompanied to
 Delhi Mirza Mohsan, the brother of Suffder Jung, the
 Nabob of Oude, when he returned from the embassy on
 which he had been sent to Nadir Shah, after his invasion
 of Hindustan. Mirza Nujuf was of a family said to be
 related to the Sophi sovereigns of Persia, and was held in
 confinement by the jealousy of Nadir. He and his sister
 were released at the intercession of the Hindustan ambas-
 sador; when the sister became the wife of her deliverer;
 and the brother accompanied them on their departure to
 Hindustan. After the death of his benefactor, Mirza Nujuf
 adhered to the fortunes of his son, Mohammed Coollee
 Khan, Governor of Allahabad; and when that unfortunate
 Prince was treacherously put to death by his cousin Suja-
 ad-dowla, the son and successor of Suffder Jung, Nujuf
 Khan retired with a few followers into Bengal, and offered
 his services to Meer Casim. When that Nabob fled for
 protection to the Nabob of Oude, whom Nujuf Khan, as
 the friend of Mohammed Coollee Khan, was afraid to trust

he departed into Bundelcund, and was received into employment by one of the chiefs of that country. Upon the flight of Suja-ad-dowla, after the battle of Buxar, Mirza Nujuf offered his services to the English; advanced claims to the government of Allahabad; was favourably received; and put in possession of a part of the country. But when the transfer of that district to the Emperor came to be regarded as a politic arrangement, the pretensions of Nujuf Khan were set aside; and, in the way of compensation, he was allowed a pension of two lacks of rupees from the English revenues, and recommended warmly to the Emperor. His talents and address raised him to a high station in the service of that enfeebled Sovereign, whom he accompanied, as commander of the forces, on his ill-fated expedition to Delhi.

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

1772.

The united power of the Emperor and Mahrattas, Zabita Khan, though he made a spirited defence, was unable to withstand. He was overcome in battle; and fled across the Ganges, in hopes to defend what territories he possessed on the opposite side. He stationed parties of troops at the different fords, but this weakened his main body; Nujuf Khan gallantly braved the stream, and was followed by the Mahrattas, when Zabita Khan, despairing of success, fled to Pattirgur, where he had deposited his women and treasures. The closeness with which he was pursued allowed not time sufficient to remove them, and they fell into the hands of the enemy; while Zabita Khan himself, with a few attendants, escaped to the camp of Suja-ad-dowla. His country, one of the most fertile districts in India, which had flourished under the vigorous and equitable administration of Nujub-ad-dowla, afforded a rich booty; which the Mahrattas wholly seized, and set at nought the outcries of the Emperor.

The Rohillas were now placed in the most alarming situation. We have already seen¹ that among those soldiers of fortune from the hardy regions of the North, who constantly composed the principal part of the Mogul armies, and, according to their talents and influence, procured themselves lands and governments in India, the Afghans had latterly occupied a conspicuous place; that a portion of this people, who took the name of Rohillas, had given

¹ Book iii. chap. iv.

BOOK V. several chiefs, with large bands of followers, to the imperial
CHAP. I. armies; that these chiefs had in some instances been re-
 1772. warded with jaghires in that fertile district of country
 which lies principally between the Ganges and the moun-
 tains, on the western boundary of the Subah of Oude; that
 amid the disturbances which attended the dissolution of
 the Mogul Government, those leaders had endeavoured to
 secure themselves in their possessions, which they had
 filled with great numbers of their countrymen. It is com-
 pletely proved, that their territory was by far the best
 governed part of India; that the people were protected;
 that their industry was encouraged; and that the country
 flourished beyond all parallel. It was by these cares, and
 by cultivating diligently the arts of neutrality; that is, by
 pretending, according to the necessity of Indian customs,
 to favour all parties, not by conquering a larger territory
 from their neighbours, that the Rohilla chiefs had endea-
 voured to provide for their independence. After the death
 of Nujub-ad-dowla, no one among them was remarkably
 distinguished for talents.¹ Hafez Ruhmet Khan, whose
 territories lay nearest to those of Suja-ad-dowla, was looked
 upon as the chief of the tribe; but his character had in it
 more of caution than of enterprise, and his prudence had

¹ This chief had impressed, both on Indians and Europeans, the highest opinion of his character. Mr. Verelst, giving an account of the surrounding powers, at the conclusion of his government, thus describes him. "As a man and a prince, he is perhaps the only example in Hindostan of, at once, a great and good character. He raised himself from the command of fifty horse, to his present grandeur, entirely by his superior valour, integrity, and strength of genius; and has maintained himself in it with universal applause, by a spirited and well-grounded system of policy. Experience and abilities have supplied the want of letters and education; and the native nobleness and goodness of his heart have amply made amends for the defect of his birth and family. He is a strict lover of justice, a most faithful subject to his Emperor; and has long been the sole defence and support of the royal family at Delhi. His wisdom and conduct were no where more manifest than in his transactions last year with the Shah Abdalla. He found himself obliged to join him, or expose his country to an immediate invasion, and therefore complied with the necessity; but at the same time, so protracted their councils, and threw so many secret obstacles in the way of their designs, that, after several months, the Shah finding his troops mutinous for want of pay or plunder, himself harassed by the Seiks, the heat of the season, and the rains approaching, was obliged to return home with disgrace, and rest contented with a sum of money infinitely inferior to what his expedition had promised. Another man in such a situation would probably have lost his life or liberty; but Nujub-ad-dowla, by his prudence, at once saved his dominions, and extricated himself. He is now about sixty years old, and his constitution much worn down by fatigue and sickness; so that it is probable he will soon be succeeded by his eldest son, Zabita Khan, aged nearly thirty-five, who, to all his father's virtues, joins the improvements of a liberal education." Verelst to the Court of Directors, March 28, 1768.

stamped upon him the reputation of avarice. The united force of all these leaders was estimated at 80,000 horse and foot. But though a sense of common danger might with difficulty combine them in operations of defence, they were too independent, and their minds too little capable of a steady pursuit of their own interests, to offer, through an aggressive confederacy, any prospect of danger to the surrounding powers.¹

BOOK V.

HAP. I.

1772.

The Rohillas, on their part, however, stood exposed to alarming designs, on almost every quarter. Their nearest, and for a long time their most dangerous enemy, was the Subahdar of Oude, to whom, from its first acquisition, their territory had been a constant object of envy and desire. A predecessor of Suja-ad-dowla, nearly thirty years before, had invited the Mahrattas to assist him in wresting it from their hands; and had given the first temptation to that dangerous people to claim a settlement in that part of Hindustan. From the character of the present Subahdah of Oude, the danger of the Rohillas on that side was increased rather than diminished; and at the same time the superior power of the Mahrattas pressed upon them with alarming violence from the south. With their own strength, they were a match for neither party; and clearly saw, that their safety could only be found in obtaining protection against both. They temporized: and endeavoured to evade the hostile designs of each, by shielding themselves with the terror which one set of their enemies kept alive in the breasts of the other.

The Rohillas were vehemently roused by intelligence of the attack upon Zabita Khan, which they regarded as the first step of a general plan of aggression. They proposed an union of councils and of arms with the Subahdar of Oude, to whom the establishment of the Mahrattas upon his frontier was, they knew, an object equally of danger and alarm. He was thrown into great consternation and

¹ Of this, Mr. Verelst had left his decided conviction upon record. "There is something in the constitution of the Rohillas which must ever make them weak and inconsiderable as aggressors. Their government is divided into chiefships: but no one chief has singly troops or resources to enterprise a foreign war. When attacked, their national affection will unite, the common cause will animate them. A private contest will not rouse them; nor is it practicable to engage their voice on any other motive than the general safety." Verelst, Appendix, No. 28.

BOOK V. embarrassment. Early in January, 1772, he pressed for
CHAP. I. an interview with the English General, Sir Robert Barker,
 1772. who was then on his route to Allahabad, and met him on the 20th of the same month at Fyzabad. He remarked that "either, to prevent a total extirpation, the Rohillas would be necessitated to give up a part of their country, and to join their arms with the Mahrattas, when the whole confederacy would fall upon him; or that the Mahrattas, refusing all terms to the Rohillas, would establish themselves in the Rohilla country, and expose him to still greater danger." To extricate himself from these difficulties, the following is the plan which he had devised. He would march with his army to his own Rohilla frontier: he would there, partly by the terror of his arms, partly by desire of his aid, obtain from the Rohillas, first, the cession of a portion of their territory for the Emperor's support, leaving to them such a part as was best adapted to serve as a barrier to the province of Oude; and, secondly, a sum of money, with part of which he would purchase the departure of the Mahrattas, and part of which he would keep to his own use. He would thus effect an accommodation with both the Emperor and the Mahrattas, at the expense of the Rohillas; and put something in his own pocket besides. But for the accomplishment of these desirable ends, the presence of the English was absolutely necessary, without the guarantee of whom, he plainly declared that the Rohillas, who knew him, would yield him no trust. To the letter of the General, making known this proposal, the Presidency on the 3rd of February wrote in reply, approving highly of the project of Suja-ad-dowla, and authorizing the General to lend the support which was desired.

The proposals of the Subahdar, in regard especially to the division of their territory, were odious to the Rohillas; and time was spent in negotiation, while 30,000 Mahrattas ravaged the country beyond the Ganges, and their main body subdued the territory of Zabita Khan. The English General, Sir Robert Barker, strongly urged upon Suja-ad-dowla the necessity of protecting the Rohillas, the weakness of whom became the strength of the Mahrattas, and enabled them, if their departure were purchased, to return to the seizure of the country whenever they pleased. In

the mean time the Subahdar was eager to conclude a treaty with the Mahrattas; the prospect of which alarmed the English General, and called forth his exertions to prevent so dangerous a confederacy. The Mahrattas, however, treated the overtures of the Subahdar with so little respect, that they varied their terms at every conference; and forced him at last to break off the negotiation. In their instructions to the General, on the 30th of April, the Select Committee declare: "We are confirmed in the opinion we have for some time past entertained, that the Mahrattas will not make any stay in the Rohilla country; but that they will be obliged to quit it even before the rains set in; and every day's intelligence renders the probability of this event the more apparent." Their opinion was grounded upon the knowledge which they possessed of the revolution which had taken place in the Mahratta government, and which could not, as they supposed, and as the event turned out, fail to recall their armies. The Committee add, "We therefore so far concur in opinion with you, that any concessions made to the Mahrattas to promote their departure would be superfluous and highly improper."

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

1772.

The defeat of the negotiation with the Mahrattas, and the knowledge with which the Subahdar was already furnished, of the events which summoned home the Mahrattas, brought about that alliance between him and the Rohillas, which Sir Robert had laboured so eagerly to effect. The Subahdar was very keen for an arrangement, from which he expected to derive money, now when he hoped by the voluntary departure of the Mahrattas to have nothing to do in return for it. The Rohillas, on the other hand, it is observable, entered into the engagement with the utmost reluctance; in compliance solely, as it would appear, with the importunities of the English. Sir Robert Barker had sent Captain Harper to the camp of the Rohillas to negotiate; and on the 25th of May, from the Nabob's camp at Shawabad, he writes to the Presidency, in the following remarkable terms: "Gentlemen, on the 21st instant, Captain Harper, returned from the Rohilla Sirdars [commanders] having *at length prevailed* on Hafez Ruhmet Khan to proceed with him to Shawabad the second day's march. The jealousy of Hindustanees

BOOK V. has been very particularly evinced in this visit; for notwithstanding Hafez Ruhmet has been encamped within three coss since the 23rd of the month, until this morning, he could not prevail on himself to perform the meeting.—I hope, in a few days, to have the satisfaction of communicating to you the final conclusion of this agreement with the Rohilla Sirdars.”¹

CHAP. I.
1772.

It was not, however, before the 17th day of the following month, that all difficulties were borne down or removed, and a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was signed by the respective parties. Of the articles, that which was attended with the most memorable consequences—that to which the Rohillas, it is probable, assented only from that rashness and negligence in forming pecuniary obligations which is universal in Indian governments, and which their universal practice of fulfilling none which they can violate or evade unavoidably engenders, was the promise to pay to the Vizir forty lacks of rupees, on condition that he should expel the Mahrattas from the Rohilla territories; ten of these lacks to be furnished on the performance of the service, the rest in the space of three years.²

¹ The particulars of the Rohilla war depend chiefly upon statements intended to prejudice Warren Hastings, or those of persons engaged in the transactions, but who, if impartial, were ill qualified by conversancy with the native languages and Indian politics to understand what was going on. At any rate they are, as recited in the text, very irreconcilable both in letter and spirit, with accounts derived from a source, the authenticity of which is unquestionable, and the tone of which cannot possibly be intended to be favourable to Shuja-ad-dowla. A life of Hafez Rahmet Khan, written by his son Mustajab Khan, and translated by Mr. Elliot, has been published by the Oriental Translation Committee, and the circumstances there narrated are in constant contradiction to those recorded in the text. Thus, instead of any reluctance on the part of the Rohillas to apply to the Vizir for aid, the reluctance is there assigned to Shuja-ad-dowla. The purport of Sir R. Barker's letter has been misunderstood. The difficulty there alluded to, was not that of inducing the Rohilla sirdars to ask for aid, but of persuading Hafez to trust his person into the hands of the Nawab: they had long been political enemies, and Hafez Rahmet Khan not unnaturally suspected, that if the Vizir could get hold of him, his detention would be followed by a renewed attempt upon the country: this is the reluctance spoken of: it was wholly personal, and was at variance with the wishes of the other chiefs. Life of Hafez, 96.—W.

² For the preceding facts, see the Papers in the Appendix, No. 21, of the Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy in 1781.—M.

According to the authority last cited, the agreement was of a very different nature. The Mahrattas consented to retire on the promised payment of forty lacks of rupees by the Rohillas, but they demanded that Shuja-ad-dowla should be surety for the payment. “The Nawab declined entering into such an engagement, unless Hafez gave him a bond for the money, adding, that he would not have acted as mediator, but from regard to Hafez. The whole of the Afghan Sirdars entreated Hafez to consent, promising to con-

No effort whatsoever, in consequence of this agreement, was made by the Subahdar for the expulsion of the Mahrattas; in a little time he returned to his capital, and the Mahrattas, after ravaging the country, crossed the Ganges of their own accord, at the commencement of the rains. They encamped, however, between the Ganges and the Jumna, with too evident an intention of renewing their operations as soon as the favourable season should return. During the period of inaction, the Rohillas importuned the Vizir to make such arrangements with the Emperor and Mahrattas, as might prevent them crossing the Ganges any more. But no such arrangements were attempted. As soon as the termination of the rains approached, the Mahrattas drew near to the river, and, again threatening the Rohillas, demanded a sum of money, of which, after temporizing, a portion was, by Hafez Ruhmet, most reluctantly paid.

Upon the accomplishment of the enterprise against Zabita Khan, the Emperor returned to Delhi, disgusted with his new allies, and eagerly desirous of an opportunity to dissolve the connexion. The Mahrattas on their part, who disdained the restraint of obligation, whenever it might be violated with profit, had entered into correspondence with Zabita Khan, and had engaged for a sum of money to compel the Emperor not only to restore his territory, but to bestow upon him the office of Ameer-al-Omra, which his father had enjoyed. To these commands the Emperor could not prevail upon himself quietly to yield; and the Mahrattas thought proper to march towards Delhi, to enforce submission. The Emperor prepared himself for resistance; and, by the vigour and foresight of Nujuf Khan, was enabled to make a respectable defence. Incapable, however, of long supporting the weight of the Mahratta host, he opened the gates of Delhi on the 22nd of December, exactly one year, wanting three days, from the period of his inaugural entry. From this time, he

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

1772.

tribute their quotas towards its discharge; on which the deed was executed, and Shooja-ad-dowla having made himself responsible to the Mahrattas, they quitted Kuthur." p. 99. The sequel was characteristic of all parties: the Sirdars never paid their quotas: Hafiz paid the Nawab five lacks, and then demanded that his bond should be cancelled. Shuja-ad-dowla never paid the Mahrattas, and no doubt they never expected that he would. The Nawab, however, did good service to the Rohillas for the time.—W.

BOOK V. was no better than an instrument in the hands of the
 CHAP. I. Mahrattas. Of their power the first use was to extort
 1772. from their prisoner a grant of the provinces of Corah and
 Allahabad, in which he had been established by the Eng-
 lish. Having accomplished these events, they returned to
 the banks of the Ganges, which they made preparations to
 cross.

The Subahdar was now thrown into a state of the most violent alarm, and wrote repeated letters to the Bengal government to send a military force to his protection. He had neglected, or had been unable, to take any measures for placing the country of the Rohillas in a state of security. That people were now laid at the mercy of the Mahrattas, and would, he foresaw, be compelled to join them, to avoid destruction. Zabita Khan had already thrown himself upon their mercy; and he violently feared that the other chiefs would speedily follow his example. The Mahrattas, indeed, made great offers to the Rohillas. They would remit the greater part of the sums of which they had extorted the promise. They engaged to pass through the country without committing any depredations or molesting the ryots, and to grant all sorts of advantages; provided the Rohillas would yield a free passage through their dominions into the territory of the Vizir.¹ The Subahdar of Oude exerted himself to prevent that union of the Mahrattas and Rohillas; the effects of which he contemplated with so much alarm. He moved with his army into that part of his country which was nearest to that of the Rohillas; and held out to them whatever inducements he conceived most likely to confirm their opposition to the Mahrattas. He engaged to make effectual provision both for their present and future security; and to remit, as Hafez Ruhmet affirms, the forty lacks of rupees. Difficult as was the choice, the Rohillas thought it still less dangerous to rely upon the faith of the Subahdar, than upon that of the Mahrattas; and gaining what they could, by temporizing with that formidable people, they, however, declined all engagements with

¹ This is distinctly asserted in a letter of Hafez Ruhmet himself, addressed to the Gov. General; and it is too conformable to the state of the circumstances to be liable to any reasonable doubt. Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 19.

them, and actually joined their troops to those of the English and Subahdar.¹

BOOK V.
CHAP. I.

On the 7th of January, 1773, the Secret Committee at Calcutta entered into consultation on intelligence of these events; and thus recorded their sentiments: "Notwithstanding the alarms of the Vizir, expressed in the foregoing letters, it does not clearly appear that the Mahrattas have acquired any accession of power, since, whatever advantage they derived from the sanction of the King's name, when he was independent, must now be either lost, or very much diminished, by their late rupture with him, by their having violently possessed themselves of his person, and their usurpation of his dominions." On the subject of the Rohillas, whom the Vizir, to increase the ardour of the English to send an army to his support, represented as actually connected with the Mahrattas, though he only dreaded that event, they remark, that instead of joining with the Mahrattas in an invasion of the territories of the Vizir, "It is still more probable that the Rohilla chiefs, who have sought their present safety in a treacherous alliance, *to which necessity compelled them*, with the Mahrattas, will, from the same principle, abandon their cause, or employ the confidence reposed in them to re-establish their own independence, rather than contribute to the aggrandizement of a power, *which in the end must overwhelm them*." With regard to the unhappy Shah Aulum, the humiliated Emperor of the Moguls, they remark: "It is possible he may solicit our aid; and, in point of right, we should certainly be justified in affording it him, since no act of his could be deemed valid in his present situation, and while he continues a mere passive instrument in the hands of the Mahrattas: but whether it would be politic to interfere, or whether, at this time especially, it would be expedient, must continue a doubt with us."² It is remarkable, that with regard to the most important of his acts—the surrender of Corah and Allahabad—so little did any one regard it as binding, that his deputy in these provinces, instead of delivering them up to the Mahrattas, applied to the English for leave to place them under their protection, "as the King, his master,

1773.

¹ See Sir Robert Barker's Letter, 23rd March, 1773, *Ibid.* App. No. 18.

² Fifth Report, *ut supra*, App. No. 18.

BOOK V. whilst a prisoner in the hands of the Mahrattas, had been
 CHAP. I. compelled to grant sunnuds in their favour."¹ The Eng-
 1773. lish, in consequence, threw a garrison into Allahabad,
 and sent a member of council to take charge of the re-
 venues.²

The obligation under which the English were placed to aid the Vizir in the defence of his own territory, and their opinion of the advantage of supporting him against the Mahrattas, induced them to send Sir Robert Barker, with a part of the army. The importance of preventing the Mahrattas from establishing themselves on the northern side of the Ganges, and the facility which they would possess of invading Oude if masters of Rohilcund, disposed the English to include that district also within the line of their defensive operations. But, though the combined forces of the English and Vizir passed into the territories of the Rohillas, and encamped near the river, opposite to the main army of the Mahrattas, which threatened at once the territories of Oude and the province of Corah, a large body of Mahrattas crossed the Ganges, overran a great part of Rohilcund, destroyed the cities of Moradabad and Sumbul, and continued to ravage the country till the end of March.

No operation of any importance ensued.* The English General was restrained by peremptory orders from passing the river, to act on the offensive; the Mahrattas were afraid of crossing it in the face of so formidable an opponent. And in the month of May, the situation of their domestic affairs recalled that people wholly to their own country.

The departure of the Mahrattas opened a field to the ambition of the Subahdar, which he was eager to cultivate. A meeting was concerted between him and the Governor, which took place at Benares at the beginning of September. The terms are memorable in which the cause and object of this interview are mentioned by the English chief. In his Report to the Council at Calcutta, on the 4th of October, 1773, he says, "The Vizir was at first very desirous of the assistance of an English force to put him in possession of the Rohilla country, lying north of his dominions and east of the Ganges. This has long been a

¹ Fifth Report, *ut supra*, App. No. 18.

² *Ibid.* App. No. 12.

favourite object of his wishes ; and you will recollect that the first occasion of my last visit was furnished by a proposal of this kind."¹ The Governor-General was so far from revolting at this proposition, or hesitating to close with it, that he stimulated the Vizir to its execution.² *Money* was the motive to this eager passion for the ruin of the Rohillas. "As this had long," says the English ruler, "been a favourite object of the Vizir, the Board judged with me that it might afford a fair occasion to urge the improvement of our alliance, by obtaining his assent to a more equitable compensation for the expenses attending the aid which he occasionally received from our forces."³ The situation of the Company, he says, urged it upon them, "as a measure necessary to its interest and safety. All our advices," he continues, "both public and private, represented the distresses of the Company at home, as extreme. The letters from the Court of Directors called upon us most loudly for ample remittances, and a reduction of our military expenses. At the same time, such was the state of affairs in this government, that for many years past the income of the year was found inadequate to its expense ; to defray which, a heavy bond debt, amounting at one time to 125 lacks of rupees had accumulated."⁴ It was accordingly stipulated that forty lacks of rupees, upon the accomplishment of the enterprise, should be advanced to the English by the Vizir, and a monthly allowance, equivalent to the computed expense, be provided for the troops engaged in that service. By this, says the Governor, "a saving of near one-third of our military expenses would be effected during the period of such a service ; the stipulation of forty lacks would afford an ample supply to our treasury : the Vizir would be freed from a troublesome neighbourhood, and his dominions be much more defensible."

In all this, we may allow, there was enough for convenience and profit, both to the President and the Vizir.

¹ Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 19. See also his Minute, addressed to the New Government, Ibid. No. 45 ; and his Answer to the first of the Charges of Burke.

² "I found him," (says he, in his Appeal to the Directors, dated 3rd Dec., 1774, Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 45,) "still equally bent on the design of reducing the Rohillas, which I encouraged, as I had done before, by dwelling on the advantages which he would derive from its success."

³ Appeal, ut supra.

⁴ Appeal, ut supra.

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

1773.

But to bring ruin upon a large body of our fellow-creatures for our own convenience and profit, unless where the most cogent reasons of justice and necessity impel, is to perform the part of the most atrocious oppressors. In this case, the pleas of justice and necessity are, to an extraordinary degree, defective and weak. The unhappy Rohillas, it seems, procrastinated, and evaded, with respect to the demand which was now violently made upon them for payment of the formerly stipulated price of defence; a payment which had not been earned, since they had never been defended; which they were not able to pay, since their country had been repeatedly ravaged and stripped; of which the exaction was in reality a fraud, since the return for it was never intended to be made; which it was no wonder they were reluctant to pay to the man who was impatient to assail them, and whom the use of their money would only strengthen for their destruction. At the worst, a failure in a pecuniary obligation can never justify a war of extermination; it even authorized hostilities, as the Directors, when they condemned this employment of their forces, remarked, so far only, as might be necessary to compel the fulfilment of the contract. It was also alleged, that the Rohillas assisted the Mahrattas. But this is by no means true. They temporized with the Mahrattas, as it was highly natural they should do; but the whole power of the nation was exerted; to keep and to drive the Mahrattas from their own side of the Ganges.¹ With regard to necessity for the extirpation of the Rohillas, there was not so much as prudence to justify the deed; Hastings himself confessing, "that the dependence of the Vizir upon the Company (in other words his weakness) would, by that extension of his possessions, be *increased*, as he himself was incapable of defending even his ancient possessions without the English support."²

¹ See the official letters of Sir Robert Barker, who commanded the British forces upon the spot, Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 18. He condemned the assistance given to the destruction of the Rohillas, but less on the score of justice, than expediency. See his Minute, ut supra, App. No. 23. The Rohillas, among other reasons, alleged with truth, that merely driving the Mahrattas across the river was no deliverance, as they would return the very next campaign. See Barker's Evidence, in Minutes of Evidence before the House of Commons, May 2nd, 1786. Sir Robert was asked; "Were the Mahrattas in fact prevented from invading the Rohillas, by any acts of Sujad-dowla, or by his protection of that country?—No."

² Appeal, ut supra. This is a contradiction to his former assertion, that the acquisition of the Rohilla country made his territories more defensible.

Another object of great importance was to be settled between the Governor and Vizir. The provinces of Corah and Allahabad, of which a forced surrender had been obtained by the Mahrattas, but which the deputy of the Emperor, declaring the act involuntary, had, to save them for his master, placed under the protection of the English, were to be disposed of. At first, if no resolution was taken to restore them to the Emperor, it appears, at least, that none was adopted to take them from him. As soon as the idea was begotten of making money out of the present situation of affairs, the provinces of Corah and Allahabad naturally fell into the crucible. It had long been a decided principle in the Company's policy, not to retain those provinces under their own administration; because the expense of governing them, at so great a distance, would exceed the utmost revenue they could yield. The choice lay between preserving them for the Emperor and making them over to the Vizir. Generosity, had it any place in such arrangements, pleaded with almost unexampled strength in behalf of the forlorn Emperor, the nominal sovereign of so vast an empire, the representative of so illustrious a race, who now possessed hardly a roof to cover him. Justice, too, or something not easily distinguished from justice, spoke on the same side: considering that, in the first place, the Emperor had a right to the provinces, both by his quality of sovereign of India, and also by the peculiar concession and grant of the English Company, if not in express terms for, most certainly in consideration of, his not absolutely necessary but highly useful grant of the dewanee of the three great and opulent provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa; and that, in the second place, he could not, by any fair construction, be deemed to have forfeited any right by the surrender of the provinces, an act which was in the highest degree involuntary, and therefore not his own. But these considerations were a feeble balance against the calls of want, and the heavy attractions of gold. To secure Allahabad and Corah against the posses-

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

1773.

True. But having a bad cause to defend, his apology is full of contradictions. There can be no doubt that the Rohillas, whose troops were among the best and bravest of Hindustan, were a barrier against the Mahrattas. But the desire of territory and plunder blinded the Vizir; that of money, the Governor.

BOOK V. sion of so dangerous a power as the Mahrattas was the
 CHAP. I. acknowledged policy of the British government ; and it
 1778. was alleged, that the Emperor was unable to protect
 them. But it is certainly true, that the Emperor was not
 less able at that time than he was at the time when they
 were first bestowed upon him ; or than he was at any
 point of the time during which they had been left in his
 hands. It is equally true, that the inability of the Vizir
 to secure them was just as certain as that of the Emperor ;
 since there is the confession of the Governor, that he was
 unable to protect even his own dominions, without the
 assistance of the English ; and that every extension of
 his frontier rendered him more vulnerable and weak.
 There was, however, one difference ; the Vizir could give
 money for them, the Emperor could not ; and in this, it
 is probable, the whole advantage will be found to consist.
 That the English strengthened their barrier by giving to
 a crude native government a vast frontier to defend, in-
 stead of combining against the Mahrattas the forces of
 the Rohillas, the Emperor, and the Vizir, will hardly be
 affirmed by those who reflect how easily the balance
 among those powers might have been trimmed, or who
 know the consequences of the arrangement that was
 formed. For a sum of money, Corah and Allahabad were
 tendered to the Vizir. That he was delighted with the
 prospect of regaining a territory, for which, a few years
 before, we have seen him incurring the infamy and guilt
 of perfidy and murder, perpetrated against a near kins-
 man, we need not doubt. About terms there appears to
 have been no dispute. For the sum of fifty lacks of rupees,
 of which twenty lacks were to be paid in ready money, and
 the remainder in two years by payments of fifteen lacks at
 a time, the provinces in question were added to his do-
 minions.

The acquisition of those provinces made an apparent
 change with regard to the Rohillas in the views of the
 Vizir. If we may believe the representation of the Presi-
 dent ; whose representations, however, upon this subject,
 are so full of management and ambiguity, that they are all
 to be received with caution ; the Nabob represented him-
 self unable to meet the pecuniary obligations under which
 the acquisition of both territories would lay him to the

English Company; and desired for that reason to suspend his attack upon the Rohillas. It was agreed, however, between him and the President, that whenever the time convenient for the extirpation of that people should arrive, the assistance of the English should not be wanting. The difficulty of fulfilling his pecuniary engagements with the Company, if they were ever alleged, did not detain him long.

From the meeting at Benares, the Vizir and President parted different ways; the former to the Dooab and Delhi, to reduce, during the absence of the Mahrattas, some forts and districts which were still held for that people; the latter to lay before his colleagues, and to transmit to his employers, such an account of the transactions at this interview, as was most likely to answer his ends.

In his report to the Council at Fort William, the President confined himself to the agreement respecting Corah and Allahabad, and the allowance for such troops as might hereafter be employed in the service of the Vizir. The agreement respecting the Rohillas, which it had been settled between the President and Vizir might be conveniently kept out of the ostensible treaty, was wholly suppressed. With a view to the future, it was politic however to explain, that the Vizir showed at first a desire to obtain English assistance for the seizure of the Rohilla country; it was politic also to state the pretexts by which the expediency of that assistance might best appear to be established. Adding, that for the present, however, the Vizir had laid aside this design, the President subjoined the following declaration: "I was pleased that he urged the scheme of this expedition no further, as it would have led our troops to a distance."¹ Yet we have it from his pen, that he "encouraged" the Vizir to the enterprize, as what promised to be of the greatest advantage to the Company.

In the letter of the President despatched from Benares to the Directors, announcing the result of his arrangements with the Vizir, all intelligence of the project for exterminating the Rohillas is suppressed.

Upon the return of Mr. Hastings to Calcutta, he effected an object, of which, from the important consequences

¹ Fifth Report, *ut supra*, App. No. 19.

BOOK V. with which it was attended, it is necessary to give some
CHAP. I. account. The correspondence with the country powers
 1773. had frequently been carried on through the military officers upon the spot. The power thus conveyed to the military, Mr. Hastings had represented as inconvenient, if not dangerous; and one object of his policy had been to render the head of the civil government the exclusive organ of communication with foreign powers. He now stated to the Council the concurrence in opinion of the Vizir and himself, that an agent, permanently residing with the Vizir for the communication and adjustment of many affairs to which the intercourse of letters could not conveniently apply, would be attended with important advantages: and he urged the propriety of granting to himself the sole nomination of such an agent, the sole power of removing him, and the power of receiving and answering his letters, without communication either to the Committee or Council. To all these conditions the Council gave their assent; and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, with an extra salary, was sent as private agent to attend the residence of the Vizir, and to communicate secretly with Mr. Hastings.¹

The Vizir, in the meantime, had made himself master of several places in the Doab. He advanced towards Delhi with a show of great friendship to the Emperor; assisted him with money; sent a force to assist his army in wresting Agra from the Jaats; and, having thus laid a foundation for confidence, began to intrigue for his sanction to the intended attack upon Rohilcund. A treaty was negotiated, and at last solemnly concluded and signed, by which it was agreed that the Emperor should assist with his forces in the reduction of the Rohillas, and in return should receive a share of the plunder, and one-half of the conquered country.²

On the 18th of November, about two months after their interview, the Vizir wrote to the President, demanding the promised assistance of the English for the destruction of the Rohillas. Mr. Hastings appears to have been thrown

¹ Hastings' Report, App. No. 19, ut supra; Letter of 17th June, 1774, App. No. 25.

² Francklin's Shah Aulum, p. 54. Letter of Col. Champion; Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 45; and the treaty itself, App. No. 27. Scott's Aurangzebe's Successors, p. 259, 260.

BOOK V.
CHAP. I.

1774.

into some embarrassment. The suddenness and confidence of the call corresponded but indifferently with the terms on which he had given his colleagues to understand that the communication on this subject rested between him and the Vizir. His abilities in making out a case, though singularly great, were unable to produce unanimity: and it was not till after a long debate, that a decision in favour of the expedition was obtained. The assistance was promised on the very terms concerted and settled between him and the Vizir; and yet this President had the art to persuade his colleagues, and joined with them in a declaration to their common masters, that these terms were so favourable to the English, and so burdensome to the Vizir, as to render his acceptance of them improbable, and therefore to leave but little chance of their involving the English Government in a measure which the principal conductors of that government were desirous to avoid.¹

In the month of January, 1774, the second of the three brigades into which the Company's army in Bengal was divided, received orders to join the Vizir; and Colonel Champion, now Commander-in-Chief, proceeded about the middle of February to assume the command. On the 24th of February the brigade arrived within the territory of the Vizir; and, on the 17th of April, the united forces entered the Rohilla dominions. On the 19th, Colonel Champion wrote to the Presidency, that the Rohilla leader, "had by letter expressed earnest inclinations to come to an accommodation with the Vizir; but that the Nabob claimed no less than *two crores* of rupees." After this extravagant demand, the Rohillas posted themselves on the side of Babul Nulla, with a resolution of standing their ground to the last extremity. And early on the morning of the 23rd, the English advanced to the attack. "Hafez," says the English General, with a generous esteem, "and his army, consisting of about 40,000 men, showed great bravery and resolution, annoying us with their artillery and rockets. They made repeated attempts to charge, but our guns, being so much better served than theirs, kept so constant and galling a fire, that they could not advance; and where they were closest, was the greatest slaughter. They gave

¹ Fifth Report, ut supra, App. Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25.

BOOK V. proof of a good share of military knowledge, by showing
CHAP. I. inclinations to force both our flanks at the same time, and
 1774. endeavouring to call off our attentions by a brisk fire on
 our centre. It is impossible to describe a more obstinate
 firmness of resolution than the enemy displayed. Numerous
 were their gallant men who advanced, and often pitched
 their colours between both armies, in order to encourage
 their men to follow them; and it was not till they saw
 our whole army advancing briskly to charge them, after
 a severe cannonade of two hours and twenty minutes,
 and a smart fire of musketry for some minutes on both
 flanks, that they fairly turned their backs. Of the enemy
 above 2000 fell in the field, and amongst them many
 Sirdars. But what renders the victory most decisive is
 the death of Hafez Ruhmet, who was killed whilst bravely
 rallying his people to battle. One of his sons was also
 killed, one taken prisoner, and a third returned from flight
 to-day, and is in the hands of Suja-ad-dowla."

In passing to another character, the General changes his
 strain. "I wish," says he, "I could pay the Vizir any
 compliment on this occasion, or that I were not under the
 indispensable necessity of expressing my highest indignation
 at his shameful pusillanimity; indispensably, I say,
 because it is necessary that administration should clearly
 know how little to be depended on is this their ally. The
 night before the battle, I applied to him for some particular
 pieces of cannon, which I thought might prove of great
 service in the action; but he declined giving the use of
 them. He promised solemnly to support me with all his
 force, and particularly engaged to be near at hand with a
 large body of cavalry, to be used as I should direct. But,
 instead of being nigh me, he remained beyond the Gurrah,
 on the ground which I had left in the morning, surrounded
 by his cavalry and a large train of artillery, and did not
 move thence till the news of the enemy's defeat reached
 him." Then, however, his troops began to be active, and
 effectually plundered the camp; "while the Company's
 troops, in regular order in their ranks, most justly" (says
 their commander) "observed, *We have the honour of the
 day, and these banditti the profit.*"¹

¹ Letter of Col. Champion, to the Hon. Warren Hastings, &c., 24th April, 1774; Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 26.

This action, in reality, terminated the war. Though BOOK V.
 Fyzoolla Khan, with his treasures and the remains of the CHAP. I.
 army, had made good his flight toward the mountains, the 1774.
 whole country, without opposition, lay at the mercy of the
 Vizir; and never, probably, were the rights of conquest
 more savagely abused. Not only was the ferocity of Indian
 depredation let loose upon the wretched inhabitants, but as
 his intention, according to what he had previously and
 repeatedly declared to the English Government, was to
 exterminate the Rohillas, every one who bore the name of
 Rohilla was either butchered, or found his safety in flight
 and in exile.¹

¹ "The inhumanity and dishonour," says Col. Champion, in his letter of June 12, 1774, "with which the late proprietors of this country and their families have been used, is known all over these parts; a relation of them would swell this letter to an immense size. I could not help compassionating such unparalleled misery; and my requests to the Vizir to show lenity, were frequent, but as fruitless as even those advices which I almost hourly gave him, regarding the destruction of the villages, with respect to which I am now constrained to declare, that though he always promised as fairly as I could wish, yet he did not observe one of his promises, nor cease to overspread the country with flames, till three days after the fate of Hafez Rhamet was decided."—In another letter he says, "Above a lack of people have deserted their abodes in consequence of the defeat of Hafez." Ibid. App. No. 27. In another, "The whole army were witnesses of scenes that cannot be described." That the President was perfectly aware of the designs of the Vizir, before his engagement to assist in them, sufficiently appears from his own letter to that chief, dated the 22nd of April, 1773. "I have received," says he, "your Excellency's letter, mentioning.....that if, should the Rohillas be guilty of a breach of their agreement [viz., about the forty lacs], we will *thoroughly exterminate* them, and settle your Excellency in the country; you will in that case pay the Company fifty lacs of rupees, and exempt them from the King's tribute." Ibid. App. No. 21. In the Nabob's own letter to the President, of the 18th November, 1772, he says, "During our interview at Benares, it was agreed that I should pay, &c.....and that I should, with the assistance of the English forces, endeavour to punish and *exterminate the Rohillas out of their country*." Ibid. App. No. 22. Mr. Hastings only admits the atrocities in part, and then defends them in a curious manner; that is to say, not only by the example of Indian barbarity in general, but by the example of British barbarity, on the subjects of the Vizir. "I believe it to be a truth," says he, "that he [the Vizir] began by sending detachments to plunder. This I pronounce to have been both barbarous and impolitic. But too much justified by the practice of war established among all nations of the East; and I am sorry to add by our own; in an instance (which the Vizir has a right to quote in vindication of the charge against him), of a detachment employed in the war in which we were engaged with him in the year 1764, to burn and ravage his country." He then quotes a letter from Major Champion, who commanded the detachment, which says, "Two separate parties have been sent into the enemy's country, the one of which was as high up as Buxar, and (according to the directions given me) there are destroyed upwards of a thousand villages. Had not the rains, &c., prevented, we should have done very considerably more damage." Minute of the Governor-General, dated 10th Jan., 1775, in the Fifth Report, *ut supra*, App. No. 45.—M. The words 'extermination,' 'extirpation,' and the like, although found in the correspondence, are here put forward so as to convey erroneous impressions. The only extirpation proposed, was, that of the power of one or two Rohilla chiefs. It was not a war against the people, but against a few military adventurers, who had gained their possessions by the

BOOK V. Shortly after this decisive affair, the army marched to
 CHAP. VI. the city of Bissouly, which was near the centre of the
 1774. Rohilla country, with the intention of passing in quarters
 the season of the rains. At this place had arrived before
 them Nujuf Khan, with the army of the Emperor. In
 obedience to the treaty between the Emperor and Vizir,
 they had marched from Delhi to assist in the reduction of
 the Rohillas ; but, before they reached the scene of action,
 the rapidity and vigour of the English had terminated the
 war. Nujuf Khan demanded partition of the country, and
 of the plunder, according to the conditions on which the
 countenance and co-operation of the Emperor had been
 procured. The Vizir did not dispute the treaty, a copy of
 which the Emperor had sent to Colonel Champion ; he
 alleged, however, that the counterpart, which was in his
 own possession, expressed a condition that his Majesty
 should take the field in person ; and that the breach of
 that article annulled the contract. " But when the coun-
 terpart," says Colonel Champion, " which he put into the
 hands of my interpreter, came to be examined, it appeared
 there was no such stipulation, nor did it ever exist even
 verbally."¹ The decision of the English Government is
 the next incident in the scene. Instructing on this subject
 the commander of their troops, when he had as yet sent
 them only a surmise, and the treaty had not been produced,

sword, who were constantly at war with their neighbours and with each other, and whose forcible suppression was the legitimate object of the King of Delhi, or the Nawab of Oude. So far was the contest from being national, that the mass of the population of Rohilcund consisted of Hindus, hostile both in religion and policy to their Afghan rules, to whom the name Rohillas is somewhat incorrectly confined. Even amongst the Afghans, however, there was but a partial combination, and several of the Sirdars joined the Vizir. One of the many pamphlets put forth by the virulent enemies of Hastings (Origin and authentic narrative of the present Mahratta and late Rohilla War. Lond. 1781.) unblushingly affirms that 500,000 families of husbandmen and artists had been driven across the Jumna, and that the Rohilla provinces were a barren and uninhabited waste. An equally false representation is cited from the Parliamentary Register, 1781, by Hamilton, according to whom, the numbers expelled were about 17,000 or 18,000 men with their families, none being included in the spirit of the treaty, *excepting such as were actually found in arms*. The Hindu inhabitants, consisting of about 700,000, were no otherwise affected by it than experiencing a change of masters, to which they had been frequently accustomed. Hamilton, History of the Rohilla Afghans, 268. These statements all proceeded from personal hostility to Hastings, and had no foundation in genuine humanity. It is evident that the son of Hafiz, although the most grievous consequence of hostilities was his father's death, entertains no suspicion that there was anything atrocious in the transaction, and he expresses no personal resentment towards the chief actors in the revolution.—W.

¹ App. No. 45, sup.

“ our engagements (they say) with the Vizir are to aid him in the conquest of the Rohilla country ; and if he is opposed by Nujuf Khan, or the King himself, you are to pay no regard to either. We cannot (they add) entertain so bad an opinion of the Vizir as to suppose him capable of acting in avowed breach of a treaty ; but if any plea of that kind should be made for contesting our right to occupy any part of the Rohilla country yet unconquered, it will be proper to put to him the question, whether such treaty does exist or not? If he should acknowledge such a treaty, you must undoubtedly abstain from further hostilities in abetment of his breach of faith.” Yet, after they were fully satisfied of the existence of such a treaty ; and not only of the capability, but the resolution of the Vizir to act in avowed breach of it, they laid their commands upon the English general, to abet and support him, because “ it is our intention” (say they) “ to persevere in pursuit of the object which originally engaged us in the present enterprise, and to adhere strictly to our engagements with the Vizir, without suffering our attention to be diverted by foreign incidents or occurrences,”¹ that is, by solemn treaties, or the breach of them.

BOOK V.

CHAP. VI.

1774.

From Fyzoolla Khan an early application arrived, offering to come to the camp upon the faith of the English, and to hold the district which had belonged to his family as a dependant or renter of the Vizir. His offers, variously modified, were frequently repeated, with great earnestness. But the Vizir persisted in his declaration, that he would allow no Rohilla chief to remain on the further side of the Ganges ; and only offered him one of the districts in the Dooab which had been recently conquered from the Mahrattas. Fyzoolla Khan, with justice, observed, that this the Mahrattas would take from him the first time they returned to the country.

Towards the end of July, the united forces of the English and Vizir marched towards Fyzoolla Khan, who occupied a strong post on the skirts of the mountains, near Pattir Gur. At the beginning of September they came near the enemy, and, as the Vizir began to exhibit a strong desire of an accommodation with the Rohillas, an active intercourse of letters and messengers ensued.

¹ Letter of 23rd May, and 14th July, App. ut supra, No. 27.

BOOK V. Whether his mind was operated upon by the approaching
CHAP. I. arrival of the new councillors at Calcutta, or the dread
 1774. which he pretended of assistance to Fyzoolla Khan from the Mahrattas and Afghans, he now made offer of terms to which a little before he would not so much as listen. He proposed to make Fyzoolla collector of the revenues, or Zemindar, of the whole territory of Rohilcund, allowing six lacks of rupees per annum for his own expenses. But this offer, and even that of a jaghire of ten lacks of rupees, in the Rohilcund country, were rejected. The Rohillas were so advantageously posted, with works thrown up in their front, that it was necessary to advance by regular approaches, and the army were so discontented, on account of hardship, arrears of pay, and ill-usage, either real or supposed, that the general was doubtful of their steadiness and order. After several days, in which the approaches were carried on, and the scouting parties of both armies were frequently engaged, it was at last agreed, that Fyzoolla Khan should receive a jaghire of fourteen lacks and seventy-five thousand rupees in the Rohilcund territory, and should surrender one-half of all his effects to the Vizir. Thus terminated the first Rohilla war.¹

Before closing the account of the events to which the visit of Mr. Hastings to Benares gave birth, it is necessary to mention its effects with regard to the deserted Emperor. Upon receiving from him the grant of the dewannee, or the receipt and management of the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, it was agreed that, as the royal share of those revenues, twenty-six lacks of rupees should be annually paid to him by the Company. His having accepted of the assistance of the Mahrattas, to place him on the throne of his ancestors, was now made use of as a reason for telling him, that the tribute of these provinces should be paid to him no more. Of the honour or the discredit, however, of this transaction, the principal share belongs not to the Governor, but to the Directors themselves; who, in their letter to Bengal of the 11th of November, 1768, had said, "If the Emperor flings himself into the hands of the Mah-

¹ See the correspondence, Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 27, and Col. Champion's long defensive letter, Ibid. App. No. 45. See also No. 28 of the Bengal Treaties, in the Collection of Treaties, &c., with the native princes, printed in 1812. *Rampore*, and some dependent districts, formed the territory bestowed upon Fyzoolla Khan.

rattas, or any other power, we are disengaged from him and it may open a fair opportunity of withholding the twenty-six lacks we now pay him.”¹ Upon the whole, indeed, of the measure dealt out to this unhappy sovereign, depriving him of the territories of Corah and Allahabad, depriving him of the tribute which was due to him from those provinces of his which they possessed, the Directors bestowed unqualified approbation. And though they condemned the use which had been made of their troops in subduing the country of the Rohillas; they declare frankly, “We, upon the maturest deliberation, confirm the treaty of Benares.”²

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

1774.

The circumstance upon which, in summing up the account of his administration to his honourable masters, Hastings advanced the strongest claim to applause, was the alleviation of the pecuniary difficulties of the Indian government, and the improvement of the revenues. In the letters from the Bengal administration to the Court of Directors, under date 22nd August, and 17th October, 1774, after presenting the most flattering picture of the financial situation to which the government was happily exalted, they advance a confident prediction, that in the course of the ensuing season, the whole of the bond debt would be discharged.³ And in that representation of the state of Bengal, which was published by Mr. Hastings in 1786, he declares, “When I took charge of the government of Bengal in April 1772, I found it loaded with a debt at interest of nearly the same amount as the present; and in less than two years I saw that debt completely discharged, and a sum in ready cash of the same amount actually accumulated in store in the public treasuries.”⁴ This boasting exhibits some remarkable features, when the facts are sufficiently ascertained. No improvement had been made in the productive powers of the country, which is the only permanent and satisfactory source of an improved revenue. The gross revenues of the year ending in April 1772, 3,13,63,894 current rupees; the gross revenues of that ending in April 1774 were only 2,76,10,556. Hardly had any improvement been made in the net

¹ Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 12.

² Company's Letter to Bengal. 3rd March, 1775, Ibid. App. No. 46.

³ Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 37, and App. No. 43.

⁴ Memoirs relative to the state of India, by Warren Hastings, Esq., p. 21.

BOOK V. receipt. That for the year ending in April 1772, was
 CHAP. I. 2,16,88,538 rupees, equal to 2,373,650*l.*; that for the year
 1774. ending 1774, was 2,20,56,919 rupees, or 2,481,404*l.*¹ In the
 next great department of financial administration, the ex-
 pense of the civil and military services, instead of any
 retrenchment there had been an increase. In the year
 ending in 1772, the civil service is stated at 154,620*l.*, the
 marine at 52,161*l.*, the military at 1,164,348*l.*, and the
 total expense, exclusive of buildings and fortifications, at
 1,371,129*l.*² In the year ending in 1774, the civil service
 is stated at 159,537*l.*, the marine at 53,700*l.*, the military
 at 1,304,883*l.*, and the total at 1,518,120*l.*³ In the year
 1772, the proportion of the military expense, defrayed by
 the Nabob of Oude, was 20,766*l.*⁴ In the year 1774, the
 proportion defrayed by him was 131,430*l.*⁵ In the follow-
 ing year, that ending in April 1775, there was a slight im-
 provement in the collections, which may in part be
 ascribed to the measures of the preceding administration;
 and there was a total cessation of war which produced a
 reduction of the military expenditure, remarkable only for
 its minuteness. The gross collections amounted to
 2,87,20,760 rupees, the net receipt to 2,51,02,090, or
 2,823,964*l.*; the civil service to 231,722*l.*, the marine to
 36,510*l.*, and the military to 1,080,304*l.*; total, 1,349,836*l.*;
 and the proportion this year borne by the Nabob of Oude
 was 240,750*l.*⁶ It thus abundantly appears, that nothing
 so important as to deserve the name of improvement had
 arisen in the financial administration of the Company. A
 pecuniary relief had indeed been procured, but from sources
 of a temporary and very doubtful description; partly from
 the produce of the bills drawn in such profusion upon the
 Company, by the predecessor of Hastings; partly from the
 reduction of the allowance to the Nabob of Bengal, from
 thirty-two to sixteen lacks; but chiefly from the plunder
 of the unhappy Emperor of the Moguls, whose tribute of
 twenty-six lacks per annum for the dewannee of Bengal
 was withheld, and whose two provinces Corah and Allah-
 abad were sold for fifty lacks to the Vizir; from the sale
 of the Rohillas, the extirpation of whom was purchased at

¹ Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 7 and 35.² Ibid. p. 35.³ Ibid. p. 35.⁴ Ibid. p. 8.⁵ Ibid. p. 8.⁶ Ibid. p. 41.

forty of the same eagerly coveted lacks ; and from the pay and maintenance of a third part of the troops, which were employed in the wars and dominions of the Vizir. With regard even to the payment of the debt, an inspection of the accounts exhibits other results than those presented by the declarations of the President.

BOOK V.
CHAP. II.
1774.

Year ending in April.	Balances in the Treasuries.	Debts at interest.	Other debts.
1772 ...	C.R.65,09,041 ...	1,07,84,520 ...	52,48,480.
1774 ...	21,62,994 ...	1,17,71,486 ...	95,41,795.
1775 ...	1,23,95,598 ...	90,68,584 ...	87,05,871. ¹

Upon this statement, if we compare the year in which Mr. Hastings began his administration, with that in which it ended, we see a prodigious deterioration. If we compare it even with that which follows, the total amount of debt in 1772 was 1,60,30,000 rupees ; in 1775 it was 1,77,68,584, which is an increase of 17,41,455. The only improvement appears in the balance of cash, which in 1775 exceeded the balance in 1772 by 58,86,557 rupees. Deducting from this a sum equal to the increase of debt, there remains 41,45,102 rupees, by which alone the state of the exchequer, after all the calamity which had been produced to supply it, was better in 1775 than it had been in 1772.

CHAPTER II.

Commencement of the New Government—Supreme Council divided into two Parties, of which that of the Governor-General in the Minority—Presidency of Bombay espouse the Cause of Ragoba, an ejected Peshwa—Supreme council condemn this Policy, and make Peace with his Opponents—Situation of the Powers in the Upper Country, Nabob of Oude, Emperor, and Nujuf Khan—Pecuniary Corruption, in which Governor-General seemed to be implicated, in the cases of the Ranee or Burdwan, Phousdar of Hoogley, and Munny Begum—Governor-General resists Inquiry—Nuncomar the great Accuser—He is prosecuted by the

¹ Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 8, 36, 42.

BOOK V. *Governor-General—Accused of Forgery, found guilty, and
 CHAP. II. hanged—Mohammed Reza Khan, and the office of Naib
 Subah restored.*

1774.

THE operation of the new constitution framed by the Parliament of England, was ordained to commence in India after the 1st of August, 1774. The new councillors, however, General Clavering, Mr. Monson, and Mr. Francis, who, along with Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, were elected to compose the board of administration, did not arrive at Calcutta until the 19th of October. On the following day the existing government was dissolved by proclamation, and the new council took possession of its powers. On the proposal of the Governor-general, who stated the necessity of a few days, to prepare for the council a view of the existing state of affairs, and to enable Mr. Barwell, who was then absent, to arrive ; the meeting of the Board was suspended until the 25th. On the very day on which its deliberations began, some of the discord made its appearance, which so long and so deeply embarrassed and disgraced the government of India. The party who had arrived from England, and the party in India, with whom they were conjoined, met not, it should seem, with minds in the happiest frame for conjunct operations. Mr. Hastings, upon the first appearance of his colleagues, behaved, or was suspected of behaving, coldly. And with jealous feelings this coldness was construed into studied and humiliating neglect. In the representation which the Governor-general presented of the political state of the country, the war against the Rohillas necessarily attracted the principal attention of the new councillors ; and, unhappily for the Governor-general, presented too many appearances of a doubtful complexion not to excite the desire of elucidation in the minds of the most candid judges. An obvious objection was, its direct opposition to the frequent and urgent commands of the Court of Directors, not to engage in offensive wars of any description, and to confine the line of defensive operations to the territorial limits of themselves and allies. The reasons, too, upon which the war was grounded ; a dispute about the payment of an inconsiderable sum of money, and the benefit of conquest, to which that dispute afforded the only pretext ; might well

appear a suspicious foundation. When the new government began the exercise of its authority, the intelligence had not arrived of the treaty with Fyzoola Khan ; and an existing war appeared to demand its earliest determinations. To throw light upon the field of deliberation, the new Councillors required that the correspondence should be laid before them, which had passed between the Governor-general (such is the title by which the President was now distinguished), and the two functionaries, the commander of the troops, and the agent residing with the Vizir. And when they were informed that a part indeed of this correspondence should be submitted to their inspection, but that a part of it would also be withheld, their surprise and dissatisfaction were loudly testified, their indignation and suspicions but little concealed.

As reasons for suppressing a part of the letters, Mr. Hastings alleged, that they did not relate to public business, that they were private confidential communications, and not fit to become public.

It is plain that this declaration could satisfy none but men who had the most unbounded confidence in the probity and wisdom of Mr. Hastings ; and as the new Councillors neither had that confidence, nor had been in circumstances in which they could possibly have acquired it on satisfactory grounds, they were not only justified in demanding, but their duty called upon them to demand a full disclosure. The pretension erected by Mr. Hastings, if extended into a general rule, would destroy one great source of the evidence by which the guilt of public men can be proved : and it was calculated to rouse a suspicion of his improbity in any breast not fortified against it by the strongest evidence of his habitual virtue.¹ Nothing could be more unfortunate for Mr. Hastings than his war

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1774.

¹ The Directors not only condemned the retention of the correspondence, and sent repeated orders for its disclosure, which were never obeyed ; but arraigned the very principle of a private agent. "The conduct of our late Council," say they, "in empowering the President to prepare instructions for Mr. Middleton as agent at the court of Suja-ad-dowla, without ordering them to be submitted to the Board for their inspection and approbation, was very improper. And it is our express direction, that no such independent or separate authority be ever delegated, to any Governor, or Member of Council, or to any other person whatsoever ; but that all instructions to public agents be laid before the Council, and signed by a majority of the Members, before they be carried into execution." Letter to Bengal, 15th December, 1775, Fifth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 46.

BOOK V. against the Rohillas, and the suppression of his correspondence with Mr. Middleton. The first branded his administration with a mark, which its many virtues were never able to obliterate, of cruel and unprincipled aggression ; and the second stained him with a natural suspicion of personal impurity. Both together gave his rivals those advantages over him which rendered his subsequent administration a source of contention and misery, and involved him in so great a storm of difficulties and dangers at its close.

CHAP. II.

1774.

Of the Council, now composed of five Members, the three who had recently come from England joined together in opposing the Governor-General, who was supported by Mr. Barwell alone. This party constituted, therefore, a majority of the Council, and the powers of government passed in consequence into their hands. The precipitation of their measures called for, and justified, the animadversions of their opponents. Having protested against the suppression of any part of Middleton's correspondence, they were not contented with commanding that, as at least a temporary expedient, his letters should be wholly addressed to themselves : they voted his immediate recall ; though Hastings declared that such a measure would dangerously proclaim to the natives the distractions of the government, and confound the imagination of the Vizir, who had no conception of power except in the head of the government, and who would consider the annihilation of that power as a revolution in the state. The governing party, notwithstanding their persuasion of the injustice and cruelty of the Rohilla war, and notwithstanding their ignorance whether or not it was brought to a close, directed the Commander-in-Chief, in the first place, immediately upon receipt of their letter, to demand payment from the Vizir of the forty lacks of rupees promised for the extirpation of the Rohillas,¹ and of all other sums which might

¹ On the supposition of the injustice of the Rohilla war, these forty lacks ought to have been paid, not to the Company, but to the sufferers : Suja-ad-dowla ought to have been compelled to restore the unhappy refugees to their homes, and to make compensation. But neither the party, who now possessed all the powers of government, though they reprobated the Rohilla war, nor the Court of Directors, though they solemnly condemned it, ever uttered a wish for the restoration of the expatriated and plundered Rohillas ; for a farthing of compensation for their loss, or alleviation to their miseries, either out of their own revenues, or those of the Vizir. The cry about justice, therefore, was a cheap virtue to them ; and they were so much the less excusable

be due upon his other engagements. Provided a real inability was apparent, he might accept not less than twenty lacks, in partial payment, and securities for the remainder, in twelve months. And they directed him in the second place, to conduct the troops within fourteen days out of the Rohilla country, into the ancient territory of Oude; and in case the Vizir should refuse compliance with the prescribed demands, to withdraw the troops entirely from his service, and retire within the limits of the Company's dominions. Before the despatch of these instructions, intelligence arrived of the treaty with Fyzoolla Khan; of the payment of fifteen lacks by the Vizir, from the share of Fyzoolla Khan's effects; of his return to his capital, for the declared purpose of expediting payment to the Company of the sums which he owed; and of the intention of the English army to march back to Ramgaut, a Rohilla town near the borders of Oude. In consideration of these events the Governor-General proposed to suspend the peremptory demands of money, and the order for the recall of the troops; and to proceed with more leisure and forbearance. But every motion from that quarter in favour of the Vizir was exposed to the suspicion of corrupt and interested motives; and the proposal was rejected. The directions to the Commander were no further modified, than by desiring him to wait upon the Vizir at his capital, and to count the fourteen days from the date of his interview. The Governor-General condemned the precipitation of the pecuniary demand as harsh, impolitic, and contrary to those rules of delicacy, which were prescribed by the directors for their transactions with the native princes, and which prudence and right feeling prescribed in all transactions; and he arraigned the sudden recall of the troops as a breach of treaty, a violation of the Company's faith, tantamount to a declaration that all engagements with the Vizir were annulled, and affording to him a motive and pretence for eluding payment of the debts, which if his alliance with the Company continued, it would be his interest to discharge. Both parties wrote

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1774.

than the Vizir and Mr. Hastings, that these actors in the scene denied its injustice, and were consistent; the Directors, and the condemning party, were inconsistent; if conscious of that inconsistency, hypocritical; if not conscious, blind.

BOOK V. the strongest representations of their separate views of
 CHAP. II. these circumstances to the Directors ; and the observations of one party called forth replies from the other, to a mischievous consumption of the time and attention, both in England and in India, of those on whose undivided exertions the right conducting of the government depended.¹

1774.

Shortly after his return from the expedition against the Rohillas, Suja-ad-dowla, the Vizir, whose health was already broken, began to show symptoms of a rapid decay, and expired in the beginning of 1775, when his only legitimate son, who assumed the title of Asoff-ul-dowla, succeeded without opposition to the Subahdaree of Oude. Mr. Middleton had already returned, and Mr. Bristow was now sent to supply his place at the residence of the new Nabob. The majority in Council resolved to obtain from the son, with all possible despatch, the sums of money due by the father, but to consider all engagements by which they were bound to the late Nabob as dissolved by his death, and to make any assistance, which they might hereafter afford his successor, the result of new purchases and payments. A treaty was at last arranged on the 21st of May, by which it was agreed, that the Company should guarantee to Asoff-ul-dowla, the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, which had been sold to his father ; but that the Nabob in return should cede to the Company the territory of the Raja Cheyte Sing, Zemindar of Benares, yielding a revenue of 22,10,000 rupees ; that he should raise the allowance for the service of the Company's brigade to 2,60,000 rupees per month ; and should pay, as they fell due, the pecuniary balances upon the engagements of the late Vizir. Mr. Hastings refused his sanction to the imposition of these terms, as inconsistent with any equitable construction of the treaty with the late Vizir, extorted from the mere necessities of the young Nabob, and beyond his power to fulfil. The conduct of the Directors was peculiar. In their letter of the 15th December, 1775, remarking, upon the resolution of the

¹ See the Documents in the Appendix, Nos. 44, 45, and 46 of the Fifth Report, *ut supra*. They are also to be found in the Minutes of Evidence, exhibited to the House of Commons on the Oude charge ; and once more in the Minutes of the Evidence exhibited on the trial of Mr. Hastings in Westminster Hall.

Council to disregard the treaties concluded with the late Nabob of Oude, they say, "Although the death of Suja-ad-dowla may render it necessary to make new arrangements with his successor, we cannot agree with our Council, that our treaties with the State of Oude expired with the death of that Nabob." When they were made acquainted however with the new grant of revenue, and the new allowance on account of the troops, they say, in their letter of the 24th of December, 1776, "It is with singular satisfaction we observe at any time the attention paid by our servants to the great interests of their employers; and it is with particular pleasure we here signify our entire approbation of the late treaty concluded with Asoff-ul-dowla, successor of Suja-ad-dowla, by which such terms are procured as seem to promise us solid and permanent advantages."¹

BOOK V.
CHAP. II.

1774.

The new Board of Administration had early announced to the distant Presidencies, that it had assumed the reins of government, and was vested with controlling power over all the British authorities in India. It had also required from each of the Presidencies a representation of its political, financial, and commercial situation; and found a scene opened at Bombay, which it requires a notice of some preceding circumstances rightly to unfold.

The Mahratta sovereigns, or Rajas; were assisted, according to the Hindu institution, by a council of eight Brahmens, who shared among them the principal offices of the state.² The official name of the chief of this council was Peshwa, upon whom the most important parts of the business of government devolved. According as the pleasures, the indolence, or the incapacity of the sovereign withdrew him from the management of affairs, the importance of this principal servant was increased; and a proportionable share of the dignity and power of the sovereign passed into his hands. In a rude state of society, it appears not to be difficult for the influence and dignity of the servant to outgrow that of the master, who becomes too weak to resume the power which he has imprudently

¹ Fifth Report, *ut supra*, with Appendix, Nos. 44 and 45.

² These ministers were not in all instances Brahmans, nor were their offices part of the Hindu system; they were instituted by Sivajee. See Duff's *Mahrattas*, i. 235.—W.

BOOK V. devolved. The minister leaves his office and ascendancy
 CHAP. II. to his son ; the son makes it hereditary ; and the sove-
 1775. reign, divested of all but the name of king, sinks into an
 empty pageant. Such was the course of events in the
 case of the mayor of the palace in France, in that of the
Chu-vua in Tunquin,¹ and such it was, besides other cases,
 in that of the Peshwa, among the Mahrattas. In the reign
 of the Raja Sahoo, who was but third in succession from
 Sivajee, Viswanath Balajee had raised himself from a low
 situation in life to the rank of Peshwa. Sahoo was a
 prince devoted to ease and to pleasure ; and the supreme
 powers were wielded, with little check or limitation, by
 Viswanath Balajee. He assumed the name of Rao Pundit,
 that is, chief of the Pundits, or learned Brahmens, and
 made the Raja invest him with a *sirpah*, or robe of office,²
 a ceremony which ever since has marked the succession of
 the Peshwas, and appeared to confer the title. Viswanath
 was able to leave his office and power to his son Bajerao
 who still further diminished the power of the sovereign ;
 and finally allowed him not so much as liberty. The Raja
 was confined to Satarah, a species of state prisoner ; while
 the Peshwa established his own residence at Poona, which
 henceforth became the seat of government. The brother
 of Bajerao, Jumnajee Anna, though a Brahmen, led the
 forces of the state ; he attacked the Portuguese settlements
 in the neighbourhood of Bombay ; and added Salsette and
 Bassein to the conquests of the Mahrattas. The family of
 the Peshwa prided themselves in these acquisitions ;
 affected to consider them as their own, rather than the
 property of the state ; and showed a violent attachment
 to them, as often as, either by force or negotiation, the
 alienation of them was attempted. The vicinity of these
 territories to the British settlements at Bombay, brought
 the interests of the Company in contact with those of the
 Mahrattas ; and the terms of a commercial and maritime
 intercourse were somewhat inaccurately framed. Bajerao
 left a son, named Bao, who was slain in the battle of Paniput ;
 and Jumnajee Anna, his brother, left two sons, Nanah,

¹ See the *Exposé Statistique du Tunquin*, published in London, in 1811, from the papers of M. de la Bissachère, a French missionary, who had spent twenty-six years in the country.

² The *Sirpa* is an honorary dress, not particularly a robe of office.—W.

called also Bajee Rao, and Ragonaut Rao, with the former of whom, as Peshwa, the Presidency of Bombay, in 1756, concluded a treaty. The Mahrattas agreed to exclude the Dutch from all intercourse with their dominions, and to give up Fort Vittoria, Hematgur, and Bancote, in exchange for Gheriah, which the English had taken from Angria the pirate. In 1761, Bajee Rao, or Nanah, died, of grief, it is said, for the death of Bao, and left two sons, the eldest Madhoo Rao, the other Narrain Rao, both minors. The hereditary succession of the Peshwas had now so firm an establishment that the title of Madhoo was not disputed; and the burden of government, during the minority of his nephew, devolved upon Ragonaut Rao, more commonly known by the name of Ragoba.¹

BOOK V.
CHAP. II.
1775.

It had fared with the Mahratta government, as it commonly fares with extended dominion under the rude policy of the East. The government of the provinces was confided to the chief military leaders, and the more distant and powerful of them, as the vigour of the central government relaxed, acquired independence. Of these independencies, the most important by far was that of the Bhonslas, which, together with Cuttuck, a part of Orissa, included the whole of the vast province, or region of

¹ This short account in the text of the rise of the power of the Peshwa and of his descendants, is a series of inaccuracies. The usurpation of all real power by the Peshwa did not take place till the death of Shao Raja, and was not the work of Viswanath. He was not succeeded, as a matter of course, by his son, Bajirao, who was not appointed Peshwa until seven months after his father's death, and his son, a second Bajirao, by whom the ascendancy was obtained, succeeded to the office of Peshwa only after some opposition. His aggrandizement was materially owing to Shao's having fallen into a state of mental imbecility some time before his death, and to his having left no successor. Raja Ram, who was placed upon the throne, and was a grandson of Sivaji, had been kept concealed throughout Shao's reign, and some doubts of his right to the succession were entertained. The Peshwa's agency in his accession necessarily gave additional power to the minister. With respect to the descendants of the first Bajirao the whole is erroneous.

Bajirao left no son named Bao, nor were the sons of his brother, whose proper name is Chimmaji Appa, named Bajirao and Ragonath. They were in fact not Chimmaji's sons, but Bajirao's; the second Bajirao being distinguished from his father by the term Balajee. The term Bao, or more correctly Bhao, is no name, but an epithet meaning literally 'brother,' but applicable to any near relative, and it was the familiar appellation of Sewdasheo Chimmaji, the son of Chimmaji Appa, as the cousin of the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao. The Bhao commanded at the fatal battle of Paniput, and Balaji Bajirao died of grief, not merely for his cousin's death, but the disgrace and danger in which the Mahratta state was plunged. It is true, that on all points connected with Mahratta History, we now have in Captain Duff's excellent work a better guide than was in the author's reach when he wrote, but the materials to which he had access, were capable of furnishing him with a more accurate knowledge both of persons and events. -W.

BOOK V. Berar. The next in point of magnitude, of the separate
 CHAP. II. Mahratta kingdoms, was the province of Guzerat, which
 1775. had been wrested from the Mogul empire by Pillajee Guicawar, or the herdsman, and its government rendered hereditary in his family. Besides these independent princes, two chiefs, Holkar and Sindia, possessed extensive dominions in the province of Malwa, and in the regions bordering on the territories of the Raja of Berar and the Nabob-vizir. And there were inferior adventurers, who in other parts had acquired a sort of independence, among whom the most remarkable was Morari Rao,¹ who had acted a considerable part in the long struggle between the French and English in the Carnatic, and possessed the fort of Gooti with a considerable district on the frontier of the Nizam. All these powers acknowledged a nominal dependence upon the government founded by Sivaji; and a sort of national feeling was apt to unite them against a foreign enemy. But their connexion was voluntary, and they scrupled not to draw their swords against one another, and even against the Peshwa, upon any provocation or prospect that would have engaged them in hostilities with a different foe.

The Brahmen council of eight, known also by the name of Mutseddies, or ministers, had been reduced to a low station in the government, during the vigour of the preceding Peshwas. The weak and divided councils of a minority and regency offered a tempting opportunity to endeavour the recovery of the influence which they had lost. By intriguing with Gopicaboy, the mother of Madhoo, they succeeded in creating jealousies between the nephew and the uncle; and in the end the uncle was stripped of his power. The Mutseddies and Gopicaboy ascribed to Ragonaut Rao a design to elevate himself to the office of Peshwa, and treacherously to deprive his nephews of their dignity or their lives. The Regent described his opponents as an ambitious confederacy, leagued with a dissolute intriguing woman for the purpose of grasping the powers of the state. The account of the transaction which the ministers themselves drew up for

¹ He was of a family highly distinguished in Mahratta history, and was hereditary Senapati, or Commander-in-Chief, but relinquished his claim for a territorial grant from the Raja.—W.

the English government¹ is marked with strong improbabilities. Hitherto, moreover, the members of the Peshwa family, instead of supplanting, had acted with the greatest harmony in supporting their head. And if Ragonaut Rao had aimed at the supremacy, of which no other token appears than the accusation of his enemies, prudence would have taught him, either to usurp the authority from the beginning; or to leave but little time for his nephew to gather strength. After the fall of Ragoba, the power of Mutseddies, during the nonage of Madhoo, was without control; and they employed it, after the manner of Hindus, for the acquisition of enormous riches. As the years however, of the Peshwa increased, he displayed some vigour of mind, and began to restrict the power of this cabal; but died at an early age in 1772.² At his death he bore a testimony to the fidelity of Ragoba, or his distrust of the ministerial confederacy, by releasing that relation from confinement; giving him the guardianship of Narrain Roa; and vesting him with the regency during the nonage of that prince. A short time elapsed before the intrigues of the Mutseddies with Gopicaboy, and the influence of Gopicaboy with her son, stripped Ragoba a second time of his power and his liberty. Dissensions, however, arose among the Mutseddies themselves. Siccaram Baboo, who had been raised by Ragoba from a menial service in his household, to the office of Dewan, or financial minister of the state, had taken the lead in all the preceding intrigues

¹ See Fifth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 35.

² We now possess better authority for these transactions, than that which has misled the text into an imperfect and incorrect relation of them. From Duf's Mahratta History, and Col. Briggs' Secret Correspondence of the Court of the Peshwa, from 1761 to 1772, (Tr. R. As. Society, vol. ii. p. 109), consisting chiefly of Madhu Rao's letters, we learn to appreciate the character of Madhu Rao, as an intelligent and amiable prince, who considerably outlived the period of his 'nonage,' dying at the age of twenty-eight, and distinguishing himself by great abilities, both in the cabinet and the field. His uncle, Ragoba, was a restless ambitious prince, perpetually endeavouring to usurp the supremacy, and occasionally effecting his purpose, by his nephew's anxiety not to expose the state to danger from without, by intestine dissensions. The Peshwa finally established his authority, and compelled his uncle to submit, but never failed to treat him with consideration, and, as mentioned in the text, was reconciled to him at his death. The eight 'Brahmans' to whom all the civil discord is ascribed, had very little to do with it, for Madhu Rao placed his whole confidence in Nana Furnavees, and the 'eight' ministers (they were not all Brahmins) of the old Mahratta constitution had ceased to exist. "The usurpation of the Raja's authority had superseded that of the eight Purdhans." Mahr. Hist. ii. 230; and again, "these ministers (seven of whom are named) were distinct from the Purdhans of Sivaji and Shao." *Ib.* 258.—W.

BOOK V. against his former master, and had acted as chief of the ministerial combination.¹ Another of the ministers, however, Nanah Furnavese, now attained the foremost place

CHAP. II.

1775.

in the favour of Gopicaboy and her son ; and the principal share of the power appeared ready to fall from the hands of Siccaram Baboo. In these circumstances a conspiracy was formed against the life of the young Peshwa, who is said to have rendered himself odious by his follies and cruelty. The commander of the guards was gained ; who forced his way into the palace with a body of men, and cut down the prince in the apartment of Ragoba, to whom he had fled for protection. It was believed in Poona, at the time, according to the report of Mr. Mostyn, the English resident, who was upon the spot ; that a party of the ministers were engaged in this transaction ; and that Siccaram Baboo was at their head. It is to them that Ragoba himself ascribed both the conception and execution of the plot. But when the party of Siccaram Baboo regained the ascendancy, and chased Ragoba from the throne, they accused him of having alone been the author of his nephew's murder, and repelled or shifted the accusation from themselves.²

Upon the death of Narrain Rao, Ragoba was immediately acknowledged Peshwa ; received the sirpah, or robe of office, from the pageant Raja ; and was complimented by the ministers of foreign states, among others by the English resident, in the same form as was usually observed on the

¹ Sukaram Bapoo who had been nominated by Madhu Rao, as his brother's prime minister, was of a respectable Mahratta descent, and was chosen especially, because he was more favourably disposed towards Ragonath than the other ministers, having acted under him, not in a menial capacity, but as his Karkoon and Dewan, confidential manager of his affairs, and commander of his forces. Duff, ii. 242.

² From the information collected by Capt. Duff, there is little doubt that Narain Rao was murdered in consequence of a plot which originated with Ragonath, to release himself from detention, and make his nephew captive in his stead. Such he states was the moderate and general opinion amongst the Mahrattas. That the project ended fatally for Narain Rao, is attributed to the interference of a person not named in the text, but who was more implicated in the dissensions between the uncle and his nephews, than any other person ; this was Anundee Bye, the wife of Ragonath, who had a violent personal animosity towards Gopika Bye, the mother of Madhu Rao and Narain Rao. She is said to have altered the paper sent by Ragonath, to the leaders in the disturbance, authorizing them to seize Narain Rao, into an order for killing him. Of Narain Rao's character, Capt. Duff observes, he was murdered in the 18th year of his age. His follies were those of a boy, but the feelings and interests of a party blackened them into crimes. He was affectionate to his relations, kind to his domestics, and all but his enemies loved him. Duff, ii. 250.—W.

accession of a Peshwa. From the beginning of his administration, the new Peshwa acted with a visible distrust of the Mutseddies. He forbore appointing Siccaram Baboo to the office of Dewan, and performed the duties of it himself. This conduct ensured him the hatred of the ministers. An army seemed the best security against their ambition and malice; and under the pretext of avenging the encroachments which the Subahdar of the Deccan, the Nizam, according to the English phrase, had made upon the Mahratta territories during the confusions of the government, he levied an army against that neighbouring prince. A union however was formed between the two hostile parties of the Mutseddies; his principal officers were debauched from their allegiance; and through their treachery, he sustained, in an engagement with the Subahdar, a total defeat.¹ To supply his pecuniary necessities, which were extremely urgent, he marched towards the south, to exact a long arrear of Chout from Hyder, and from the Nabob of Arcot. With Hyder he had compromised his claim, by accepting twenty-five lacs of rupees, and ceding to him in return the three provinces of Mudgawarry, Hanscootah, and Chunderdroog. But he was recalled from prosecuting his design against Mohammed Ali, by intelligence, that the ministerial confederacy had raised an army; that they were joined by the forces of the Subahdar; that they had proclaimed the widow of Narrain Roa to be with child; and under pretence of securing her offspring, had carried her to the fort of Poorunder. Ragoba met, and, by a well-concerted stratagem, gained a decisive victory over his foes. But after he was within a few miles of Poona, he was struck with a panic, upon intelligence, that the two chiefs, Holkar and Sindia, were gained by the ministerial party; and quitting his army in secret with a small body of men, he fled to Guzerat, where Govind Rao Guicawar engaged to support him. His army dispersed; Holkar and Sindia, whether previously engaged, or now led to the determination, joined the Brahmen cabal; the widow of Narrain Rao was said to have been delivered of

¹ There was no defeat, for there was no action: there was a very quiet, and on Ragonath's part, a very improvident reconciliation with the Nizam. Capt. Duff has pointed out the source of this error in a dispatch from the British Resident, founded on false information. Duff, ii. 256.—W.

BOOK V. a son ; and the confederacy agreed to support the pretensions of the infant.

CHAP. II.

1775.

The fact of the birth was immediately disputed ; and it is evident that the affirmation of the ministers ought to have been for ever disregarded ; because, whether or not a child was born of the widow, and whether a male or female, their conduct and pretences would have still been the same. By withdrawing the pretended mother from the perception or disinterested witnesses ; and by shutting up with her, as was generally affirmed and believed, a number of pregnant women in the same fort, they rendered it impossible that evidence of the reality of the pretended birth could ever be obtained ; and for that reason it ought never to have been believed.¹

At the time when Ragoba fled to Guzerat, the country was distracted by the rival pretensions of the two brothers Futty Sing Guicawar, and Govind Rao Guicawar. In the time of the Peshwa, Madhoo Rao, Futty Sing, by means it was said of bribes, to the ministerial junto, obtained, through the authority of the Peshwa, succession to the Musnud of Guzerat, in prejudice of his elder brother

¹ This is a very extraordinary argument : it is admitted that the birth of a child was probable, and yet it is asserted, that the fact ought never to have been believed, because it was impossible to prove its occurrence by actual testimony. Even if this were true, it would not be a reasonable ground of disbelief ; but it was not true, for there was abundant evidence ; and although an interest in making out a case may be a reason for receiving such testimony with caution, it is not a valid plea for its utter rejection. Such fastidiousness would render almost every doubtful matter incapable of proof. The present case, however, is wholly mis-stated. There was not only evidence, but unimpeachable evidence. From information furnished by General Briggs, it appears that Ragoba had two Vakeels at Parandhar immediately after the young Peshwa's birth, and his own daughter, Durga Bye, the wife of Pandurang Raji Bhattikar, was in the room at the moment of the infant's birth. She and her husband, with several other persons, had been brought to Parandhar, and were detained there by Nana Furnavese, that there might be no doubt about the birth. Capt. Duff remarks, that the only circumstance which shed any suspicion upon the event, was, the assemblage of several pregnant women in the fortress, with the intention, as it was sometimes reported, that if Gunga Bye should be delivered of a girl, a male child might be substituted for it. An equally plausible report, however, states, that these women were assembled that a wet-nurse might be selected from among them. Whatever was the cause of this arrangement, General Briggs affirms, that neither Ragonath nor his party ever disputed the authenticity of the young Peshwa's birth ; and Capt. Duff also states, that no doubt prevails amongst the Mahrattas that the infant was the child of Narain Rao. The parentage is also confirmed, it is said, by his striking resemblance to his cousin, the Ex-Peshwa Baji Rao. The doubts regarding his birth originated with the imperfect information and credulity of the English authorities at Bombay, and are readily adopted in the text, apparently for no other reason, than the mistaken notion that the ministers were Brahmans.—W.

Govind Rao.¹ When the office of Peshwa, however, devolved upon Ragoba, he acknowledged the title of Govind Rao. Govind Rao proceeded to levy war upon his brother; had gained over him various successes in the field; and was actually besieging him in his capital city of Broderah, when Ragoba came to claim his protection.²

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1775.

It so happened that a similar contention at the same moment divided the kingdom of Berar, and ranged one of the rivals on the side of Ragoba, the other on that of his adversaries. Jannajee, the late Raja, died without issue. He had two brothers, Shabajee the elder, Moodajee the younger. Jannajee, before his demise adopted the son of Moodajee, then a minor, and named him his successor. Shabajee and Moodajee disputed to whom the guardianship of the minor, and the regency of the kingdom, should belong. Shabajee claimed as the elder brother; Moodajee, as the parent of the Raja. And to determine their pretensions they involved the country in a violent and destructive war.³

In looking therefore to the neighbouring powers, there was none from which Ragoba could expect so much support as from the English at Bombay. To them, accordingly, he offered terms of alliance. And there existed circumstances, in the state of that Presidency, which induced the members of the government to lend a favourable ear to his proposals. Salsette and Bassein, with their dependencies, had been strongly coveted for some years. In the letter to the President and Council of Bombay, dated the 18th of March, 1768, the Directors said, "We recommend to you, in the strongest manner to use your endeavours, upon every occasion that may offer, to obtain these places, which we should esteem a valuable acquisition. We cannot directly point out the mode of doing it, but rather wish they could be obtained by purchase than war."⁴ In the following year they expressed high approbation of

¹ The circumstances of the dispute are very differently told by Duff, li. 281.—W.

² To the documents adduced in the Fifth Report, ut supra, add the anecdotes related by a man who had access to the conversation of the best informed of his countrymen, Mr. James Forbes, in his *Oriental Memoirs*, the fifteenth and two subsequent chapters.

³ It was not of long duration, Sabajee was killed in action early in 1775. Mahr. Hist. li. 310.—W.

⁴ Fifth Report, Appendix, No. 47.

BOOK V. an attempt to obtain them by negotiation; and add,
CHAP. II. "Salsette and Bassein, with their dependencies, and the
 1775. Mahrattas' proportion of the Surat provinces, were all that we seek for on that side of India. These are the objects you are to have in view, in all your treaties, negotiations, and military operations,—and that you must be ever watchful to obtain."¹ In more earnest prosecution of the same design, Mr. Mostyn arrived from England, in 1772, with instructions from the Court of Directors, that he should be sent immediately to negotiate with Madhoo Rao, the Peshwa, for certain advantages to the settlements on the coast of Malabar, and above all for the cession of the island and peninsula of Salsette and Bassein, which added so much to the security and value of Bombay. The result of this negotiation tended only to show that, pacifically at least, the coveted spots were very unlikely to be obtained.

In the mean time the Presidency had engaged themselves in a dispute with the Nabob of Baroach, upon whom they advanced a demand for the phoorza, a species of tribute, formerly yielded by Baroach to the government of Surat;² and for indemnification of an overcharge in the customs, which for the six preceding years had been levied on the merchants trading under the Company's protection. The more effectually to enforce the demand, a body of troops was sent to invade the Nabob's territory; but after proceeding so far as to attack his capital, they were obliged to abandon the enterprise, and return to Surat. This expedition the Directors condemned in the severest terms; as involving the Presidency in expense, when it was under the greatest pecuniary difficulties; as unskillfully conducted; as disgracing the Company's arms; and, even if successful, promising no proportional advantage. The supreme authority, weakened by its distance, prevented not the subordinate from raising a new expedition out of the first. The Nabob of Baroach, despairing of his power to resist the arms of the Company, repaired to Bombay, and represented his inability to comply with their heavy demand, amounting to thirty-three lacks of rupees. Among

¹ Fifth Report, p. 60. Extract of a general letter, dated 31st March, 1769.

² Surat was still governed nominally by a Mogul Nabob, who was, however, now, in a great measure, dependent upon the Company.

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1775.

the various expedients to which he had recourse for conciliating the favour of the Bombay administration, and obtaining a mitigation of their claims, he recommended with great assiduity the conquest of Guzerat ; which he represented as easy, and promised to assist them with all his resources. The presidency lent him a very favourable ear. After great discussion, an arrangement was concluded at the end of November, 1771. A species of military alliance ; a sum of four lacks of rupees to be paid by instalments ; the privilege of levying all duties on those who traded under the protection of the Company in the territory of Baroach ; the erection of an English factory ; and exclusion of all other Europeans excepting the Dutch, who had a previous establishment ; were the advantages which the treaty promised to the English. Before the lapse of a year the Presidency began to accuse the Nabob of an intention to elude his agreement. After the question was left undetermined in the Committee, it was decided in the Council, with the censure of the Court of Directors on the former expedition lying before them, to send an armament to chastise the Nabob, and wipe off the former disgrace of their arms. Now indeed the enterprise succeeded ; the Nabob was ruined ; and the Presidency settled the division of the revenues with Futty Sing on the same terms on which they had formerly been shared between the government of Guzerat and the Nabob.

The assassination of Narrain Rao, and the succession of Ragoba, announcing a weak and distracted government, appeared to the Council to present a favourable opportunity for accomplishing an object which their honourable masters had so much at heart, the possession of Salsette and Bassein. In their select consultations, on the 17th of September, 1773, they agreed to instruct Mr. Mostyn, their resident at Poonah, to improve diligently every circumstance favourable to the accomplishment of that event ; and on no account whatever to leave the Mahratta capital. Baroach, and several of the recent acquisitions, as Fort Vittoria, and Rajapore, were offered in exchange. But in their letter to the Directors, of the 12th of January, 1774, the Council declare the disappointment of all their endeavours ; and their opinion that no inducements would prevail upon the Mahrattas willingly to part with those fa-

BOOK V. yourite possessions, so justly the object of the Company's
 CHAP. II. desire. They next represent the violent distractions of
 1775. the Mahratta government; and the opinion, which they
 had received from Mr. Mostyn, that Ragoba would be
 either assassinated, or deposed. With this event, say they,
 "our treaties with the present government may be deemed
 at an end." The violent competitions for the throne, and
 consequent weakness of the state, might afford them, re-
 leased as they would be from all engagements, an opportu-
 nity of acquiring those important possessions by what
 appeared to be the only means of acquiring them, force of
 arms; and they signify to the Court of Directors their de-
 termination not to let the occasion be lost, provided their
 pecuniary situation would permit, and the circumstances
 of Ragoba, which some recent intelligence represented as
 not yet desperate, should be found to be such as the Resi-
 dent described.

After the despatch of this letter, Ragoba had returned
 upon his enemies; gained the victory, already mentioned,¹
 over their forces in the field; fled from his army to Guze-
 rat; and opened a negotiation with the Presidency; when
 towards the end of November, 1774, intelligence was re-
 ceived at Bombay, from the Company's resident at Goa,
 that great preparations were making by the Portuguese
 for the recovery of their lost possessions; and, in particu-
 lar, of Salsette and Bassein. The accomplishment of this
 project appeared to the Presidency not only to cut off all
 chance of making this favourite acquisition for the Com-
 pany, but to give to the Portuguese the command of the
 passes into the interior country, and the power of harass-
 ing, by what imposts and restrictions they pleased, the
 trade of the English. They came, therefore, to the resolu-
 tion preventing, at all events, the fall of Salsette and
 Bassein into the hands of the Portuguese; and, for that
 purpose, regarded no expedient so good as of taking pos-
 session themselves. It was agreed to signify to Ragoba,
 with whom they were treating, that it was a measure
 purely of precaution, and in no respect intended to inter-
 fere with his rights. To avoid an immediate rupture with
 the Mutseddies, the Resident was instructed to make to
 them a similar declaration; and to renounce all intention

¹ Vide supra, p. 604.

of holding Salsette and Bassein in opposition to the will of the existing government at Poona. On the 12th of December a considerable force set out from Bombay ; it carried by assault the principal fort in Salsette on the 28th ; and, without further opposition, took possession of the island.¹

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1775.

The negotiation was not interrupted with Ragoba. The Presidency regarded him as the rightful Peshwa. They expected, and with good reason, that their assistance would place him, without much difficulty, on his throne ; and though he adhered with obstinacy to the possession of Salsette and Bassein, he offered territorial dominion and revenue to a large amount in the neighbourhood of Surat. Amid these proceedings, arrived, on the 7th of December, the letter from the Supreme Council in Bengal, announcing the accession of the new government, and requiring an account of the state of the Presidency of Bombay. It was answered on the 31st, when accounts were rendered of the acquisition of Salsette and Bassein, of the negotiation with Ragoba, the intention of the President and Council to grant him their assistance, and the reasons which guided them in these acts and determinations. In the interval between the adjustment and execution of the treaty with the Ragoba, he was brought to an action by the army of the Ministers ; deserted in the battle by a body of Arabs, on whom he depended, and obliged to fly from the field with a small body of horse. This disaster the majority of the Bombay Council deemed it an easy matter to retrieve ; as Ragoba still had powerful adherents ; as the Ministers were neither united nor strong ; and the union of the English troops with his army would render him more than a match for his opponents. They resolved, therefore, " not to give up the great advantages which they were to reap by the treaty, when so fair an opportunity occurred." Ragoba made his way to Surat, and a treaty was concluded on the 6th of March, 1775, by which he now yielded up Salsette and Bassein, with the Mahratta share of the revenues of Baroach and other places in the district of Surat, to the amount, upon the whole, of a revenue of twenty-two and a half lacks of rupees. His army, with that of Govind Rao, made good

¹ Fifth Report, at *supra*, p. 69.

BOOK V. their retreat to the fort of Copperwange, about fifty coss
CHAP. 11. from Cambay, and were joined by the English, under the
 1775. command of Colonel Keating, on the 19th of April. The detachment consisted of eighty European artillery, and 160 artillery Lascars, 500 European infantry, and 1400 Sepoys, with a field-train of twelve pieces, besides two mortars and several howitzers. The whole amounted to about 25,000 men in arms.¹

The army of the Mutseddies had been deserted by Sindia, with 12,000 of the best horse; Shabbajee Bonsla, who favoured their cause in Berar, had been cut off by his brother, who befriended Ragoba; the fidelity of Holkar was held in doubt; and the Nizam, though he received their concessions, and promised assistance, always evaded performance; but they were still superior in numbers to Ragoba and his allies.

As soon after conjunction as possible, the English commander proposed to advance towards the enemy, who were encamped on the banks of the Sabermatty. After a few indecisive rencounters, finding they could not bring the enemy to a general action, the English, in concert with their allies, resolved to march toward the south, and, penetrating to the Deccan, arrive at Poona before the setting in of the rains. The enemy, as soon as they discovered their intention, laid waste the country in front, and destroyed the wells. At last, on the 18th of May, having reached the plain of Arras, on which they had given Ragoba his recent defeat, they advanced, and commenced a cannonade upon the rear of the English and their ally. The enemy were received with great gallantry; but an officer of Ragoba, having treacherously introduced as partisans a body of hostile cavalry,² between the advanced party of the British army and the line, some confusion ensued, and the first company of European grenadiers, by a mistake of the officer commanding them, began to retreat, and were followed in a panic by the rest of the party. Considerable execution was then performed by the enemy's horse; but so destructive a fire of grape and

¹ Forbes, *Oriental Memoirs*, li. 32.

² Some confusion is said to have arisen from the irregular interposition of Ragoba's horse, but it is not ascribed to treachery by Col. Keating himself. *Hist. of Mahrattas*, li. 299.—W.

shells was immediately poured upon them from the British line, as compelled them to seek their safety by quitting the field. The loss of Europeans, seven officers and eighty men, mostly grenadiers, beside 200 Sepoys, rendered this an expensive victory; while the want of horse, and the backwardness occasioned or excused by the want of pay of the troops of Ragoba, made it impossible, by an active pursuit, to derive from it the advantages it might otherwise have given. The rear of the enemy was attacked in crossing the Nerbuddah, on the 11th of June, where they lost many lives, and were obliged to sink a part of their guns. After this rencounter, they hasted out of the province of Guzerat. And as Ragoba's troops refused to cross the Nerbuddah till they obtained satisfaction in regard to their long arrears, it was resolved, as the season of the rains was at hand, to suspend the progress of the expedition. Dhuboy, a fortified city, about fifty miles from Baroach, convenient for receiving reinforcements and supplies, was selected for quartering the English; while Ragoba encamped with his army at Bellapoor, a pass on the river Dahder, at ten miles distance. The favourable complexion of Ragoba's affairs produced, among other consequences, the alliance of Futty Sing. His overtures were made through the English; and, Govind Rao being previously satisfied by the promises of Ragoba, the terms of a treaty were agreed upon in the month of July. To the English he consented to confirm all the grants within the Guicawar dominions, which had been yielded by Ragoba; and to make further concessions in perpetuity to the annual amount of about one million seventy-eight thousand rupees.¹ To Ragoba he engaged himself for the usual tribute and aid to the Poona durbar; and, what was of unspeakable importance on the present emergency, for the sum of twenty-six lacks of rupees, to be paid in sixty days. The English and Ragoba had thus a prospect of marching to Poona in the next campaign, with a great augmentation of resources, and a friendly country in the rear.²

¹ There is a strange exaggeration: the cessions to the Company were the Gaekwar's share of the revenues of Baroach, and three villages estimated at 2,13,000 rupees.—Hist. of Mah. ii. 303. W.

² Mr. Forbes, who was private secretary to the commanding officer of the British detachment, gives us, though less of the campaign than of other objects, our best particulars, in the chapters xvi. to xx. of his Oriental Memoirs.

BOOK V. We have seen that the Presidency of Bombay informed
 CHAP. II. the Directors by letter, on the 12th of January, 1774, that
 1775. the Mahratta government was in a peculiar crisis, and that
 such an opportunity now occurred of acquiring Salsette
 and Bassein, as they had very little intention of letting
 escape. The Directors, as if anxious to allow time for the
 conquest, replied not till the 12th of April, 1775, when
 their answer could not be received at Bombay in much
 less than two years from the time when the measure was
 announced as on the verge of execution. Nearly six months
 after the place was reduced by their arms, and governed
 by their authority, they sat down to say, "It is with much
 concern we learn from your records, that we are not likely
 to obtain Salsette from the Mahrattas by negotiations.
 We, however, disapprove your resolution to take possession
 of the island by force, in case of the death or deposition
 of Ragoba; and hereby positively prohibit you from
 attempting that measure, under any circumstances what-
 ever, without our permission first obtained for that pur-
 pose."

The letter containing the account of the capture of
 Salsette, and the negotiation with Ragoba, written by the
 Bombay Presidency to the Supreme Council, on the 31st
 of December, was not received at Calcutta till the begin-
 ning of March. Before that time, however, intelligence
 from various quarters had reached them of the fate of
 Salsette; and they had written letters to Bombay,
 reprehending the Council, in severe terms, for delay-
 ing to send more complete information. Vested with
 a control over the other presidencies, not well defined, and,
 by consequence, ill-understood, the Supreme Council were
 jealous of every appearance of an attempt to originate
 important measures independently of their authority.
 This jealousy, and a desire to carry their own importance
 high, distinguished the party in the new Council, which
 now, by force of numbers, engrossed the powers of the
 government. They looked, therefore, with a very evil eye
 upon the audacity which, in a subordinate Presidency, so
 near the time when the Supreme Council were to assume
 the reins of government, ventured upon so great a mea-

¹ Fifth Report, App. No. 54. They, notwithstanding, failed not to approve
 of the acquisition when made. See p. 437, below.

sure as the conquest of Salsette, without waiting to be authorized by their sanction, or deterred by their prohibition. The letter from Bombay was answered on the 8th of March, with a dry remark, that all observations on the capture of Salsette were rendered useless by the tardiness of the information. The Council, however, declared their express disapprobation of the connexion with Ragoba; and two days after the treaty with that chieftain was signed, commanded that all negotiation with him should be suspended till further instructions were received. On the 31st of May, arrived from the President and Council of Bombay a letter dated the 31st of March, with information of the conclusion of the treaty with Ragoba, and the departure of the troops for his support. On this occasion, the Governor-General took the lead in the condemnation of the President and Council of Bombay; denouncing their procedure as "unseasonable, impolitic, unjust, and unauthorized;" and he proposed, that they should be peremptorily enjoined to cancel the treaty, and to withdraw the troops immediately from assisting Ragoba, except in the three following cases:—"1. That they should have obtained any decisive advantages over the enemy; 2. That they should be in such a situation as might render it dangerous to retreat; 3. That a negotiation should have taken place between Ragoba and his opponents." The Governor-General afterwards professed that he had gone beyond his real sentiments in these terms of condemnation, in hopes to moderate by that means the violence of the opposite party. In this expectation, if ever formed, he found himself deceived. The majority passed two resolutions, which form as singular a combination as the history of practical politics presents. They voted the condemnation of the treaty with Ragoba, and the immediate recall of the troops, subject to no consideration whatever but that of their safety. And they voted that a negotiation should be immediately opened with the Mutseddies, to arrange a treaty of peace, and obtain confirmation of Salsette and Bassein. They condemned the President and Council of Bombay, for taking part in the quarrels of the Mahrattas, and for declaring for one party in opposition to another. They themselves performed what they themselves condemned, and were most effect-

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1775.

BOOK V. ally and irresistibly declaring in favour of the ministers
 CHAP. II. against Ragoba. Other negotiators proceed to discussion
 1775. with as fair a colour on their pretensions as they can, and
 as much power in their hands as they are able to retain :
 not that honourable men will aim at advantages which are
 unreasonable and unjust ; but that they may be secure
 from the necessity of submitting to any thing which is
 unreasonable and unjust. The English rulers began with
 declaring themselves to be in the wrong, and stripping
 their hands of power ; as preliminaries to a negotiation
 with a people uniformly insolent and rapacious in propor-
 tion to their strength ; who never heard the proposal of a
 concession but as an avowal of weakness ; and could not
 conceive that any government ever yielded any thing
 which it was able to retain. Of all the courses which it
 was in the power of the Supreme Council to pursue, they
 made choice of that which was decidedly the worst. By
 fulfilling the treaty with Ragoba, they would have easily
 established his authority, and obtained the important con-
 cessions to which he had agreed. If they resolved, as they
 did, to countenance the ministers, they might, at any rate,
 have made their terms before they exalted their preten-
 sions by the annihilation of the power which would have
 made them compliant. And if they had inclined to act
 the part of really useful and pacific neighbours, they might
 have arbitrated between the parties with decisive and
 happy effect.

The Supreme Council resolved to treat with the minis-
 ters at Poona by an agent of their own, without the inter-
 vention of the Presidency of Bombay, in whose depart-
 ment the Mahratta country was situated, and who were
 best acquainted with the character and circumstances of
 the people.¹ Colonel Upton, who was selected for the
 service, departed on the 17th of July, with letters to
 Siccaram Baboo, as head of the ministerial party ; and
 with instructions to insist upon Salsette and Bassein, as
 indispensable conditions in the agreement which was pro-
 posed. It is worthy of remark, that he was furnished also
 with a letter to Ragoba, which was to be presented to that

¹ The ignorance respecting the Mahrattas, of the Supreme Council, at this time, even of Mr. Hastings, not to speak of Mr. Francis and his party, is very conspicuous in the Minutes of their Consultations.

Prince, in case of his success ; and then to form an introduction to a negotiation.

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1776.

A letter from the Governor and Council of Bombay, dated the 22nd of August, reached the Supreme Council in the beginning of October. These rulers complained severely of the disgrace which was thrown upon their Presidency, by compelling them to violate a solemn treaty, and depriving them of the power of negotiating with the neighbouring states. Such a loss of dignity in a great branch of the government could not fail, they said, to affect injuriously the interests of the Company. They denied that they had been guilty of any wilful disrespect to the Supreme Council. The nature of the circumstances required that they should act without delay ; the possession of Salsette and Bassein, required that they should declare in favour of one of the Mahratta parties ; and many considerations induced them to give the preference to Ragoba. They pointed out the unhappy effects, even upon the negotiation with the ministers, which would result from the recall of the troops, and the ruin of Ragoba ; and stated that they had deputed to Calcutta a member of their Board, upon whose representations they still hoped, that their treaty would be executed, and that the great advantages of the connexion with Ragoba would not be thrown away. Their deputy displayed both zeal and ability, in his endeavours to make an impression upon the Council. But the majority adhered to their first determinations. Colonei Upton was, however, instructed to make some stipulations in favour of Ragoba : and the Presidency at Bombay was authorized to afford a sanctuary, in case of personal danger, to himself, his family and attendants. That Presidency was also directed, notwithstanding the breach of the treaty with Ragoba, to retain possession of the districts which had been yielded by Futty Sing, till the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace.

The Council had for some time been waiting with impatience for the account of the arrival of their negotiator at Poona. In the beginning of January, 1776, they received letters from the ministers, which contained a commentary on the policy of annihilating Ragoba, at the moment of commencing a negotiation with his enemies.

BOOK V. These letters displayed a high tone of complaint, and
CHAP. II. even of menace. They expressed a disinclination, on the
 1776. part of the ministers, to submit their pretensions to discussion; and threatened a renewal of hostilities, unless the places which had been taken were immediately restored.

Letters, dated the 5th of January, received from Colonel Upton on the 12th of February, announced his arrival at Poona, and a favourable reception. Other letters received on the 6th of March, and dated on the 2nd of February, brought information of difficulties impeding the negotiation. "The ministers imagine," says Colonel Upton, "that I must treat with them at any rate:—And that I have vastly exceeded my instructions, by asking a surrender of Salsette and Bassein." "They ask me," says he, "a thousand times, Why we make such professions of honour! How disapprove the war entered into by the Bombay government; when we are so desirous of availing ourselves of the advantages of it?" Despairing of compliance with all his demands, the Colonel proposed to relax in the affair of Bassein, and to ask for something else in its stead.¹

On the 7th of March, a letter dated the 7th of February arrived; and announced that the negotiation was broken off. The ministers insisted upon an immediate renunciation of Salsette, and would not allow so much as time for consulting the government. "In five or six days more," says the Colonel, "I am to leave Poona Dhur, and they will then fix the time for the expiration of the cessation of arms. I told them, I expected time to advise all our settlements before the renewal of the war; but I suspect them of taking every advantage." He added, which confirmed the representations made in defence of the connexion with Ragoba, "If three or four companies of Europeans, a small detachment from the corps of artillery, and two or three battalions of Sepoys, were embarked from Bengal to join the army from Bombay, we might soon command peace on our own terms. For the chiefs of this country are quite at a loss which side to take; and are waiting to see what the English do."²

¹ Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 102.

² Ibid. 105.

Upon this intelligence, the Council hastened to prepare for war on the largest scale. They resolved, "to support the cause of Ragoba with the utmost vigour; and with a general exertion of the whole power of the English arms in India; to act in all quarters at once; and, by the decision and rapidity of their proceedings, to bring the war, if possible, to a speedy conclusion:" And all this, (namely, a war with the ministers, and alliance with Ragoba, the very measure for which they condemned the Presidency at Bombay,) rather than restore Salsette, the capture of which, and the alliance for its support, they had denounced as both impolitic and unjust!

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1776.

At the conclusion, however, of the month, another letter from Colonel Upton was received. This letter brought intelligence of the final compliance of the ministers on the subject of Salsette. Warlike preparations were then suspended, and a treaty was at last arranged. The English renounced Bassein, and agreed to renounce the cessions in Guzerat, provided it appeared, as the ministers maintained, that Futty Sing was not entitled to make them. The Mahrattas yielded Salsette, and the small adjacent islands, of 3,500,000 rupees revenues;¹ the Mahratta chout, or share of the revenues of Baroach, amounting to an equal sum; and a country of three lacs in the neighbourhood of Baroach. The members of the Bombay government compared these with the terms which *they* had obtained from Ragoba; and proclaimed their disapprobation. The concession with respect to Baroach, they said, was pretended and delusive, as the Mahrattas had no right to any share of its revenues. The ceded territory, not being jaghire, or free from Mahratta burdens, would be a source of continual disturbance. The relinquishment of the cessions in Guzerat was weakly made upon an unfounded pretence, which actually gave the Guicawar an interest to disclaim the right in dispute: and, upon the whole, the treaty was highly injurious to the reputation, honour, and interests of the Company. The majority in the Supreme Council grounded the defence of their mea-

¹ This is not quite correct, and the sum, if not a misprint, a gross exaggeration. Salsette was to be retained or restored at the pleasure of the Governor-General and Council; if restored, the Peishwa was to cede territory to an equal value of three lacs of rupees.—W

BOOK V. sures upon the utility of peace ; and the frequent commands of the Directors to abstain from aggressive war.¹
 CHAP. II.

1776.

It had been stipulated that Ragoba should disband his army within one month ; receive an establishment of 1000 horse, to be paid and relieved at the pleasure of government, and, of course, to act as his gaolers and guards ; enjoy a pension of three lacks of rupees per annum, and reside at an appointed place of abode. With these terms, which he represented as placing him in the hands of his enemies, Ragoba declared his resolution not to comply ; and having requested an asylum in one of the Company's settlements, he was promised, under the license formerly granted, a sanctuary for himself and his attendants, by the Governor and Council of Bombay. The Mutseddies complained of this act of protection to Ragoba ; and alarmed the ruling party in the Supreme Council with menaces that they would renounce the treaty, and betake themselves to war. After violent debates in the Supreme Council, and great diversity of opinion, it was decided by the majority, to condemn the offer made by the President and Council of Bombay of their protection to Ragoba ; and to forbid them to receive that chieftain at any of the settlements within the limits of their government. The apprehensions of his enemies were soon after allayed by the defection of his troops. And he retired to Surat with only 200 attendants.

After considerable delay, and a variety of mutual complaints on the part of the Bombay Presidency and the ministers at Poona, the treaty was signed, and transmitted by Colonel Upton to Calcutta, on the 3rd of June, 1776. It is peculiarly worthy of notice and remembrance, that intelligence of the conclusion of this affair had not reached the Supreme Council, when letters arrived from the Court of Directors, applauding the treaty which the Presidency of Bombay had formed with Ragoba ; and commanding their government of Bengal to co-operate for its fulfilment and confirmation. " We approve," they say, " under every circumstance, of the keeping of all the territories and possessions ceded to the Company by the treaty concluded with Ragoba ; and direct that you forthwith adopt such

¹ See Fifth Report, *ut supra*, p. 24—29, and 60—88, with the corresponding articles in the Appendix.

measures as may be necessary for their preservation and defence.”¹

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1776.

During these transactions, the attention of the Supreme Council was not attracted by any great event, towards the powers on the north-western frontier of the Company's empire. In Oude, Asoff ud Dowla, the new Nabob, had entered upon his government with an exhausted treasury. He was oppressed by the debts due to the Company, and by their importunate demands of payment; his troops were mutinous for want of pay; his inability to maintain them had produced a reduction of his army; he had dismissed the ministers of his father, and surrounded himself with favourites; distraction prevailed in his family and his government; his character was vicious and weak; and every commotion on his frontier alarmed the Supreme Council for the safety of his dominions. Flying parties of the Mahrattas harassed the neighbouring countries; and reports of more formidable enterprises excited the apprehensions of both the Nabob and his English friends. During the summer of 1776, it was rumoured that a league had been formed by the Emperor, the Mahrattas, the Seiks, and the Rohillas, to invade the dominions of Asoff ud Dowla. And the Governor-general urged the expediency of forming an alliance with Nujuf Khan, to lessen the danger of such an association. After the expedition against Zabita Khan, and the admission of the Mahrattas into Delhi, this leader, through the artifice of a favourite, had fallen into disgrace with his master, and been reduced to the brink of ruin. The necessity of the Emperor's affairs, and even the recommendation of Suja-ad-dowla and the English, again restored him to favour; and, in 1773, he engaged in a war with the Jaats, under an understanding that he should retain one-half of the territory he should conquer, and resign the other to the Emperor. He had prevailed over the Jaats in the field, and recovered the fort and city of Agra, at the time when the agreement was made, between the Emperor, and Vizir, to join in the war against the Rohillas. After his return from Rohileund, he prosecuted his war with the Jaats; and having driven them, though he was exceedingly distressed for pecuniary means, from the open country, he was besieging the strong

¹ Fifth Report, ut supra, App. No. 137. Compare p. 430, above.

BOOK V. fortress of Deig ; which, after an obstinate resistance,
CHAP. II. yielded to his arms, at the time when the situation of the
 1776. neighbouring powers recommended a connexion with him to the English rulers. The discharge, however, of Sumroo, and a few Frenchmen, from his service, was made an indispensable preliminary ; and as he alleged the danger at that moment of sending them to increase the power of his enemies, though he professed the strongest desire to comply with the wishes of the Company, the alliance was for the present obstructed and postponed. The anxiety of Asoff ud Dowla to receive from the Emperor, what still, it seems, was a source of illustration and an object of ambition, the office, though now only nominal, of Vizir, was kept on the rack by various interruptions ; by competitors strongly supported, particularly the Nizam, and by the disinclination of the imperial mind. The peshcush, however, or appropriate offering, with five thousand men and some artillery, which the Nabob sent to attend the Emperor, arrived at a critical moment, when Zabita Khan had not only evaded payment of the revenue for the country which he possessed, but had taken up arms to support his disobedience ; had gained a victory over the Emperor's forces, and was upon the point of becoming master of Delhi, and of the fate of its lord. The troops of Asoff ud Dowla appeared in time to save this catastrophe, and an imperial representation, in requital of this service, was soon after despatched, to invest the Nabob with the Kelât. By interference, however, of the commander of the Nabob's detachment, whom Zabita Khan had duly bribed, the helpless Emperor was obliged to confirm that disobedient chief in the territory which he held, and even to remit those arrears of tribute which formed the subject of dispute.¹

During the period of those transactions, affairs of a different description had deeply engaged the attention of the Supreme Council, and excited the most violent dissensions. So early as the month of December, 1774, a petition had been presented by the Ranee of Burdwan. This was the title of the widow of Tillook Chund, lately deceased, who, under the title of Raja, had enjoyed the Zemindary of the

¹ Report, ut supra, p. 97, 98, and App. No. 158 to 168. Also Scott's *Aurangzebe's Successors*, p. 249—267.

district, and whose ancestors, as the representatives of its ancient Rajas, had enjoyed it in succession through the whole period of Mohammedan sway. Her son, a minor of only nine years of age, had been nominated to the office upon the death of his father; and a considerable share of the power had at first passed into her hands. Afterwards, by the authority of the English Government, the young Raja was withdrawn from the guardianship of the Ranee, and the affairs of the Zemindary were intrusted to administrators of English appointment. She now complained of corrupt administration on the part of the Dewan, or chief agent of the Zemindary, and accused the English Resident of supporting him in his iniquity, for the sake of the bribes with which the Dewan took care to engage him. The more numerous party in the Council decreed that the Dewan should be compelled to render an account of his administration; that the Ranee, agreeably to her petition, should be allowed to repair to Calcutta with her son; and, as no inquiry into the conduct of the Dewan could be successfully performed while he retained power over the persons and papers of his office, that a temporary substitute should occupy his place. These resolutions, the Governor-General, accompanied by Mr. Barwell, opposed. The Governor-General said, that the presence of the Ranee at Calcutta, whom he described as a troublesome, violent woman, would be not only unnecessary, but inconvenient; that the removal of the Dewan from his office before any guilt was proved, would be a violation of justice;¹ and the appointment to that office of persons whose qualifications had not been tried, a total departure from policy and prudence. On the 6th of January, 1775, a letter was received from the Resident, against whom the accusations of the Ranee were directed. It was drawn up in a very lofty style; the writer celebrated his own virtues; ascribed a bad character to the Ranee; and expressed the highest indignation

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1776.

¹ Wherein lay the difference between this case, and that of Mohammed Reza Khan, and the Raja Shitabroy?—M.

There is a material difference as far as Hastings is concerned; the arrest of Mohammed Reza Khan was ordered by the Court of Directors, and that of Shitab Roy followed as a consequence of the same instructions. Hastings was new in the Government, and had little time to form his own opinion on the case. All he had to do was to institute the inquiry as commanded; with more opportunities of acquiring an acquaintance with the merits of the case, or uncontrolled by positive instructions, he might have followed a course more consonant to his own notions of justice.—W.

BOOK V. that she had the audacity to prefer an accusation against him. He professed his readiness to submit his conduct to examination; but required, that security should first be

CHAP. II.

1776.

demanded of the Ranee to pay an equivalent penalty, in case she failed in the proof of her charges. The pretext for this condition was, its alleged conformity to the laws of the country. To stifle complaint, and to screen misrule, were its natural effect; and, upon this consideration, the majority of the Council refused to impose it.¹ A variety of accounts were presented to the Board, in which were entered several sums of considerable amounts, as paid by the Dewan to the servants of the Company and their dependants, not only upon the appointment of the young Raja, but also upon that of his Dewan. Not less than 3,20,975 rupees were charged to the account of the Resident, his banyan, and cash-keeper. Mr. Hastings, himself, was accused of receiving 15,000 rupees,² and his banyan, or native secretary, 4,500; and the whole of the sums represented as thus distributed among the Company's servants, since the death of the deceased Raja, amounted to 9,36,497 rupees.³ The authenticity of these accounts was called in question by the parties whom they affected; and everything is doubtful which rests upon the authority of Indian witnesses, under strong temptations to depart from truth. Enough does not appear to condemn any individual. Enough appears to render it not doubtful that money was upon this occasion received by the Company's servants; and enough does not appear to exculpate any individual against whom the charge was advanced. Mr. Hastings now

¹ The execution of such a deed was not unusual, and the object was to put some check upon false and calumnious charges. It should have been noticed, in justice to Mr. Graham, the Resident at Burdwan, that he not only wrote the indignant denial, so slightly adverted to, but he subsequently furnished a categorical reply to the Rani's petition, which, if it was not a most enormous falsehood, demonstrated the utter impossibility of the truth of her allegations, as affecting him. He could have had very little time to interfere with the affairs of the Zemindaree, as he was transferred to Hoogly within three months after the Raja's death, and had quitted Burdwan within six weeks of that event. On the other hand, the Rani antedates the Raja's death three years, in order to make it appear that the Resident had had ample opportunities of extorting money from her. Mr. Graham's change of appointment must have been too generally known for him to have misstated it, and the inaccuracy of the petition is too glaring to have been accidental. It furnishes an undeniable proof of the spirit of the petition. Eleventh Report, App. 740.—W.

² The very smallness of the sum exonerates Hastings from all credible imputation of having received it, and no proof whatever was attempted to establish the charge.—W.

³ Ninth Report of the Select Committee, App. 111.

lost his tone of calmness and forbearance. He accused the party in the Council, by whom he was opposed, of a design to supersede him in his authority, and to drive him from his office. He pronounced them to be his accusers, parties to the cause against him, and therefore disqualified to sit as judges upon his conduct. He declared that he would not summon or hold councils for "a triumph over himself." He proposed that whatever inquisition they might choose to make into his conduct, they should make it in a Committee,¹ where his absence would save his station and character from degradation and insult; and he declared it to be his resolution to dissolve the Council, as often as they should enter upon any criminating inquiry against himself. An occasion soon presented itself for putting his threat in execution. The resolution to compliment the Rance with the usual insignia of office, he pronounced an insult to himself: declared the Council dissolved, and quitted the chair. The majority resolved that a vote of adjournment could, as all other votes, be passed only by a plurality of the voices present; that if this was not the law, the Governor-general was despotic; and that the right which he claimed was a right of impunity. They voted the first member of the Council into the chair, and continued their proceedings.

On the 30th of March, 1775, another accusation occupied the attention of the Board. In a representation received from one of the natives, it was set forth, that the Phoujdar of Hoogly was paid by the Company 72,000 ru-

¹ It is important to notice this proposition. Hastings never objected to inquiry; all he maintained, and judiciously maintained, even if he could have relied upon the impartial judgment of the majority of the Council, was the inconsistency and indignity of permitting the head of the Government to be accused in person, during a sitting of the Council over which he presided, by every individual who chose to charge him, truly or falsely, with acts unworthy of his place and power. He objected, rationally and soundly, to the degradation which could not fail to attend the Governor-General's either silently listening to the oburgations of a private person, or entering into an altercation with him. It was certain of bringing himself and his office into contempt. For the purposes of truth and justice, it was wholly unnecessary. It was easy and efficacious for the Council to resolve themselves into a committee, as Hastings recommended, to receive information, and carry on inquiry to any extent they pleased; and had the result established the guilt of the Governor, the Supreme Court of Judicature, or the Court of Directors, were the authorities empowered to inflict punishment. In their resistance to this decorous and effective course, they showed that they sought truth less than the disgrace and mortification of their opponent. The unyielding firmness and calm resolution with which Hastings baffled their unworthy attempts, are amongst the most remarkable circumstances in his history.—W.

BOOK V. CHAP. II. 1776. pees as the annual salary of his office ; that out of this sum, however, he paid annually to Mr. Hastings 36,000 rupees, together with 4,000 to Mr. Hastings' native secretary, reserving only 32,000 rupees to himself ; and that the author of this representation would undertake the duties of the office for this reduced allowance, producing an annual saving to the Company of 40,000 rupees, now corruptly received by Mr. Hastings and his banyan. The first debate which rose upon this information regarded the competence of the Board to entertain such complaints. Mr. Hastings' party, consisting of Mr. Barwell and himself, opposed the reception of any accusations against any individual of the Board ; and referred to the courts of justice. The major party deemed it an important article of the duty of the Supreme Council to control abuses, and not least in the hands of those who had the greatest power to commit them. It is no sufficient check, upon those who are intrusted with power, to be amenable for legal crimes in a court of justice. The analogies of the most vulgar trust shed light upon the highest. Who would endure a servant, pretending that his conduct ought not to be challenged but in a court of justice ; his trust modified, or withdrawn, till after the judicial proof of a legal crime ?¹ When this plea was overruled, and the Council were about to enter upon the investigation, Mr. Hastings declared that "he would not sit to be confronted with such accusers, nor to *suffer* a judicial inquiry into his conduct, at the Board of which he is President." As formerly, he pronounced the Council dissolved ; and the majority continued their proceedings in his absence. Two letters of the Phoujdar in question were produced in evidence ; and two witnesses were examined. The Phoujdar himself was summoned to answer. At first he alleged excuses for delay. When he did appear, he declined examination upon oath, on the pretence that to persons of his rank it was a degradation to confirm their testimony by that religious ceremony. In this scrupulosity, he was strongly supported by Mr. Hastings ; but the majority construed it into a contempt of the Board, and dismissed the Phouj-

¹ The analogy does not hold. What servant would endure that his fellow and inferior servants should erect themselves to a tribunal over him, to the exclusion of an authority superior to both ?—W.

dar from his office, which they conferred, not upon the accusing petitioner, but another individual, at one-half of the preceding salary, 36,000 rupees.¹ The majority of the Council esteemed the evidence of the charge complete. The party of the Governor-general, representing the testimony of the natives of India when they have any motive to falsify, as little worthy of trust, and the known disposition of the leading party in the Council as holding forth inducement to accuse, affirmed that the evidence had no title to regard. The eagerness of the Governor-general to stifle, and his exertions to obstruct inquiry, on all occasions where his conduct came under complaint, constituted in itself an article of proof, which added materially to the weight of whatever came against him from any other source.²

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1776.

Another ground of charge presented itself in the following manner. On the 2nd of May, 1775, Mr. Grant, accountant to the provincial council of Moorshedabad, produced to the board a set of accounts, relating to the affairs of the Nabob; and stated that he had received them from a native, now in his own service, who had till lately been a clerk in the treasury office of the Nabob. From these accounts it appeared that Munny Begum, since her appointment to the superintendence of the Nabob's person and affairs, had received 9,67,693 rupees, over and above what she appeared to have disbursed or had accounted for. Upon examination of Mr. Grant, and of the clerk from whom the accounts were received, the majority of the council were induced to regard them as authentic. Among

¹ Nothing can be weaker than the whole of this case, nothing more strikingly illustrative of the unfitness of the majority of the Council to assume judicial powers. The accusation came from a person of no repute or station, who sought to obtain the appointment for himself. The letters calling for payment for purposes not avowed, contain no allusion to Hastings whatever. Of the two persons to whom the letter was addressed, only one was examined, a discarded servant of the Foujdar, who did not understand the language (Persian) of the letter, and who gave no testimony as to the fact of the money having been given. The Foujdar, when before the Council, did not refuse to answer, although he objected to being sworn, from a feeling well known to be common amongst natives of respectability,—no proof of the money having been ever offered, given, or accepted, was attempted, but the Foujdar was dismissed from his appointment abruptly, solely on the ground of his objection to an oath. See the whole of the proceedings in the Appendix to the Eleventh Report. K.—W.

² As already pointed out, he did not obstruct inquiry; he only resisted the indecorous mode in which, for factious purposes, its institution was attempted.—W.

BOOK V.
CHAP. II.

1776.

other circumstances, it was stated by the clerk that the head eunuch of the Begum, the person who stood highest in her confidence, had endeavoured, upon hearing of such accounts in the hands of the clerk, to prevail upon him, by the prospect of rewards and advantages, to restore the papers, and return to the service of the Begum; and Mr. Grant was ready to state upon his oath that similar attempts had been made upon himself. The party opposed to the Governor-General thought the circumstances sufficiently strong to render inquiry necessary, and to authorize the steps which inquiry demanded. They proposed, that a servant of the Company should immediately be sent to Moorsshedabad, invested with a proper commission and powers; and that the Begum, for the investigation of whose conduct no satisfactory evidence could be procured, while she retained authority over the officers and servants of the Nabob, should be divested of her power. The Governor-General, on the other hand, questioned the authority of the papers, resisted the proposal to inquire into the accounts of the Begum, and protested against removing her from her office, while no proof of her misconduct was adduced.¹ By decision, however, of the majority, Mr. Goring was despatched for the investigation; the power of the Begum was withdrawn; and Raja Gourlass, the son of Nuncomar, Dewan, or principal Minister of the Begum, received the temporary charge of the Nabob's affairs. Inquiry seemed to establish the authenticity of the papers. The Begum, when pressed to account for the balance with which she was charged, stated, among other circumstances, that 1,50,000 rupees had been given to Mr. Hastings, under the name of entertainment-money, when he went to Moorsshedabad in 1772, and placed her at the head of the Nabob's establishment. She also represented, that, on the same occasion, 1,50,000 rupees had been given by her as a present to Mr. Middleton. Of the sum thus delivered to Mr. Middleton (for the receipt of it was never denied), no account was ever rendered, and no defence was ever set up. Mr. Hastings justified the receipt of what was bestowed upon himself, on the several pleas, that the act of parliament which prohibited presents was not then passed, that such allowances were the common custom of the country,

¹ Another contrast to the case of Mohammed Reza Khan.

that a Nabob of Bengal received on the same account 1000 rupees a day as often as he visited the Governor in Calcutta, that he added nothing to his fortune by this allowance, and must have charged to the Company a sum as large, if this had not been received.¹ Upon part of this it is necessary to remark, that custom, the custom of a country, where almost every thing was corrupt, affords but a sorry defence; that if a visit to the Nabob was a thing of so much expense it ought not to have been made without an adequate cause; that no adequate cause, if the receipt of the present be excluded, can any where be found; that for the necessity of a great expense on such a visit, or indeed of any extraordinary expense at all, we have barely the assertion of the Governor-General, which being the assertion of a party making out a case in his own defence, and an assertion opposed to probability, possesses but little of the force of proof. Besides, the amount is enormous; 2000 rupees per day; 7,30,000 rupees, or 73,000*l.* per annum. What should have made living at Moorsshedabad cost the Governor-General at the rate of 73,000*l.* per annum? And why should the Nabob, whose allowance was understood to be cut down to the lowest point, have been oppressed by so enormous a burden? Another consideration of importance is, that when Mr. Hastings received the sum of one lack and half of rupees for entertainment-money, he at the same time charged to the Company a large sum, 30,000 rupees and upwards, as travelling charges, and a great additional amount for his colleagues and attendants.² The complaints of severe usage to the Begum, advanced both by herself and by Hastings, appear to have had no other foundation than the loss of her office; an office which the majority considered her sex as disqualifying her to fill; and to which they treated her appointment as one of the errors or crimes of the preceding administration.³

¹ See defence of Mr. Hastings at the Bar of the Lords.

² Minutes of Evidence on the Trial, p. 1048.—M. The charges were for twelve months, and in general they are not immoderate with reference to Indian customs and modes of travelling: at most they involve only the charge of want of economy, and an inefficient control over the disbursements of servants and dependants.—W.

³ The sum for expenses, whether too much or not, was acknowledged and carried to account. The further sums asserted to have been given, were never proved. With that said to have been given to Mr. Middleton, Hastings had no concern. Of the spirit in which these charges were made, the proceedings are sufficient evidence. Upon the production of the accounts fur-

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

1776.

Of the different charges, however, brought against the Governor-General, those which were produced by the Raja Nuncomar were attended with the most remarkable circumstances. From this personage, whom we have seen Phoujdar of Hoogly, minister of the Nabob Jaffier Khan, the agent of Mr. Hastings in the prosecution of Mohammed Reza Chan, and whose son was appointed Dewan of the household to the Nabob, which son it was regulated and ordained that he should guide, a paper was delivered on the 11th of March, which, besides accusing the Governor-General of overlooking the proof of vast embezzlements committed by Mohammed Reza Khan and Shitabroy, and acquitting them in consideration of large sums of money by which he was bribed, exhibited the particulars of a sum amounting to 3,54,105 rupees, which, it affirmed, the Governor-General accepted, for the appointment of Munny Begum, and Goordass, to their respective dignities and powers. In prosecution of the opinion of the majority, that it was the duty of the Supreme Council to inquire into the charges which were brought against the members of the government, and to control the conduct even of the highest officers of state, it was on the 13th proposed, that Nuncomar should be summoned to appear before them and called upon to produce the grounds of his accusation

nished by Mr. Grant, it was at once determined to dispossess the Begum of her authority, and to call upon her for the whole of the public and private accounts for the preceding eight years. Mr. Goring was sent merely to enforce the delivery of those accounts, and he was directed to hand them over to the Provincial Council, Messrs. Maxwell, Anderson, and Grant, who were at the same time instructed to examine them minutely. It would have been but decent to have awaited the result of this examination, and a scrutiny so conducted, although involving a little delay, would have been most favourable to the ascertainment of the truth. Mr. Goring, however, paid little attention to his instructions. He did not leave Calcutta until after the 10th of May, and went to Nadiya by water—a voyage of five or six days at least; a few hours by dawk carried him to Moorsshedabad, but he could not have arrived there much before the 20th: on the 22nd, he despatches to Calcutta memorandums of disbursements to English gentlemen, to Mr. Hastings for an entertainment, rupees 1,50,000; to Mr. Middleton on account of an agreement with Baboo Begum, a similar sum. It was very reasonable for Hastings to remark, as the commission given to Mr. Goring was to receive from the Begum all the accounts of the Nizamut for eight years past, and to deliver them into the hands of gentlemen appointed to examine and report their contents to the Board—"I desire that Mr. Goring be asked in what manner he came by the account he has now sent, and on what account this partial selection was made by him." The answer may easily be supplied: the narrative of his proceedings shows that he came by the account by intimidation,—and that the object of the selection was the inculcation of Hastings. Eleventh Report, App. E.—W.

Mr. Hastings, instead of choosing to confront his accuser, and to avail himself of the advantage of innocence, in hearing and challenging the pretences of a false accusation, resisted inquiry. "Before the question is put," says his Minute, "I declare that I will not suffer Nuncomar to appear before the Board as my accuser. I know what belongs to the dignity and character of the first member of this administration. I will not sit at this Board in the character of a criminal. Nor do I acknowledge the members of this Board to be my judges. I am reduced, on this occasion, to make the declaration that I regard General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, as my accusers." The Governor-General, with Mr. Barwell, again recommended prosecution at law, not inquiry before the Council, as the mode of investigating his conduct. Again he pronounced the Council dissolved, and, together with Mr. Barwell, quitted the Board. Again the majority voted this form of dissolution void, and continued the inquiry. Nuncomar made positive declaration as to the sums which he himself had paid to the Governor; gave in the names of several persons who were privy to the transactions; and presented a letter, in purport from Munny Begum to himself, of which the seal, upon comparison, by the Persian translator and his moonshee, was declared to be authentic; and in which a gift was stated of two lacks to the Governor from herself. Upon this evidence, the Governor was called upon to refund to the Company the money which he had thus illegally received. But he refused to acknowledge the majority as a council, and returned no answer.

Nothing surely can be more inadmissible than the pretences of the Governor-General for stifling inquiry. What he alleged was, the dignity of the accused, and the baseness of the accuser. If the dignity in the accused be a sufficient objection to inquiry, the responsibility of the leading members of every government is immediately destroyed; all limitation of their power is ended; and all restraint upon misconduct is renounced. If the character of the accuser is bad, so much the greater is the advantage of the accused; because so much the more easy it is to counterbalance the evidence of his testimony. So great may be the improbability of a charge, and so little the

BOOK V.
CHAP. II.
1776.

BOOK V. value of an accuser's testimony, that the first may outweigh the latter, and preclude the propriety of any further research. But where the case is in any degree different

CHAP. II.

1776.

from this, the character of the informer is not a sufficient objection to inquiry. It is often from men of the worst character that the most important intelligence is most likely to be received; and it is only necessary, in receiving it, to make those abatements of belief which the character of the informant may appear to require. Perpetual reference to the courts of law, as the only place where inquiry into the conduct of an officer of government could fitly be made, merits the highest condemnation; because the conduct of a member of government may be evil to almost any degree, may involve his country in ruin, and yet may be incapable of being touched by courts of law, constituted and conducted as those of England. It is another species of superintendence and control which must ensure good conduct in those who are vested with great public trusts. In disclaiming the majority for his judges, the Governor availed himself of an ambiguity in the word. They did not undertake the office of judgment. They only held it their duty to inquire, for the benefit of those who might afterwards judge.¹

In this case, the Governor-general was not satisfied with crying out against inquiry. He took the extraordinary resolution of prosecuting, with all the weight of his autho-

¹ The question is not fairly stated. The comparative rank of the accused and the accuser was not alleged as an objection to the hearing of the accusation—it was the incompatibility of choosing a meeting of the Council as the scene of such a procedure—the necessary consequence of which was the privation of the head of the state of all respect and authority. A still stronger objection, however, lies to the tribunal. Whatever might be professed, the members of the Council were necessarily converted into judges the moment an accusation was pleaded before them on one side, and defended on the other. Hastings must either have admitted the charge in silence, or replied to it,—in either case the other members of the Council would have come to a resolution on the proceedings, they would to all intents and purposes have pronounced judgment. They would have assumed a power which they did not possess, and to the exercise of which it was right therefore at once to object. The general principle is incontrovertible, but in the present instance it is evident that such a course was most unlikely to promote the cause of truth. Had the governor acknowledged his colleagues as his judges, what measure of justice was he to expect at their hands. Had they been calm, prudent, dispassionate men, Hastings might have conceded the abstract principle, but with such daily proofs of their personal animosity, the cause of truth and justice, as well as his own safety, demanded that he should resist their usurpation. He did not dispute, he did not obstruct their right to inquire. He pointed out to them the legitimate mode of making inquiry; and their refusing to adopt it is sufficient proof that they did not seek to inquire, but were eager to condemn.—W.

rity, the man by whom he was accused. An indictment, at the instance of the Governor-general, of Mr. Barwell, of Mr. Vansittart, of Mr. Hastings' Banyan, and of the Roy Royan or head native agent of finance, was preferred against Nuncomar, together with Messrs. Joseph and Francis Fowke, for a conspiracy to force a man named Commaul-ad-din Khan, to write a petition against the parties to the prosecution. After an examination before the judges, Mr. Francis Fowke was discharged; and Mr. Barwell, the Roy Royan, and the Governor's Banyan, withdrew their names from the prosecution. The Governor and Mr. Vansittart persevered; and Nuncomar and Mr. Joseph Fowke were held to bail at their instance. "The truth is, as we" says the minute of Clavering, Monson, and Francis, on the 16th of May, "have reason to believe, that there never existed such a paper as has been sworn to; and that every particular said to be contained in it, is an imposition invented by Commaul-ad-Din." A few days after this suspicious, but ineffectual proceeding, a new prosecution was instituted against Nuncomar. At the suit of a native, he was taken up on a charge of forgery, and committed to the common gaol. He was tried before the Supreme Court, by a jury of Englishmen, convicted, and hanged. No transaction, perhaps, of this whole administration more deeply tainted the reputation of Hastings, than the tragedy of Nuncomar. At the moment when he stood forth as the accuser of the Governor-general, he was charged with a crime, alleged to have been committed five years before; tried, and executed; a proceeding which could not fail to generate the suspicion of guilt, and of an inability to encounter the weight of his testimony, in the man whose power to have prevented, or to have stopped (if he did not cause) the prosecution, it is not easy to deny. As Hastings, aware of the sinister interpretations to which the destruction of an accuser, in circumstances so extraordinary, would assuredly expose him, chose rather to sustain the weight of those suspicions, than to meet the charges by preventing or suspending the fate of the accuser; it is a fair inference, though mere resentment and spite might hurry some men to as great an indiscretion, that from the accusations he dreaded something worse than those suspicions. Mr.

BOOK V.
CHAP. II.
1776.

BOOK V. Francis, in his examination before the House of Com-
 CHAP. II. mons, on the 16th of April, 1788, declared that the effect
 1776. of this transaction upon the inquiries carried on by the Board into the accusations against the Governor, was, "to defeat them; that it impressed a general terror on the natives with respect to preferring accusations against men in great power; and that he and his coadjutors were unwilling to expose them to what appeared to him and these coadjutors, as well as themselves, a manifest danger."

The severest censures were very generally passed upon this trial and execution; and it was afterwards exhibited as matter of impeachment against both Mr. Hastings, and the Judge, who presided in the tribunal. The crime for which Nuncomar was made to suffer, was not a capital offence, by the laws of Hindustan, either Moslem or Hindu; and it was represented as a procedure full of cruelty and injustice, to render a people amenable to the most grievous severities of a law with which they were unacquainted, and from which, by their habits and associations, their minds were totally estranged. It was affirmed; that this atrocious condemnation and execution were upon an *ex-post-facto* law, as the statute which created the Supreme Court and its powers was not published till 1774, and the date of the supposed forgery was in 1770: that the law which rendered forgery capital did not extend to India, as no English statute included the colonies, unless where it was expressly stated in the law: that Nuncomar, as a native Indian, for a crime committed against another Indian, not an Englishman, or even a European, was amenable to the native, not the English tribunals: that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to warrant condemnation: and that although the situation in which the prisoner was placed with regard to a man of so much power as the Governor-general, should have suggested to the Judge peculiar circumspection and tenderness, there was every appearance of precipitation, and of a predetermination to find him guilty, and to cut him off. In the defence which was set up by Sir Elijah Impey, the Chief Judge, in his answer at the bar of the House of Commons on the 12th of December, 1787, he admitted that a native inhabitant of the provinces at large was not amenable to the

English laws, or to the English tribunals : and it was not as such, he affirmed, that Nuncomar was tried. But he maintained that a native inhabitant of the English town of Calcutta, which was English property, which had long been governed by Englishmen and English laws, was amenable to the English tribunals, and justly, because he made it his voluntary choice to live under their protection ; and that it was in this capacity, namely, that of an inhabitant of Calcutta, that Nuncomar suffered the penalties of the English laws. If the competency of the jurisdiction was admitted, the question of evidence, where evidence was complicated and contradictory, could not admit of any very clear and certain decision ; and the judge opposed the affirmation of its insufficiency by that of the contrary. He denied the doctrine that an English penal statute extended to the colonies, only when that extension was expressed. The allegation of precipitation and unfairness, still further of corruption, in the treatment of the accused, he not only denied with strong expressions of abhorrence, but by a specification of circumstances endeavoured to disprove. It was, however, affirmed, that Nuncomar was not an inhabitant of Calcutta at the time when the offence was said to have been committed ; but a prisoner brought and detained there by constraint. The Chief Justice, on the other hand, maintained that not only was no evidence to this fact exhibited on the trial, but evidence to the contrary, and that not opposed. It does indeed, appear, that an omission, contrary to the intent of the framers, in the Charter of Justice granted the Company in 1753, had afforded a pretext for that extension of jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Calcutta, under which Inpey sheltered himself. In establishing the *civil* court for the administration of the English laws, this charter expressly excepted "such suits as shall be between Indian natives, which shall be determined among themselves, unless both parties consent." In establishing the *penal* court, the reservation of the natives, having once been expressed, was not repeated ; and of this opening the servants of the Company had availed themselves, whenever they chose, to extend over the natives the penalties of English law. That the intention of the charter was contrary, appeared by its sanctioning a separate court, called the Phoujdary, for the

BOOK V. trial of all offences of the native inhabitants ; a court
 CHAP. II. which, under the intention of rendering natives, as well as
 1776. English, amenable to the English criminal laws, would
 have been totally without a purpose.¹ Of the evidence it
 may fairly be observed, that though the forgery was com-
 pletely proved by the oaths of the witnesses to the pro-
 secution, it was as completely disproved by the oaths of
 the witnesses to the defence ; that there was no such dif-
 ference in the character of the parties or their witnesses
 as to throw the balance greatly to either of the sides ; and
 that the preponderance, if any, was too weak, to support
 an act of so much importance and delicacy, as the condem-
 nation of Nuncomar. Even after the judgment, the case
 was not without a remedy ; the execution might have been
 stayed till the pleasure of the King was known, and a
 pardon might have been obtained. This too the Court
 absolutely refused ; and proceeded with unrelenting deter-
 mination to the execution of Nuncomar ; who, on the 5th
 of August, with a tranquillity and firmness that never were
 surpassed, submitted to his fate, not only amid the tears
 and lamentations, but the cries and shrieks of an extraor-
 dinary assemblage of his countrymen.²

¹ Accordingly, this jurisdiction had hitherto been exercised with great timidity ; and the consent of the government was always asked before the sentence was executed. In one case, and but one, there had been a conviction for forgery, but the prisoner was not executed—he received a pardon. See the Seventh Report of the Committee of Secrecy, in 1773, p. 17.

² It is true, that no circumstance in the administration of Hastings, has been so injurious to his reputation as the execution of Nuncomar—whether rightly so is a different question. From the moment that Nuncomar became the object of judicial investigation, it would have ill become the governor to have interfered—it was not for him to interpose his personal or official influence to arrest the course of the law, nor would it have availed. The Supreme Court was new to its position, strongly impressed with a notion of its dignity, and sensitively jealous of its power. The judges would have at once indignantly resisted any attempt to bias their decision. For the fate of Nuncomar, they are alone responsible. It is presently admitted that they decided according to law, and the attempt to impeach the Chief Justice, Sir Elijah Impey, on this ground subsequently failed. It is therefore to be concluded, that the sentence was strictly according to law, and there can be no doubt that the crime was proved. The infliction of the sentence, however, upon a native of India, for an offence of which his countrymen knew not the penalty, and which had been committed before the full introduction of those laws which made it a capital crime, was the assertion of law at the expense of reason and humanity—with this Hastings has nothing to do—the fault, and a grievous one it was, rests with the judges. The question, as it concerns the Governor, regards only the share he had in the prosecution. Did he in any way instigate or encourage it ? The prosecutor was a party concerned, a native, unconnected with the Governor. He may have thought he was doing a not unacceptable act in prosecuting a personal antagonist of Hastings, but that was his feeling. There is no necessity to suppose that he was urged on by Hastings : he had wrongs of his own to avenge, and needed no other instigation. There is no positive

There was, perhaps, enough to save the authors of this transaction, on the rigid interpretation of naked law. But that all regard to decorum, to the character of the English Government, to substantial justice, to the prevention of misrule, and the detection of ministerial crimes, was sacrificed to personal interest and personal passions, the impartial inquirer cannot hesitate to pronounce.¹

BOOK V.
CHAP. II.
1776.

Among the regulations of the financial system, formed and adopted in 1772, under the authority of Mr. Hastings, the seventeenth article was expressed in the following words: "That no Peshcar, Banyan, or other servant, of whatever denomination, of the collector, or relation or dependant of any such servant, be allowed to farm lands, nor directly nor indirectly to hold a concern in any farm, nor to be security for any farmer; and, if it shall appear that the collector shall have countenanced, approved, or connived at a breach of this regulation, he shall stand *ipso*

proof that he acted in concert with Hastings: we are therefore left to circumstantial proof, and the only circumstance upon which the participation of Hastings in the persecution of Nuncomar, is, its following hard upon the latter's charges against him. These were preferred on the 11th March, 1775. On the 6th of May following, Nuncomar was arrested under a warrant of the Court at the suit of Mohun Persaud. Here is certainly a suspicious coincidence—but is there no other way of accounting for it than by imputations fatal to the character of W. Hastings? In truth, it seems capable of such explanation as acquits Hastings of having exercised any influence over it. Proceedings in the same cause did not then commence. They had been instituted before in the Dewanny Adaulat, and Nuncomar had been confined by the judge, but released by order of Hastings. The suit had therefore been suspended, but it had not been discontinued. The Supreme Court sat for the first time at the end of October, 1774. The forged instrument had been deposited in the Mayor's Court, and could not be recovered until all the papers had been transferred to the Supreme Court, and without it no suit could be proceeded with. At the very first opportunity afterwards, or in the commencement of 1775, at the first effective court of Oyer and Terminer and gaol delivery, held by the Supreme Court, the indictment was preferred and tried. It is not necessary to suspect Hastings of having from vindictive motives suggested, or accelerated the prosecution. It had previously been brought into another court, where it was asserted the influence of the Governor-General had screened the criminal, and it was again brought into an independent court at the first possible moment when it could be instituted. The coincidence was unfortunate, but it seems to have been unavoidable; and in the absence of all possible proof, the conjectural evidence is not unexceptionable enough to justify the imputation so recklessly advanced by Burke, and seemingly implied in the observations of the text, that Hastings had murdered Nuncomar by the hands of Sir E. Impey.—W.

¹ For the preceding charges against Mr. Hastings, and the proceedings of the Council, see the Eleventh Report of the Select Committee, in 1781, with its Appendix; Burke's Charges against Hastings, No. 8, and Hastings' Answer to the Eighth Charge, with the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial, p. 953—1001; and the Charges against Sir Elijah Impey, exhibited to the House of Commons by Sir Gilbert Elliot, in 1787, with the Speech of Impey in Reply to the first charge, printed, with an Appendix, by Stockdale, in 1788. For the execution and behaviour of Nuncomar, see a very interesting account, written by the sheriff who superintended, and printed in Dodsley's Annual Register for 1788, Historical part, p. 157.

BOOK V. *facto* dismissed from his collectorship." These regulations
 CHAP. II. had the advantage of being accompanied with a running
 1776. commentary, in a corresponding column of the very page
 which contained the text of the law; the commentary
 proceeding from the same authority as the law, and exhibiting
 the reasons on which it was founded. The commentary
 on the article in question, stated, that, "If the collector,
 or any persons who partake of his authority, are permitted
 to be farmers of the country, no other persons will dare
 to be their competitors. Of course they will obtain the
 farms on their own terms. It is not fit that the servants
 of the Company should be dealers with their masters. The
 collectors are checks on the farmers. If they, themselves,
 turn farmers, what checks can be found for them? What
 security will the Company have for their property? Or,
 where are the ryots to look for protection?"¹ Notwith-
 standing this law, it appeared that Mr. Hastings' own
 Banyan had, in the year 1773, possessed, or was concerned
 in the farm of no less than nineteen pergunnahs, or dis-
 tricts, in different parts of Bengal, the united rent-roll of
 which was 13,33,664 rupees; that in 1774, the rent-roll of
 the territory so farmed was 13,46,152 rupees; in 1775,
 13,67,796 rupees; that in 1776, it was 13,88,346 rupees;
 and in 1777, the last year of the existing or quinquennial
 settlement, it was 14,11,885 rupees. It also appeared that,
 at the end of the second year, he was allowed to relinquish
 three of the farms, on which there was an increasing rent.
 This proceeding was severely condemned by the Directors,
 and Mr. Hastings himself, beyond affirming that he had no
 share in the profits, and that little or none were made,
 alleged but little in its defence.²

¹ Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, in 1773; Bengal Consultations, 14th May, 1772, p. 18.

² Extract of Bengal Revenue Consultations, 17th March, 1775; Parliamentary Papers, printed in 1787; see also the Fifteenth of the Charges exhibited to Parliament against Warren Hastings, Esq., and his Answer to the same.—M.

There was nothing to defend. The regulation applied to the native agent of a collector, being intended to obviate local influence and interests. The Banyan of the Governor-General residing in Calcutta, renting farms or being security for others so doing in different and distant parts of the country, and having so done before he became the servant of Mr. Hastings, did not come under the regulation. It was of importance that he should be a man of rank and wealth, and whence could either be derived more creditably than from landed possessions. That Cauntoo Baboo may have turned his connexion with the Governor to profit, is very possible, but that was inevitable, whoever might have filled the office. In the situation of Hastings, and of all the Company's servants, at that time, native agency was indispensable, and in the absence of efficient

For the affairs of the Nabob, and that part of the business of government, still transacted in his name, a substitute to Munny Begum, and to the plan superseded by her removal, was urgently required. In their letter of the 3rd of March, 1775, the Directors had declared Mohammed Reza Khan to be so honourably cleared of the suspicions and charges with which he had been clouded, and Nuncomar to be so disgraced by his attempts to destroy him, that they directed his son, who was no more than the tool of the father, to be removed from his office ; and Mohammed Reza Khan to be appointed in his stead. It is remarkable, that the Directors were so ignorant of the government of India, which it belonged to them to conduct, that they mistook the name of the office of Gourdess, who was the agent for paying the Nabob's servants, and the substitute for Munny Begum, when any of the affairs were to be transacted to which the fiction of the Nabob's authority was still applied, for that of the officer who was no more than the head of the native clerks in the office of revenue at Calcutta. When they directed Gourdess to be replaced by Mohammed Reza, they distinguished him by the title of Roy Royan, and thence enlarged the ground of cavil and dispute between the contending parties in the Council. Clavering, Francis, and Monson, decided for uniting, in the hands of Mohammed Reza Khan, the functions which had been divided between Munny Begum and Raja Gourdess ; and as Raja Gourdess, notwithstanding the prejudices against his father, was recommended by the Directors to some inferior office, the same party proposed to make him Roy Royan, and to remove Raja Bullub, the son of Doolob Ram, by whom that office had hitherto been held.

As the penal department of justice was ill-administered in the present Foujdary courts (that branch of the late arrangements had totally failed), and as the superintendence

check from a knowledge of the languages and of the country, was very liable to be abused. Many of the charges of corruption and collusion had their origin from this source. The principals suffered not only for their own acts, but those of their dependants. That the European functionaries were all without exception immaculate, is not to be believed, considering how recent was the general prevalence of corruption, but their servants signed no covenants, and were no doubt accessible to bribes, and the masters were supposed to share in the illicit gains. No charge of corruption against Hastings himself, however, is unequivocally made out, and although he seems to have been careless and extravagant, and little scrupulous in raising means for public emergencies, he may be acquitted of all intention of enriching himself by the violation of principles or of covenants. — W.

BOOK V. of criminal justice, intrusted to the Governor-general, as
 CHAP. II. head of the Nizamut Adaulut, or Supreme Penal Court of
 Calcutta, loaded him with a weight of business, and of
 1776. responsibility, from which he sought to be relieved, the
 majority agreed to restore to Mohammed Reza Khan, the
 superintendence of penal justice, and of the native penal
 courts throughout the country; and, for that purpose, to
 remove the seat of the Nizamut Adaulut from Calcutta,
 back to Moorshedabad. The Governor-general agreed that
 the orders of the Directors required the removal of
 Gourdess from the office which he held under Munny
 Begum, and the appointment to that office of Mohammed
 Reza Khan; but he dissented from all the other parts of
 the proposed arrangement; and treated the renewal of the
 title of Naib Subah, and the affectation of still recognising
 the Nabob's government, as idle grimace. "All the arts
 of policy cannot," he said, "conceal the power by which
 these provinces are ruled, nor can all the arts of sophistry
 avail to transfer the responsibility to the Nabob: when it
 is as visible as the light of the sun, that every act origi-
 nates from our own government, that the Nabob is a mere
 pageant without the shadow of authority, and even his
 most consequential agents receive their express nomina-
 tion from the servants of the Company."¹ The opposing
 party, however, thought it would be still politic, to up-
 hold the pretext of "a country government," for managing
 all discussions with foreign factories. And, if ultimately
 it should, they say, "be necessary to maintain the authority
 of the country government by force, the Nabob will call
 upon us for that assistance, which we are bound by treaty
 to afford him, and which may be effectually employed in
 his name." That party possessed the majority of votes,
 and their schemes, of course, were carried into execution.²

¹ How strange a language this from the pen of the man who, but a few months before, had represented the power of the shadow of this shadow, the Naib Subah, as too great to exist with safety to the Company in the hands of any man!

² Fifth Report of the Select Committee 1779; and the Report on the Resolutions in the Appendix, No. 6.



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